Chen v. Noem: Administrative Delay Claims and Mootness—Voluntary Cessation and Capable of Repetition Exceptions Clarified

Introduction

Chen v. Noem is a summary order issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on May 22, 2025. The plaintiff‐appellant, Baoming Chen, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, sued the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) under the Mandamus Act (28 U.S.C. § 1361) and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(1)). Chen sought a writ of mandamus compelling USCIS to adjudicate and approve his I-601A provisional unlawful presence waiver application within 30 days, alleging unreasonable delay. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim, and Chen appealed. Shortly after his appeal was filed, USCIS approved his waiver, prompting the Second Circuit to evaluate whether the appeal remained justiciable under Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement.

Summary of the Judgment

The appeal was dismissed as moot because USCIS granted the very relief Chen requested before the appellate court resolved the appeal.
The district court’s June 6, 2024 judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court held that Chen failed to satisfy either the “voluntary cessation” or the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exceptions to mootness.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. (568 U.S. 85 (2013)): Defines when an Article III case or controversy becomes moot—“issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest.”
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona (520 U.S. 43 (1997)): Reinforces that an actual controversy must exist throughout all stages of litigation.
American Freedom Defense Initiative v. MTA (815 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2016)): Holds mootness occurs when no effective relief can be granted.
Srour v. New York City (117 F.4th 72 (2d Cir. 2024)): Establishes the two-part test for voluntary cessation exceptions—no reasonable expectation of recurrence and complete eradication of the effects.
New Yorkers for Religious Liberty v. City of New York (125 F.4th 319 (2d Cir. 2024)): Illustrates that the mere theoretical power to reinstate challenged conduct does not preclude mootness.
Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ. (397 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005)): Describes the requirement to show more than a speculative possibility that challenged conduct will recur.
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp. (494 U.S. 472 (1990)): Explains that a claim for attorney’s fees alone cannot supply a live case or controversy.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey (28 F.4th 383 (2d Cir. 2022)): Sets out the elements for the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception.
N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Dole Food Co., Inc. (969 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1992)): Describes the proper appellate disposition when a civil case becomes moot—vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss.

Legal Reasoning

1. Article III Justiciability: The panel began with the principle that Article III requires a live controversy at every stage of litigation (Already, LLC; Arizonans). Once USCIS approved Chen’s I-601A waiver, there was no practical relief left to grant.

2. Voluntary Cessation Exception: Chen argued the approval was a tactical “voluntary cessation” to evade review. Under Srour, the government must show (a) no reasonable expectation of recurrence and (b) that the challenged conduct’s effects have been completely eradicated. The court found no evidence USCIS would revoke the approved waiver, and Chen suffered no lingering harm from the delay.

3. Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review: To invoke this exception (Exxon Mobil), Chen had to show a reasonable expectation he would face the same delay and that the delay was inherently too short to litigate before it ended. The possibility of renewing an application and facing delay again was purely speculative.

4. Attorney’s Fees Claim: The court reaffirmed that a standalone claim for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act does not sustain a live case or controversy (Lewis; Lamar Advertising).

Impact

This decision clarifies the Second Circuit’s approach to administrative delay claims:

Plaintiffs cannot maintain an appeal once the underlying administrative relief is granted unless they can demonstrate more than speculative future harm.
The ruling discourages litigants from relying lightly on the “voluntary cessation” or “capable of repetition” exceptions without concrete evidence of intent to revert or of a pattern of short-lived wrongs.
It reinforces deadlines and processing‐time statistics disclosed by agencies as judicially noticeable facts when evaluating delay claims.
Future litigants seeking mandamus relief against USCIS must act promptly and may face mootness if the agency grants relief on the eve of appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Case or Controversy (Article III): A live dispute must exist at every stage of litigation. If the defendant grants full relief, the case is moot.
Voluntary Cessation Exception: Even if a defendant stops the challenged practice, a case can proceed if there’s a realistic chance they’ll resume wrongful conduct or lasting injury remains.
Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review: Applies when the same issue is likely to happen again but resolves so quickly it always ends before courts can decide it.
Mandamus Act & Administrative Procedure Act: Statutory bases for challenging unreasonable delay—mandamus compels a duty, APA § 706(1) authorizes review of agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.

Conclusion

Chen v. Noem underscores the rigorous application of mootness doctrine in administrative delay litigation. Once an agency grants the relief a plaintiff seeks, courts will dismiss the appeal unless the plaintiff can point to concrete, non‐speculative future harm or a demonstrable tactic of evasion. By vacating the district court’s decision and remanding with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the Second Circuit affirms that the judiciary’s power is limited to live controversies and that exceptions to mootness will not be lightly extended.