Beyond Caretaking Duties: First Department Broadens the Definition of “Person Legally Responsible”
Commentary on Matter of B.F. v. Administration for Children’s Services, 2025 NY Slip Op 03393

1. Introduction

The Appellate Division, First Department’s June 5 2025 decision in Matter of B.F. v. Administration for Children’s Services confronts a perennial tension in New York’s child-protection jurisprudence: How far can Family Court jurisdiction extend beyond parents to reach other adults in a child’s orbit?

At the core was whether Roberto R.—the mother’s boyfriend who moved into the household for roughly five months and later sexually abused ten-year-old B.F.—qualifies as a “person legally responsible” (PLR) under Family Court Act (FCA) §1012(g). The majority held he does, notwithstanding the absence of traditional caretaking acts such as school pick-ups, meal preparation, or medical appointments. The ruling simultaneously sustained findings of derivative abuse as to Roberto’s infant child R.R. and neglect against the child’s mother, Sade E.

Because the majority accords decisive weight to co-residence, emotional closeness, and minimal financial contribution—even where day-to-day caretaking is lacking—the decision marks a doctrinal expansion of PLR status and will guide future Article 10 litigation statewide. A vigorous dissent by Justice Rodriguez underscores the breadth of the majority’s step and provides a roadmap for future challenges.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The First Department affirmed Family Court’s findings that:
  • Roberto R. sexually abused B.F.;
  • Roberto derivatively abused his newborn child R.R.; and
  • Sade E. neglected R.R. by exposing her to risk through her psychiatric instability.
  
• Key holding: Roberto, though a non-parent with no formal caregiving role, was a “person legally responsible” because he resided with B.F. for five months, contributed $100 weekly to household expenses, and formed a “substantial familial relationship.”
• Appeals from the fact-finding order were dismissed as subsumed; the dispositive order of disposition was affirmed without costs.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Matter of Yolanda D., 88 NY2d 790 (1996) – Cornerstone case defining PLR as the “functional equivalent of a parent” and providing four non-exhaustive factors (frequency of contact, control, duration, relationship to parent). Both majority and dissent invoke these factors; the majority stresses their flexibility.
2. Trenasia J. (2015) – Reaffirmed the Yolanda factors and the fact-intensive nature of PLR determinations. Majority heavily relies on language noting factors are not exhaustive.
3. Keniya G. (2016), Christopher W. (2002), Gary J. (2017) – Cases in which romantic partners or non-parents were deemed PLRs when they assumed caretaking tasks. Majority analogizes Roberto’s situation to these precedents; dissent distinguishes them.
4. Contrasting authorities: Zulena G. (2019) and Samantha M. (2008) delineate limits where caretaking was absent or brief. Dissent argues these cases should govern.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The majority’s rationale unfolds in three steps:

1. Credibility Findings. Family Court credited B.F. and her mother, discredited Roberto, and drew a negative inference from Sade’s silence.
2. Application of Yolanda Factors with Flexible Weighting.
   • Frequency & Duration: Five months of cohabitation and nightly interaction established substantial familiarity.
   • Control: Roberto’s post-abuse threats illustrated de facto authority and intimidation—deemed a relevant, if unconventional, form of “control.”
   • Relationship to Parent: Romantic partnership, co-residence, and financial contributions created a familial setting.
   The court emphasized that no single factor is dispositive and that the statute’s protective purpose warrants a broad lens.
3. Statutory Purpose. Citing FCA §1011’s remedial aim, the majority held that excluding a live-in paramour would frustrate legislative intent “to help safeguard” children, especially in single-parent homes.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

a) Expanded Pool of Article 10 Respondents
Paramours, roommates, or other adults who embed themselves in a household—even without explicit childcare duties—may now face Article 10 petitions if abuse or neglect occurs. Practitioners should expect ACS and other agencies to plead PLR status more aggressively.

b) Evidentiary Strategy Shifts
Evidence of emotional closeness, shared leisure activities, or minimal monetary support may suffice to prove PLR status. Counsel for respondents will need to counter with evidence that any contact was “fleeting or temporary.”

c) Derivative Abuse Findings Strengthened
The decision reinforces that egregious conduct toward one child can readily support derivative findings—even for children not yet born—where parental judgment is “fundamentally flawed.”

d) Inter-Departmental Tension
The dissent meticulously catalogs contrary authority, setting up a potential split among Departments and inviting Court of Appeals review. Until resolved, differing thresholds for PLR status may emerge statewide.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article 10 Proceeding: A Family Court civil action where the state seeks to protect a child from abuse or neglect, possibly restricting or terminating parental or custodial rights.
• Person Legally Responsible (PLR): Not necessarily someone with legal custody; can be any adult who acts like a parent within the household, giving Family Court jurisdiction over that person.
• Derivative Abuse/Neglect: When misconduct toward one child indicates such poor judgment that any other child in the respondent’s care is presumed at risk—no direct harm to the second child is required.
• Preponderance of the Evidence: The civil-law standard employed in Article 10; the judge must believe the alleged abuse or neglect is more likely than not (just over 50%).
• Negative Inference: When a party’s failure to testify allows the court to infer that their testimony would not have helped them.

5. Conclusion

Matter of B.F. crystallizes an important evolution in New York child-protection law: the functional-parent test under FCA §1012(g) no longer pivots exclusively on traditional caretaking tasks. Cohabitation, emotional intimacy, and even modest financial contributions can render a romantic partner a PLR subject to Family Court oversight.

While the majority frames this expansion as necessary to fulfill Article 10’s protective mission, the dissent warns of jurisdictional overreach and uncertain boundaries. Future appellate decisions—potentially from the Court of Appeals—will determine whether this broader reading endures. For now, practitioners, child-welfare agencies, and family-law judges must recalibrate their PLR analyses in light of this precedent.

Key takeaway: Living under the same roof with a child, forming a close bond, and sharing household expenses—even absent classical parental duties—may suffice to trigger the powerful machinery of Article 10 protection.