Calder’s “Express Aiming” Requires More Than Foreseeable In‑State Harm: General Out‑of‑State Tax Rules and Routine Enforcement Letters Do Not Create New Hampshire Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Officials

Introduction

In Stephen D. Anderson & a. v. Geoffrey E. Snyder (N.H. July 22, 2025), the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a putative class action brought by New Hampshire residents against the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (the Commissioner), sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs—New Hampshire residents who worked for Massachusetts employers and, due to the COVID‑19 emergency, performed their work from New Hampshire—challenged a Massachusetts emergency tax regulation (later formalized on March 5, 2021) that treated compensation earned by nonresident employees teleworking outside Massachusetts during the emergency as Massachusetts‑source income subject to Massachusetts income tax and withholding.

The core issue on appeal was not the constitutionality of the tax rule, but whether New Hampshire courts could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Massachusetts Commissioner. The plaintiffs argued that jurisdiction existed under the “effects test” from Calder v. Jones because the tax rule was “aimed” at New Hampshire and caused predictable and disproportionate harm there. The Commissioner moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; the superior court agreed and the Supreme Court affirmed.

This decision clarifies New Hampshire’s personal jurisdiction doctrine in cases involving out‑of‑state officials and regulatory actions with cross‑border effects. It holds that:

A regulation of general applicability promulgated by an out‑of‑state official is not “expressly aimed” at New Hampshire merely because its effects are felt, or even felt most acutely, in New Hampshire.
Foreseeable in‑state harm and even disproportionate effects are insufficient to satisfy the “purposeful direction” component of specific jurisdiction.
Routine enforcement correspondence into New Hampshire, where the plaintiffs’ claims fundamentally challenge an out‑of‑state regulatory scheme, does not establish purposeful availment.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying New Hampshire’s specific jurisdiction framework—which aligns the state long‑arm statute (RSA 510:4, I) with federal due process—the Court conducted the familiar three‑part analysis: (1) relatedness; (2) purposeful availment (or, for intentional torts, “purposeful direction” under Calder); and (3) fairness and reasonableness. The trial court had found neither relatedness nor purposeful availment satisfied. On appeal, the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that the Calder effects test applies to § 1983 claims and that “purposeful availment” could be established by “purposeful direction,” as articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Burri Law PA v. Skurla. Even under that assumption, the Court held the plaintiffs failed to show the Commissioner “expressly aimed” his conduct at New Hampshire.

The Court reasoned that the Massachusetts tax rule applied to all out‑of‑state employees of Massachusetts employers during the emergency, not specifically to New Hampshire residents. The fact that New Hampshire bore disproportionately heavy effects (because many commuters are New Hampshire residents and because New Hampshire does not provide offsetting credits) speaks to foreseeability, not express aiming. The Court further held that two Department letters to a New Hampshire plaintiff—audit notice and tax due notice—did not transform the general regulatory scheme into conduct “aimed” at New Hampshire. Citing Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski and distinguishing Defense Distributed v. Grewal, the Court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ claims were directed at the regulatory “scheme,” not the letters themselves.

Because purposeful availment (purposeful direction) was not satisfied, the Court affirmed without reaching relatedness or fairness.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

RSA 510:4, I; Staffing Network v. Pietropaolo, 145 N.H. 456 (2000); N.H. Bank Commissioner v. Sweeney, 167 N.H. 27 (2014).
The Court reiterated that New Hampshire’s long‑arm statute extends to the limits of federal due process. Thus, the due process analysis is dispositive.
Specific jurisdiction framework — Sweeney and Seward v. Richards, 174 N.H. 401 (2021).
New Hampshire evaluates specific jurisdiction by asking whether (1) the defendant’s forum contacts relate to the cause of action; (2) the defendant purposefully availed themselves of the protection of New Hampshire’s laws (or, for intentional torts, purposefully directed conduct at New Hampshire); and (3) requiring the defendant to litigate in New Hampshire is fair and reasonable. All three must be satisfied.
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Although the Court did not formally decide its applicability to § 1983 claims, it assumed arguendo that the Calder “effects test” could satisfy the purposeful‑availment prong for intentional tort‑like claims, borrowing the Ninth Circuit’s articulation (Burri Law PA v. Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207 (9th Cir. 2022); Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865 (5th Cir. 2001); McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753 (5th Cir. 2009).
These authorities underscore that mere foreseeability of in‑forum harm is not a “sufficient benchmark” for personal jurisdiction; there must be conduct purposefully directed at the forum. The Court leaned on this line to reject the plaintiffs’ “disproportionate harm in New Hampshire” theory as insufficient.
Seward v. Richards, 174 N.H. 401 (2021) (voluntariness requirement).
Purposeful availment requires both foreseeability and voluntariness; contacts cannot be based on unilateral actions of another party. Here, any disproportionate impact caused by other states’ tax credits was attributable to those other states, not to voluntary acts of the Commissioner.
Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2008).
A key analog: an Arizona regulator’s cease‑and‑desist order and correspondence sent into Texas did not constitute express aiming at Texas where the regulator’s intent was to enforce Arizona law. The Court found Stroman highly persuasive in concluding that the Commissioner’s enforcement letters did not establish purposeful direction at New Hampshire.
Defense Distributed v. Grewal, 971 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2020).
Distinguished: there, the cease‑and‑desist letter itself was a central basis of the plaintiffs’ claims. In Anderson, the claims targeted the “unconstitutional tax scheme” (the rule), not the letters—keeping the case within Stroman’s ambit.
Skillsoft Corp. v. Harcourt General, 146 N.H. 305 (2001).
New Hampshire precedent that letters into the forum, designed to inform that conduct violates another state’s laws, do not amount to purposeful availment in New Hampshire.

Legal Reasoning

The Court proceeded through New Hampshire’s three‑part specific jurisdiction test but resolved the appeal at the second prong (purposeful availment/purposeful direction). Two strands of reasoning are pivotal.

1) General regulatory rule is not “expressly aimed” at New Hampshire

The tax rule at issue applied broadly to nonresidents who worked for Massachusetts employers and performed services from locations outside Massachusetts during the declared emergency. By its text, the rule neither singled out New Hampshire nor narrowed its scope to any particular state. The plaintiffs’ argument that New Hampshire bore a disproportionate share of the harm (given the large number of New Hampshire commuters and the absence of a New Hampshire income tax) goes to foreseeability, not express aiming. The Court relied on Burger King, Panda Brandywine, and McFadin to conclude that foreseeability alone cannot support specific jurisdiction; there must be intentional conduct directed at the forum.

Further, to the extent plaintiffs’ disproportionality rested on other states’ granting tax credits, the Court found that such enhanced effects were not the product of the Commissioner’s voluntary conduct and therefore could not satisfy the voluntariness component of purposeful availment (citing Seward).

2) Enforcement letters do not transform a general scheme into forum‑directed conduct

One plaintiff received two Department letters (an audit notice and a tax bill) sent into New Hampshire. The Court held these letters did not create minimum contacts sufficient for specific jurisdiction. The governing principle, drawn from Stroman and Skillsoft, is that a foreign official’s attempt to uphold and enforce their own state’s laws—even when communicated to a forum resident—does not equate to “express aiming” at the forum state.

The Court distinguished the Grewal decision, where the cease‑and‑desist letter was itself a foundation of the claims. In contrast, the Anderson plaintiffs “attacked” the regulatory tax scheme—i.e., the promulgation of the emergency rule—rather than any independent tortious character of the letters. Because the claims were “more a product of [the foreign state’s] regulatory scheme than [of] the cease‑and‑desist letter itself” (echoing Grewal’s description of Stroman), the letters could not supply purposeful direction.

Standard of review and procedural posture

The trial court decided the motion without an evidentiary hearing, triggering the prima facie standard: the court (and the Supreme Court on de novo review) accepts the plaintiffs’ properly documented proffers as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs’ jurisdictional claim. Despite that favorable lens, the plaintiffs’ proffers still failed to establish purposeful direction toward New Hampshire.

Impact and Forward‑Looking Implications

Personal jurisdiction constraints in cross‑border regulation suits. Litigants seeking to sue out‑of‑state officials in New Hampshire courts for regulatory actions with extraterritorial effects face a high bar. Even significant and foreseeable in‑forum consequences will not suffice absent conduct expressly aimed at New Hampshire.
General rules vs. targeted conduct. Promulgation and enforcement of general regulatory schemes by a foreign official typically will not establish New Hampshire jurisdiction, even if the forum is disproportionately affected. Jurisdiction is more likely where a foreign official’s conduct is specifically targeted at New Hampshire—for example, if the claims are based on targeted cease‑and‑desist letters, subpoenas, or other enforcement measures that themselves constitute the alleged wrong.
Forum selection for § 1983 challenges. Plaintiffs challenging out‑of‑state regulatory action under § 1983 may need to file in the regulator’s home state or another forum where minimum contacts clearly exist. Anderson reduces incentives for forum shopping into New Hampshire when the gravamen is a foreign state’s general policy.
Telework and cross‑border tax disputes. Although Anderson does not address the merits of pandemic‑era telework taxation, it signals that New Hampshire courts will not entertain such suits against out‑of‑state tax officials absent express forum‑directed conduct. This threshold jurisdictional barrier will shape strategic choices in future telework taxation litigation.
Comity and federalism considerations. The reasoning aligns with comity principles: an official enforcing their own state’s laws is not, by that fact alone, haled into other states’ courts. This reduces interstate friction and preserves orderly administration of state regulatory schemes.
Unresolved question: attributing official acts in individual‑capacity suits. The Court expressly declined to decide whether the Commissioner’s official conduct could, as a matter of attribution, be used to ground jurisdiction over him in his individual capacity. That issue remains open in New Hampshire and could matter in future cases where plaintiffs press an “individual‑capacity contacts” theory.
Calder’s scope remains assumed, not decided. The Court assumed, without deciding, that Calder’s effects test applies to § 1983 claims and that purposeful direction can satisfy the purposeful‑availment prong. A future case could require a definitive ruling on Calder’s applicability and contours in New Hampshire for federal civil rights claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Personal jurisdiction is a court’s power to make binding decisions about a defendant. It turns on the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.
Specific vs. general jurisdiction:
- General jurisdiction exists where a defendant is “at home” (e.g., domicile), allowing suit on any claim. Plaintiffs did not argue this.
- Specific jurisdiction allows suit only for claims that arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum contacts.
New Hampshire’s long‑arm statute (RSA 510:4, I) reaches as far as federal due process allows. If due process is satisfied, so is the statute.
Minimum contacts and due process require:
- Relatedness: the contact must relate to the claim.
- Purposeful availment/direction: the defendant must have purposefully engaged with the forum, not through random or unilateral acts of others.
- Fairness and reasonableness: litigation in the forum must be fair.
Calder “effects test” (assumed applicable): for intentional torts, purposeful direction can be shown where the defendant (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum, (3) causing harm the defendant knew would likely be suffered in the forum. Key: “express aiming” is more than foreseeability; it requires targeting the forum.
Voluntariness means the defendant’s forum contacts must stem from their own actions, not from the unilateral actions of others (e.g., other states’ tax credit policies).
Enforcement letters sent into the forum can sometimes establish purposeful direction—but generally only where the letters themselves are the alleged wrong (e.g., a cease‑and‑desist letter that is the basis of the claim). Letters that merely communicate or implement a foreign state’s regulatory scheme typically do not suffice.
Individual vs. official capacity suits: Plaintiffs sued the Commissioner individually. Whether and how official acts can be attributed to a defendant “as an individual” for personal jurisdiction purposes remains unsettled in New Hampshire after this decision.

Conclusion

Anderson v. Snyder sets out a clear jurisdictional boundary: New Hampshire courts will not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over an out‑of‑state official whose general regulatory acts merely have foreseeable or even disproportionate effects in New Hampshire. Under the assumed Calder framework, “express aiming” demands more than in‑forum consequences—it requires conduct targeted at New Hampshire. Routine enforcement correspondence into the forum, where the underlying claim challenges a foreign regulatory scheme, does not create purposeful availment.

The decision aligns New Hampshire with persuasive federal authority (Stroman) and with its own precedent (Skillsoft) on letters into the forum, while carefully reserving two questions for another day: whether Calder formally applies to § 1983 claims in New Hampshire and when official acts can be attributed to an individual defendant for jurisdictional purposes. Practically, plaintiffs seeking to litigate the merits of out‑of‑state regulatory measures—like pandemic‑era telework tax rules—will often need to bring those challenges where the regulators are “at home” or where forum‑directed conduct can be shown. As a matter of comity and due process, Anderson underscores that sovereign regulatory decisions of one state do not, without targeted conduct, expose its officials to suit across state lines.

Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire • Date: July 22, 2025 • Case No. 2024‑0428 • Disposition: Affirmed (dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction)