Clarification of “Availability” of Administrative Remedies under the PLRA: Dead-End Transfers and Tolling

Introduction

In Edwards v. Destefano (2d Cir. 2025), the Second Circuit addressed whether a sudden transfer of a prisoner from one facility to another, combined with the structure of the facility’s grievance procedure, rendered available administrative remedies effectively unavailable under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Raheem Edwards sued officers of the Nassau County Correctional Center (“NCCC”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force, denial of medical treatment, and property destruction. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that Edwards failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Edwards’ transfer created a “dead end” in the grievance process and excused PLRA exhaustion.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. It held:

The PLRA requires exhaustion of available administrative remedies (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)), but remedies that are “unavailable” need not be pursued.
An administrative scheme is unavailable if it operates as a “dead end” due to sudden transfer, is so opaque that no ordinary prisoner can use it, or is actively thwarted by prison staff (Ross v. Blake; Hayes v. Dahlke).
By analogy to Romano v. Ulrich (2d Cir. 2022), Edwards’ transfer seven days after the incident, without advance notice and into a facility with no mechanism for submitting NCCC grievance forms, made NCCC’s grievance procedure a dead end.
Informal attempts to resolve the complaint—oral reporting to officers and repeated requests for medical care—tolled the Handbook’s five-day filing window.
Because Edwards could not have complied with the procedure post-transfer, his remedies were unavailable, and he was excused from PLRA exhaustion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016): Established that exhaustion under the PLRA is mandatory only if administrative remedies are “available,” and described three circumstances rendering a scheme unavailable.
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001): Clarified that exhaustion is required regardless of the relief offered by the grievance process.
Hayes v. Dahlke, 976 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 2020): Adopted Ross’s three-part test for unavailability: procedural “dead ends,” opacity, and active obstruction.
Romano v. Ulrich, 49 F.4th 148 (2d Cir. 2022): Held that a transfer within the grievance period that prevented filing constituted a “dead end,” excusing exhaustion.
Williams v. Priatno, 829 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2016) and Rucker v. Giffen, 997 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2021): Noted that Ross’s list of unavailability scenarios is non-exhaustive.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in several steps:

Mandatory but Qualified Exhaustion: The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory (Ross; Booth) but only applies to remedies that remain “available.”
Dead-End Transfers: Under Ross and Hayes, a remedy is unavailable if a prisoner cannot navigate or access it. In Romano, a sudden transfer before the grievance period lapsed rendered the scheme a dead end. The Second Circuit applied identical logic to Edwards.
Tolling via Informal Reporting: NCCC’s Handbook tolls the five-day deadline while an inmate attempts informal resolution. Edwards’ oral complaints on April 22 and 24, plus repeated medical and property requests, tolled the window until his April 26 transfer.
Procedural Impossibility Post-Transfer: The Handbook required inmates to deposit official grievance forms in an NCCC housing-area mailbox—a process impossible after transfer. Defendants bore the burden to show Edwards could comply; they failed to do so.
No Advance Notice: Edwards received no prior warning of his transfer. He could not foresee the procedural dead end, distinguishing his situation from ordinary procrastination.

Impact

Edwards v. Destefano clarifies and extends the Second Circuit’s treatment of PLRA exhaustion by:

Cementing the principle that administrative remedies made inaccessible by a prison transfer are unavailable and therefore need not be exhausted.
Emphasizing that informal grievance efforts can toll strict filing deadlines, reinforcing prisoners’ ability to preserve claims.
Encouraging correctional institutions to revise grievance procedures to accommodate inter-facility transfers (as DOCCS did post-Romano).
Providing guidance to lower courts evaluating exhaustion defenses: a plaintiff’s lack of procedural compliance may be excused if the remedy was inaccessible or a “dead end.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

PLRA Exhaustion: A federal statute requires prisoners to use internal grievance systems before suing under § 1983. However, they need not exhaust remedies that are not realistically available.

“Dead End”: A grievance process is a dead end if it cannot provide relief because of procedural hurdles or practical impossibility—e.g., a never-explained transfer that prevents form submission.

Tolling: Pausing the clock on a filing deadline. NCCC’s policy tolls its five-day grievance limit while an inmate seeks an informal resolution.

De Novo Review of Summary Judgment: The appeals court reviews the district court’s legal ruling without deference, examining the record under the usual summary-judgment standard.

Conclusion

Edwards v. Destefano marks a significant development in PLRA jurisprudence by confirming that administrative exhaustion is excused when prison procedures become unavailable through no fault of the inmate. It reinforces the “dead end” exception first articulated in Ross v. Blake and applied in Romano v. Ulrich, while underscoring the tolling effect of informal grievance efforts. Going forward, prisons must ensure that grievance systems remain accessible—even across transfers—and courts must vigilantly guard against imposing impossible procedural requirements on incarcerated litigants.