Charge-Specific Probable Cause Not Clearly Established Pre‑Chiaverini: Third Circuit Affirms Dismissal, Applying Any‑Crime Rule to False Arrest and Qualified Immunity to Malicious Prosecution and False Imprisonment

Introduction

This commentary examines the Third Circuit’s non-precedential decision in Johnathan Voorhis v. Patrick Ginkel, No. 24-2859 (3d Cir. Sept. 5, 2025), affirming the dismissal of a pro se § 1983 action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution arising out of a 2021 road-rage incident in Erie County, Pennsylvania. Detective Patrick Ginkel initiated criminal proceedings by filing a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause. Although multiple misdemeanor charges were later withdrawn or reduced, Voorhis was ultimately convicted at a bench trial of two summary disorderly conduct offenses; his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

Voorhis sued Detective Ginkel, alleging the affidavit contained material misstatements and omissions and asserting that the criminal case had terminated in his favor when various charges were withdrawn or when he was acquitted of one summary count. The District Court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, relying primarily on its recent decision in Rivera-Guadalupe v. City of Harrisburg, 124 F.4th 295 (3d Cir. 2024), and the Supreme Court’s clarification in Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024).

Key issues addressed include: (1) application of the “any‑crime rule” to defeat false arrest claims where probable cause existed for any charge, even if other charges lacked probable cause; (2) qualified immunity for malicious prosecution claims arising before Chiaverini clarified the requirement of charge-specific probable cause; (3) qualified immunity for false imprisonment claims because the Third Circuit has not yet squarely held that the any‑crime rule applies to false imprisonment; and (4) the limits of what documents may be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of all claims:

False Arrest: Dismissal was proper under the “any‑crime rule.” Because there was probable cause to arrest for at least two summary disorderly conduct offenses (for which Voorhis was later convicted), the false arrest claim failed, regardless of probable cause for other charges.
Malicious Prosecution: Detective Ginkel was entitled to qualified immunity. At the time of the 2021 arrest and 2023 trial, it was not clearly established in the Third Circuit that officers must have probable cause for each individual charge (charge-specific probable cause). That rule only became clear after the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Chiaverini and the Third Circuit’s 2024 decision in Rivera‑Guadalupe.
False Imprisonment: Dismissal was affirmed on qualified immunity grounds. The Third Circuit has not squarely held that the any‑crime rule applies to false imprisonment claims, so any such right was not clearly established. The panel also observed the claim likely lacked merit on the facts as alleged.
Procedural Note: The District Court improperly considered videos outside the pleadings when granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but the error was forfeited on appeal and, in any event, the Third Circuit affirmed on alternative grounds supported by the record.
Costs: Costs were awarded to the prevailing party (Ginkel), with the caveat that costs could not be recovered for materials in the supplemental appendix that were duplicative of the appellant’s appendix or outside the district court record.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Rivera‑Guadalupe v. City of Harrisburg, 124 F.4th 295 (3d Cir. 2024):
Central to the court’s reasoning. Rivera-Guadalupe held that the “any‑crime rule” defeats a false arrest claim if probable cause existed for any offense, even if probable cause was lacking for others. Importantly, it also recognized the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chiaverini that malicious prosecution is charge-specific—probable cause for one count does not automatically bar a malicious prosecution claim for a different count. However, Rivera‑Guadalupe concluded that before Chiaverini (and before the Third Circuit adopted charge-specificity), it was not clearly established that officers must have probable cause for each charge. Thus, for pre‑2024 conduct, qualified immunity shields officers against charge-specific malicious prosecution claims.
Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024):
The Supreme Court clarified that for Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims, probable cause must be assessed charge by charge. Probable cause for one charge does not immunize the filing of a different charge that lacks probable cause. The Third Circuit applied this clarification to the lawgoing forward but held that it did not clearly establish the right for conduct that predated the decision (the period relevant to Voorhis).
Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2005):
The foundational Third Circuit articulation of the “any‑crime rule” for false arrest: an officer’s probable cause for any offense renders a false arrest claim untenable. This rule undergirds the panel’s disposition of Voorhis’s false arrest claim.
Dempsey v. Bucknell University, 834 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 2016):
Reiterates the “fair probability” standard for probable cause. The panel used the consistency between the arrest affidavit and the victim’s ultimately credited testimony on direct appeal to reinforce that there was a fair probability Voorhis committed at least two summary disorderly conduct offenses at the time of arrest.
Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239 (3d Cir. 2021):
Clarifies elements for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution in the § 1983 context. The panel cited Lozano to anchor the elements of each claim.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007):
Distinguishes false arrest/false imprisonment (typically absence of legal process) from malicious prosecution (wrongful institution of legal process). The panel used this framework to assume, arguendo, that Voorhis’s detention began without process but nonetheless found his claims deficient.
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2010):
Limits a Rule 12(b)(6) court to the complaint, attached exhibits, public records, or undisputedly authentic documents integral to the complaint. The panel acknowledged the District Court’s error in relying on videos outside that record, but held the error forfeited and affirmed on alternative grounds.
Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 757 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2014):
Authorizes affirming on any basis supported by the record. The panel applied this rule to affirm despite the District Court’s evidentiary error.
Commonwealth v. Voorhis, 2023 WL 8928880 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2023):
The state appellate court’s affirmance of the two summary disorderly conduct convictions. The Third Circuit referenced the Superior Court’s deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and element-by-element sufficiency to demonstrate the alignment between the arrest affidavit and later-credited testimony, reinforcing the presence of probable cause at the time of arrest.
Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 946 A.2d 93 (Pa. 2008):
Cited to explain the mens rea distinction relevant to grading disorderly conduct (misdemeanor vs. summary), and to support that the facts alleged could reasonably support either grading at the time of arrest.
Hinkle v. Beckham County Board of County Commissioners, 962 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2020):
Noted in passing to illustrate that, in some circumstances, post-arrest developments can dissipate probable cause for continued detention—an issue not pleaded here.

Legal Reasoning

The panel proceeded claim by claim, tethering each to the applicable standards and the temporal posture of the governing law.

False Arrest:
The any‑crime rule squarely disposes of Voorhis’s false arrest claim. Under Wright, probable cause to arrest for any offense defeats the claim. The pleadings and the state appellate record establish that the victim’s account—recited in Ginkel’s affidavit—supported at least two summary counts of disorderly conduct, later resulting in convictions. That suffices to show, at the time of arrest, a “fair probability” (Dempsey) that Voorhis committed an arrestable offense. The panel also explained that the any‑crime rule does not require correct grading of the offense at the time of arrest; alternatively, even if grading mattered, the facts alleged supported a fair probability of misdemeanor disorderly conduct as well, given the intent dimension described in Fedorek.
Malicious Prosecution:
A malicious prosecution claim challenges the wrongful institution of legal process (Wallace) and requires, among other things, lack of probable cause for the charge(s) and a favorable termination. Voorhis targeted the charges that were withdrawn or on which he was acquitted. However, because his arrest and prosecution occurred before 2024, the dispositive question is whether it was clearly established then that officers must have probable cause for each charge (not just some charge). Rivera‑Guadalupe squarely answers no: the charge-specific rule only became clear after Chiaverini. Under qualified immunity doctrine, an officer is shielded unless every reasonable official would have understood the challenged conduct to violate clearly established law at the time. Because Ginkel had probable cause for at least the disorderly conduct charges, and because the charge-specific requirement was not clearly established before Chiaverini, qualified immunity bars Voorhis’s malicious prosecution claim.
False Imprisonment:
Although akin to false arrest, false imprisonment imposes liability for detention without legal process absent probable cause. The panel observed that Third Circuit precedent has not squarely held that the any‑crime rule applies to false imprisonment. Given that uncertainty, any such right was not clearly established; qualified immunity thus applies. The court also noted that Voorhis did not plead post-arrest investigative developments that extinguished probable cause for continued detention—an alternative route sometimes recognized in other circuits (e.g., Hinkle).
Procedural Guardrails at the Pleading Stage:
The District Court relied on videos not properly considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under Mayer. The panel acknowledged the error but deemed the issue forfeited because neither party raised it, and affirmed on alternative grounds. This is a practical reminder that Rule 12(b)(6) adjudication is confined to the complaint, its attachments, public records, and undisputedly authentic documents integral to the claims.

Impact and Implications

Transitional Qualified Immunity After Chiaverini:
For conduct preceding the Supreme Court’s 2024 clarification in Chiaverini, officers in the Third Circuit remain protected by qualified immunity from charge-specific malicious prosecution claims. Plaintiffs challenging pre‑2024 charging decisions must surmount this hurdle; even if some counts lacked probable cause, the absence of clearly established law at the time likely forecloses liability.
False Arrest Remains Constrained by the Any‑Crime Rule:
The court’s application of the any‑crime rule reaffirms a demanding barrier for plaintiffs. If facts known at arrest established probable cause for any offense (regardless of ultimate grading or the fate of other charges), false arrest claims generally fail.
False Imprisonment—An Unsettled Interface with the Any‑Crime Rule:
The panel highlights a gap: the Third Circuit has not “squarely held” that any‑crime forecloses false imprisonment. Until it does, officers may be entitled to qualified immunity on such claims, absent clearly established law to the contrary. Plaintiffs seeking to pursue false imprisonment should specifically allege post-arrest developments that dissipated probable cause for continued detention (a theory some circuits recognize).
Victim Statements and Probable Cause:
The opinion underscores that an officer may reasonably rely on a victim’s account; where that account is later credited at trial and on appeal, it retrospectively corroborates the officer’s probable cause assessment—even though probable cause is judged at the time of arrest. Here, the consistency between the affidavit’s description and the testimony credited by the trial and appellate courts strongly supported the any‑crime analysis.
Pleading-Stage Discipline:
District courts must adhere to Mayer’s constraints on what materials can be considered at Rule 12(b)(6). Litigants should promptly object to any reliance on extra-record materials to avoid forfeiture. Appellate courts may nonetheless affirm on alternative grounds.
Costs and Appellate Recordkeeping:
The court’s costs ruling cautions appellees against loading supplemental appendices with duplicative or extra-record materials. Costs may be disallowed for those items.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Any‑Crime Rule: If officers had probable cause to arrest for any single offense, a false arrest claim fails even if other charges lacked probable cause.
Probable Cause (“Fair Probability”): A practical, common-sense standard; officers need not be certain—only that there is a fair probability the suspect committed an offense.
False Arrest vs. False Imprisonment vs. Malicious Prosecution: False arrest and false imprisonment address arrest/detention without legal process; malicious prosecution addresses the wrongful initiation of legal process (e.g., filing charges) and requires favorable termination.
Qualified Immunity: Shields officials unless they violate a right that was clearly established at the time. New decisions (like Chiaverini) do not retroactively strip immunity for earlier conduct.
Charge-Specific Probable Cause (Chiaverini): Probable cause for one charge does not automatically bar a malicious prosecution claim for different charges that lacked probable cause. This rule is clear now, but was not clearly established before 2024 in the Third Circuit.
Rule 12(b)(6) Record Limits (Mayer): At the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts generally consider only the complaint, its exhibits, public records, and undisputedly authentic documents integral to the complaint.
Forfeiture: If a party does not raise an issue on appeal, the appellate court may treat it as forfeited and decline to address it.

Notes and Clarifications

Statutory Citations: The opinion references 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503(b) (grading of disorderly conduct). Where the opinion’s earlier footnote lists elements under “§ 2706,” that appears to be a typographical slip; disorderly conduct is codified at § 5503.
Favorable Termination: Voorhis asserted favorable termination based on charge withdrawals and an acquittal on one summary count. The panel resolved the malicious prosecution claim on qualified immunity grounds and did not substantively analyze favorable termination.

Conclusion

Although non-precedential, Voorhis v. Ginkel is a consequential application of recent doctrine in the Third Circuit. It reconfirms that the any‑crime rule remains a potent defense to false arrest, and it clarifies the transitional posture after Chiaverini: for pre‑2024 conduct, charge-specific malicious prosecution claims are generally barred by qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established at the time. The court also flags an unresolved question—whether the any‑crime rule categorically applies to false imprisonment—leading it to confer qualified immunity on that claim as well. Practitioners should heed the panel’s procedural reminders regarding the Rule 12(b)(6) record and appellate costs.

Going forward, plaintiffs alleging malicious prosecution for post‑Chiaverini conduct must plead the absence of probable cause for each contested charge and must anticipate that any‑crime will still defeat false arrest. Those pursuing false imprisonment should focus on post-arrest developments that allegedly dissipated probable cause for continued detention. For law enforcement defendants, reasonable reliance on a victim’s account—especially where later credited—will often suffice to establish probable cause at the pleading stage. In the broader legal context, this decision underscores how evolving Supreme Court doctrine interacts with qualified immunity, shaping both the viability of claims and the strategic framing of § 1983 litigation in the Third Circuit.