Civil Limitation Periods Excluded from POST Disciplinary Actions

Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards & Training Council, 2025 UT 7

Introduction

Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards & Training Council (2025 UT 7) addresses whether Utah’s general four-year “catch-all” statute of limitations for civil actions applies to administrative disciplinary proceedings under the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) statute. In 2014, Officer Quintin Grillone resigned amid an internal investigation for providing false information to a prosecutor. POST did not learn of the incident until 2019, when Grillone applied to reactivate his certification. POST then initiated proceedings to suspend his certification. Grillone argued those proceedings were time-barred under the civil limitations statute (Utah Code § 78B-2-307(4)), relying on language in the POST statute (Utah Code § 53-6-211(3)(c)) calling all POST adjudications “civil actions.” The key issue was whether that label imported Utah’s civil-case limitation periods into an administrative, non-criminal context.

Summary of the Judgment

The Utah Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the court of appeals. It held:

• By default, civil statutes of limitation do not govern administrative disciplinary proceedings unless the legislature clearly incorporates them.
• The POST statute’s phrase “all adjudicative proceedings under this section are civil actions”—read alongside the provision’s context—distinguishes POST proceedings from criminal prosecutions rather than invoking civil limitation periods.
• Although the POST statute uses the term “civil action,” it does not explicitly or implicitly import title 78B, chapter 2 of the Utah Code’s limitation periods. Consequently, no statute of limitations bars POST from disciplining Grillone more than four years after the conduct.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Rogers v. Division of Real Estate (Utah Ct. App. 1990): Held that “[i]n the absence of specific legislative authority, civil statutes of limitation are inapplicable to administrative disciplinary proceedings.” Rogers underpins the default rule.
• Phillips v. Department of Commerce (2017 UT App 84) and Morgan v. Department of Commerce (2017 UT App 225): Reaffirmed Rogers in the context of professional licensing boards.
• Statutory Recodification (2008): The legislature moved the civil-action limitation language verbatim from former section 78-12-1 into section 78B-2-102 without change—suggesting satisfaction with Rogers’ construction.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in three parts:

1. Default Rule: Administrative disciplinary proceedings are “statutorily created hearings” distinct from civil court actions. The civil code’s statutes of limitation apply only to “actions” filed in court, not to agency adjudications, unless the legislature says otherwise.
2. Statutory Context and Interpretation
   • Ejusdem Generis: The judicial-code definition of “action” lists counterclaims, cross-complaints, then “all other civil actions in which affirmative relief is sought.” By principle, general terms take their character from the specifics named. Those specifics are dispositive of court pleadings, not agency sanctions.
   • Prior Construction Canon: The legislature preserved the civil-action language and the limitation provisions when recodifying without amendment. We presume it accepted the long-standing judicial interpretation that those limitations do not reach disciplinary proceedings.
   • Statutory Scheme: Civil limitation periods reside in Title 78B (Judicial Code), whereas most administrative procedures—including professional licensing—are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in Title 63G and by specialized limitation rules in licensing statutes (e.g., the DPLA’s 4- and 10-year windows). Absent clear cross-references, the civil limitations do not leap across titles.
3. Meaning of “Civil Actions” in the POST Statute

   Read in context, section 53-6-211(3)(c) uses “civil actions” to distinguish POST adjudications from criminal prosecutions—“notwithstanding whether the issue . . . may be prosecuted criminally.” It addresses the procedural and collateral-consequence differences (e.g., no right to jury trial, different burden of proof), rather than importing civil limitation periods.

3. Impact

Grillone v. POST clarifies a recurring question in Utah administrative law:

• Agencies cannot rely on the mere label “civil action” to resurrect expired civil limitation periods. If the legislature intends to impose a filing deadline on administrative discipline, it must say so explicitly.
• Professional boards and their licensees gain certainty: disciplinary time-bar arguments must look to specific statutory limitation windows (like those in the DPLA), not to the general catch-all in the Judicial Code.
• Legislators drafting or amending adjudicative statutes will now know to include explicit language if they want civil limitation periods to apply to agency actions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Administrative Disciplinary Proceeding

A special hearing before an agency or board that reviews a professional’s conduct and may impose sanctions (license suspension or revocation). It is governed by the APA, not by court rules.

Civil Statute of Limitations

A deadline in the Judicial Code (Title 78B, Chapter 2) after which a court will dismiss a civil lawsuit if not filed in time. Utah’s “catch-all” period is four years for claims “not otherwise provided for by law” (section 78B-2-307(4)).

Ejusdem Generis

A rule saying that when a statute lists specific items followed by a general term, the general term covers only things similar to the specific items.

Prior Construction Canon

If the legislature re-enacts statutory language without change, it is presumed to accept the courts’ prior interpretations of that language.

“Civil Action” vs. “Criminal Action”

Civil Action: A lawsuit in court to enforce or protect private rights (e.g., breach of contract, personal injury).
Criminal Action: A prosecution brought by the state to punish conduct deemed harmful to society (e.g., theft, assault).

Conclusion

Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards & Training Council reaffirms that Utah’s civil-case limitation periods do not automatically apply to agency disciplinary hearings. By clarifying that the POST statute’s reference to “civil actions” serves only to distinguish administrative proceedings from criminal prosecutions, the Court preserves the integrity of administrative regimes and underscores the necessity of explicit statutory language when imposing filing deadlines on non-judicial proceedings.