Brown v. Commissioner: Clarifying Claimant’s Burden to Establish Non-SGA Past Work at Step Four

Introduction

In Brown v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, No. 24-11068 (5th Cir. 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit confronted a routine-seeming Social Security disability appeal that ultimately produced an important clarification: when a claimant challenges an Administrative Law Judge’s finding that a prior job constitutes “past relevant work” because it was not substantial gainful activity (SGA), the claimant bears the burden of supplying evidence of the duration of the employment necessary to invoke the low-earnings presumption. Failing to do so, the Fifth Circuit held, leaves the ALJ’s SGA finding intact so long as it is supported by “more than a scintilla” of evidence—a standard the court reaffirmed as “highly deferential.”

The appellant, Billy Lee Brown, argued that his earnings as a fast-food worker were too low to qualify as SGA and therefore could not be used to deny benefits at step four of the five-step disability analysis. The panel (Judges Davis, Smith, and Higginson) rejected that contention, affirming both the district court and the Commissioner. Although the opinion is unpublished, the Fifth Circuit’s explication of the evidentiary burden at step four, especially regarding how monthly earnings must be averaged over actual months worked, will likely reverberate in future disability litigation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision that Brown was not disabled. Crucially, the court held:

The ALJ’s determination that Brown’s previous fast-food employment constituted past relevant work performed at the SGA level was supported by substantial evidence.
Brown, who bore the burden at step four, did not provide employment-duration evidence necessary to show his average monthly earnings fell below regulatory SGA thresholds.
Even if Brown’s earnings were presumptively below SGA, the ALJ permissibly relied on other vocational and medical evidence suggesting Brown could perform light work, including similar jobs he held while his application was pending.

Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit found no legal error and deemed the ALJ’s decision adequately supported under the deferential substantial-evidence standard.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000) – Cited for the proposition that the Commissioner’s decision becomes final once the Appeals Council denies review. This frames what is reviewable and preserves the ALJ’s decision as the agency’s final word.
Garcia v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2018) & Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2005) – Quoted for the “highly deferential” substantial-evidence standard. These cases underscore that appellate courts neither re-weigh evidence nor substitute their judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Allentown Mack Sales & Service v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998) – Provides the general definition of “substantial evidence” used across administrative-law contexts.
Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715 (5th Cir. 2021) – Reiterates the five-step disability analysis and the inquiry at step four (past relevant work).
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003) – Establishes that if disability or non-disability is found at any step, the inquiry ends; relied on to justify stopping at step four.
Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019) – Supplies the Supreme Court’s modern articulation of the low “not high” bar for substantial evidence and is quoted throughout to reinforce the deferential review.
Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920 (5th Cir. 2014) – Provides the concept of a “rebuttable presumption” against SGA when earnings fall below regulatory thresholds, laying the groundwork for Brown’s argument—and the Fifth Circuit’s explanation of how to rebut that presumption.
Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2002) – Quoted for the principle that reviewing courts do not substitute their judgment for the Commissioner’s when evidence conflicts.

Legal Reasoning

The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three interlocking steps:

Affirmation of the Substantial-Evidence Standard.
The court recites the deferential framework, emphasizing that “more than a mere scintilla” suffices and that courts refrain from re-weighing evidence. This sets a high barrier for claimants seeking reversal on factual grounds.
Burden of Proof on the Claimant at Step Four.
Citing 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512 & 416.912, the panel underscores that the claimant bears the burden to prove inability to perform past relevant work. Brown’s attack on the SGA finding required him to show that his earnings, averaged over the actual months worked, were below the yearly SGA guideline. Because he offered no documentation of how long he worked at Pizza Hut during each year, he could not leverage the low-earnings presumption recognized in Copeland.
Alternative Evidentiary Support.
Even if the low-earnings presumption applied, SSA regulations permit an ALJ to examine “all of the medical and vocational evidence” (20 C.F.R. §§404.1571, 416.971). The ALJ noted Brown’s contemporaneous jobs (restaurant and convenience store), his report—“I’ve been working a lot”—and his parole-related circumstances. This cumulative record supplied sufficient evidence for the ALJ’s conclusion that Brown could perform light work akin to his fast-food duties.

Impact of the Judgment

The decision, though unpublished, carries several doctrinal and practical ramifications:

Reinforced Evidentiary Burden at Step Four. Claimants must now produce specific duration evidence alongside earnings data when arguing that past work was not SGA. Merely pointing to annual earnings below guidelines will no longer suffice in the Fifth Circuit.
Strategic Guidance for Practitioners. Counsel must develop detailed employment records—paystubs, schedules, or employer statements—to calculate average monthly earnings accurately and defeat SGA classifications.
ALJ Discretion Expanded. The opinion validates ALJs’ reliance on broader vocational evidence, even where earnings fall below presumptive thresholds, so long as the overall record shows work capability.
Potential Influence on Other Circuits. While non-precedential, Brown may be cited for persuasive authority regarding claimant burden and averaging methodology, especially in circuits that have not squarely addressed the issue.
Administrative Efficiency. By clarifying the evidentiary expectations, the ruling may reduce remands based on incomplete earnings records, streamlining disability adjudications within the SSA.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) – Work that is (a) performed for pay or profit and (b) involves significant physical or mental activity. SSA sets monthly earnings thresholds each year; earning above the threshold triggers a presumption that the work is SGA.
Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) – An administrative assessment of what a claimant can still do despite impairments. It looks at lifting, standing, sitting, mental tasks, etc. Here, the ALJ found Brown capable of “light work,” which generally involves lifting ≤ 20 lbs and frequent standing/walking.
Five-Step Sequential Evaluation – The methodological framework the SSA uses to decide disability. Step 4 asks: “Can the claimant do past relevant work?” If “yes,” the inquiry ends and benefits are denied.
Substantial Evidence Standard – A deferential appellate standard requiring only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept.” Courts do not re-weigh evidence under this test.
Rebuttable Presumption Against SGA – If earnings fall below SGA thresholds, a presumption arises that the work was not SGA. However, the Commissioner may rebut with other evidence, and claimants bear the initial burden of invoking the presumption.
Averaging Earnings Over Months Worked – SSA regulations (20 C.F.R. §404.1574a) require dividing annual earnings by the actual months worked, not by 12, to compute average monthly earnings for SGA purposes.

Conclusion

Brown v. Commissioner stands for a straightforward yet consequential proposition: a claimant attacking an ALJ’s past-relevant-work finding must provide concrete, month-specific earnings evidence; otherwise, the ALJ’s SGA conclusion will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by any reasonable evidence. The Fifth Circuit’s analysis reinforces the deferential substantial-evidence standard, clarifies the mechanics of averaging earnings, and affirms ALJ discretion to look beyond earnings when evaluating work capability. For practitioners, the ruling is a blueprint for the documentation needed to challenge SGA determinations effectively and highlights the importance of building a robust factual record at the agency level. Although unpublished, the opinion adds persuasive weight to the jurisprudence on claimant burdens and promises to shape future disability litigation within and beyond the Fifth Circuit.