Beyond Objective Credentials: Communication as an Essential Function and “Qualified Individual” Status under the Rehabilitation Act

Commentary on Richard Fowlkes v. U.S. Department of Defense (6th Cir. No. 25‑3126, Dec. 8, 2025)

I. Introduction

This unpublished Sixth Circuit decision addresses a recurring and legally difficult question in disability discrimination law: when does an employee’s inability to control disruptive or aggressive behavior—caused by a mental-health disability—mean that the employee is not a “qualified individual” under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA?

Plaintiff–appellant Richard Fowlkes, a civilian Electronics Engineer on the U.S. Air Force’s F‑15 Qatar Team at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, alleged that he was terminated because of his PTSD and major depressive disorder. He had a strong technical background—advanced engineering degrees and prior deployment with the Air Force—but his tenure was marked by repeated, serious communication problems with both a key contractor (Boeing) and co-workers. The Air Force terminated him during his two‑year probationary period; he claimed disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.

The legal crux of the appeal is whether Fowlkes could show that he was “otherwise qualified” to perform the essential functions of his engineering job, with or without reasonable accommodation—an indispensable element of a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act, which incorporates the ADA’s standards.

The Sixth Circuit (Judge McKeague, joined by Judges Griffin and Mathis) affirmed summary judgment for the Department of Defense, holding that even accepting his disability and his requested accommodations, Fowlkes could not perform the essential communication functions of his role. The court also clarified that, unlike age-discrimination cases where courts look only to “objective qualifications” at the prima facie stage, disability cases require an inquiry into whether the plaintiff can in fact perform essential job functions with reasonable accommodation.

Although marked “Not Recommended for Publication,” this decision offers important, persuasive guidance in at least three respects:

It reinforces that effective, non-adversarial communication can be an “essential function” for technical positions, not just “soft skills.”
It emphasizes that a requested accommodation must actually address the job‑related limitations caused by the disability to render an employee “qualified.”
It delineates a doctrinal distinction between disability claims and age-discrimination claims regarding the use of performance evidence at the prima facie stage.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

Fowlkes began work as an Electronics Engineer on October 1, 2018, on the F‑15 Qatar Team. His responsibilities included technical projects supporting foreign military sales and extensive interaction with Boeing and other contractors. Like many federal civilian hires, he was in a two‑year probationary period so that supervisors could continue to evaluate his performance and conduct.

Fowlkes suffers from PTSD and major depressive disorder. Early in his tenure, he disclosed his conditions to his first‑level supervisor, Donald Huckle, and requested:

Flexibility to attend medical appointments during normal work hours; and
A general understanding by supervisors of his PTSD so that they could “help [him] be successful with it.”

He described his PTSD as sometimes causing exaggerated startle responses and anger, but he expressly rejected proposals for accommodations directed at avoiding adversarial encounters or assisting him with anger management—for example, having someone join him on calls to de-escalate if needed. Without a formal accommodation process, Huckle informally honored his scheduling request and maintained an open-door policy for discussion.

Despite this, Fowlkes’s tenure was “defined” by interpersonal problems:

Supervisors found his communications with contractors “a little too inflammatory,” such that colleagues had to screen his questions before they went to Boeing.
He was insubordinate in tone, attempted to circumvent the chain of command, and used passive-aggressive communication internally.
He received a mid‑point review warning him to “minimize the adversarial nature” of his interactions.

Two incidents loom particularly large:

The May 6, 2019 “Boeing call” (“the May 6th incident”). On a conference call with Boeing, when a representative made a comment that questioned his reliability, Fowlkes erupted, yelling so loudly that he could be heard across the office, even through noise‑canceling headphones. He described himself as going from “zero to 100” like “Bruce Banner transforming into the Incredible Hulk.” Colleagues were alarmed; his second‑level supervisor, Tobin Denney, had to apologize to Boeing and assure them Fowlkes did not represent the team’s standards. Denney and supervisor Stephanie NeCamp counseled him and offered an accommodation: someone could sit in on contractor calls to help de‑escalate. Fowlkes refused, insisting he did not need such assistance.
The August 2, 2019 internal outburst. While venting to contracting colleagues about Boeing, Fowlkes became increasingly agitated and loud. When a co‑worker tried to calm him, he continued raising his voice until a contracting officer ordered him to leave the office and return only once he could control his emotions. Again, colleagues reported concerns about his instability and unpredictability.

After these and many other episodes, Denney concluded that he had never seen an employee create such disruption. Supervisors compiled a list for human resources documenting Fowlkes’s adversarial behavior, graphic comments in staff meetings, and complaints from coworkers and contractors, highlighting his refusal to accept help or proposed accommodations. HR and management jointly agreed to terminate him during probation, citing his failure to demonstrate ability to perform the job’s communication demands.

Fowlkes sued under the Rehabilitation Act, also initially alleging whistleblower retaliation (which he later voluntarily dismissed). The district court granted summary judgment to the Department of Defense on the disability discrimination claim. Fowlkes appealed.

B. Procedural Posture and Standard of Review

The Sixth Circuit reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, asking whether there is any “genuine dispute of material fact” and whether the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)), drawing all reasonable inferences for the nonmovant. The court cited:

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) on the basic summary judgment framework;
Saunders v. Ford Motor Co., 879 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2018), Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 11 F.4th 483 (6th Cir. 2021), and Walden v. Gen. Elec. Int'l, Inc., 119 F.4th 1049 (6th Cir. 2024), regarding the burden on the moving and nonmoving parties; and
Energy Mich., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 126 F.4th 476 (6th Cir. 2025), for the split between legal issues (de novo) and factual findings (clear error).

C. Holding

The court held that Fowlkes failed at the prima facie stage under the Rehabilitation Act because he could not show he was “otherwise qualified” for his engineering position, with or without reasonable accommodation. In particular:

While his requested accommodations (scheduling flexibility and general understanding of his PTSD) were considered reasonable, they did not enable him to perform the job’s essential communication functions.
Effective, professional communication—with contractors and coworkers—was an essential function of the Electronics Engineer position, as shown by the written job description and the operational realities of the F‑15 Qatar program.
Even with his accommodations, Fowlkes’s communication failures—marked by explosive outbursts and adversarial conduct—made him unable to meet this essential function.
His refusal of an offered accommodation (a colleague to help de‑escalate contractor calls) meant the court would not consider that hypothetical accommodation in deciding if he was “qualified.”
His argument that the court must look only to objective qualifications (degrees, experience) at the prima facie stage—under Wexler and Morgan—was rejected as inapposite to disability claims, because the Rehabilitation Act by definition requires an inquiry into ability to perform essential functions with accommodation.

Because Fowlkes did not establish that he was a “qualified individual,” the court did not proceed to the employer’s proffered reasons or pretext under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The judgment for the Department of Defense was affirmed.

III. Legal Framework and Precedents

A. Rehabilitation Act and ADA Standards

The court begins by emphasizing that, for federal employees, the Rehabilitation Act is the “exclusive remedy” for disability-based employment discrimination claims. It cites Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2007), for that point.

Under 29 U.S.C. § 794(d), Rehabilitation Act claims are analyzed “under the same standards” applicable to the ADA. The court relies on:

Patterson v. Kent State Univ., 155 F.4th 635, 651 (6th Cir. 2025); and
Brent‑Crumbley v. Brennan, 799 F. App’x 342 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).

Thus, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that he is a “qualified individual” with a disability, which the ADA (incorporated by the Rehabilitation Act) defines as someone who, “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

B. Indirect Evidence and McDonnell Douglas

Because Fowlkes relied on indirect (circumstantial) evidence of discrimination, the court applied the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework, citing Bledsoe v. Tenn. Valley Auth. Bd. of Dirs., 42 F.4th 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2022).

Under Bledsoe and Jones, a prima facie case of disability discrimination requires the plaintiff to show:

He is disabled;
He is otherwise qualified for the job, with or without reasonable accommodation;
He suffered an adverse employment action;
His employer knew or had reason to know of his disability; and
Following the adverse action, he was replaced by a nondisabled person or the position remained open.

If that prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action, and then back to the employee to prove that reason is pretextual. Because Fowlkes failed on element (2), the court never reached steps two and three.

C. The “Qualified Individual” Test: Kellar, Cooper, Jakubowski, King

The panel draws on its recent decision in Kellar v. Yunion, Inc., 157 F.4th 855 (6th Cir. 2025), to structure the “qualified individual” inquiry as a three-step analysis:

The employee bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that it is objectively reasonable.
The court relies on Cooper v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 93 F.4th 360 (6th Cir. 2024), for this proposition.
The employee must then show that, with the proposed accommodation, he can perform the essential functions of the job.
This step reflects Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 202 (6th Cir. 2010).
Only if the employee meets this burden does the burden shift to the employer to show that the accommodation would impose an “undue hardship” on the operation of the business, as described in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), and discussed in King v. Steward Trumbull Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 30 F.4th 551, 568 (6th Cir. 2022).

In this case, the court holds that:

Fowlkes met step 1 by requesting reasonable accommodations (scheduling flexibility and general understanding of his PTSD);
But he failed step 2 because—even with these accommodations—he could not perform the essential communication functions of his job;
Therefore, the court never reached the undue hardship inquiry at step 3.

D. Essential Functions: Rorrer, Thompson, and the Regulations

To assess whether Fowlkes could perform “essential functions,” the court invokes the ADA regulations (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)) and Sixth Circuit cases:

Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025 (6th Cir. 2014); and
Thompson v. Fresh Prods., LLC, 985 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2021).

Key principles from these sources:

“Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position” (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)).
If the position “exists to perform” the function, that function is usually essential (id. § 1630.2(n)(2)).
Courts consider:
- the employer’s judgment,
- written job descriptions prepared before hiring,
- the amount of time spent performing the function, and
- the consequences of not requiring the function.
Whether a function is essential is usually a fact question and often not suitable for summary judgment—but may be decided on summary judgment where the evidence is one‑sided.

Here, the written job description required the Electronics Engineer to:

“Effectively communicate” with customers, coworkers, and groups;
Provide “clear, concise” communication at the appropriate level; and
“Promote and maintain an environment of cooperation and teamwork.”

Given that the position effectively “exists” to serve as a liaison between the Air Force and Boeing, the court concludes that communication is an essential function. Fowlkes himself admitted that engineers “need to communicate with each other professionally” to solve assigned problems.

E. Wexler, Morgan, and the Objective Qualification Argument

Fowlkes relied heavily on:

Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); and
Morgan v. Interstate Resources, Inc., No. 23‑3866, 2024 WL 3221394 (6th Cir. June 28, 2024).

Those cases hold that in age-discrimination claims, courts should look only to “objective” criteria (like education, experience, skills) to determine whether a plaintiff is “qualified” at the prima facie stage; performance-related criticisms belong at the later “pretext” stage.

The panel here draws a clear doctrinal line: Wexler and Morgan concern ADEA claims, not disability law. Disability claims under the ADA/Rehabilitation Act are different because the statute itself defines “qualified individual” in terms of whether the person can perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation. Thus:

Courts in disability cases cannot restrict themselves to “objective credentials” when evaluating the prima facie case.
They must consider whether the plaintiff’s limitations (even those tied to disability) prevent performance of essential functions, despite accommodations.
Consequently, performance evidence may legitimately appear at the prima facie stage in ADA/Rehabilitation Act cases.

The court also rejects Fowlkes’s contention that the district court improperly blended the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason (poor communication) into the prima facie analysis. It explains that:

It is independently necessary to assess whether a plaintiff is a “qualified individual,” even if that factual inquiry overlaps with the employer’s explained reason for termination.
The mere overlap does not insulate the plaintiff from scrutiny at the prima facie stage.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning Applied to the Facts

A. Step One: Reasonable Accommodation Proposed

The court first considers whether Fowlkes satisfied his initial burden by proposing a reasonable accommodation. He asked for:

Scheduling flexibility to attend medical appointments; and
An understanding from supervisors about his PTSD and a desire to help him “be successful with it.”

Key points:

The court characterizes these requests as reasonable, even though they were vague and largely overlapped with existing policies (e.g., flexible scheduling and an open-door policy).
Although Huckle never documented a formal accommodation, he honored the requests informally, particularly regarding time for medical appointments.
The court notes that Fowlkes did not understand his request to include any counseling, personal assistance for anger, or specific interventions regarding conflict de-escalation, and he later rejected such focused assistance when offered.

Because these accommodations were modest and consistent with general workplace practices, the court treats them as objectively reasonable. Step one is therefore satisfied.

B. Step Two: Ability to Perform Essential Communication Functions

The pivotal question is whether, with his requested accommodations, Fowlkes could perform the essential communication functions of his job. The court answers no, for several interconnected reasons:

1. Communication as an Essential Function

The court reasons from:

The job description’s emphasis on “effective” and “clear” communication, teamwork, and cooperation;
The nature of the position—which “exists to perform” liaison and communication functions with Boeing and other contractors;
Fowlkes’s own admission that professional communication is central to the engineering role.

Given this, the court holds that communication—both external (with Boeing) and internal (with colleagues and supervisors)—is an essential function of Fowlkes’s job.

2. Fowlkes’s Performance Even with Accommodations

The court then examines the record of Fowlkes’s performance after he received the accommodations he requested. Even assuming:

He had flexible scheduling to attend medical appointments; and
Supervisors and colleagues were aware of his PTSD and sought to be understanding;

his communication problems persisted and, by supervisory accounts, worsened:

His questions to contractors had to be screened because they were too inflammatory.
He repeatedly ignored the chain of command and challenged his supervisor’s directions in disruptive ways.
He engaged in explosive outbursts (the May 6 Boeing call and the August 2 internal incident) that alarmed colleagues and seriously strained the contractor relationship.
He was warned in his mid‑point review that his adversarial communication was unacceptable and needed improvement, but there was no sustained change.

The court concludes that these behaviors “interfered with his ability to perform his job,” because he was supposed to build rapport, support teamwork, and effectively liaise with Boeing. Instead, he became a source of disruption that other employees had to mitigate.

3. The Refusal of Additional, Targeted Accommodation

After the May 6 incident, Denney and NeCamp offered a more targeted accommodation: another employee could attend phone calls with Fowlkes to help manage and de‑escalate adversarial interactions with contractors. Fowlkes refused, stating he was “an adult” who did not need that assistance.

The court notes this refusal and explicitly states: “We need not consider whether Fowlkes could perform the essential functions of the job with accommodations that he rejected.” This underscores an important principle:

To claim “qualified individual” status, a plaintiff cannot rely on an accommodation that he refused.
The analysis is based on the accommodation actually requested and used—not hypothetical accommodations that were offered but declined.

4. Analogy to Jakubowski

The panel finds Fowlkes’s case “much like” Jakubowski v. Christ Hospital, Inc., 627 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2010), where a doctor with communication-related limitations (due to Asperger’s syndrome) requested that colleagues understand his “triggers” and communication style. The Sixth Circuit in Jakubowski held that:

The requested accommodation (understanding from staff) did not address the core problem: his inability to communicate adequately with patients and staff, which was essential to the position.
Because the accommodation failed to overcome the barrier to performing essential functions, the doctor was not a “qualified individual.”

Similarly, Fowlkes’s request for generalized understanding of his PTSD did not remedy his inability to manage anger and engage in non‑adversarial communication. The court notes:

Colleagues had to monitor and correct his communications with Boeing;
He remained unable to communicate appropriately despite awareness and informal support;
His behavior undermined his capacity to serve as an effective liaison and problem‑solver.

Therefore, like the doctor in Jakubowski, Fowlkes failed to show that his chosen accommodations enabled him to perform an essential function. On this basis alone, his prima facie case fails.

C. Addressing Fowlkes’s Counterarguments

1. Objective Qualifications vs. Actual Ability to Perform

Fowlkes argued that because he had strong objective credentials (degrees, experience, a prior deployment), he satisfied the “qualified” element at the prima facie stage, and that any shortcomings in his performance should be reserved for the pretext stage as under Wexler and Morgan.

The court rejects this argument, explaining:

Wexler and Morgan address qualifications in the context of age discrimination, where “qualification” is not defined by statute in terms of “essential functions.”
In disability cases, the Rehabilitation Act incorporates the ADA’s explicit requirement that a plaintiff be capable of performing essential job functions, with or without accommodation.
Thus, it is not enough for a disabled plaintiff to show impressive degrees or technical skills; he must also show that, considering his disability and any accommodations, he can actually perform all essential functions, including communication and interpersonal conduct where those are fundamental duties.

This is a significant doctrinal clarification: in disability discrimination cases, unlike many other employment discrimination contexts, courts are both permitted and required to consider performance-related evidence at the prima facie “qualified individual” stage.

2. Alleged Exaggeration by Supervisors

Fowlkes asserted that his supervisors exaggerated the severity of his outbursts and communication problems. The court describes this claim as “baseless”:

He did not present evidence to support his allegation of exaggeration.
There was corroborating testimony from multiple witnesses (e.g., Vega‑Flores) and objective facts (e.g., Denney’s need to apologize to Boeing, coworkers hearing him through noise‑cancelling headphones, a contracting officer ordering him out of the office).

At the summary judgment stage, mere speculation or self‑serving disagreement, without supporting evidence, cannot generate a “genuine dispute of material fact.”

3. Overlap Between Prima Facie Analysis and Employer’s Proffered Reason

Fowlkes argued that the district court improperly allowed the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason (communication problems) to influence the prima facie analysis. The panel explains the distinction:

The court does not reach or assess whether the employer’s reason is legitimate or pretextual under McDonnell Douglas.
Instead, it uses the same underlying facts (the communication failures) to answer a separate, threshold statutory question: is the plaintiff a “qualified individual” who can perform essential functions with reasonable accommodation?
The fact that the same factual events are relevant to two distinct inquiries does not legally bar considering them at the prima facie stage in disability cases.

Thus, the court maintains a formal separation between the prima facie “qualification” element and the employer’s burden to articulate a legitimate reason, even if both inquiries draw on the same evidence.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a way for a court to decide a case without a trial when there are no real disputes about important facts and one side is clearly entitled to win under the law. The moving party (here, the Department of Defense) must show that:

There is no “genuine” dispute over any fact that could affect the outcome; and
The law, applied to those undisputed facts, entitles it to judgment.

If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party (here, Fowlkes) must respond with specific evidence—documents, deposition testimony, etc.—showing a real, factual dispute for a jury to resolve. Mere assertions or minor disagreements are not enough.

B. Rehabilitation Act vs. ADA

The ADA generally covers private‑sector and state/local-government employers. The Rehabilitation Act covers federal agencies and recipients of federal funds. For employment discrimination claims brought by federal employees, the Rehabilitation Act is the vehicle, but:

The substantive standards come from the ADA; and
Theories, definitions, and defenses (like “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship”) are effectively the same.

C. Prima Facie Case and McDonnell Douglas

In discrimination cases where there’s no direct evidence of bias (no explicit slur or admission), courts use an indirect method from McDonnell Douglas:

The employee first must make a “prima facie case”—show basic facts that, if unexplained, raise an inference of discrimination.
The employer must then give a nondiscriminatory reason for its action.
The employee then must show that this reason is a pretext—a cover—for discrimination.

In disability cases, one key part of the prima facie case is that the plaintiff is a “qualified individual”—able to do the job’s essential functions with reasonable accommodation.

D. Essential Functions

“Essential functions” are the core, fundamental duties of a job—not incidental or marginal tasks. Examples:

For a firefighter, physically entering burning buildings is an essential function.
For a delivery driver, safely operating a vehicle is an essential function.
For an engineer assigned to manage contractor issues, effective, professional communication with the contractor can be an essential function.

Courts look at written job descriptions, what supervisors say the job requires, how much time is spent on the function, and what would happen if the employee could not do it.

E. Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship

A “reasonable accommodation” is a change in the workplace or how a job is done that allows a person with a disability to perform essential functions. Examples include modified schedules, assistive technology, job restructuring, or allowing some work from home (where consistent with the job).

An accommodation is not required if it would cause an “undue hardship” for the employer—significant difficulty or expense, or a fundamental alteration of operations. The employer bears the burden of proving undue hardship, but that question never arises unless the employee first shows the accommodation would enable him to perform essential functions.

F. Qualified Individual

To be a “qualified individual,” a person must:

Have the necessary skills, education, or experience; and
Be able, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform all essential job functions.

In Fowlkes, the court assumes he has the technical qualifications but concludes that, even with his chosen accommodations, he cannot perform the essential communication aspects of his role.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. For Disability Discrimination Doctrine

This opinion reinforces several important points for future ADA/Rehabilitation Act litigation within the Sixth Circuit’s sphere of influence:

Communication as an Essential Function in Technical Roles The decision underscores that “soft skills”—effective, non‑adversarial communication and adherence to organizational hierarchies—can be essential functions, even in highly technical positions. Employers can legitimately define and enforce communication standards as fundamental to performance where the job is structured around collaboration and contractor relationships.
Limits of “Understanding” as an Accommodation Like Jakubowski, the case shows that asking coworkers and supervisors simply to “understand” a disability is often insufficient. The accommodation must concretely mitigate the employee’s limitations in a way that enables performance of essential functions. Vague requests for empathy or patience, standing alone, may not satisfy the employee’s burden.
Refusal of Offered Accommodations The court’s refusal to consider accommodations Fowlkes declined (having a colleague help on contractor calls) sends a clear signal: plaintiffs cannot retroactively rely on accommodations they refused to accept to establish that they were “qualified.” This encourages employees to engage constructively in the interactive process.
Use of Performance Evidence at the Prima Facie Stage By distinguishing Wexler and Morgan, the opinion clarifies that:
- In age-discrimination cases, performance critiques typically go to pretext;
- In disability cases, the “qualified individual” definition compels courts to evaluate performance in relation to essential functions at the prima facie stage.
This doctrinal clarification affects how both plaintiffs and defendants should brief disability cases, making clear that the “objective qualifications only” approach does not apply.

B. For Employees with Mental-Health Disabilities

The decision is particularly relevant to employees whose disabilities manifest as anger, impulsivity, or difficulty controlling emotional responses:

It implicitly recognizes that such behaviors can be symptoms of PTSD or other conditions but still holds that, if they prevent the employee from meeting essential communication and behavior standards, the employee may not be “qualified,” even with some accommodations.
It underscores the importance of requesting and accepting accommodations that directly address the behavior at issue—such as coaching, mentoring, modified duties, or support in high‑conflict situations—rather than simply seeking general understanding.
It highlights the evidentiary value of documented warnings, counseling sessions, third‑party witness accounts, and contractor complaints in demonstrating that behavior problems remain unresolved despite accommodations.

C. For Federal Employers and the Interactive Process

Even though the Rehabilitation Act does not contain an independent “interactive process” cause of action in the same way the ADA has been interpreted in some circuits, federal agencies nonetheless must engage reasonably with accommodation requests. This case illustrates:

Supervisors can and should offer practical accommodations (like having a second person on difficult calls) in response to observed problems tied to a disability.
Informal accommodations (flexible scheduling; open-door policies) may be recognized as accommodations in litigation even absent formal paperwork, which can be helpful to employers but also places them within the statutory framework.
Thorough documentation of problematic incidents, counseling efforts, and the employee’s rejection of assistance is critical in defending against discrimination claims.

D. Probationary Federal Employees

The decision also speaks indirectly to the vulnerability of probationary federal employees:

The Air Force’s two‑year probationary period gives supervisors broader discretion to terminate for performance and conduct issues without the procedural protections of full civil-service status.
However, even probationary employees are protected by the Rehabilitation Act; the employer here still needed to show that Fowlkes was not a “qualified individual.”
The outcome suggests that for probationary employees, early, serious, and well‑documented performance or conduct problems can be particularly damaging in subsequent litigation, especially if they go unremedied after accommodations are provided.

E. Precedential Weight

The opinion is explicitly labeled “Not Recommended for Publication.” Under Sixth Circuit rules, such decisions are generally non‑precedential, though they may be cited as persuasive authority.

Even so, the opinion’s alignment with published cases like Jakubowski, Rorrer, King, and Cooper, and its clarification of the limited reach of Wexler in the disability context, gives it practical significance for litigants and lower courts within the Circuit.

VII. Conclusion

Fowlkes v. U.S. Department of Defense reinforces a foundational but often misunderstood aspect of disability discrimination law: being “qualified” under the Rehabilitation Act is not just about degrees and technical skills. It is about whether, in light of the disability and with reasonable accommodation, the employee can perform all essential job functions, including those involving communication and interpersonal conduct.

The court’s analysis highlights:

The centrality of communication as an essential function for roles that exist to manage contractor relationships and collaborative problem‑solving.
The limits of “understanding” as a stand‑alone accommodation when a disability manifests in behavior that repeatedly disrupts the workplace and undermines core job duties.
The doctrinal distinction between disability cases and age-discrimination cases, confirming that performance-related evidence belongs at the prima facie stage in Rehabilitation Act/ADA litigation.
The significance of engaging fully and constructively with proposed accommodations—both by employers (who must offer reasonable adjustments) and by employees (who must be willing to accept those that address their limitations).

For employers, the case underscores the importance of clear job descriptions, consistent expectations about behavior and communication, and diligent documentation of both performance issues and accommodation efforts. For employees with mental‑health conditions affecting behavior, it emphasizes the need to seek targeted accommodations that directly mitigate the job‑related effects of their conditions, and to recognize that refusal of such accommodations may undercut later claims of being “otherwise qualified.”

In the broader legal landscape, Fowlkes—though unpublished—serves as a detailed, fact‑rich application of existing ADA/Rehabilitation Act principles, offering a practical roadmap for how courts may evaluate “qualified individual” status when disability-related behavior repeatedly conflicts with essential job requirements.

Beyond Objective Credentials: Communication as an Essential Function and “Qualified Individual” Status under the Rehabilitation Act — Commentary on Richard Fowlkes v. U.S. Department of Defense