Cable-Splicing as “Alteration”: Breslin v. Access Auto’s Clarification of Labor Law §§240(1) & 241(6) Liability on Utility-Pole Work

Introduction

Breslin v. Access Auto Sales & Service, LLC (2025 NY Slip Op 03615) is the Third Department’s most comprehensive treatment in a decade of how New York’s “Scaffold Law” (Labor Law §240[1]) and its companion construction safety statute (§241[6]) apply to cable-installation work performed from ladders on public utility poles. The dispute arose after Matthew M. Breslin, a subcontractor’s cable technician, fell from a 28-foot extension ladder while splicing a feeder cable to provide new telephone, television and Internet service to the premises of Access Auto Sales & Service, LLC in Albany County. Breslin and his wife sued:

• Access Auto (the commercial customer and premises owner),
• Spectrum (Charter Communications, Inc. & Spectrum Management Holding Co., LLC), Breslin’s upstream contractor, and
• National Grid (Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., National Grid USA Service Co. Inc. & National Grid USA), the utility-pole owner.

Plaintiffs asserted statutory claims under Labor Law §§240(1), 241(6), 200, and common-law negligence. All defendants moved for summary judgment; plaintiffs cross-moved for partial summary judgment on liability. Supreme Court denied every motion, finding issues of fact across the board. On cross-appeals, the Appellate Division:

• Affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the §§240(1) and 241(6) causes of action,
• Reversed as to Labor Law §200 and common-law negligence, awarding dismissal to all defendants,
• Granted Access Auto dismissal of all contribution/indemnification cross-claims, and
• Otherwise affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Labor Law §240(1) – Alteration Confirmed: The court deemed Breslin’s cable-splicing and routing work a “sufficiently significant change” to constitute an “alteration” of a structure, satisfying §240(1)’s threshold applicability. Nevertheless, disputed facts about how the ladder and safety belt were used precluded summary judgment for any party.
2. Labor Law §241(6) – Construction Work Triggered: Because the work qualified as “construction” under 12 NYCRR 23-1.4(b)(13), §241(6) applied, but factual questions remained as to whether the specific Industrial Code provisions on harnesses (23-1.16[b]) and ladder securing (23-1.21[b][4][iv]) were violated and were the proximate cause of the fall.
3. Labor Law §200 & Common-Law Negligence – Dismissed: Neither Access Auto, Spectrum, nor National Grid supervised Breslin’s work or had notice of any dangerous condition; therefore, they owed no duty under §200 and could not be held negligent.
4. Indemnification/Contribution Cross-Claims – Dismissed as to Access Auto: With no evidence of Access Auto’s fault, it was entitled to dismissal of all cross-claims.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Randall v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 81 AD3d 1149 (3d Dept 2011) – treated cable-installation work as an “alteration.” Breslin relies heavily on Randall to defeat defendants’ argument that §240(1) is inapplicable to routine cable work.
• Joblon v. Solow, 91 NY2d 457 (1998) – seminal Court of Appeals decision defining “alteration” broadly as a physical change requiring labor and time, not mere maintenance.
• Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co., 81 NY2d 494 (1993) – analytic framework for §240(1) and §241(6) and distinction between those statutes and §200 common-law claims.
• Canino v. Electronic Tech. Co., 28 AD3d 932 (3d Dept 2006) & Beardslee v. Cornell Univ., 72 AD3d 1371 (3d Dept 2010) – cases explaining when the adequacy of safety devices presents a triable issue.
• Ortega v. Puccia, 57 AD3d 54 (2d Dept 2008) – dichotomy within §200 (premises condition vs. method of work).

By adopting Randall and Joblon, the Third Department reinforced a liberal interpretation of “alteration” that captures even short-duration cable-splicing tasks when they result in a meaningful modification to a structure (the building and the utility-pole system together).

2. Legal Reasoning

a) Applicability of §240(1)
The court first determined whether Breslin’s activity fit within §240(1). Citing Joblon and Randall, it held that running a new cable through exterior and interior points of a building, after splicing at height, “constitutes alteration” because it changes the physical wiring infrastructure. This threshold matter is crucial; absent alteration, §240(1) would not apply.

b) Adequacy of Safety Devices
Section 240(1) imposes absolute liability if a statutory defendant fails to provide a safety device that is “so constructed, placed and operated” as to give proper protection. Although Breslin had an extension ladder and safety belt, the competing accounts (the trainee’s affidavit, owner’s testimony, Breslin’s partial recollection, and the wife’s hearsay) created classic factual disputes: Did the ladder slide? Was it tied off? Was the belt detached mid-descent? Because §240(1) liability cannot be imposed merely because a fall occurred, summary judgment for either side was inappropriate.

c) Section 241(6) and Specific Industrial Code Violations
Plaintiffs invoked 12 NYCRR 23-1.16(b) (fall-arrest systems) and 23-1.21(b)(4)(iv) (ladder securing at >10 ft.). Defendants contested both the factual predicate and causation. Under settled law, the court must find a specific, concrete code provision, a violation, and proximate cause. Genuine disputes on whether Breslin detached his harness and whether the ladder was braced foreclosed summary judgment.

d) Labor Law §200 & Negligence
The Third Department applied the two-track analysis from Ortega. Because Breslin’s injury arose from the means and methods of his own employer’s work (rather than a defective premises condition), liability required supervisory control. Undisputed testimony established: (i) National Grid merely owned the poles; (ii) Spectrum retained no on-site supervisory personnel; and (iii) Access Auto exercised no direction over Breslin. Absent supervisory authority or notice of a hazard, claims under §200 and common-law negligence failed as a matter of law.

e) Indemnification & Contribution
New York permits common-law indemnification only where a passive, vicariously liable party seeks reimbursement from an actively negligent tortfeasor. Once Access Auto was found free from negligence, the cross-claims collapsed.

3. Impact of the Decision

• Cable & Telecom Sector: Breslin cements that routine customer-premises installations involving ladder work on utility poles constitute “alteration”/“construction,” pulling them under §§240 and 241. Telecom defendants can no longer rely on Cooper v. Time Warner (4th Dept 2005) distinctions to obtain early dismissal in the Third Department.
• Liability Allocation: The opinion simultaneously narrows exposure under §200 and negligence for property owners and pole owners who lack supervision, balancing the broadened §240 reach.
• Litigation Strategy: Expect more fact-intensive discovery on harness use, ladder tie-offs, and site supervision. Summary judgment will be difficult without unambiguous accident mechanics.
• Insurance & Risk Management: Utilities and telecom companies will revisit subcontractor contracts to mandate detailed fall-protection protocols and perhaps contractual indemnification clauses explicitly triggered by §240(1) incidents.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Labor Law §240(1) (Scaffold Law): Imposes near-absolute liability on owners, contractors, and their agents for gravity-related injuries when proper safety devices are not provided. Applicability hinges on the worker’s activity (erection, demolition, alteration, etc.) and a height differential.
• Labor Law §241(6): Requires owners/contractors to furnish “reasonable and adequate protection” for construction workers and allows suit when a specific Industrial Code rule is violated.
• Alteration vs. Maintenance: An alteration is a lasting physical change to a building or structure, even if modest. Simple upkeep or repair of existing components is maintenance and usually outside §240(1).
• Summary Judgment: A procedural device that allows the court to dispose of claims/defenses without a trial when no material facts are in dispute.
• Common-Law Indemnification/Contribution: Means of redistributing or shifting damages among defendants, based on degrees of fault.

Conclusion

Breslin v. Access Auto Sales & Serv., LLC crystallizes two essential propositions: (1) ladder-based splicing and routing of telecommunication cables is “alteration” and “construction” under Labor Law §§240(1) and 241(6), exposing owners, contractors and utility-pole owners to strict and statutory liability; and (2) those same entities escape §200 and negligence liability when they neither supervise the means and methods of the work nor create/know of a premises hazard. Going forward, courts confronting falls from ladders during cable installations will almost inevitably apply §240(1) but will scrutinize supervisory control before allowing §200-based claims. The decision thus recalibrates the risk landscape for New York’s ever-expanding telecom infrastructure projects, encouraging clearer contractual risk allocation and rigorous on-site fall-protection practices.