Bright-Line Buffer Zones & the First Amendment:
Hebb v. City of Asheville (4th Cir. 2025)

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Published Opinion • Decided 23 July 2025 • No. 24-1383 • Opinion by Judge Wynn (King, J. joining; Quattlebaum, J. concurring/dissenting)

1. Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zachary Hebb v. City of Asheville revisits the delicate balance between a municipality’s interest in protecting patients at medical facilities from disruptive noise and the constitutional right to engage in public protest on traditional public fora. The panel confronted two central questions:

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to an anti-abortion protester who challenged Asheville’s 150-foot ban on “amplified sound” near medical clinics?
Was the earlier iteration of the ban void for vagueness because it failed to define “amplified sound”?

The majority affirmed the district court’s refusal to dismiss the First Amendment claim at the pleading stage, but reversed summary judgment for the protester, holding that factual disputes remain as to whether the ordinance is narrowly tailored. On the Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim, the court reversed and ordered dismissal, ruling that the earlier ordinance gave adequate notice. The net effect is a remand for further factual development, coupled with a new doctrinal clarification: even bright-line bans on amplification near clinics can survive intermediate scrutiny if municipalities compile an evidentiary record demonstrating the inadequacy of less-restrictive alternatives.

2. Summary of the Judgment

First Amendment Claim
• Denial of the City’s two Rule 12 motions upheld (no facial insufficiency; no mootness).
• District court’s grant of summary judgment to Hebb reversed; genuine issues of material fact exist on content-neutral purpose, narrow tailoring, and alternative channels.
• Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Due Process / Vagueness
• Prior version of § 10-85(2) held sufficiently definite; district court’s contrary ruling and nominal-damage award vacated; claim to be dismissed on remand.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

The panel wove a tapestry of Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit authorities:

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) – baseline for content-neutral, time-place-manner (TPM) analysis and “narrowly-tailored / not substantially broader than necessary” test.
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) – medical-facility buffer zones: Hill validates content-neutral distance rules; McCullen underscores need for evidence that less-restrictive tools were tried.
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) – importance of noise control around clinics.
Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 2015) & Billups v. Charleston, 961 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2020) – Fourth Circuit’s “actual evidence” requirement that governments demonstrate attempts to use less-speech-restrictive means.
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) – modern articulation of vagueness doctrine.

These cases informed each stage of the opinion: Ward supplied the TPM framework; Hill/McCullen/Madsen guided the medical-facility context; Reynolds/Billups dictated the evidentiary burden; Williams steered the vagueness inquiry.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Content Neutrality

The ordinance is facially neutral – it bans all amplified sound, irrespective of speaker viewpoint. The panel rejected Hebb’s inference of anti-abortion motive, citing lack of direct evidence and noting the City’s articulated aim of “protecting patients from harmful noise.” Importantly, the majority emphasized that disproportionate impact on a particular viewpoint does not convert a rule into a content-based one (McCullen principle).

3.2.2 Narrow Tailoring under Intermediate Scrutiny

Key holding: if Asheville ultimately produces credible evidence that its existing multi-factor “noise-disturbance” test and decibel limits failed in practice, a bright-line 150-foot amplifier ban might be deemed narrowly tailored. The district court, however, took all inferences against Asheville and concluded the ban was overbroad & underinclusive. The Fourth Circuit found that approach impermissible on summary judgment because:

Disputed fact questions linger regarding efficacy of prior enforcement and the feasibility of decibel-meter policing in public rights-of-way.
Under Ward, government need not adopt the least-restrictive means; it must merely avoid burdening “substantially more” speech than necessary.

3.2.3 Ample Alternative Channels

Although the district court never reached this prong, the panel indicated (dicta) that numerous channels remain: unamplified speech, signage, leafleting, and remote amplification outside the buffer. Thus, on remand, Hebb faces a high hurdle on this element.

3.2.4 Vagueness Claim

Reversing the district court, the Fourth Circuit declared that an ordinary speaker would understand that a device (cone or otherwise) that makes sound “louder or stronger” is “amplifying.” The majority stressed that the ordinance posed at most “close-case factual application,” not standardless enforcement – citing Williams: difficulty at the margins does not equal unconstitutional vagueness.

3.3 Practical & Doctrinal Impact

Municipal Drafting Guidance – Cities contemplating noise limits near sensitive land uses now have a roadmap: compile an objective record (complaints, enforcement logs, failed decibel-meter efforts) before enacting blanket bans.
Litigation Posture – Plaintiffs challenging TPM rules will need more than inference or legislative history; they must undermine the empirical foundation the city offers.
Fourth-Circuit Clarification – The decision reconciles prior precedents (Billups) with nationwide cases upholding buffer zones, emphasizing the evidence-based nature of narrow-tailoring review rather than categorical invalidation or approval.
Due-Process Landscape – By upholding a lay meaning of “amplified sound,” the court constrains vagueness challenges to truly opaque or subjective terms (e.g., “annoying,” “indecent”) rather than ordinary diction.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Traditional Public Forum: Places like sidewalks and parks historically open for public speech; restrictions here undergo heightened scrutiny.
Content-Neutral TPM Regulation: Government rule that regulates when, where, how, not what is said. Subject to “intermediate scrutiny.”
Intermediate Scrutiny Elements: 1) Content-neutral; 2) Significant governmental interest; 3) Narrowly tailored (doesn’t burden substantially more speech than necessary); 4) Leaves open ample alternative channels.
Overbreadth & Underinclusivity: Overbreadth: covers too much speech unrelated to the harm; Underinclusivity: fails to cover speech that causes the same harm, suggesting motive problems.
Narrow Tailoring Evidence Requirement (4th Cir.): Per Reynolds/Billups, cities must document serious consideration of less-restrictive methods (warnings, decibel enforcement) before flat bans.
Vagueness Doctrine: A statute is void if people “of ordinary intelligence” can’t tell what’s forbidden or if police lack clear standards, risking arbitrary enforcement.

5. Conclusion

Hebb v. City of Asheville reshapes First Amendment litigation over noise ordinances by stressing evidence-driven narrow tailoring while simultaneously signaling judicial receptivity to carefully supported, bright-line buffer zones. Municipalities retain power to safeguard patient well-being but must build an administrative record showing why lesser tools fail. On the flip side, activists challenging such rules must marshal tangible proof of ineffective enforcement and suppressed alternatives, not merely point to statutory breadth. Finally, the court’s vagueness holding underscores that everyday language, even if capable of edge-case debate, generally passes constitutional muster. As buffer-zone disputes proliferate nationwide, the Fourth Circuit’s nuanced framework will likely become a touchstone for district courts within – and beyond – its jurisdiction.

Bright-Line Buffer Zones & the First Amendment: Hebb v. City of Asheville (4th Cir. 2025)