Best Interest Over Kinship and Contract: Mississippi Supreme Court Confirms Foster Parents’ Ability to Seek Adoption Despite CPS Relative-Placement Policies

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in In the Matter of the Petition for the Adoption of the Minor Child Named and Described Herein, James Hines and Wanda Hines v. John Caldwell, Amy Caldwell and Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (decided November 6, 2025).

The case concerns a contested adoption of a minor child, J.B., who had been in foster care with John and Amy Caldwell (“the foster parents”) since she was three months old. James and Wanda Hines (“the relatives”), J.B.’s maternal great-aunt and her husband, living in Georgia, sought to adopt J.B. as relatives after learning of the youth court proceedings more than a year into J.B.’s placement with the Caldwells.

The Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (“CPS”) supported the relatives’ position, arguing that the foster parents were bound by their foster-care contract and by CPS policy to give priority to relative placement and to refrain from pursuing adoption before CPS had exhausted family-placement options. The relatives also argued that the foster parents were judicially estopped from seeking adoption because they had previously participated in the youth court process as temporary custodians in furtherance of CPS’s reunification/relative placement plan.

After this Court had earlier reversed a temporary order for lack of a proper hearing and remanded for a full evidentiary hearing (Hines v. Caldwell, 384 So. 3d 1238 (Miss. 2024)), the chancery court held a full hearing on competing adoption petitions and granted the Caldwells’ petition, finding that it was in J.B.’s best interest to be adopted by the foster parents. The relatives appealed.

The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so, it clarified and reinforced several important principles:

The best interest of the child is the paramount consideration in adoption proceedings, and it prevails over CPS policy preferences and contractual restrictions in foster-care agreements.
Relatives have no automatic or controlling preference in adoption proceedings; kinship is a factor, not a presumption or entitlement.
Foster parents are not contractually barred from petitioning for adoption once a child is legally freed for adoption by court order, even if CPS is still pursuing relative placement.
Judicial estoppel does not apply to bar foster parents from moving from a role of temporary caregivers to adoption petitioners when the child’s status and the legal context have materially changed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Issues on Appeal

The relatives, James and Wanda Hines, raised two primary issues:

Contractual Bar / CPS Policy Issue: Whether the Caldwells were contractually barred from seeking adoption of J.B. before CPS had exhausted relative-placement options, given CPS statutory directives and the foster-care “resource home” contract.
Judicial Estoppel Issue: Whether judicial estoppel prohibited the Caldwells from petitioning for adoption after they had initially accepted temporary custodial status in the youth court proceedings aligned with CPS’s plan.

2.2 Holding

The Court affirmed the chancery court’s decision and held that:

The foster-care contract and CPS policy did not bar the Caldwells from filing a petition for adoption once J.B. was legally freed for adoption by the youth court’s termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) order.
CPS’s statutory preference for relative placement and CPS’s internal policies do not override the chancery court’s duty to decide the adoption based on the child’s best interest.
Kinship is an important factor but not decisive in the best-interest analysis; relatives have no absolute or presumptive right to adopt.
Judicial estoppel does not apply to the Caldwells, because:
- They were not parties in the youth court proceedings, only foster parents allowed to attend; and
- Their progression from foster caretakers to adoption petitioners is not an “intentional self-contradiction” used to gain unfair advantage.
The chancery court’s best-interest finding in favor of the Caldwells was supported by substantial credible evidence and thus must be affirmed.

2.3 Central Factual Points Underlying the Decision

J.B. was born in March 2021 and placed with the Caldwells in June 2021.
J.B. had lived continuously with the Caldwells for more than three years by the time of the chancellor’s decision.
The relatives did not come forward until around October 2022, when J.B. was already about eighteen months old and deeply bonded to the Caldwells.
The youth court terminated both biological parents’ rights in December 2022, legally freeing J.B. for adoption.
The guardian ad litem conducted an investigation and recommended that adoption by the Caldwells was in J.B.’s best interest, emphasizing stability and the potential trauma of removing J.B. from the only home she had ever known.
CPS acknowledged the Caldwells’ home was safe, and the record showed that J.B. was “healthy and thriving” there.

3. Precedents and Statutory Framework

3.1 Standard of Review in Custody and Adoption Cases

The Court reaffirmed its standard of review in custody and adoption cases, citing K.D.F. v. J.L.H., 933 So. 2d 971, 980 (Miss. 2006), which in turn relied on Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So. 2d 583 (Miss. 2002). The rule is:

In custody cases, we are bound by the limits of our standard of review and may reverse only when the decision of the trial court was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was employed.

The Court also cited Miller v. Smith, 229 So. 3d 100 (Miss. 2017), and In re Guardianship of Savell, 876 So. 2d 308 (Miss. 2004), for the proposition that the chancery court’s interpretation and application of law are reviewed de novo.

In sum:

Factual findings: reviewed under a deferential “manifest error / clearly erroneous” standard.
Legal questions: reviewed de novo.

3.2 The “Best Interest of the Child” as Polestar

The Court reinforced its longstanding doctrine that the best interest of the child is the “polestar” consideration in adoption proceedings. It cited C.T. v. R.D.H. (In re Adoption of D.N.T.), 843 So. 2d 690, 706 (Miss. 2003), which itself quoted C.L.B. v. D.G.B., 812 So. 2d 980 (Miss. 2002):

Whenever reviewing adoption proceedings, we must always remember that the best interests of the child are paramount.

This principle undergirds the Court’s approach to both the contract/CPS-policy issue and the judicial-estoppel issue. Where there is tension between administrative preferences, contractual obligations, and the child’s welfare, the latter prevails.

3.3 CPS Statutory Mandates and Relative Placement

The relatives relied heavily on several Mississippi statutes, especially Mississippi Code § 43-15-13 and § 43-21-609, to argue that CPS both had, and was following, a statutory obligation to prioritize relative placement, and that the foster parents were bound to cooperate with this plan.

3.3.1 CPS’s Objectives – Miss. Code Ann. § 43-15-13(2)

Section 43-15-13(2) sets forth CPS’s objectives in managing foster care:

Prevent unnecessary separation of children from their families by identifying and addressing family problems;
Restore children to their families when safe and appropriate; and
Place children in suitable adoptive homes “in cases where restoration to the biological family is not safe, possible or appropriate.”

These provisions codify a general policy favoring family preservation and reunification where possible, with adoption as a permanent option when reunification is not feasible.

3.3.2 Relative Placement Priority – § 43-15-13(7)

Section 43-15-13(7) provides that when CPS is considering placement of a child in a foster home:

[T]he department shall give first priority to placing the child in the home of one (1) of the child's relatives within the third degree, as computed by the civil law rule, when the department deems it to be in the best interest of the child.

This is important: the statute gives relatives priority in CPS’s placement decisions, but explicitly conditions that priority on the child’s best interest. It does not, by its terms, confer a superior right to adopt, nor does it constrain the chancery court’s ultimate best-interest determination once an adoption petition is before it.

3.3.3 Foster/Relative Care Responsibilities – § 43-15-13(12)(h)

Section 43-15-13(12)(h) requires CPS to impose certain responsibilities on foster or relative caregivers, including:

Cooperating with any plan to reunite the child with his birth family and work with the birth family to achieve this goal.

The relatives tried to transform this cooperation obligation into an absolute bar on foster parents filing adoption petitions before CPS has exhausted family-placement options. The Court rejected that interpretation, as discussed below.

3.3.4 Disposition Sequence in Youth Court – § 43-21-609

Section 43-21-609 governs dispositional alternatives in abuse and neglect cases. It states that, in such cases, the court may:

Release the child without further action;
Place the child with parents, a relative, or another person (subject to conditions), and only if such options are inappropriate, consider durable legal custody or, by implication, foster or adoptive placements.

The statute gives “precedence” to placing the child with parents or relatives, but again this is at the dispositional stage while the child remains under youth court jurisdiction. Here, the youth court terminated parental rights and then transferred the matter to chancery court for placement/adoption determination, shifting the analytical framework.

3.4 Foster Parents and Adoption – In re Adoption of J.C.

A crucial precedent was In re Adoption of J.C. v. Natural Parents, 417 So. 2d 529 (Miss. 1982), which the Court quotes extensively. In that case, foster parents had signed a contract expressly stating they would not attempt to adopt a foster child unless the child was made free for adoption by the welfare department. Nevertheless, the Court held:

The paramount concern in cases where custody of a child is involved is the child’s best interest. … Prospective adoption homes and foster care homes are not mutually exclusive.

The Court had ruled that the chancellor erred by excluding foster parents as potential adoptive parents merely because of the contract.

In the present case, the Court uses J.C. to:

Undermine the relatives’ argument that the foster contract absolutely barred the Caldwells from adopting; and
Reiterate that courts, not CPS contracts, ultimately decide what arrangement is best for the child.

3.5 The Court’s “Unbounded Jurisdiction” Over Minors – L.W. v. C.W.B.

The Court also invokes L.W. v. C.W.B., 762 So. 2d 323 (Miss. 2000), which in turn relied on In re Adoption of J.C. The Court quotes the classic statement:

The law has given to our courts the most unbounded jurisdiction over minors. Fathers may be preferred to mothers—mothers to fathers, relatives to parents—or strangers to either, for the custody and care of minors, where the interest of the child requires its exercise.

This quotation underscores a key theme: no category of adult (parent, relative, foster parent, or stranger) has a categorical priority that overrides the court’s best-interest determination.

3.6 Kinship as a Factor, Not a Presumption – In re Beggiani and In re E.M.

The Court relied on Prante v. Beggiani (In re Beggiani), 519 So. 2d 1208 (Miss. 1988), and In re E.M., 810 So. 2d 596 (Miss. 2002), to reiterate that:

Kinship is not decisive but is only a factor to be considered when determining the best interest of a child in an adoption proceeding. … [A] relative does not have a preferential right to custody as against unrelated parties because such could foreseeably be against the best interest of the child.

This line of authority makes clear that while CPS may prioritize relatives at the placement stage, the adoption stage is governed by a holistic best-interest analysis, in which biology is one factor among many.

3.7 Judicial Estoppel – Clark, Kirk, and Richardson

The Court’s discussion of judicial estoppel rests on Clark v. Neese, 131 So. 3d 556 (Miss. 2013), which in turn cited Kirk v. Pope, 973 So. 2d 981 (Miss. 2007), and In re Estate of Richardson, 903 So. 2d 51 (Miss. 2005).

Judicial estoppel is defined as:

[Designed] to protect the judicial system and [applies] where “intentional self-contradiction is being used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice.” It precludes a party from asserting a position, benefiting from that position, and then, when it becomes more convenient or profitable, retreating from that position later in the litigation.

The Court uses this framework to conclude that the Caldwells did not take inconsistent positions in different proceedings in a way that would trigger judicial estoppel.

4. Detailed Legal Analysis

4.1 The Contractual / CPS-Policy Argument

4.1.1 The Foster Contract Language

The relatives’ first argument was that the Caldwells had contractually agreed to follow CPS’s plans and policies, including the priority of family placement, and thereby had waived any right to seek adoption before CPS completed its relative-placement efforts.

The 2019 resource-home contract signed by the Caldwells provided that they:

agree to cooperate with [CPS] in carrying out [CPS]’s plans for any foster child placed in [their] home, including the plan to return a child to his/her parents, to transfer a child to another foster home or institution, or any other plan which [CPS] may have.

The relatives further asserted, based on their reading of “Part A, subparagraph 1” of the contract, that the Caldwells were barred from attempting adoption “unless the child is made free for adoption by the written decision and action of the State Department of Public Welfare” and that no such written decision existed.

The Supreme Court rejected this factual premise. The contract in the record actually provided:

We hereby expressly waive any right to custody of a child placed in our home for care, unless the child is made free for adoption by the written decision and action of the court.

Two critical points flow from this:

The waiver of custody rights was conditional, and the condition was tied to a court’s decision, not CPS’s decision.
The child was made free for adoption by the youth court’s TPR order in December 2022.

Testimony from Abbey Young, an assistant deputy commissioner with CPS, confirmed that the youth court’s termination of parental rights “freed J.B. for adoption,” and CPS’s comprehensive family assessment recorded that J.B. was “legally freed for adoption as of 12/12/2022.”

Thus, even under the relatives’ contract-based theory, once the youth court terminated parental rights, the contractual condition allowing the Caldwells to seek adoption had been met.

4.1.2 Cooperation with CPS vs. Independent Right to Petition

The Court implicitly distinguishes between:

The foster parents’ obligation to “cooperate with” CPS’s plans and reunification efforts under § 43-15-13(12)(h); and
Their separate, statutorily recognized ability to file a petition for adoption in chancery court once the child is legally free for adoption.

“Cooperation” does not equate to a waiver of all legal rights or to a promise never to seek adoption if the foster parents conclude that adoption is in the child’s best interest, especially after family preservation efforts have failed and parental rights have been terminated.

4.1.3 CPS Policy vs. Judicial Authority

The Court also firmly reiterates that CPS is not the ultimate arbiter of the child’s permanent placement. Quoting L.W. v. C.W.B., the Court notes:

Nevertheless, it is the court which is charged with the ultimate responsibility of the final determination of what is in the best interests of the child. It is the court which directs the final disposition of the adoption.

Thus, while CPS has a “primary role” in serving the child’s best interest, CPS’s internal policies—such as preferring relative placement—cannot bind the chancery court or override judicial discretion when making the final decision on adoption.

The Court’s reliance on In re Adoption of J.C. underscores that even explicit contractual language purporting to restrict adoption rights cannot justify excluding foster parents from consideration when the best-interest analysis points to them as the preferable adoptive parents.

4.1.4 Relative Placement Priority vs. Adoption Decision

The relatives stressed § 43-15-13(7)’s “first priority” for relative placement and argued that CPS was actively working toward placing J.B. with them when the Caldwells filed their adoption petition. The Court does not dispute CPS’s ongoing efforts but makes two critical points:

Timing and Child’s Attachment: By the time the Hineses came forward in October 2022, J.B. had already spent her entire life with the Caldwells. When the Caldwells filed their petition in March 2023, J.B. had been with them for roughly eighteen months; the relatives had only just begun in-person visitation in April 2023.
Scope of Relative Priority: The statutory “first priority” applies to CPS placement decisions and is constrained by the “best interest” caveat. Once the case is transferred to chancery court for an adoption decision and the child is free for adoption, that statutory priority does not operate as a binding legal preference in an adoption contest between a long-term foster family and relatives.

The Court’s analysis aligns relative priority with the administrative phase of placement, not with the final judicial adoption determination.

4.1.5 Substantial Evidence Supporting Best-Interest Finding

Having cleared the contractual and statutory obstacles, the Court then asks whether the chancery court’s decision in favor of the Caldwells is supported by substantial credible evidence.

Key evidence includes:

J.B. had been in the Caldwells’ home continuously since June 2021; she was more than three years old at the time of the decision and had never lived anywhere else.
The guardian ad litem, Ginger Miller, recommended adoption by the Caldwells, emphasizing:
- The importance of relative placement in general, but;
- That CPS had already tried “numerous avenues” of relative or fictive-kin placement without success; and
- That removing J.B. from the only home she had ever known would likely cause unnecessary trauma.
CPS adoption specialist Johnnie Sykes testified that the Caldwells’ home was safe and that removing a child from a long-term foster home could be “traumatizing.”
Case summaries documented that J.B. was “healthy and thriving” in the Caldwells’ home; there were no safety concerns.
The relatives themselves acknowledged that the Caldwells had taken good care of J.B.

The Court analogizes to In re Adoption of J.C., where it noted that removing a fifteen-month-old child from foster parents with whom the child had resided since seven weeks of age might not be in the child’s best interest due to emotional attachment. Here, the attachment is even stronger: J.B. had been with the Caldwells for over three years.

Given this record, the Court concludes that the chancellor’s best-interest determination is well supported and therefore must be affirmed under the deferential standard of review.

4.2 The Judicial Estoppel Argument

4.2.1 Elements of Judicial Estoppel

Judicial estoppel prevents a party from:

Taking a particular position in a judicial proceeding;
Benefitting from that position (i.e., the court accepts it); and then
Later taking a clearly inconsistent position to gain an unfair advantage.

The doctrine aims to protect the integrity of the judicial process, not to shield parties from every change in litigation strategy.

4.2.2 Non-Party Status in Youth Court

The Court’s first and decisive point is that the Caldwells were not parties to the youth court proceedings. They participated only as foster parents, which is permitted by § 43-15-13(11)(i), affording foster parents the right to attend youth court hearings involving the foster child, without making them parties to the action.

Because judicial estoppel applies to “a party” who has taken a position and gained benefit in that litigation, the Caldwells’ non-party status in youth court undercuts the doctrine before it even gets off the ground.

4.2.3 No Intentional Self-Contradiction

Even if one set aside the non-party issue, the Court emphasizes that caring for a foster child and later seeking to adopt is not an “intentional self-contradiction” within the meaning of Clark v. Neese and Kirk v. Pope. Rather, it is a natural evolution in light of:

The child’s long-term placement;
The failure of reunification and relative placement efforts; and
The youth court’s termination of parental rights.

The foster parents did not obtain any judicial benefit based on an explicit representation that they would not seek adoption. At most, they accepted their role as temporary custodians under CPS’s plan; their later petition for adoption, after circumstances changed, does not amount to gaming the system.

The Court thus finds “no merit” in the estoppel argument and reiterates, citing In re Adoption of J.C., that foster parents may indeed be considered as adoptive parents.

5. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

5.1 “Best Interest of the Child”

The “best interest of the child” standard is a flexible, child-centered test that looks at all relevant factors to determine what outcome will most promote the child’s long-term welfare and stability. Though the opinion does not list specific factors, best-interest analyses typically consider:

The child’s emotional bonds with caregivers;
The stability and continuity of the child’s living situation;
The safety and suitability of each proposed home;
The child’s physical, emotional, educational, and developmental needs;
The moral, financial, and caregiving capacities of each petitioner; and
Any potential harm from disrupting existing attachments.

In this case, the length and quality of J.B.’s placement with the Caldwells, and the likely trauma of removal, were particularly significant.

5.2 “Legally Freed for Adoption” and Termination of Parental Rights (TPR)

A child becomes “legally free for adoption” when a court terminates the parental rights of the child’s legal parents—usually in a separate proceeding, often in youth court. Termination of parental rights (TPR) means:

The legal parent-child relationship is severed;
The parents lose rights to custody, visitation, and decision-making; and
The child can be placed permanently with adoptive parents.

Here, the youth court’s December 2022 TPR order freed J.B. for adoption, satisfying the contractual condition that allowed the Caldwells to seek adoption.

5.3 Durable Legal Custody vs. Adoption

“Durable legal custody” is a custody arrangement, authorized by § 43-21-609, in which a non-parent custodian (not CPS) receives long-term custody of a child when reunification, adoption, or other options are “inappropriate, unavailable or otherwise not in the best interest of the child,” and only after the child has been in that person’s physical custody for at least six months under CPS supervision.

Durable legal custody:

Provides a long-term custody solution;
Does not terminate parental rights by itself; and
Is generally less permanent than adoption (parents may, in some circumstances, seek modification).

Adoption, by contrast, creates a new legal parent-child relationship and is intended to be permanent. In this case, the controversy was not about durable legal custody at final judgment, but about which party should be granted permanent adoption.

5.4 Relative Placement Preference

A “relative placement preference” means that, during the foster-care placement process, CPS must consider relatives within the third degree of kinship before seeking non-relative foster homes or permanent placements. But the preference is:

Conditional on the placement being in the child’s best interest;
Primarily relevant to CPS’s administrative placement decisions; and
Not a legal guarantee that relatives will be chosen for adoption over other suitable caregivers, especially when strong attachments have formed elsewhere.

5.5 Judicial Estoppel

Judicial estoppel is a doctrine designed to stop a party from abusing the court system by saying one thing in one proceeding, gaining an advantage, and later saying the opposite in another proceeding to gain a new advantage. It requires:

A clear position taken in prior litigation;
Judicial acceptance of that position; and
A later, clearly inconsistent position that would unfairly benefit the party.

Because the foster parents here were not parties in the youth court and did not gain any advantage by promising never to adopt, judicial estoppel did not apply.

6. Impact and Significance

6.1 Reinforcing the Supremacy of the Best-Interest Standard

The decision strongly reaffirms that in Mississippi:

The best interest of the child supersedes:
- CPS internal policies or preferences;
- Contractual provisions in foster-care agreements; and
- General statutory placement sequences that otherwise prioritize relatives.
Chancellors retain ultimate authority to determine placement in adoption proceedings, even when CPS advocates for a different outcome.

This clarity may discourage attempts to use policy documents or boilerplate contract terms to limit what the chancery court can consider or who can be considered as an adoptive parent.

6.2 Clarifying the Role of Relatives in Adoption Contests

Though Mississippi statutes encourage initial relative placement where appropriate, the Court underscores:

Relatives are important candidates, but not automatically preferred adopters once the case reaches the chancery adoption stage.
Kinship is a factor that can be outweighed by:
- Extended placement with another caregiver;
- Strong emotional bonds with a non-relative;
- The likelihood of trauma from disrupting the existing placement.

For relatives, this decision highlights the importance of:

Early engagement: The longer a child remains in a stable non-relative placement, the harder it becomes, legally and practically, to justify uprooting the child in the name of kinship.
Demonstrating best interest: It is not enough to show a biological connection and an approved home; relatives must show that moving the child will actually serve the child’s long-term welfare better than remaining with established caregivers.

6.3 Foster Parents’ Rights and Responsibilities

For foster parents, the case sends several important signals:

They may cooperate fully with CPS’s reunification or relative-placement efforts, yet later petition to adopt if those efforts fail and the child is legally freed for adoption.
Contractual language requiring “cooperation” or temporary custody acceptance does not amount to a permanent waiver of the opportunity to seek adoption.
If they have provided long-term, stable care and formed deep bonds with the child, their status as foster parents does not preclude them from being favored in the best-interest analysis.

At the same time, the Court does not diminish CPS’s role; it simply clarifies that CPS does not have veto power over the court’s final decision or over who may file an adoption petition.

6.4 Guidance for CPS Practice and Contract Drafting

CPS may need to recognize that:

Attempts to contractually prohibit foster parents from adopting are legally fragile when weighed against the best-interest standard.
Its statutory duty to prioritize relatives is constrained both by “best interest” qualifiers and by the independent authority of chancery courts in adoption matters.
Delay in locating and approving relatives can drastically change the best-interest calculus if a child forms strong attachments in a foster home.

Practically, this may:

Encourage more diligent and early relative searches and home studies;
Promote earlier identification of foster parents who may be willing to adopt, allowing for clear permanency planning; and
Discourage over-reliance on contract clauses that attempt to dissuade foster parents from ever seeking adoption.

6.5 Judicial Estoppel Boundaries in Child-Welfare Contexts

The decision also clarifies the limits of judicial estoppel in child-welfare contexts:

Non-party foster parents’ participation in youth court does not expose them to estoppel claims based on positions taken in that forum.
Progression from foster care to adoption is not inherently inconsistent; it often reflects the natural evolution of a child’s case as circumstances change (e.g., failure of reunification, TPR).
Courts will be cautious about applying estoppel doctrines in ways that could freeze a child’s situation or punish caregivers for adapting to new realities in order to serve the child’s best interests.

7. Conclusion

This decision cements and clarifies several core principles of Mississippi child-welfare and adoption law:

The best interest of the child remains paramount, even when it conflicts with CPS policies, statutory placement preferences, or foster-care contract language.
Relatives, though favored at the CPS-placement stage, do not possess a controlling preference in adoption contests; kinship is a factor, not a trump card.
Foster parents may seek adoption when a child has been legally freed by court order, and long-term stable foster placements can justifiably result in adoption by foster parents over relatives.
Judicial estoppel has no application where foster parents were not parties in earlier proceedings and have not engaged in intentional self-contradiction to gain unfair advantage.

By affirming the chancery court’s decision to grant the Caldwells’ petition for adoption, the Mississippi Supreme Court sends a clear message: courts must focus unswervingly on the specific child before them, the relationships and attachments that child has formed, and the practical realities of the child’s life. Administrative preferences and contractual forms cannot override a fully developed, evidence-based determination of what will, in fact, best serve the child’s future.