Canon 3(C) Clarified: No Misconduct Where a Judge Promptly Invokes Article 154’s Ad Hoc Recusal Procedure; Thirty‑Day Suspension for Injudicious Demeanor

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Louisiana’s decision in In re Judge Donald “Chick” Foret (No. 2025‑O‑00320, Oct. 15, 2025) announces two consequential points for Louisiana judicial discipline and recusal practice. First, the Court imposed a 30‑day suspension without pay on a district judge for repeated lapses in judicial temperament and decorum, holding that his conduct constituted “willful misconduct relating to his official duty” under Article V, Section 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution and violated multiple Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Second—and most notably as a clarifying principle—the Court held that a judge does not violate Canon 3(C) by declining to self‑recuse when, after a party files a motion to recuse under La. C.C.P. art. 154, the judge promptly requests the appointment of an ad hoc judge and refrains from further action in the case.

The case reached the Court on recommendation from the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana following investigations triggered by two complaints and a media report. The matters involved: (1) a second‑degree murder trial (State v. Monterroso); (2) a homeowner’s insurance case (Senner v. Federated National Insurance Co.); and (3) high‑profile nursing home class action litigation (Anderson v. Dean). The Commission recommended public censure. The Supreme Court, exercising its de novo authority, found clear and convincing evidence of extensive misconduct concerning demeanor and imposed a suspension, while rejecting the Commission’s conclusion that Judge Foret’s refusal to self‑recuse violated Canon 3(C) given his compliance with the statutory recusal procedure.

Summary of the Opinion

Discipline: The Court suspended Judge Foret for thirty days without pay and assessed $7,488.67 in costs.
Violations: The Court found violations of Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3A(2), 3A(3), and 3A(4), and willful misconduct under La. Const. art. V, § 25(C), based on repeated displays of anger, profanity, impatience, and derogatory comments in official settings, including off the record.
Recusal Clarification: No violation of Canon 3(C) occurred where, after a party filed a motion to recuse under La. C.C.P. art. 154, the judge promptly requested the appointment of an ad hoc judge and took no further action; Article 154 offers two lawful options—self‑recusal or referral to an ad hoc judge—and choosing the latter does not, by itself, constitute misconduct.
Sealed Record: The Court granted a motion to seal a transcript volume to respect an existing district court sealing order, noting the necessary facts were otherwise established in public sources, while acknowledging the public’s constitutional right of access (Copeland v. Copeland).

Factual Background

State v. Monterroso

During a March 2022 second‑degree murder trial, the court lost its temper when the prosecutor requested a table to publish exhibits, chastising counsel and using profanity in the presence of court staff, causing his minute clerk to leave in tears. The next day, although jurors were told to return at 9:00 a.m. and the victim’s family was expected then (their first opportunity to hear proceedings due to sequestration), the court began closing arguments early when jurors arrived around 8:30 a.m. The family missed approximately seven minutes of the State’s closing.

Senner v. Federated National Insurance Company

In fall 2021 civil proceedings, the judge told counsel he was “generally predisposed” against motions for summary judgment and motions in limine (“you’re probably going to lose”), creating an appearance of bias. In a separate exchange about settlement, he advised plaintiffs’ counsel to tell defense counsel to “go f--- himself” if the offer was not raised.

Anderson v. Dean

At a May 2022 status conference in nursing home class action litigation, after the court reporter departed, the judge sua sponte questioned plaintiffs’ counsel, Suzette Bagneris, about a purported partnership with an attorney not involved in the case, referred to that attorney as “a piece of s---,” and said he might have to recuse if they were partners. Defense counsel Stephen Miles disclosed he also had a professional relationship with that same attorney. The judge then revealed a related car accident occurred in his front yard and showed video of the scene from his phone, while continuing crude disparagement. Defense later moved to recuse; an ad hoc judge denied the motion, but the Fifth Circuit granted recusal under the “substantial and objective basis” standard in newly enacted La. C.C.P. art. 151(B) (effective Aug. 1, 2021).

Procedural History

A hearing officer received testimony and found clear and convincing evidence of misconduct, noting the judge “largely admitted” the conduct. The Commission conducted a de novo review, concluded the Canons and La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) were violated, and recommended public censure. On de novo review, the Supreme Court found the record supported the demeanor violations by clear and convincing evidence and imposed a thirty‑day suspension, while holding no violation of Canon 3(C) occurred with respect to the judge’s choice to refer the recusal motion for ad hoc adjudication.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

In re Benge (La. 2009): Establishes that the Supreme Court is not bound by the Commission’s findings and may make its own factual findings on a clear and convincing standard.
In re Free (La. 2016): Confirms that violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, without more, may warrant discipline under La. Const. art. V, § 25(C).
In re Denton (La. 2022): Defines “willful” misconduct as voluntary and intentional, not requiring bad faith, and encompassing inexcusable carelessness; key to finding constitutional “willful misconduct” for demeanor failures.
Copeland v. Copeland (La. 2006): Affirms the strong public interest in open courts; used to contextualize the Court’s decision to respect an existing sealing order where the sealed transcript added nothing substantive beyond public sources.
In re Gremillion (La. 2016): Reiterates the primary purpose of judicial discipline is public protection, not punishment of judges.
In re Chaisson (La. 1989), referenced by In re King (La. 2003): Provides the non‑exclusive factors for sanctions, which the Court applied extensively here.
In re Bowers (La. 1998): Demonstrates that a judge’s good reputation or work ethic does not negate multiple instances of inappropriate behavior.
In re Elloie (La. 2006): Clarifies that “the public” includes lawyers, staff, and litigants—misconduct toward them undermines public confidence.
In re Rose (La. 2025) and In re Fiffie (La. 2024): Emphasize that judicial inexperience does not insulate new judges from discipline.
In re Ellender (La. 2009) and In re Cresap (La. 2006): Sanction benchmarks where 30‑day suspensions issued for improper temperament and discourtesy—used to calibrate the penalty here.
Anderson v. Dean, 22‑233 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2022): Applies La. C.C.P. art. 151(B)’s “substantial and objective basis” standard to require recusal where the judge’s own comments raised doubts about impartiality.
Supreme Court Rule XXIII, §§ 14, 22, 29: Procedural framework for judicial discipline, costs, and hearing officer process.
La. Const. art. V, § 25(C): Constitutional basis for judicial discipline for willful misconduct related to official duties.
La. C.C.P. arts. 151, 154, 155: Substantive grounds for recusal (151), procedural mechanism for recusal motions (154), and appointment of ad hoc judge (155).
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3A(2), 3A(3), 3A(4), 3(C): Standards on integrity, avoidance of impropriety, decorum, patience, impartiality, and disqualification.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standard of Review and Burden

The Court reiterated it is not bound by the Commission and makes independent factual findings on a clear and convincing evidence standard (Benge). The Court found the demeanor‑related facts largely undisputed after the judge abandoned factual challenges at oral argument.

2) Demeanor Violations and “Willful Misconduct”

The Court cataloged multiple episodes showing loss of temper, profanity, impatience, crudity, and disrespect toward staff and attorneys—both in court and during official proceedings even if off the record. It emphasized that:

Profanity and outbursts at staff over an exhibit table in a murder trial breached decorum and courtesy and led to cascading consequences (staff distress, tense communications with a colleague).
Beginning closings early while knowing the victim’s family was en route disregarded their reasonable expectation to be present after sequestration, violating patience and dignity requirements.
Announcing a predisposition against summary judgment and evidentiary limitations created an appearance of bias, undermining impartiality and fairness.
Crude disparagement of a non‑party attorney during a large status conference, and displaying personal accident video, flouted decorum and magnified reputational harm through the judge’s institutional authority.

Invoking Denton, the Court held that “willful misconduct” does not require malice or bad faith; deliberate or inexcusable carelessness in exercising judicial authority suffices. The pattern and extent of conduct here met that constitutional threshold.

3) The Recusal Clarification: Article 151(B) Grounds vs. Article 154 Procedure

The Commission concluded the judge’s failure to self‑recuse violated Canon 3(C) because La. C.C.P. art. 151(B) was satisfied. The Supreme Court disagreed on the Canon 3(C) discipline point, carefully parsing the statutory scheme:

La. C.C.P. art. 151(B) sets the substantive “grounds” for recusal: a judge “shall be recused” when there is a substantial and objective basis reasonably expected to prevent fair and impartial conduct of any aspect of the cause.
La. C.C.P. art. 154 prescribes the “procedure”: upon a party’s motion stating an Article 151 ground, the judge must either (a) self‑recuse or (b) request the Supreme Court to appoint an ad hoc judge. Article 155 requires the Court to appoint the ad hoc judge.

Here, once a motion to recuse was filed in Anderson, the judge promptly chose the second, equally lawful option—referring the motion to an ad hoc judge—and took no further action in the case. While the Fifth Circuit ultimately ordered recusal under Article 151(B), the Supreme Court held that, on these facts, the choice to pursue the Article 154 pathway did not violate Canon 3(C). Put differently, a judge does not commit misconduct by utilizing the procedural option the Code of Civil Procedure expressly provides, so long as the judge promptly refers the motion and refrains from further action pending the ad hoc adjudication.

Important limits: The Court did not suggest that recusal was unwarranted under Article 151(B); it acknowledged the Fifth Circuit’s application of the new “substantial and objective basis” standard. Nor did it opine on situations with no motion or with delay or continued merits action by the challenged judge. The holding squarely addresses the Commission’s attempt to discipline a judge solely for choosing the Article 154 referral route once a motion was filed.

4) Sealing and Public Access

The Court granted the Commission’s motion to seal one transcript volume to honor an existing district court order sealing the recusal hearing, noting that the material facts were already established via public sources (including the Anderson opinion). While reaffirming the public’s strong right of access to court records (Copeland), the Court found sealing the redundant transcript appropriate in this disciplinary context.

5) Sanctions: Application of Chaisson Factors

Applying the Chaisson factors, the Court highlighted:

Pattern and frequency (a)-(b): Multiple, distinct incidents over several months, each involving more than one lapse, displaying a pattern rather than isolated slips.
Official setting (c)-(d): Misconduct occurred in the exercise of judicial office, often in the courtroom or in formal proceedings, even if not on the record.
Acknowledgment and reform (e)-(f): Partial acknowledgment and some remedial steps (mentoring and counseling), but lingering concerns about temper and perspective (e.g., comments about colleagues and the complainant, emotional appearance before the Commission).
Experience (g): Although relatively new to the bench, the judge’s decades of lawyering should have revealed expected judicial demeanor; inexperience is not a shield (Rose; Fiffie).
Impact on the judiciary (i): Media attention and attorney affidavits reflected diminished public confidence and professional shock at the lack of decorum (Elloie).
No exploitation for personal desires (j): Misconduct stemmed from frustration and anger, not self‑dealing.

Against sanction benchmarks (Ellender; Cresap), the Court deemed a thirty‑day suspension without pay appropriate and necessary to protect public confidence.

Impact

For Louisiana Judges

Temperament is non‑negotiable: Profanity, impatience, and crude disparagement—even off the record in official settings—breach Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3A(2)-(4) and can rise to constitutional “willful misconduct.”
Victims and the public: Managing calendars cannot eclipse reasonable accommodations, especially for victims’ families; beginning proceedings early after announcing a later time, when warned family members are en route, risks sanction.
Predisposition statements: Announcing skepticism toward motions (e.g., summary judgment, motions in limine) creates an appearance of bias in violation of Canon 3A(4), even if rulings later prove even‑handed.
Recusal process clarity: When a party files a motion to recuse that invokes Article 151 grounds, a judge may either self‑recuse or timely request an ad hoc appointment under Article 154. Choosing the ad hoc route, if done promptly and without acting further, is not misconduct under Canon 3(C).

For Litigants and Counsel

Recusal standard: Under Article 151(B)’s “substantial and objective basis” test, a judge’s own public doubts or animus—even toward non‑party attorneys—can require recusal (Anderson v. Dean).
Record vs. setting: Misconduct does not require an on‑the‑record exchange; off‑record conduct in official proceedings is disciplinable and can affect appellate outcomes.
Professional expectations: Attorneys and staff are integral components of “the public” for judicial‑demeanor purposes; disrespect to them can trigger discipline.

For the Judiciary Commission and Lower Courts

Focus on substance, not procedural choice: Where a motion to recuse is filed and the judge timely seeks an ad hoc appointment, discipline should target underlying conduct, not the choice between two statutorily authorized procedural options.
Sanction signaling: The Supreme Court increased the penalty beyond public censure to a suspension, emphasizing seriousness and deterrence.
Sealed materials: Respect existing sealing orders where public sources already establish pertinent facts, consistent with open‑courts principles.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Willful misconduct (constitutional): Conduct done deliberately or with inexcusable carelessness in office; it does not require bad faith or intent to cause harm (In re Denton). Injudicious temperament can meet this standard.
Canon 3A(2)-(4): Requires judges to maintain order and decorum, and to be patient, dignified, courteous, and impartial in words and actions. Statements suggesting predispositions toward classes of motions can violate these duties.
Canon 3(C): A judge should disqualify if impartiality might reasonably be questioned and shall disqualify if required by law. But when a party moves to recuse under Article 154, the judge may either self‑recuse or request an ad hoc judge; choosing the latter is not misconduct if done promptly and without further action on the case.
Article 151(B) (recusal grounds): If there is a substantial and objective basis that would reasonably be expected to prevent a judge from conducting any aspect of a case fairly and impartially, recusal is required.
Article 154 (recusal procedure): On a motion stating Article 151 grounds, the judge has two options: (1) self‑recuse; or (2) request an ad hoc appointment from the Supreme Court; the ad hoc then decides the motion.
Public confidence: “The public” includes attorneys and court personnel; mistreating them undermines the judiciary’s integrity (In re Elloie).

Practical Guidance and Benchmarks

Adopt a “cooling‑off” protocol: Adjourn briefly when tempers rise; never express anger through profanity or demeaning language.
Calendar clarity: Announce precise start times; if jurors arrive early, confirm with counsel whether critical observers (e.g., victims’ families) are present before beginning.
Avoid predisposition statements: Evaluate each motion (summary judgment, in limine) on its merits; refrain from global proclamations about how such motions will fare.
Keep personal disputes out of proceedings: Do not air allegations or personal grievances about non‑party attorneys; avoid sharing personal media unrelated to judicial fact‑finding.
Recusal best practices:
- When a party moves under Article 154 and states a 151 ground, promptly request an ad hoc judge or self‑recuse; do not act on the merits in the interim.
- If no motion is filed but 151(B) plainly applies, self‑recusal remains the safer course to avoid undermining confidence.
Mentorship and training: Structured mentoring and regular feedback can remediate demeanor issues; continued engagement evidences reform.

Conclusion

In re Judge Foret reinforces a core message: judicial power demands patience, dignity, and restraint. The repeated use of profanity, visible anger, and crude disparagement in official contexts violates the Canons and constitutes willful misconduct, warranting meaningful suspension. At the same time, the Court clarifies an important procedural point in the recusal arena: when a party invokes Article 154 and articulates Article 151 grounds, a judge may lawfully opt to refer the motion to an ad hoc judge and, if done promptly and without further case action, does not thereby violate Canon 3(C). The ruling thus pairs stern enforcement of demeanor norms with a practical, text‑anchored clarification of recusal procedure. Together, these holdings aim to protect public confidence in the courts by demanding judicial composure while preserving clear, fair pathways for addressing perceived partiality.