B. Practical Result

Procedurally, Gonzalez regains the ability to litigate whether:

• TMB exceeded its statutory authority in targeting him as a non‑licensee who did not practice medicine; and
• Texas Occupations Code § 104.004, and its application to his campaign speech, violates the First Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution.

The Texas Supreme Court does not decide the free‑speech or statutory‑authority issues; it simply ensures that Gonzalez can bring those challenges in a live case, rather than being cut off procedurally by the redundant‑remedies doctrine or agency‑crafted procedural rules.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015)

Patel is the linchpin of the Court’s treatment of the redundant‑remedies doctrine. In Patel, eyebrow threaders challenged cosmetology licensing requirements as unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution’s Due Course of Law Clause. The agency argued that the plaintiffs’ UDJA claims were barred as “redundant” because they could have raised the same constitutional issues in an APA appeal of disciplinary actions.

The Texas Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding:

• The APA’s remedies are limited to reversal or remand of the specific agency order or citation at issue.
• By contrast, the UDJA allowed plaintiffs to obtain prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of unconstitutional statutes and regulations.
• Therefore, the UDJA claims did not present a redundant remedy, even if overlapping issues could have been raised in an APA appeal.

In Gonzalez, the Court explicitly tracks this reasoning. It emphasizes that the focus is on whether the alternative procedure (APA review) makes the same remedy available—not merely whether it allows the same claim or theory to be argued.

2. Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2022)

Jones further refined the redundant‑remedies doctrine. The Court there noted that UDJA actions are improper when the plaintiff can obtain the same relief through another vehicle. Importantly, the Court in Gonzalez cites Jones for the proposition that the relevant question is whether a plaintiff “could be awarded relief that would render a declaratory judgment redundant.”

This citation reinforces that the doctrine is about overlapping relief, not overlapping legal issues. Gonzalez therefore confirms that courts must examine the scope and nature of requested remedies, not the mere availability of alternative routes to litigate similar arguments.

3. Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2016)

Serafine is a federal Fifth Circuit case in which the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists sanctioned a political candidate for using the title “psychologist” when she was not licensed as such. The Fifth Circuit held that this violated the candidate’s First Amendment rights.

The Texas Supreme Court in Gonzalez cites Serafine to emphasize two points:

• It is highly unusual for Texas professional licensing boards to police campaign speech.
• There is federal precedent treating such board actions as constitutionally problematic under the First Amendment.

Although the Court does not decide the constitutional issue here, Serafine looms large as a signal that TMB’s position on campaign speech will face serious scrutiny on remand.

4. City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission, 51 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam)

The Court cites City of Corpus Christi for the proposition that constitutional challenges—including facial challenges—may be considered within the context of an APA “contested case” review proceeding. This citation is crucial to dismantling the court of appeals’ logic: if the ability to raise a given constitutional challenge in an APA proceeding were enough to make UDJA claims “redundant,” then even facial challenges would be barred—which contradicts the court of appeals’ own holding.

5. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009)

Heinrich addresses ultra vires suits and sovereign immunity. It holds that:

• Suits alleging that government officials acted ultra vires—beyond their legal authority—may proceed despite sovereign immunity to the extent they seek prospective relief compelling compliance with the law.
• Such suits must be brought against state actors in their official capacity, not the governmental entity itself.

The Court in Gonzalez cites Heinrich to signal that, on remand, Gonzalez can amend his pleadings and name individual state actors as defendants in his ultra vires and constitutional claims for prospective relief. This underscores that these claims are structurally viable vehicles for challenging TMB’s future enforcement posture.

6. Continental Casualty Insurance Co. v. Functional Restoration Associates, 19 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. 2000)

Continental Casualty is the foundation for the Court’s ruling on jurisdiction for substantial‑evidence review. It states:

• There is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless:
  • a statute expressly provides such a right, or
  • the order violates a constitutional right.
• An agency’s rulemaking power cannot expand or create district court jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature has authorized by statute.

In Gonzalez, the Court applies this principle to reject the argument that a TMB rule (22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f), since repealed) created a freestanding right to judicial review of cease‑and‑desist orders. Absent a statutory grant of judicial review—or a constitutional basis for review—courts lack jurisdiction for substantial‑evidence review.

7. Other Citations

• King Street Patriots v. Texas Democratic Party, 521 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. 2017), and Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989): cited for the “usual judicial practice” of deciding as‑applied constitutional challenges before facial challenges. This highlights the oddity of remanding only the facial challenge.
• Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1963): referenced to note, but not decide, whether any inherent constitutional right to judicial review might exist. Gonzalez did not make such an argument.
• Academic commentary (Hamilton & Jewett, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 285 (1976)): noted regarding the scope of “contested case” under the APA, but the Court ultimately sidesteps deciding that question here.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Reframing the Redundant‑Remedies Doctrine

The pivotal doctrinal move in Gonzalez is the Court’s insistence that the redundant‑remedies doctrine is about remedies, not claims.

The court of appeals reasoned as follows:

• Gonzalez could have obtained judicial review of the TMB’s cease‑and‑desist order by timely filing under the APA.
• In that APA proceeding, he could have raised:
  • his constitutional objections;
  • his argument that TMB exceeded its statutory authority.
• Therefore, his UDJA ultra vires and as‑applied constitutional claims were “redundant” and barred.

The Texas Supreme Court rejects this chain of reasoning for two main reasons.

a. Misreading the Petition

First, the Court holds that the court of appeals constricted Gonzalez’s pleadings too narrowly. The appellate court treated all non‑facial challenges as directed solely at the cease‑and‑desist order itself. The Supreme Court, by contrast, reads the petition as seeking:

• Declaratory and injunctive relief that goes beyond the specific order, including:
  • A declaration that TMB lacks statutory authority to regulate non‑licensees like Gonzalez for speech alone; and
  • A declaration that applying § 104.004 to Gonzalez’s campaign speech violates the federal and Texas constitutions.
• Protection against future enforcement, not just reversal of the existing cease‑and‑desist order.

Thus, the Court observes that these claims, like the facial constitutional challenge, seek relief “beyond reversal” of the order.

b. Focusing on Remedies, Not Availability of an APA Forum

Second, the Court emphasizes that the redundant‑remedies doctrine is misapplied when a court focuses solely on whether the same issues could have been raised in an APA proceeding. The Court notes:

• It is “true but irrelevant” that Gonzalez could have raised his constitutional and ultra vires claims in an APA petition.
• Under Patel, what matters is whether the APA provides the same remedy that the UDJA action seeks.
• The APA’s remedies are limited to reversal or remand of the specific agency order; they do not reach prospective, order‑independent constitutional or statutory declarations.

In other words, the doctrine is not the “redundant‑claims” doctrine; it is the “redundant‑remedies” doctrine. Because Gonzalez seeks:

• prospective injunctive relief against future enforcement; and
• broad declaratory relief about TMB’s authority and the constitutionality of § 104.004,

the APA cannot furnish the same relief, even though it could entertain similar legal arguments. Thus, his UDJA claims are not barred.

2. Treatment of the Facial Constitutional Claim

The court of appeals allowed Gonzalez’s facial challenge to § 104.004 to proceed, reasoning that a declaration of facial unconstitutionality necessarily extends beyond reversal of a single agency order. The Supreme Court agrees with that analysis and notes that, if the logic of the court of appeals were applied consistently, the facial challenge would also be barred—because it too could have been raised in an APA petition.

This contradiction underscores the mistake of equating “could have been raised in an APA case” with “remedy is redundant.” By converging the analysis across facial and as‑applied challenges, the Supreme Court restores coherence to the doctrine: any claim—facial or as‑applied—that seeks relief beyond reversal of a discrete order is not barred as redundant merely because similar arguments could have been pressed under the APA.

3. Affirmance of the Dismissal of the Substantial‑Evidence Claim

On the substantial‑evidence challenge, the Supreme Court affirms the dismissal but on a simpler ground than the court of appeals.

a. Gonzalez’s Litigation Choice

Gonzalez expressly disclaimed reliance on the APA. Instead, he relied on an old TMB rule (22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f), since repealed) which—according to him—created a right to judicial review of cease‑and‑desist orders in the Travis County District Court, without a time limit.

b. Jurisdiction Cannot Be Created by Agency Rule

Relying on Continental Casualty, the Court reiterates that:

• Judicial review of agency action requires a statutory grant of jurisdiction (or a constitutional basis).
• An agency rule cannot enlarge or create district court jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature enacted.

Therefore:

• Because Gonzalez disavowed the APA as a jurisdictional basis;
• And pointed only to a rule, not a statute, as a source of judicial review;
• The district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain his substantial‑evidence review claim.

The Court explicitly notes that Gonzalez does not argue for an inherent constitutional right to judicial review of this order; thus it does not reach that broader constitutional question.

4. The Contested‑Case Question the Court Leaves Open

Before the Supreme Court, the parties disputed whether the cease‑and‑desist proceedings were a “contested case” under the APA. The court of appeals had said yes, reasoning that a contested case exists whenever an agency in fact provides an adjudicative hearing—even if statute does not require one.

The Supreme Court notes that there is authority suggesting “contested case” may be limited to legislatively mandated hearings, not hearings voluntarily provided by agencies. But the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve this definitional issue because its jurisdictional analysis for the substantial‑evidence claim rests on a separate and dispositive point: Gonzalez chose not to rely on the APA at all.

5. Pleadings and Remand: The Practical Path Forward

The Court also addresses a procedural concern raised at oral argument—that Gonzalez’s live petition may not have clearly requested declaratory or injunctive relief on constitutional grounds.

The Court notes:

• Gonzalez’s petition includes a prayer for “such other and further equitable relief” as he may be entitled to;
• Under Texas practice (e.g., Starr v. Ferguson), this can be broad enough to support various forms of relief consistent with the pleaded claims and evidence;
• Critically, the TMB did not cross‑petition the Supreme Court to challenge the court of appeals’ remand of the facial constitutional claim.

Because the case is returning to the district court anyway, Gonzalez may:

• File an amended petition;
• Explicitly add claims for prospective constitutional and ultra vires relief; and
• Name appropriate state officials as defendants under Heinrich.

This assures that procedural niceties will not obstruct a full and fair adjudication of the central statutory and constitutional questions on remand.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Doctrinal Impact: Narrowing the Redundant‑Remedies Doctrine

The decision clarifies and constrains the redundant‑remedies doctrine in Texas administrative law. Key consequences:

• Remedy‑centered analysis: Courts must distinguish between:
  • Order‑specific review (e.g., APA appeals seeking reversal of a particular order); and
  • Systemic, prospective relief (e.g., UDJA actions attacking statutes as unconstitutional or agencies as acting ultra vires).
  The mere ability to raise the same arguments in an APA appeal does not automatically make a UDJA action redundant.
• Preservation of constitutional and ultra vires UDJA suits: Regulated individuals and entities retain a robust path to seek:
  • Prospective declaratory relief declaring statutes unconstitutional (facially or as applied); and
  • Ultra vires relief to prevent agencies from exceeding statutory authority.
  Agencies cannot rely on the APA’s limited remedial scope and deadlines as a complete shield against such litigation.
• Consistency with Patel and Jones: The opinion reinforces that Patel was not an outlier; rather, it is the controlling framework for understanding when UDJA actions are barred as redundant.

2. Structural Impact on Agency Power and Litigation Strategy

For agencies:

• They must anticipate increased use of UDJA and ultra vires suits challenging:
  • The scope of their statutory authority;
  • The constitutionality of their enabling provisions or implementing regulations.
• They cannot rely on APA deadlines (e.g., 30‑day filing periods) as a universal time bar to all challenges—especially where plaintiffs seek prospective constitutional or statutory declarations rather than mere reversal of a particular order.

For regulated parties:

• Strategic choice: They can choose between:
  • APA review (if available) to attack a specific adverse order; and/or
  • UDJA and ultra vires suits to pursue broader, forward‑looking relief.
• They must still navigate sovereign immunity doctrine, but Heinrich‑style ultra vires claims remain a viable route, as reaffirmed here.

3. Implications for Political Speech and Licensing Boards

While the Court does not resolve the free‑speech issues, the opinion has important implications:

• Boards policing campaign speech is suspect: The Court emphasizes that TMB’s action is unprecedented in its own history, and it cites Serafine—which condemned similar conduct by another Texas board. The framing suggests skepticism toward regulatory expansion into campaign speech.
• Substantive issues queued up: On remand, courts will likely confront questions such as:
  • Is § 104.004, as applied to campaign speech by someone who truthfully holds an M.D. but is unlicensed, a content‑based restriction on political speech?
  • Does compelling Gonzalez to add clarifying disclaimers (e.g., that he is not licensed to practice medicine) amount to compelled speech, and if so, what level of scrutiny applies?
  • Can the State’s interest in preventing deception about professional credentials justify such regulation in the uniquely protected context of political campaigns?
• Chilling effects: Boards should consider whether aggressive enforcement against campaign speech risks chilling legitimate political expression by professionals and degree‑holders who are not licensees (or whose licensure status is complex).

Even if the ultimate merits ruling remains to be written, Gonzalez ensures that these constitutional questions will not be quietly extinguished via procedural doctrines.

4. Clarifying the Limits of Agency Rulemaking

The Court’s rejection of jurisdiction based on a TMB rule independently reinforces a core structural principle:

• Legislature controls judicial review: Only the Legislature (or the Constitution) can authorize judicial review of agency action. Agencies cannot self‑confer review rights or expand district court jurisdiction by rule.
• Implications for rule drafters: Agencies must be careful in drafting procedural rules. Promising review by “petition in district court” where no statute authorizes it invites legal uncertainty and, as here, ultimate rejection by the courts.

This aspect of the decision protects separation of powers: courts derive jurisdiction from statutes and the Constitution, not from agencies’ preferences.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Redundant‑Remedies Doctrine

The redundant‑remedies doctrine is a judicial rule designed to prevent litigants from using the UDJA or similar vehicles when:

• An alternative statutory mechanism already provides the same kind of relief; and
• Allowing the UDJA suit would be unnecessary and duplicative.

The key clarifications from Gonzalez:

• The doctrine asks: Does another procedure (like an APA appeal) offer the same remedy?
• It does not ask: Could the plaintiff have raised the same arguments or claims elsewhere?
• If the UDJA suit seeks broader, prospective relief (e.g., declaring a statute invalid for future cases), and the alternative procedure only affects one specific order, then the UDJA suit is not redundant.

2. Facial vs. As‑Applied Constitutional Challenges

• Facial challenge: Argues that a statute is unconstitutional in all, or virtually all, of its applications. A successful facial challenge can invalidate the statute broadly.
• As‑applied challenge: Argues that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff’s particular facts or circumstances, without necessarily invalidating it in all other contexts.

In Gonzalez:

• The facial challenge targets § 104.004 as overly broad, allegedly prohibiting anyone with an M.D. or other doctoral degree from truthfully describing their education and training.
• The as‑applied challenge focuses on the use of “doctor” and “physician” in the specific context of a congressional campaign by an unlicensed but medically trained candidate.

3. Ultra Vires Claims

“Ultra vires” is Latin for “beyond the powers.” An ultra vires claim:

• Alleges that a government official or agency acted outside the authority granted by statute or the Constitution.
• Is often used to overcome sovereign immunity, because Texas law allows suits seeking to require officials to comply with the law, even if the State itself is generally immune from suit.

Here, Gonzalez’s ultra vires claim asserts that TMB:

• Has authority to regulate “the practice of medicine” by licensees or unlicensed practitioners, but
• Does not have statutory authority to regulate:
  • Non‑licensees who are not practicing medicine; and
  • Purely political speech during an election campaign.

4. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and “Contested Case”

• The Texas APA provides a mechanism to obtain judicial review of certain agency decisions, particularly those made in a “contested case.”
• A “contested case” generally involves a statutory right to an adjudicative hearing before an agency makes a determination affecting legal rights.
• Judicial review under the APA is usually subject to:
  • Short filing deadlines (e.g., 30 days);
  • Limited remedies, such as reversal or remand of the agency’s order, based on standards like “substantial evidence.”

In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court bypasses the hard question of whether the TMB’s voluntarily provided hearing made the matter a “contested case,” because Gonzalez chose not to rely on the APA at all for jurisdiction.

5. Substantial‑Evidence Review

In an APA appeal, courts typically apply the “substantial‑evidence” standard. In simplified terms:

• The court asks whether the agency’s decision is reasonably supported by evidence in the record.
• The court does not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for the agency’s on factual matters.
• The usual remedies are:
  • Affirming the order;
  • Reversing the order; or
  • Remanding the case for further proceedings.

This kind of review does not typically allow a court to declare a statute unconstitutional in the abstract, or to issue broad injunctions against future enforcement apart from the specific order under review.

6. Jurisdiction and the Role of Statutes vs. Rules

“Jurisdiction” refers to a court’s legal power to hear and decide a case. In Texas:

• District court jurisdiction over agency decisions must be conferred either:
  • By statute (e.g., the APA); or
  • By a recognized constitutional basis (e.g., if an agency’s action violates constitutional rights and no statute otherwise provides review).
• An agency rule cannot, by itself, create or expand court jurisdiction.

Thus, an agency cannot, merely by rule, invite parties to “appeal” to the district court if no statute authorizes such appeals. This is the core reason Gonzalez’s substantial‑evidence claim fails for lack of jurisdiction.

V. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Gonzalez v. Texas Medical Board is an important procedural decision with broad substantive consequences.

• On the redundant‑remedies doctrine: The Texas Supreme Court makes clear that what matters is the remedial scope of the alternative proceeding, not the overlap in legal arguments. When a plaintiff seeks prospective constitutional or ultra vires relief that reaches beyond a single agency order, the UDJA suit is not barred merely because similar arguments could have been raised in an APA appeal.
• On judicial review of agency actions: Agencies cannot, by rule, grant courts jurisdiction to review their decisions. Only the Legislature (or the Constitution) can authorize such review. Substantial‑evidence review requires a statutory basis.
• On ultra vires and constitutional suits: The decision reaffirms the availability of ultra vires and UDJA actions for prospective relief against agencies alleged to have exceeded statutory authority or to be enforcing unconstitutional statutes.
• On professional licensing and political speech: Although the Court does not resolve the First Amendment or Texas‑Constitutional questions, it ensures that those issues will be litigated on the merits. The opinion indirectly signals skepticism toward the idea that a medical licensing board can police how a congressional candidate with an M.D. describes himself to voters, especially in light of federal precedent like Serafine.

In sum, Gonzalez fortifies the procedural pathways by which individuals can challenge both the scope of agency authority and the constitutionality of professional‑regulation statutes, particularly where core political speech is at stake. Agencies seeking to regulate such speech will no longer be able to hide behind procedural barriers fashioned from a misapplied redundant‑remedies doctrine or overreaching agency rules on judicial review. On remand, the case promises to become a major vehicle for clarifying the permissible intersection between professional regulation and the constitutional guarantees of free expression in the political arena.