United States v. Campus: Clarifying When the Physical-Restraint Adjustment Can Accompany an Offense-Specific Enhancement

Introduction

United States v. Campus, No. 24-5068 (10th Cir. Aug. 4, 2025), presented the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit with a recurring sentencing puzzle: When, if ever, may a district court layer the two-level “physical restraint of victim” adjustment in U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3 on top of another guideline provision that already punishes conduct seemingly involving restraint?

Dakota Wayne Campus—convicted by a jury of strangling, assaulting, and brandishing a firearm at his pregnant fiancée (M.D.) in Indian Country—received a 240-month aggregate sentence. On appeal he challenged only the procedural reasonableness of that sentence, arguing the district court double-counted restraint: once through the three-level strangulation enhancement in § 2A2.2(b)(4) and again through the § 3A1.3 adjustment.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Drawing heavily on United States v. Holbert and distinguishing United States v. Joe, the court held that § 3A1.3 may be applied when separate, relevant conduct—here, forcing the victim back into the apartment at gunpoint—constitutes restraint beyond that inherent in strangulation itself.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Issue: Whether applying the § 3A1.3 two-level increase after already applying the § 2A2.2(b)(4) strangulation enhancement constitutes impermissible double counting.

2. Holding: It does not. The adjustment is proper where distinct acts—such as pointing a gun at the victim and dragging her back into an apartment—physically restrain the victim and are part of the defendant’s “relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3.

3. Disposition: Sentence affirmed; no procedural error.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Joe, 696 F.3d 1066 (10th Cir. 2012) – Held restraint could not be double-counted where it was an element of the offense (aggravated sexual abuse). Distinguished because in Campus restraint described in § 3A1.3 arose from conduct separate from strangulation.
• United States v. Holbert, 285 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2002) – Recognized that courts must look at the defendant’s “relevant conduct,” not just the offense of conviction, to determine applicability of § 3A1.3. Formed the backbone of the majority’s reasoning.
• United States v. Walker, 74 F.4th 1163 (10th Cir. 2023) – Reaffirmed that restraint need not be prolonged or sophisticated; it exists when a victim is kept “within bounds or under control.” Helped the court reject Campus’s argument that the restraint was too brief.
• United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1999) – Early Tenth Circuit precedents clarifying that “tied, bound, or locked up” in § 1B1.1 n.1(L) are illustrative, not exhaustive.
• Out-of-Circuit Authorities – e.g., Old Chief (9th Cir.), Arcoren (8th Cir.), used to show national consensus that restraint adjustments may piggy-back on other assault-related enhancements when extra conduct is present.

Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Framework: § 3A1.3 authorizes a two-level increase “[i]f a victim was physically restrained in the course of the offense.” Application Note 2 forbids the adjustment only when (a) the offense guideline itself “specifically incorporates” restraint or (b) unlawful restraint is an element of the offense.
2. Relevant Conduct Lens: Drawing from § 1B1.3(a)(1), the majority treated the pursuit, gun-point, and dragging of M.D. as conduct “during the commission of the offense” and therefore part of the sentencing calculus.
3. Double-Counting Doctrine: Impermissible double counting occurs when “identical factors” are used to trigger separate increases serving the same purpose. The majority found the § 2A2.2(b)(4) strangulation enhancement punishes the method and severity of the assault, whereas § 3A1.3 addresses the additional harm of being forcibly detained. Different harms, no overlap.
4. Distinguishing Joe: In Joe, every aggravated sexual abuse necessarily contained restraint, so Note 2 barred § 3A1.3. Here, strangulation does not inevitably involve dragging a victim at gunpoint; that discrete act justified the extra two levels.
5. Policy Underpinning: The court implicitly endorsed proportional sentencing—extra punishment where a victim is exposed to heightened terror, immobilization, or risk beyond that inherent in the baseline offense.

Impact of the Judgment

• Guideline Clarity: Reinforces a “totality-of-relevant-conduct” approach—trial courts may parse the narrative of events and isolate restraint episodes that are distinct from the core offense elements.
• Sentencing Practice: Prosecutors now have explicit Tenth Circuit authority to seek both strangulation and restraint enhancements where factual bases differ; defense counsel must be prepared to contest the separateness of the conduct.
• Domestic Violence in Indian Country: The decision underscores the judiciary’s willingness to impose cumulative enhancements for multifaceted domestic-violence behavior in tribal jurisdictions, potentially raising sentencing exposure.
• National Persuasive Value: While consonant with several circuits, Campus supplies a detailed analytical roadmap others may cite when reconciling § 3A1.3 with overlapping offense-specific characteristics.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Physical Restraint (§ 3A1.3): Any forcible limitation on a victim’s freedom of movement—not limited to rope or handcuffs; pointing a gun, locking a door, or pinning someone can qualify.
• Relevant Conduct (§ 1B1.3): The sentencing court looks beyond the bare elements of the offense to all acts the defendant committed during, in preparation for, or in avoidance of detection of the crime.
• Double Counting: The Sentencing Guidelines try to prevent punishing the exact same wrong twice. But they allow multiple enhancements if each addresses a different facet of the defendant’s behavior.
• Specific Incorporation: An offense guideline “specifically incorporates” a factor when that factor must be found to apply the guideline. If so, a separate adjustment for the same factor is barred.
• Indian Country Jurisdiction: Under 18 U.S.C. § 1152, federal courts have jurisdiction over certain crimes committed in Indian Country when either the defendant or victim (but not both) is Indian; here, the victim’s Cherokee status and location in Tulsa qualified.

Conclusion

United States v. Campus cements an important sentencing principle: whenever the defendant’s conduct includes additional, discrete acts of restraint beyond what is inherent in the core offense, the § 3A1.3 adjustment remains available—even if another guideline enhancement touching on restraint is already in play. The decision harmonizes Tenth Circuit precedent, offers clear guidance to district courts, and underscores that the Guidelines’ architecture is capacious enough to recognize the layered harms victims endure during violent crimes.

Practitioners should now scrutinize the narrative of events rather than the statutory labels alone; seemingly “duplicative” adjustments may stand if they spring from distinct factual soil.