Bruner v. Cassidy: Continuing Prone Back-Pressure After a Suspect Is Subdued Defeats Qualified Immunity (Even Where Bodycam Footage Is Ambiguous)

1. Introduction

Case: Bruner v. Cassidy, No. 23-6216 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 2026).
Parties: LaQuita Bruner, as Administrator of the Estate of Dawawn Q. McCoy (Plaintiff–Appellee) vs. Oklahoma City police officers Kelly Cassidy, Brandon Lee, and Robin Ridner (Defendants–Appellants).
Posture: Interlocutory appeal from denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment on a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The case arises from a late-night trespass call at the Biltmore Hotel in Oklahoma City. Officers attempted to arrest and remove Dawawn McCoy, who appeared intoxicated and refused to leave, claiming he could not walk. After a struggle involving pepper spray and taser deployments, the officers handcuffed McCoy, rolled him prone, and (viewed favorably to the Estate) maintained a knee-on-back restraint and a leg-bending restraint for roughly ninety seconds after he had stopped resisting. McCoy later went into cardiac arrest and died days later; the medical examiner cited “hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy following cardiac arrest in the setting of methamphetamine use and physical restraint.”

Key issues: (1) On interlocutory review, whether body-worn camera footage “blatantly contradicts” the district court’s finding that a jury could conclude McCoy had stopped resisting during the relevant ninety-second period; (2) whether the continued prone restraint was objectively unreasonable under Graham v. Connor; and (3) whether the unlawfulness was clearly established, defeating qualified immunity.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim. Accepting the district court’s view of the facts (as required on interlocutory review unless the record “blatantly contradicts” them), the panel held a reasonable jury could find that:

McCoy was handcuffed and had stopped resisting, yet
officers continued applying significant force while McCoy was prone—one officer with a knee in McCoy’s back and another pressing McCoy’s bent legs toward his buttocks—for roughly ninety seconds.

The panel concluded this continued force could be objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and, crucially, that the unlawfulness was clearly established by Tenth Circuit precedent—especially Weigel v. Broad. Judge Rossman concurred, emphasizing that Weigel clearly established that kneeling on a prone person’s back after they are subdued is unconstitutional, making it unnecessary to analyze the leg-restraint aspect to affirm.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Interlocutory jurisdiction and scope of review

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985): Supplies appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review denials of qualified immunity “to the extent” the appeal raises legal questions. The panel relies on this to hear the appeal.
McWilliams v. Dinapoli, 40 F.4th 1118 (10th Cir. 2022), and Andersen v. DelCore, 79 F.4th 1153 (10th Cir. 2023): Reinforce that reasonableness of force is a legal issue suitable for interlocutory review, while factual disputes generally are not.
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), and Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2010): Establish that appellate courts ordinarily must accept the district court’s determination of which facts a jury could find at summary judgment.
McCowan v. Morales, 945 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2019), and Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2016): Frame the rule that, at this posture, the appellate court “take[s] as true” the facts the district court says a jury could find.
Zia Tr. Co. ex rel. Causey v. Montoya, 597 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2010), quoting Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2008): Emphasize the appellate court’s limited role in reviewing factual inferences.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Creates the narrow exception allowing appellate courts to reject the district court’s version if it is “blatantly contradicted by the record.”
Vette v. K-9 Unit Deputy Sanders, 989 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 2021), Clerkley v. Holcomb, 121 F.4th 1359 (10th Cir. 2024), and Crowson v. Washington Cnty., 983 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2020): Characterize the “blatantly contradicted” threshold as “very difficult,” applicable only when the district court’s view is “visible fiction.”
Lynch v. Barrett, 703 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2013): Supports the obligation to accept the district court’s fact view on interlocutory appeal.

How these cases shaped the outcome: They largely determine the battleground. The officers attempted to recast the facts (claiming continued resistance), but the panel held the bodycam footage was not so conclusive as to trigger Scott v. Harris. That procedural move preserved the Estate’s factual theory—continued significant force after subdual—long enough for the court to address objective reasonableness and clearly established law.

B. Qualified immunity framework

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (per curiam): Restates qualified immunity’s protection unless conduct violates clearly established rights.
Smart ex rel. Est. of Smart v. City of Wichita, 951 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2020), and Arnold v. City of Olathe, 35 F.4th 778 (10th Cir. 2022): Used to describe the “presumption” of immunity and the plaintiff’s two-part burden (constitutional violation + clearly established law).
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002): Central to the court’s approach to “clearly established” law—rejecting a rigid demand for factually identical precedent in favor of “fair notice.”
Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 2015): Notes that a single on-point in-circuit precedential case can clearly establish unlawfulness.

C. Excessive force: Fourth Amendment standards and prone-restraint cases

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): Supplies the objective reasonableness standard and the three familiar (non-exclusive) factors: severity of crime, immediate threat, active resistance/flight.
Est. of Taylor v. Salt Lake City, 16 F.4th 744 (10th Cir. 2021), quoting Sturdivan ex rel. Est. of Larsen v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2008): Restate that excessive-force claims require objectively unreasonable force, assessed under totality.
Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2008): Cited for the proposition that significant force can be unreasonable when used for misdemeanor arrests.
Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep't, 389 F.3d 167 (6th Cir. 2004): Persuasive authority characterizing trespass as minor, not justifying significant force.
Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2001): Early Tenth Circuit warning about positional asphyxia risks tied to prone restraint and hog-tying, and the dangers of back pressure and positioning.
Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008): The cornerstone. Holds that applying pressure to the upper back of a prone, handcuffed, subdued person creates a significant asphyxiation risk and is unreasonable; also explains that intoxication and vigorous struggle increase positional asphyxia risk.
McCoy v. Meyers, 887 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 2018): Clarifies that officers must have enough time to recognize changed circumstances; and frames the clearly established principle against using force on a person who poses no threat or has been subdued.
Fancher v. Barrientos, 723 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2013): Used to explain when officers have “enough time” to recognize changed circumstances and react.
Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405 (10th Cir. 2014): Reinforces that applying pressure to the back of a handcuffed person can be unconstitutional, supporting the court’s “clearly established” holding.
Giannetti v. City of Stillwater, 216 F. App'x 756 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished): Persuasive example that continued force after handcuffing may still be reasonable where active thrashing continues—distinguishing the point that handcuffs alone do not equal subdual.
Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1993), and Edwards v. City of Muskogee, 841 F. App'x 79 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished): Cited to note intoxication can affect the threat calculus, sometimes justifying greater force while resistance persists.
Palacios v. Fortuna, 61 F.4th 1248 (10th Cir. 2023), and Ceyala v. Toth, 2020 WL 6947721 (D. Ariz. Mar. 5, 2020) (unreported): Referenced for the relevance of warnings and gradual escalation when assessing reasonableness.
Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655 (10th Cir. 2010): Supports the proposition that justifications for significant force can evaporate quickly as circumstances change, requiring officers to adjust.
Jackson v. Wilkins, 517 F. App'x 311 (6th Cir. 2013) (unpublished): Persuasive authority on the significance of a dramatic change from extreme strength to near-helplessness as an observable indicator of distress.
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008): Invoked for the “party presentation principle” to justify not conducting separate, officer-by-officer qualified immunity analyses because the parties did not frame the issues that way.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The “blatantly contradicted” argument failed because the videos were not conclusive

The officers’ primary factual push was that McCoy continued resisting after handcuffing, making continued restraint reasonable. The panel’s key procedural move was to accept the district court’s finding that a jury could reasonably infer McCoy had stopped resisting for roughly ninety seconds while prone. The bodycam showed McCoy prone, cuffed, with a knee on his back and his legs bent up; it did not conclusively show “kicking” sufficient to render the district court’s view a “visible fiction” under Scott v. Harris and Vette v. K-9 Unit Deputy Sanders.

This aspect is important doctrinally: when footage is unclear or subject to competing interpretations, appellate courts will typically not use Scott to override the district court’s summary-judgment fact view. The case thus fits into a line of Tenth Circuit decisions policing the boundary between legal review (permitted) and factual reweighing (not permitted) in qualified immunity interlocutory appeals.

B. Objective unreasonableness under Graham turned on the “post-subdual” window

The court accepted that substantial force before subdual may have been justified: McCoy resisted, kicked, appeared intoxicated, and officers escalated force with warnings (pepper spray, then taser). The constitutional problem begins after the district court’s inferred inflection point—when resistance stopped but force continued.

Applying the Graham v. Connor factors to the ninety-second period:

Severity of crime: Nonviolent trespass (minor), weighing against significant force.
Immediate threat: Once subdued (as factually assumed), threat materially diminished.
Active resistance/flight: Once resistance stopped, continued substantial restraint lacked justification.

The panel emphasized not simply “continued force,” but continued force in a high-risk configuration: a prone, face-down individual with back pressure and legs held bent toward the buttocks—restraints associated with positional asphyxia concerns discussed in Cruz v. City of Laramie and Weigel v. Broad. The opinion also explains that ninety seconds provided “more than enough time” for reasonable officers to perceive changed circumstances and adjust—an application of Fancher v. Barrientos and McCoy v. Meyers.

C. Clearly established law: Weigel supplied “fair notice”

On clearly established law, the court relied primarily on Weigel v. Broad, which (building on Cruz v. City of Laramie) held that maintaining pressure on the upper back of a prone suspect once subdued creates a significant risk of asphyxiation and is unreasonable. The officers attempted to distinguish Weigel because Weigel’s legs were restrained with tubing, while McCoy’s legs were not bound to his arms.

The panel rejected that as too fact-specific under Hope v. Pelzer: the question is fair notice of the unconstitutional principle, not a demand for identical facts. The controlling principle is that once a person is subdued, officers may not continue prone back-pressure restraints that carry known asphyxiation risks. The panel also cited the Tenth Circuit’s own later formulations—McCoy v. Meyers and Estate of Booker v. Gomez—as confirming that Weigel clearly established the unlawfulness of force used without legitimate justification against a subdued person.

Concurrence’s refinement: Judge Rossman agreed qualified immunity was properly denied but would affirm solely on the clearly established rule against kneeling on a subdued prone person’s back “due to the significant risk of positional asphyxiation,” making discussion of leg restraints unnecessary. The concurrence thus narrows the minimum necessary holding while leaving the majority’s broader analysis intact.

3.3. Impact

Video-evidence discipline in interlocutory appeals: The decision reinforces that bodycam footage must be truly dispositive to displace the district court’s jury-permissible inference. Ambiguity will be resolved (at this stage) in the plaintiff’s favor rather than through appellate reweighing.
“Post-subdual” force is the constitutional flashpoint: The opinion underscores that even when early force is justified by vigorous resistance, officers must rapidly recalibrate once resistance ends—especially when a suspect is prone and restrained.
Prone back-pressure remains a clearly established danger zone: By anchoring clearly established law in Weigel v. Broad (and tying it to Cruz v. City of Laramie), the court further cements the Tenth Circuit’s longstanding notice that maintaining pressure on a prone, subdued person’s back can be unconstitutional.
Litigation and training implications: Plaintiffs will likely cite Bruner for the proposition that a relatively short interval (here, ninety seconds) can be legally sufficient time for officers to recognize subdual and stop high-risk restraints; agencies may respond by tightening policies on prone restraint duration, monitoring, and repositioning.
Officer-by-officer parsing may reemerge on remand: The panel declined individualized analyses due to the parties’ presentation (Greenlaw v. United States), leaving room for defendants to argue differentiated liability at trial based on each officer’s specific acts, role, and timing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: A doctrine protecting officials from damages unless the plaintiff shows (1) a constitutional violation and (2) the unlawfulness was “clearly established” at the time. It is designed to protect reasonable mistakes but not plainly unlawful conduct.
Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before the case ends. Denials of qualified immunity can be appealed early, but typically only for legal questions—not disputes about what happened.
“Blatantly contradicted by the record” (Scott v. Harris): A narrow exception allowing appellate courts to reject the district court’s view of the facts when objective evidence (often video) makes that view impossible to believe.
Objective reasonableness (Graham v. Connor): The Fourth Amendment test for force, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, considering severity of the crime, threat, and resistance.
Positional asphyxia: Breathing impairment caused by body position and restraint—commonly associated with prone, face-down restraint combined with pressure on the back/torso, particularly when a person is intoxicated or has just struggled heavily.
“Hog-tie” and analogous restraints: Traditionally binding ankles to wrists behind the back; the court treated restraints that force legs upward toward the buttocks (especially combined with prone positioning and back pressure) as carrying similar asphyxiation risks even if not literally tied wrist-to-ankle.

5. Conclusion

Bruner v. Cassidy reaffirms two practical rules in Tenth Circuit excessive-force litigation. First, at the qualified-immunity summary-judgment stage, ambiguous bodycam footage will not “blatantly contradict” the district court’s view if competing inferences remain for a jury. Second, and more substantively, it remains clearly established—at least since Weigel v. Broad—that maintaining prone back-pressure on a subdued, handcuffed person presents a significant risk of positional asphyxia and can violate the Fourth Amendment, defeating qualified immunity. The opinion’s emphasis on the officers’ obligation to recognize and respond to changed circumstances—within a matter of seconds to minutes—will likely shape both future liability analysis and policing practices regarding prone restraint.

Bruner v. Cassidy (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 2026) — Commentary