Bolden v. State: Trial Courts Must Decide Counsel-Withdrawal Motions Before Plea-Withdrawal Proceedings, and Provide Counsel or a Faretta Waiver at This Critical Stage

1. Introduction

In Bolden v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed a recurring post-plea problem: what a trial court must do procedurally when a represented defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty/no-contest plea before sentencing and defense counsel responds—consistent with Reed v. State—by moving to withdraw as counsel and requesting substitute counsel.

The appellant, Troy Bolden, entered a no-contest plea to Assault Second Degree and firearm charges arising from a neighborhood shooting. Two months later, Bolden attempted to file a pro se plea-withdrawal motion alleging the plea was not knowing or voluntary and that trial counsel coerced him and failed to review discovery adequately. Trial counsel then moved to withdraw as counsel and sought appointment of substitute counsel due to conflict and breakdown of trust.

The Superior Court held a hearing that purported to address both motions, but it immediately took up plea withdrawal—without first deciding counsel’s withdrawal request—requiring Bolden to advocate the plea-withdrawal request on his own. The court later granted plea withdrawal as “involuntary,” but ultimately denied counsel’s withdrawal motion and kept the same lawyer for trial, where Bolden was convicted and sentenced to 23 years.

The key issues on appeal were: (i) whether Bolden was denied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during plea-withdrawal proceedings, and (ii) whether it was an abuse of discretion to deny substitution after a finding of involuntariness. The Supreme Court reversed on the first ground and did not reach the second.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court’s decision is best understood as a synthesis of (a) Delaware’s recent plea-withdrawal right-to-counsel framework and (b) federal substitution/waiver principles governing conflicts and self-representation.

• Reed v. State (Del. 2021): The opinion’s centerpiece. Reed held that if a defendant wants to withdraw a plea before sentencing and does not rescind the request, counsel must either (1) file the motion or (2) move to withdraw as counsel so the defendant can proceed with new counsel or pro se. It also notes that when the asserted basis includes coercion or ineffective assistance, counsel “should ask” for appointment of “new unconflicted counsel.”
  Influence in Bolden: Bolden operationalizes what Reed implied: once counsel elects option (2), the court must decide that motion first—otherwise the defendant is stranded without counsel at a critical stage.
• White v. State (Del. 2000) (TABLE): Cited alongside Reed for the proposition that plea withdrawal is a critical stage requiring counsel.
  Influence: Reinforces that the plea-withdrawal proceeding is not a mere housekeeping matter; it triggers Sixth Amendment protections.
• Lafler v. Cooper (U.S. 2012): Cited for the broad principle that the right to counsel applies to “critical stages” of a criminal proceeding and for the centrality of counsel’s advice in plea decision-making.
  Influence: Supports the Court’s prejudice reasoning: even if Bolden “won” the plea-withdrawal motion, the constitutional harm included the absence of counsel’s advice on whether to pursue withdrawal at all.
• Purnell v. State (Del. 2021): Quoted for the foundational role of the right to counsel in the adversary system.
  Influence: Frames the analysis as structural to fairness, not a technicality.
• Florida v. Nixon (U.S. 2004) and Cooke v. State (Del. 2009): Used to distinguish tactical decisions controlled by counsel from fundamental objectives controlled by the defendant.
  Influence: Helps situate plea withdrawal as a defendant-controlled objective—making counsel’s and the court’s procedural duties more exacting.
• Bultron v. State (Del. 2006) and United States v. Welty (3d Cir. 1982): Cited for the requirements of a valid waiver of counsel and the “searching inquiry” demanded by Faretta v. California.
  Influence: Supplies the roadmap the Superior Court failed to follow: if no substitute counsel is appointed and the defendant persists, the court must conduct a proper waiver colloquy before allowing self-representation.
• Faretta v. California (U.S. 1975): Establishes that self-representation requires a knowing and voluntary waiver after warnings about the risks.
  Influence: In Bolden, there was no such waiver—so the court could not permissibly proceed with Bolden acting as his own advocate on plea withdrawal.
• State v. Robinson (Del. 2019), Cooke v. State (Del. 2009), and Bultron v. State (Del. 2006): Cited for standards of review—abuse of discretion generally, de novo if constitutional error is alleged.
  Influence: Enables the Court to treat the sequencing failure as a Sixth Amendment violation reviewed de novo.
• Joyner v. State (Del. 2017) (TABLE) and Muto v. State (Del. 2004) (TABLE): Support the “broad discretion” trial courts have on counsel withdrawal/substitution and that “mere dissatisfaction” is not enough.
  Influence: The Court preserves trial-court discretion, but channels it through a required sequence and required waiver safeguards.
• United States v. Gillette (3d Cir. 2013), McKee v. Harris (2d Cir. 1981): Cited for “good cause” grounds for substitution—conflict of interest, complete breakdown in communication, irreconcilable conflict risking an unjust verdict.
  Influence: Supplies the doctrinal content of “good cause” for the Delaware procedure the Court adopts.
• United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (U.S. 2006), United States v. Rankin (3d Cir. 1986), United States v. Laura (3d Cir. 1979): Cited to underscore the trial court’s “wide latitude” to deny substitution sought for delay or unfair tactical advantage (“gamesmanship”).
  Influence: The Court’s pro-substitution guidance is explicitly conditional: absent signs of manipulation, substitute counsel is often favored when coercion/involuntariness is tied to counsel’s actions.
• United States v. Rivernider (2d Cir. 2016): Discussed to distinguish the State’s argument. In Rivernider, the trial court denied counsel’s withdrawal motion first, then addressed plea withdrawal with the defendant permitted to file pro se.
  Influence: Highlights the sequencing problem as decisive: Bolden’s trial court did the reverse, creating an uncounseled critical-stage proceeding.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps:

1. Plea withdrawal is a “critical stage,” so counsel is required.
   Drawing from Reed v. State, White v. State, and Lafler v. Cooper, the Court reiterates that a request to withdraw a plea before sentencing is not ancillary; it is a stage where the defendant must have counsel unless counsel is validly waived.
2. Reed v. State necessarily implies a court-side sequencing rule.
   Reed created a binary counsel obligation: file the motion or withdraw as counsel so the client can pursue the objective with new counsel or pro se. If counsel chooses withdrawal, the Court reasons, the trial court must decide that motion first; otherwise the defendant is placed in a procedural no-man’s land—still “represented,” but without functioning advocacy on the plea-withdrawal issue because counsel has declared a disabling conflict/breakdown.
3. If the court denies substitution and the defendant persists, a full Faretta v. California/Welty colloquy is mandatory.
   The Superior Court neither decided the motion to withdraw as counsel at the outset nor conducted a “searching inquiry” to ensure a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel before having Bolden litigate plea withdrawal himself. That combination produced a constitutional violation: Bolden was “denied his constitutional right to counsel at a critical stage.”

A notable feature is the Court’s rejection of a “no harm, no foul” view. Even though the Superior Court granted Bolden’s plea-withdrawal request, the Supreme Court held the absence of counsel was prejudicial because counsel’s advice could have affected the antecedent, defendant-controlled decision whether to pursue withdrawal at all. The Court also rejected importing a Strickland-style prejudice framework into this direct appeal, emphasizing it was reviewing trial-court error (and its constitutional consequences), not counsel’s effectiveness.

3.3 Impact

Bolden establishes a clear Delaware procedural directive for Superior Court practice in the wake of Reed v. State:

• Mandatory sequencing: When a Reed-style motion to withdraw as counsel is filed in response to a defendant’s desire to withdraw a plea, the trial court must decide the counsel-withdrawal/substitution issue before any plea-withdrawal litigation.
• Good-cause framework with a practical presumption: Although trial courts retain discretion under “good cause,” Bolden signals that allegations tying plea coercion/involuntariness to counsel—absent gamesmanship—will “often favor” appointing substitute counsel.
• Self-representation safeguards in this context: If substitution is denied and the defendant insists on proceeding, courts must conduct full Faretta v. California warnings (as described in United States v. Welty) before any pro se plea-withdrawal advocacy, and should also alert the defendant to downstream consequences (including trial representation if plea withdrawal succeeds).
• Remedial template: On reversal for this error, the Court directed reinstatement of the plea and appointment of substitute counsel, then a counseled decision on whether to renew plea withdrawal—providing a roadmap for future remands.

Practically, Bolden should reduce (i) hybrid-representation confusion (defendant arguing while “represented”), (ii) post hoc rationales that plea withdrawal “moots” counsel-conflict concerns, and (iii) avoidable reversals caused by uncounseled litigation at a constitutionally protected stage.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Critical stage”: A step in a criminal case where what happens can meaningfully affect outcomes (rights, strategy, exposure, or the course of the prosecution). At a critical stage, the defendant is entitled to counsel unless the right is validly waived.
• Reed v. State “binary choice”: If a defendant wants to withdraw a plea before sentencing, defense counsel must either file the motion (if it can be done consistent with professional obligations) or seek to withdraw as counsel so the defendant can pursue the objective with new counsel or pro se.
• “Good cause” for substitute counsel: More than frustration or disagreement. It typically means an actual conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication, or an irreconcilable conflict that risks an unjust result.
• Faretta v. California waiver / “searching inquiry”: A court cannot simply allow a defendant to represent himself because he starts speaking or files papers. The judge must warn the defendant about the disadvantages and ensure the decision to proceed without counsel is knowing and voluntary.
• “Gamesmanship”: Using a request for new counsel (or plea withdrawal) as a tactic to delay trial or manufacture procedural advantage. If present, it weighs strongly against substitution.
• Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d): The Delaware rule governing withdrawal of pleas; the trial court should reach the Rule 32(d) merits only after counsel status is properly resolved.

5. Conclusion

Bolden v. State transforms Reed v. State from a counsel-duty case into a court-procedure rule: trial courts must resolve motions to withdraw as counsel (and decide substitution under “good cause”) before entertaining plea-withdrawal proceedings. If the defendant will proceed without counsel, the court must first obtain a valid Faretta v. California waiver through a “searching inquiry.” Because the Superior Court required Bolden to litigate plea withdrawal without counsel and without a waiver at this critical stage, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed his convictions, reinstated the plea for remand purposes, and required appointment of substitute counsel to ensure any renewed plea-withdrawal decision is made with constitutionally adequate assistance.