Broad Reach, Prospective Application: Vermont’s Medical‑Monitoring Statute Covers Out‑of‑State Releases but Not Pre‑2022 Exposures

I. Introduction

In Amber Neddo, as Guardian & Next Friend to Z.N., C.B., & A.B. v. Monsanto Company et al., 2025 VT 64, the Vermont Supreme Court answered two certified questions from the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont concerning the scope and temporal reach of Vermont’s 2022 medical‑monitoring statute, 12 V.S.A. §§ 7201–7202. The case arises out of alleged exposure of Vermont schoolchildren and school employees to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) emitted from building materials and fixtures in public schools.

The plaintiffs, represented by Amber Neddo on behalf of her children and a putative class, allege that PCBs manufactured decades ago by the former Monsanto Company (“Old Monsanto”) and incorporated into products such as fluorescent light ballasts and caulk later “leaked” into the air of Vermont public schools. They seek a court‑supervised medical‑monitoring program to detect cancers and other diseases allegedly associated with PCB exposure, relying exclusively on Vermont’s recently enacted medical‑monitoring statute.

The federal district court certified two interrelated questions of state law:

Whether a toxic substance was “released” from a “facility” within the meaning of 12 V.S.A. §§ 7201–7202 where the manufacturer sold the toxic substance from out‑of‑state facilities to third parties, those third parties incorporated it into finished products used in Vermont schools, and the substance later leaked into the air of those schools.
Whether the medical‑monitoring statute:
1. provides a remedy to a plaintiff whose exposure to a toxic substance occurred before the statute was enacted; and
2. provides a remedy against a defendant who sold a toxic substance to a third party before the statute was enacted.

The Court’s answers—which expand the geographic reach of the statute while firmly limiting its temporal application—have substantial implications for toxic‑tort litigation in Vermont. The Court:

interprets “release” broadly enough to encompass out‑of‑state manufacturing and sales that ultimately lead to contamination in Vermont; but
holds that the statute cannot be applied to exposures that occurred before July 1, 2022, its effective date, because it creates a new substantive right; while
permitting its application to post‑2022 exposures even if the defendant’s manufacturing or sales occurred decades earlier.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court’s principal holdings can be summarized as follows:

A. Definition of “Release” Under the Medical‑Monitoring Statute

The statutory term “release” in 12 V.S.A. § 7201(11)—defined as “any act or omission that allows a proven toxic substance to enter the air, land, surface water, or groundwater”—is broad and unqualified.
Old Monsanto’s sale of PCBs from its manufacturing facilities in Alabama and Illinois to third‑party manufacturers, knowing that PCBs would inevitably leak from finished products, qualifies as a “release” once those products are installed in Vermont schools and the PCBs enter the air there.
The statute does not require that:
- the facility be located in Vermont, or
- the emission of the toxic substance into Vermont’s environment occur directly and immediately from that facility.
Certified Question 1 is therefore answered in the affirmative.

B. Retroactivity and Temporal Scope of § 7202

The medical‑monitoring statute, 12 V.S.A. § 7202, creates a new substantive right: a cause of action for persons without present physical injury to obtain medical monitoring for exposure to “proven toxic substances.”
Vermont law presumes that substantive statutes do not apply retrospectively absent clear legislative intent. The statute contains no such retroactivity language.
As a result:
- Plaintiffs whose exposure to a proven toxic substance occurred before July 1, 2022, cannot rely on § 7202. Question 2(a) is answered in the negative.
- Defendants may nonetheless be sued under § 7202 even if they sold or released the toxic substance before July 1, 2022, so long as the plaintiff’s exposure occurred on or after that date. Question 2(b) is answered in the affirmative.

Thus, the Court charts a middle path: the statute is not retroactive as to exposures, but manufacturers are not immunized simply because their culpable conduct predates the statute if exposure continues or occurs later.

III. Analysis

A. Statutory and Factual Background

1. The Medical‑Monitoring Statute

Enacted in 2022 as Act 93 and codified at 12 V.S.A. §§ 7201–7202, the statute was designed to provide a clear, statutory mechanism for individuals exposed to toxic substances—without yet having a diagnosable disease—to obtain court‑ordered medical surveillance funded by responsible parties.

Section 7202(a) confers a “cause of action for the remedy of medical monitoring” on a person “without a present injury or disease” against “a person who is the owner or operator of a large facility from which a proven toxic substance was released,” provided that six elements are proven by a preponderance of the evidence:

Exposure at a rate significantly greater than the general population;
Exposure to a “proven toxic substance”;
Exposure resulted from tortious conduct of the defendant;
As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiffs have suffered an increased risk of contracting a serious disease;
The increased risk makes periodic medical examination medically necessary beyond what the general population would receive; and
Monitoring procedures exist that are reasonable in cost and safe for use.

If these conditions are satisfied, the court must establish a court‑supervised medical‑monitoring program and order the defendant to fund it, along with awarding attorney’s fees and costs. § 7202(b)–(c). Importantly, § 7202(d) provides that this is “the exclusive remedy for a person without a present injury to bring a cause of action to seek medical monitoring due to exposure to a proven toxic substance.”

The key definitional provisions relevant in this case include:

“Proven toxic substance”, § 7201(10): A substance that may cause personal injury or disease and is defined as a “hazardous material” under Vermont’s waste‑management act.
“Facility”, § 7201(4): “All contiguous land, structures, other appurtenances, and improvements on the land where proven toxic substances are manufactured, processed, used, or stored.”
“Release”, § 7201(11): “Any act or omission that allows a proven toxic substance to enter the air, land, surface water, or groundwater.”

These broad definitions are crucial to the Court’s resolution of Certified Question 1.

2. PCBs and the Underlying Conduct

From the 1930s until the late 1970s, Old Monsanto was the only commercial manufacturer of PCBs, a class of persistent organic pollutants now widely recognized as carcinogenic and harmful to human health. Old Monsanto manufactured PCBs at facilities in Alabama and Illinois. It is undisputed for purposes of the certified questions that:

PCBs are “proven toxic substances” under § 7201(10) and Vermont’s waste‑management statute;
Old Monsanto was “the owner or operator of a large facility” under § 7202(a); and
Old Monsanto knew PCBs were toxic and that they would “inevitably leak from virtually all finished products” into which they were incorporated.

Old Monsanto sold PCBs from its Alabama and Illinois facilities to third‑party manufacturers, who used them in building materials such as fluorescent light ballasts and caulk. Some of those PCB‑containing products were installed in Vermont schools; over time, PCBs migrated from those materials into the indoor air, allegedly exposing students and staff.

The plaintiff class consists of:

Children who attended the Cabot School in Vermont and were allegedly exposed to elevated PCB levels; and
A broader class of individuals who attended or worked at twenty‑six Vermont schools identified with high PCB levels.

Their sole statutory vehicle for relief is the medical‑monitoring statute.

B. The First Certified Question: What Counts as a “Release”?

1. Textual Analysis: “Any Act or Omission”

The Court begins with Vermont’s standard approach to statutory construction: determine legislative intent by looking first to the plain language of the statute, and then to context and legislative history only if necessary. See In re Hinsdale Farm, 2004 VT 72, ¶ 5; Perry v. Vermont Medical Practice Board, 169 Vt. 399, 406, 737 A.2d 900, 905 (1999); Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Board, 148 Vt. 47, 49, 527 A.2d 227, 228 (1986).

Section 7201(11) defines “release” as:

“any act or omission that allows a proven toxic substance to enter the air, land, surface water, or groundwater.”

The Court emphasizes the breadth of the word “any,” citing modern interpretive authorities that treat “any” as expansive rather than restrictive. See Eisenhauer v. Culinary Institute of America, 84 F.4th 507, 517 (2d Cir. 2023); Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399, 405 n.2 (2020).

Two features of the definition are determinative:

It covers “any act or omission”—not just direct emissions from a pipe, smokestack, or waste site. The sale of a toxic substance, knowing that it will migrate into the environment, can be such an “act.”
It contains no express geographic or temporal qualifiers. It does not say the act must occur in Vermont, or that the release must occur immediately at the facility. It only requires that the act or omission ultimately allows the toxic substance to enter “the air, land, surface water, or groundwater.”

Given this broad and unqualified language, the Court holds that Old Monsanto’s sales transactions themselves—carried out at its out‑of‑state manufacturing facilities—qualify as a “release” because they were acts that foreseeably and in fact allowed PCBs to enter the air in Vermont schools.

2. Rejecting a “Direct, In‑Vermont” Limitation

Monsanto argued that “release” must be read to mean only the direct emission of a toxic substance from a large facility into Vermont’s environment. The Court rejects this on several textual and structural grounds:

The statute does not contain the word “directly” or any synonym. Courts do not insert words the Legislature chose not to use. See Brennan v. Town of Colchester, 169 Vt. 175, 177, 730 A.2d 601, 603 (1999).
The Legislature knew how to impose geographical limits when it wished; its silence here suggests an intent not to do so.
The statute is a remedial measure with “benevolent objectives” and must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose: reallocating the cost of early detection of latent disease from exposed individuals to those who released the toxic substances. See Montgomery v. Brinver Corp., 142 Vt. 461, 463, 457 A.2d 644, 646 (1983).
When a statute includes an explicit definition, courts must follow that definition. See Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. 149, 160 (2018).

On this reading, the fact that the physical manifestation of contamination in Vermont happens years after the sale, via intermediate products manufactured by third parties, does not take the situation outside the statute’s coverage.

3. Legislative Context and History

Because Monsanto argued that the plain meaning conflicted with legislative intent, the Court reviewed the statute’s history. Far from undermining the broad textual reading, the history supports it.

a. The Emergence of Medical Monitoring

The Court traces the origin of medical‑monitoring remedies to toxic‑tort litigation in other jurisdictions. In an era when latency between exposure and disease made traditional tort recovery difficult, some courts allowed plaintiffs without present symptoms to recover the costs of reasonable medical surveillance, so long as they could show increased risk of serious disease and necessity of monitoring. See:

Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987);
In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 850, 852 (3d Cir. 1990);
Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 432–33 (W. Va. 1999).

Other jurisdictions rejected such claims absent present physical injury. See:

Metro‑North Commuter Railroad v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 444 (1997);
Baker v. Croda Inc., 304 A.3d 191 (Del. 2023);
Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 5 N.E.3d 11 (N.Y. 2013);
Henry v. Dow Chemical Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005);
Brown v. Saint‑Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 300 A.3d 949 (N.H. 2023).

Vermont state courts had not taken a position before the statute was enacted.

b. The Bennington PFOA Contamination and Act 154

The immediate backdrop to Act 93 was the discovery of perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) contamination in North Bennington, Vermont, originating from facilities operated by ChemFab and its successor Saint‑Gobain. This led to both:

a federal class action, Sullivan v. Saint‑Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 288 (D. Vt. 2016), and
legislative action via Act 154 (2015), which created a working group to recommend reforms to toxic‑chemical regulation and remedies.

The working group recommended a statutory medical‑monitoring cause of action to strengthen civil remedies, especially given uncertainty under Vermont common law. The Legislature attempted twice (S.197 in 2017–2018 and S.37 in 2019–2020) to enact such a law but was vetoed over concerns about breadth and economic impacts on Vermont businesses.

c. Sullivan’s “Erie Guess” and the Enactment of Act 93

In 2019, the federal district court in Sullivan predicted, under Erie principles, that the Vermont Supreme Court would recognize medical monitoring as a remedy under state law. Sullivan v. Saint‑Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 431 F. Supp. 3d 448 (D. Vt. 2019). It articulated a multi‑element test substantially similar to what would later be codified.

In 2022, the Legislature enacted Act 93, codified at 12 V.S.A. §§ 7201–7202. The liability standard was expressly modeled on the Sullivan test, but the Legislature made two key modifications:

It used the term “toxic substance” instead of “hazardous substance,” with its own statutory definition.
It limited liability to “owners and operators of large facilities,” expressly excluding municipal properties, thereby constraining the potential universe of defendants.

Nothing in this history suggests an intent to confine liability to releases directly from Vermont‑based facilities. Instead, the record indicates that:

The “large facility” limitation was driven by policy concerns about the financial vulnerability of small Vermont businesses and municipalities, not by geography.
Legislative counsel, Michael O’Grady, explicitly stated to the House Judiciary Committee that the statute could apply to out‑of‑state businesses if plaintiffs could show that the release was “caused by an out‑of‑state business through their introduction of products into commerce,” though he anticipated most cases would involve in‑state releases.

The Legislature did not amend the bill to narrow its geographic reach after being alerted to this potential application. This strongly supports the Court’s conclusion that “release” should be read broadly to encompass Old Monsanto’s conduct.

4. Relationship to Vermont’s Waste‑Management Act

Monsanto argued that because the Legislature explicitly extended liability to out‑of‑state manufacturers under the waste‑management act, but not explicitly under the medical‑monitoring statute, the latter should be read more narrowly. This argument hinges on amendments to 10 V.S.A. § 6615(a), which governs liability to the State for abating “a release or threatened release” of hazardous materials.

Before 2022, § 6615(a) imposed liability on:

owners or operators of a “facility” (where hazardous materials were treated, stored, or disposed),
persons who owned such facilities at the time of disposal,
persons who arranged for disposal, and
persons who accepted materials for disposal.

Act 93 added a new category at § 6615(a)(5): “any person who manufactured for commercial sale a hazardous material and who knew or should have known that the material presented a threat of harm to human health or the natural environment.” This finally captured manufacturers who never operated a disposal facility in Vermont but whose products caused contamination.

The Court explains why this expansion does not imply a narrow reading of “release” in the medical‑monitoring context:

The definition of “facility” differs between the two statutory regimes:
- Under the waste‑management act, a “facility” means land or structures “used for treating, storing, or disposing of waste” (10 V.S.A. § 6602(10)). Thus, pre‑Act 93, only owners or operators of waste‑treatment or disposal facilities were liable.
- Under the medical‑monitoring statute, a “facility” includes places where toxic substances are “manufactured, processed, used, or stored” (12 V.S.A. § 7201(4)). This already squarely covers manufacturers like Old Monsanto.
The Legislature also amended the waste‑management act’s definition of “release” at 10 V.S.A. § 6602(17) to explicitly include “the intentional or unintentional action or omission resulting in the spilling, leaking, emission, or disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from building materials in public schools and approved and recognized independent schools... constructed or renovated before 1980.”

This explicit reference to PCBs leaking from school building materials confirms the Legislature’s understanding that “release” includes slow, indirect emissions from commercial products long after manufacture and sale. That conceptually aligns with the medical‑monitoring statute’s broad definition.

5. Limiting Principles: Why Liability Is Not Boundless

Concerned about the potentially sweeping reach of this construction, Monsanto argued that recognizing a “release” in these circumstances would create limitless liability for manufacturers. The Court responds in a footnote by emphasizing that § 7202(a) imposes demanding proof requirements:

Exposure significantly greater than the general population;
Exposure to a proven toxic substance;
Tortious conduct by the defendant (negligence, strict liability, etc.);
Proximate causation of an increased risk of serious disease;
Medical necessity and availability of reasonable, safe monitoring.

As the causal chain between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s exposure becomes more attenuated, these elements—particularly tortious conduct and proximate cause—will become increasingly difficult to prove. Thus, the Court sees no need to constrict the statutory definition of “release” to prevent speculative or remote claims; ordinary tort and evidentiary principles perform that gatekeeping function.

Accordingly, the Court answers Certified Question 1 in the affirmative: Old Monsanto’s sale of PCBs from out‑of‑state facilities that later led to PCB emissions in Vermont schools constitutes a “release” under 12 V.S.A. §§ 7201–7202.

C. The Second Certified Question: Retroactivity

1. Vermont’s General Presumption Against Retroactivity

The Court next addresses whether the statute applies:

to plaintiffs whose toxic exposure occurred before July 1, 2022; and
to defendants whose sale of the toxic substance occurred before that date.

Vermont adheres to a strong presumption against retroactive application of new statutes that affect substantive rights. See 1 V.S.A. §§ 213, 214; Agency of Natural Resources v. Towns, 173 Vt. 552, 555, 790 A.2d 450, 455 (2001) (mem.); Agency of Natural Resources v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 595, 652 A.2d 988, 992 (1994). A law is “retrospective” if it:

“take[s] away or impair[s] vested rights acquired under existing laws, or create[s] a new obligation, impose[s] a new duty, or attach[es] a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” (Godnick, quoting prior Vermont law.)

There are two recognized exceptions:

Procedural statutes—those that change methods of enforcing existing rights—may apply to pending or past events, because they do not alter substantive entitlements. See Smiley v. State, 2015 VT 42, ¶ 18.
Remedial statutes in the narrow retroactivity sense—those that merely clarify or correct existing law—may apply to pre‑enactment events. See West v. North Branch Fire District #1, 2021 VT 44, ¶ 16; In re D.K., 2012 VT 23, ¶ 9.

The Court carefully distinguishes this narrow “remedial” concept used in retroactivity analysis from the broader notion of “remedial” as “public welfare” legislation; the medical‑monitoring statute may be remedial in the latter sense but not necessarily in the former.

2. Does § 7202 Codify Existing Law or Create a New Right?

Plaintiff argued that the medical‑monitoring statute should be viewed as merely codifying an existing right recognized, or at least foreshadowed, by the federal Sullivan decision, and therefore as “remedial” for retroactivity purposes. The Court rejects this argument on several grounds:

Federal “Erie guesses” are not state law. Sullivan was a federal district court’s prediction of how the Vermont Supreme Court might rule; such predictions do not bind state courts. See In re Ambassador Insurance Co., 2022 VT 11, ¶ 24; Bridgeview Health Care Center, Ltd. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2014 IL 116389, ¶ 16, 10 N.E.3d 902.
Vermont courts had never recognized medical monitoring absent present injury. While future medical expenses are recoverable as damages when a plaintiff has already suffered physical injury, no Vermont case had allowed a plaintiff without physical injury to recover purely prospective medical monitoring. Cases cited by plaintiffs (Hebert v. Stanley, 124 Vt. 205 (1964); Howley v. Kantor, 105 Vt. 128 (1933)) involved plaintiffs with actual injuries.
The question was genuinely unsettled. Many jurisdictions had declined to adopt medical‑monitoring claims without physical injury. Vermont’s own jurisprudence stresses an “actual injury” requirement in negligence. See, e.g., Long Trail House Condominium Association v. Engelberth Construction, Inc., 2012 VT 80, ¶ 26; Zeno‑Ethridge v. Comcast Corp., 2024 VT 16, ¶ 33. It was far from inevitable that Vermont would have adopted a medical‑monitoring cause of action as a matter of pure common law.

Given this, the Court characterizes § 7202 as creating a new substantive right: the right of a person without present physical injury to obtain a court‑supervised medical‑monitoring program at another’s expense. It is therefore not a mere clarification or procedural mechanism.

3. No Retroactivity Without Clear Legislative Command

Vermont precedent requires “the most clear and unequivocal language” before a statute that substantively alters rights can apply retrospectively. Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 86, 91 (1846). Section 7202 contains:

no explicit retroactivity clause;
no reference to past exposures; and
prospective wording (“shall have a cause of action”) similar to language previously construed as forward‑looking. See Northwood AMC Corp. v. American Motors Corp., 139 Vt. 145, 149, 423 A.2d 846, 849 (1980).

Critically, in the same Act (Act 93) the Legislature expressly made the new manufacturer‑liability provision of the waste‑management act retroactive:

“Notwithstanding any contrary provision of 1 V.S.A. § 214, the amendment contained in 10 V.S.A. § 6615(a)(5) shall apply to any relevant release... regardless of the date of the relevant release, including releases that occurred prior to the effective date....”

The Legislature’s choice to specify retroactivity for § 6615(a)(5) but not for § 7202 triggers a common canon of statutory interpretation: where the Legislature includes language in one section but omits it in another, the omission is presumed intentional. See Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. Johnson, 2009 VT 92, ¶ 9; Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).

Combined with Vermont’s strong anti‑retroactivity presumption, the absence of any express retroactivity clause compels the conclusion that § 7202 applies only prospectively.

4. Prospective Application Tied to Exposure, Not Release

The critical interpretive move is how to apply this prospective‑only rule in a case where:

the defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct (manufacturing and sale of PCBs) ceased decades before the statute’s enactment; but
the plaintiff’s alleged exposure may continue or occur after enactment because PCBs persist and continue to emit from building materials.

The Court distinguishes between:

the defendant’s past conduct (release through sale); and
the plaintiff’s later exposure and present/future risk, which is the trigger for the statutory cause of action.

Section 7202(a) conditions relief on exposure: “A person without a present injury or disease shall have a cause of action... if...” the six enumerated exposure‑related elements are satisfied. The statute does not create liability merely because a release occurred; it creates liability because of present or ongoing exposure and resulting increased risk.

The Court thus reasons:

Applying § 7202 to plaintiffs whose exposure occurred entirely before July 1, 2022 would be retroactive, because it would impose new obligations on defendants with respect to a completed set of past facts (completed exposures).
Applying § 7202 to plaintiffs who are exposed on or after July 1, 2022 does not constitute retroactivity, even if the underlying contamination arises from pre‑statute conduct. The statute is being applied to present and future exposure and risk.

The Court analogizes to federal environmental‑law cases, such as United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 741 (8th Cir. 1986), which held that statutes imposing liability for current contamination are not retroactive merely because the contaminating acts occurred in the past.

Nor, the Court notes, did Monsanto have a vested right never to be sued for future medical expenses associated with its past conduct. It had no settled entitlement to immunity from future regulatory or legislative evolutions that create new rights in response to ongoing harms.

Therefore, the Court answers Certified Question 2 as follows:

Question 2(a): No. The statute does not provide a remedy for plaintiffs whose exposure occurred before July 1, 2022.
Question 2(b): Yes. The statute can be applied against a defendant whose sale or “release” occurred before July 1, 2022, so long as the plaintiff’s exposure occurred on or after that date.

D. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Statutory Interpretation Cases

The Court relies on several well‑established canons and precedents:

In re Hinsdale Farm, 2004 VT 72, ¶ 5: primary goal is to effectuate legislative intent; start with statutory text.
Perry v. Vermont Medical Practice Board, 169 Vt. 399 (1999): consider words, history, and policy.
Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Board, 148 Vt. 47 (1986): if text is plain and consistent with the legislative scheme, no further inquiry is needed.
Brennan v. Town of Colchester, 169 Vt. 175 (1999): courts will not read implied conditions into a statute unless necessary to make it effective.
Montgomery v. Brinver Corp., 142 Vt. 461 (1983): remedial statutes with benevolent objectives should be liberally construed.
Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. 149 (2018): where a statute defines a term, the statutory definition controls.
Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. Johnson, 2009 VT 92, ¶ 9: variations in language within the same act are presumed meaningful.

2. Medical Monitoring and Physical Injury

The Court canvasses decisions from other jurisdictions both adopting and rejecting medical‑monitoring causes of action. This comparative survey underscores that there was no settled national consensus, reinforcing that Vermont’s statute created a new right rather than clarifying existing law.

The Court also references Vermont cases reinforcing the “actual injury” requirement in negligence:

Long Trail House Condominium Ass’n v. Engelberth Construction, Inc., 2012 VT 80, ¶ 26: “We require actual injury, not simply risk of harm, before one can recover in negligence.”
Zeno‑Ethridge v. Comcast Corp., 2024 VT 16, ¶ 33: an “actual injury” for personal injury negligence is typically a physical injury.

3. Retroactivity Authorities

The retroactivity analysis draws on:

1 V.S.A. §§ 213–214: Vermont’s general non‑retroactivity statutes.
Agency of Natural Resources v. Towns, 173 Vt. 552 (2001) (mem.).
Agency of Natural Resources v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588 (1994).
Myott v. Myott, 149 Vt. 573 (1988): distinction between procedural and substantive statutes.
West v. North Branch Fire District #1, 2021 VT 44: “remedial” for retroactivity means clarifying or curing defects, not social‑welfare legislation generally.
In re D.K., 2012 VT 23: creating an entirely new jurisdictional statute is not merely remedial.
Soares v. Barnet Fire Dist. #2, 2022 VT 34: new statutory exposure to attorney’s fees is a substantive change.
Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 86 (1846): a longstanding articulation of the presumption against retroactivity.
Carpenter v. Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles, 143 Vt. 329 (1983): a statute is not retroactive simply because some conditions are drawn from past facts; the key is whether it affects pre‑existing rights.

4. Federal–State Law Relationship

To address the role of the federal Sullivan decision, the Court cites:

Bridgeview Health Care Center, Ltd. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2014 IL 116389, ¶ 16: predictive decisions under Erie are not state law.
In re Ambassador Insurance Co., 2022 VT 11, ¶ 24: federal district court decisions applying state law do not bind state courts.

E. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Certified Questions from Federal Court

When a federal court hearing a case under diversity jurisdiction faces an unsettled question of state law that is potentially determinative, it can ask (or “certify”) the question to the state’s highest court. The Vermont Supreme Court then interprets the state law and returns an answer, but does not resolve the underlying federal case.

Here, the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont certified two questions about the meaning and applicability of Vermont’s medical‑monitoring statute. The Supreme Court’s answers govern how the federal court must apply Vermont law in the pending federal action.

2. “Medical Monitoring” as a Remedy

“Medical monitoring” refers to a remedy that provides for:

periodic medical examinations;
diagnostic testing; and
oversight by health professionals

to detect early signs of disease in people exposed to a toxic substance. Rather than waiting for a disease to manifest and then awarding traditional damages, medical monitoring aims to catch disease early—or demonstrate its absence—thereby reducing harm and potentially reducing overall costs.

Vermont’s statute does two important things:

It allows plaintiffs without present physical injury to obtain this remedy; and
It requires that any award be paid into a court‑supervised program rather than as lump‑sum cash damages, emphasizing health protection over compensation.

3. “Proven Toxic Substance” and “Large Facility”

A “proven toxic substance” is not just any chemical; it must both:

“may cause personal injury or disease to humans,” and
be classified as a “hazardous material” under Vermont’s waste‑management statute, which in turn incorporates federal hazardous‑substance definitions.

PCBs qualify under this definition; their toxicity and hazardous‑material status are undisputed in this case.

A “large facility” is not fully detailed in the opinion, but the statute clearly intends to limit defendants to substantial operations (as opposed to small businesses or municipalities) that manufacture, process, use, or store toxic substances on a significant scale. This reflects a legislative policy choice to shield smaller entities from potentially ruinous liability and insurance costs.

4. “Release” vs. “Exposure” vs. “Sale”

These terms are distinct:

Release (in § 7201(11)) is the act or omission that allows a toxic substance to Enter the environment, even if that occurs via products over time.
Sale is one possible “act” that may qualify as a release when the seller knows that the product will inevitably leak toxic substances.
Exposure is the plaintiff’s contact with the toxic substance (e.g., breathing PCB‑contaminated air), and is the key trigger for the cause of action under § 7202(a).

The Court’s retroactivity analysis centers on exposure, not release or sale.

5. “Procedural,” “Substantive,” and “Remedial” Laws

In the retroactivity context:

Substantive law creates, defines, or extinguishes rights and obligations (e.g., creating a new cause of action).
Procedural law governs how rights are enforced (e.g., court procedures, burdens of proof) without changing the underlying rights.
Remedial law (in the narrow retroactivity sense) clarifies or corrects existing rights and is often treated like procedural law for retroactivity analysis.

The Court classifies § 7202 as substantive because it creates a brand‑new right for asymptomatic individuals to sue for medical monitoring.

F. Likely Impact and Future Directions

1. Expanded Reach to Out‑of‑State Manufacturers

The decision has clear implications for companies that manufacture toxic substances used in products eventually sold or installed in Vermont:

Out‑of‑state manufacturers may face Vermont medical‑monitoring claims if their products are used in Vermont and later release toxic substances into Vermont’s environment, provided the statutory criteria are met and Vermont courts have personal jurisdiction over them.
The decision confirms that liability is not limited to Vermont‑based facilities or “end‑of‑pipe” pollution; it extends to supply‑chain activities that foreseeably cause toxic exposures in Vermont.

2. Temporal Cut‑Off for Exposures

By tying the statute’s applicability to the date of exposure, the Court draws a bright temporal line:

Exposures before July 1, 2022: no statutory medical‑monitoring remedy.
Exposures on or after July 1, 2022: potential statutory remedy, regardless of when the underlying release or sale occurred.

For PCB cases involving schools built or renovated before 1980, this line will be particularly important. Individuals who attended those schools years ago may be outside the statute, whereas current students and staff exposed after July 1, 2022 may fall within it, subject to proof of the statutory elements.

3. The Status of Common‑Law Medical Monitoring

The Court emphasizes that, as of enactment, Vermont had not recognized a common‑law medical‑monitoring claim for asymptomatic individuals. Section 7202(d) declares the statutory remedy to be “exclusive” for persons without present injury seeking medical monitoring “due to exposure to a proven toxic substance.”

The opinion does not squarely resolve whether individuals whose exposure pre‑dated July 1, 2022 but who have no present injury can pursue a common‑law medical‑monitoring claim. Given that:

such a right had not been recognized before; and
the Legislature cannot retroactively take away vested rights, but may prospectively shape future causes of action;

future litigation may test whether Vermont common law can or should fill the gap for historical exposures, or whether the Legislature has effectively precluded that route going forward.

4. Toxic‑Tort Litigation Framework in Vermont

The decision clarifies and stabilizes Vermont’s toxic‑tort landscape:

For asymptomatic plaintiffs exposed after July 1, 2022: the statute provides a clear, exclusive path to obtain medical monitoring, with defined elements and a structured, programmatic remedy.
For plaintiffs with present physical injury: traditional tort claims (negligence, strict liability, nuisance, etc.) and damages—including future medical expenses—remain available, and the medical‑monitoring statute does not displace them.
For historical exposures without present injury: the statutory path is closed, but whether common law will recognize any remedy remains uncertain and is not decided here.

5. Regulatory and Policy Consequences

The Court’s broad reading of “release” aligns Vermont’s civil‑remedy structure with its environmental‑regulation framework, particularly the amended definition of “release” for PCBs in schools under 10 V.S.A. § 6602(17). Together, these provisions:

reinforce the State’s commitment to addressing legacy contamination (such as PCBs in older school buildings);
place pressure on manufacturers and large facilities to account for long‑term environmental and health impacts of their products; and
enable cost shifting of preventive health measures from exposed individuals to those responsible for introducing toxic substances into commerce.

IV. Conclusion

Amber Neddo v. Monsanto is a foundational interpretation of Vermont’s 2022 medical‑monitoring statute. The Vermont Supreme Court:

Confirms that “release” is to be interpreted broadly—covering “any act or omission” that ultimately allows toxic substances to enter the environment, including out‑of‑state manufacturing and sales that lead to contamination in Vermont through intermediate products.
Holds that the medical‑monitoring statute creates a new substantive right and therefore cannot be applied retroactively to exposures predating its July 1, 2022 effective date.
Clarifies that defendants are not insulated from liability merely because their wrongful conduct occurred long ago; the statute applies to ongoing or post‑enactment exposures stemming from those acts.

Collectively, these rulings establish a legal framework of broad geographical reach but strictly prospective application. The decision provides critical guidance not only for the pending PCB school litigation, but also for future toxic‑exposure cases in Vermont, signaling that large‑scale polluters—wherever located—may be called upon to fund medical monitoring for Vermonters exposed to their products, so long as those exposures occur after the statute’s effective date and the demanding statutory criteria are met.