Caraballo: Tenth Circuit Requires Particularized, First Amendment–Sensitive Findings for Adult‑Pornography Bans on Supervised Release; Affirms Purpose-Based Computer Solicitation Enhancement

Introduction

In United States v. Caraballo (10th Cir. Apr. 4, 2025), the Tenth Circuit addressed two discrete sentencing issues arising from a sex-offense case in Indian country: (1) a Guidelines enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) for using a computer to solicit a minor for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material, and (2) a special condition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from possessing sexually explicit material involving adults. The panel affirmed application of the “computer-solicitation” enhancement, concluding the district court adequately addressed the required purpose element. But it vacated the adult pornography restriction, holding the district court failed to make individualized, record-tethered findings and to balance the defendant’s significant First Amendment interests as required by statute and circuit precedent.

The appeal arises from convictions for sexual abuse of a minor in Indian country and production of child pornography, in which the defendant, Carlos Caraballo, engaged in sexual conduct with an underage girl and photographed her as she performed oral sex. The district court imposed a 324-month prison term and lifetime supervised release, adding the § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement and a special condition barring adult sexually explicit material. On appeal, Caraballo argued (a) the court never addressed the “for the purpose of producing” element of the Guideline enhancement and (b) the adult-pornography ban was unsupported and overbroad.

Summary of the Opinion

• Guidelines Enhancement: The Tenth Circuit affirmed the application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B). The district court’s findings—coupled with Caraballo’s plea admissions—showed he used a cell phone to persuade the victim to send sexually explicit images, thus satisfying the enhancement’s purpose requirement.
• Adult-Pornography Ban: The court vacated the special condition prohibiting possession of sexually explicit material involving adults, holding the district court:
  • did not base the condition on record evidence tying adult pornography to Caraballo’s offenses, risk, or rehabilitative needs;
  • relied on generalized assumptions (e.g., difficulty distinguishing adults from minors in images) without individualized support; and
  • failed to balance the asserted goals against the defendant’s significant First Amendment interest in accessing adult material.
  The condition was remanded for further, particularized findings. In light of that remand, the court declined to reach overbreadth and validity challenges.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

For the § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement

• United States v. Eddington, 65 F.4th 1231 (10th Cir. 2023): The court applied de novo review to Caraballo’s legal challenge that the district court failed to address the “purpose” element. Eddington underscores that the legal interpretation of Guidelines requirements is reviewed de novo.
• United States v. Reaves, 253 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Gallegos, 2023 WL 8802687 (10th Cir. 2023) (unpublished): The district court cited these for the broader idea that luring victims, including by sending sexually explicit content, can evidence exploitation for production purposes. The Tenth Circuit noted that, regardless of how those cases were interpreted below, the dispositive point was that the district court here did not disregard the “purpose” element; it made explicit findings and relied on the plea admission mirroring the Guideline’s language.

For the supervised release condition restricting adult sexually explicit material

• 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d): The statutory framework requires special conditions to be reasonably related to deterrence, protection of the public, and the defendant’s correctional needs, impose no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary, and be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements.
• United States v. Englehart, 22 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2022): Establishes that when a condition implicates significant First Amendment interests (as adult-sexual-material bans do), sentencing courts must expressly balance the value of the condition against those constitutional concerns. Failure to conduct and articulate this balancing warrants reversal.
• United States v. Koch, 978 F.3d 719 (10th Cir. 2020): Warns against blanket approvals of adult-pornography restrictions simply because the underlying offense involves minors. Koch suggested that in some cases the nature of the crime may render it impracticable to distinguish adult from minor sexual material, but emphasized the need for case-specific analysis rather than assumptions.
• United States v. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2015): Requires at least some explanation and record support when imposing a ban on adult sexually explicit material, especially where the record does not show that such material contributed to the offense or risk.
• United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) (persuasive): Cited for the necessity of demonstrating that the condition is needed and no broader than necessary.
• Cross-circuit alignment: United States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2007). These cases, like Martinez-Torres, reject adult-pornography bans absent evidence that adult pornography factored into the offense or reoffense risk.
• United States v. Hahn, 551 F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 2008): Appellate review of the substantive reasonableness of special conditions presupposes that the sentencing court has articulated record-based justifications; without particularized findings, the appellate court cannot properly assess overbreadth or necessity.

Legal Reasoning

1) The “purpose” element for § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) was satisfied. The enhancement applies where a defendant uses a computer to solicit a minor’s participation in sexual conduct for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material. Reviewing de novo, the Tenth Circuit identified concrete district-court findings that Caraballo: (a) sent the victim sexually explicit material to lure and normalize exploitation with the aim of obtaining explicit material in return, and (b) solicited explicit images and videos by cell phone to desensitize and normalize the behavior. The court also underscored that Caraballo’s guilty plea admitted he persuaded and enticed the minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct “for the purpose of producing a visual depiction,” language that tracks the Guideline. Together, these show purposeful solicitation for production, satisfying the enhancement.

2) The adult-pornography ban lacked individualized, record-based justification and required First Amendment balancing. The district court posited two rationales: rehabilitation/avoidance of temptation and difficulty distinguishing adults from minors in sexual images. The panel found both rationales unsupported by the record and untethered to Caraballo’s specific conduct:

• No record evidence that Caraballo had ever viewed adult pornography;
• No evidence that adult sexual material fueled the offense or would aggravate reoffense risk; and
• No record basis to conclude he would have difficulty distinguishing adult from minor sexual images in a way that necessitated a broad prohibition.

The district court’s reliance on Koch’s observation about potential difficulties distinguishing adult from minor content was insufficient; Koch did not authorize blanket restrictions. Moreover, even if some nexus had been shown, Englehart requires explicit balancing against the defendant’s significant First Amendment interest in accessing lawful adult material—a balancing the district court did not conduct. These procedural and substantive deficiencies compelled vacatur and remand for particularized findings.

Impact

Although issued as a nonprecedential Order and Judgment, Caraballo offers persuasive and practical guidance in the Tenth Circuit on two points:

• Supervised Release Conditions and Speech: District courts must:
  • Identify a defendant-specific nexus showing that an adult-pornography restriction advances deterrence, public protection, or rehabilitation (e.g., evidence of adult porn consumption linked to the offense or risk; treatment-provider assessments tying exposure to relapse or recidivism).
  • Explain why the condition is no broader than necessary (consider narrower alternatives, definitional precision, temporal limits, and mechanisms for probation-approved exceptions).
  • Explicitly balance the value of the restriction against significant First Amendment interests and explain why, in this case, the balance favors the restriction.
  Absent that record, broad adult-content bans face vacatur.
• Guidelines § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B): The panel confirms that “purpose” can be satisfied by a combination of the defendant’s admissions and district-court findings that communications were designed to solicit, normalize, or desensitize a minor to generate sexually explicit images. Courts may infer purpose from the defendant’s acts and communications surrounding the solicitation, including the use of a smartphone.

The decision thus encourages more careful crafting and justification of supervised release conditions that impinge on lawful speech, and signals that enhancements keyed to purpose can rest on common-sense inferences from communications and plea admissions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Purpose” in § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B): The enhancement applies when the defendant uses a computer (including a cell phone) to solicit a minor’s sexual conduct with the goal of producing sexually explicit images or videos. Purpose can be inferred from context—e.g., messaging that normalizes sexual exchanges to obtain images.
• “Computer” under the Guideline: The term encompasses internet-capable devices, such as smartphones, used to send, receive, or solicit sexual content.
• Special Conditions of Supervised Release: These are tailored restrictions during supervision after imprisonment. They must be:
  • Reasonably related to deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation;
  • No greater deprivation of liberty than necessary; and
  • Consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policies.
  When a condition limits protected speech (e.g., adult pornography that is not obscene), courts must provide individualized justifications and balance the restriction against First Amendment interests.
• Particularized Findings: Case-specific, evidence-based reasons explaining why a condition is needed for this defendant, in this case, and how it is narrowly tailored.
• First Amendment Balancing in Sentencing: Restrictions on lawful adult sexual material implicate significant speech interests. Courts must weigh the rehabilitative or protective value of a condition against the speech burden and explain the balance on the record.

Practical Guidance for District Courts and Counsel

• Building the Record: If an adult-pornography restriction is contemplated, develop evidence showing a concrete connection to risk or treatment needs (e.g., psychosexual evaluations, treatment-provider recommendations, documented use patterns, offense conduct linking adult material to offending).
• Narrow Tailoring Options: Consider:
  • Limiting the restriction to materials reasonably likely to involve minors or to content that is indistinguishable from minors;
  • Employing clear, statutory definitions (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2256) to reduce vagueness;
  • Allowing probation-officer-approved exceptions for therapy, education, or clearly adult content; and
  • Temporal limits or phased conditions tied to treatment milestones.
• On Remand in Cases Like Caraballo: The court should (a) identify specific facts about the defendant’s conduct and risks, (b) explain how the condition advances § 3583(d) goals, (c) show why narrower alternatives are insufficient, and (d) articulate its First Amendment balancing.

Conclusion

Caraballo provides two important lessons. First, on the Guidelines side, the Tenth Circuit confirms that the “purpose” element of § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) is satisfied when the district court’s findings—reinforced by plea admissions—show the defendant used electronic communications to normalize and solicit a minor’s production of sexually explicit material. Second, and more far-reaching in day-to-day sentencing practice, the court reiterates that adult-pornography bans on supervised release are not automatic in sex-offense cases. They require individualized, evidence-based justifications, narrow tailoring, and explicit First Amendment balancing. Absent that rigor, such conditions cannot stand.

Though nonprecedential, the decision aligns with and deepens existing Tenth Circuit and cross-circuit authority, signaling that speech-implicating supervised release conditions demand careful reasoning and a solid evidentiary foundation.