Bell v. Bollenbach & House, Inc.: Reinforcing Espinal Limits on Contractor Liability and Tightening Proof Standards for Constructive Notice and Expert Weather Evidence in Snow-and-Ice Slip-and-Fall Cases

Introduction

In Bell v. Bollenbach & House, Inc. (2025 NY Slip Op 04453), the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the grant of summary judgment to three defendants in a snow-and-ice slip-and-fall case stemming from a delivery driver’s fall in a Dunkin’ Donuts drive-through lane in Washingtonville, New York. The decision provides a crisp application—and, in practical effect, a reinforcement—of three doctrinal pillars in New York premises liability litigation:

The Espinal framework cabining tort liability for snow-removal contractors.
The stringent evidentiary burden on plaintiffs to establish actual or constructive notice against possessors of property.
The admissibility and sufficiency standards governing expert affidavits and meteorological data at the summary judgment stage.

The plaintiff, Charles Bell, sued multiple defendants: the owner (Bollenbach & House, Inc.), the lessee (Lucky Munchkin, Inc.), the subtenant/store operator (Washingtonville Donuts, LLC), and the snow-removal contractor (Monteverde Landscaping, Inc.). On appeal, the court affirmed summary judgment dismissing the claims against Monteverde, Washingtonville Donuts, and Lucky Munchkin, leaving undisturbed whatever remained of the claims against the owner, Bollenbach, at the trial level.

Summary of the Judgment

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court, Orange County’s order granting:

Monteverde Landscaping, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment—no Espinal liability where speculation, not evidence, linked any contractor-created snow piles to the ice patch, and the plaintiff’s expert affidavit was inadmissible and conclusory.
Washingtonville Donuts, LLC’s motion for summary judgment—no creation of the icy condition, no actual notice, and no constructive notice given documented travel-path inspections and lack of complaints.
Lucky Munchkin, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment—no creation of the icy condition and no actual or constructive notice; generalized awareness of icy conditions is not constructive notice of the specific patch that caused the fall.

The court emphasized that general awareness of recurring icy conditions does not substitute for proof of notice of the specific condition at issue; that expert opinions must be grounded in admissible data within the expert’s competence; and that speculation about melt-and-refreeze without evidence of snow piles or weather conditions contemporaneous to the incident cannot defeat summary judgment.

Factual Background and Procedural Posture

On December 7, 2019, Charles Bell slipped on ice in the drive-through lane while delivering donuts to a Dunkin’ Donuts premises. Ownership and control of the property were layered:

Owner: Bollenbach & House, Inc. (Bollenbach).
Lessee: Lucky Munchkin, Inc. (Lucky), which subleased to the operating franchisee.
Subtenant/Operator: Washingtonville Donuts, LLC.
Snow Contractor: Monteverde Landscaping, Inc., contracted by Lucky for the 2019–2020 winter season.

Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions for Monteverde, Washingtonville Donuts, and Lucky. On appeal, the Second Department affirmed.

Key Issues

Whether the snow-removal contractor (Monteverde) owed and breached a duty to the plaintiff under the Espinal exceptions by launching a force or instrument of harm.
Whether the possessor/operator (Washingtonville Donuts) created the icy condition or had actual or constructive notice of it.
Whether the lessee (Lucky) created the condition or had actual or constructive notice, despite having subleased the premises.
Whether the plaintiff’s expert affidavit—relying on meteorological assertions and observations made 14 months after the accident—was admissible and sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136 (2002). The court reiterated the Espinal rule that a contractor’s contractual duty does not, by itself, create tort liability to third parties. Liability arises only if one of three exceptions applies:

Launches a force or instrument of harm (negligent performance creates or exacerbates danger).
Detrimental reliance by the plaintiff on the contractor’s continuing performance.
Complete displacement of the property owner’s duty to maintain premises safely.

Here, only the first Espinal exception was in play. The court found no evidence that Monteverde created or exacerbated the hazard; speculation about plowed piles melting and refreezing was insufficient.

Martinelli v Dublin Deck, Inc., 198 AD3d 635 (2d Dept 2021). Cited for the articulation of Espinal’s three exceptions. The decision used Martinelli to frame the contractor-liability inquiry.

Linarello v Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 31 AD3d 396 (2d Dept 2006). Applied to emphasize that claims of contractor-created hazards must rest on more than speculation; here, no proof of snow piles in the accident area negated the “launching instrument of harm” theory.

Leicht v City of N.Y. Dept. of Sanitation, 131 AD3d 515 (2d Dept 2015). Stands for the proposition that experts must be qualified in the field on which they opine. A civil engineer was not qualified to interpret meteorological data; thus, his weather-related opinions were inadmissible.

U.S. Bank N.A. v Zakarin, 208 AD3d 1275 (2d Dept 2022). Affirms that reliance on documents not in evidence (such as third-party weather records not annexed or otherwise admissible) is hearsay and cannot support summary judgment opposition.

Werny v Roberts Plywood Co., 40 AD3d 977 (2d Dept 2007). Expert conclusions based on observations long after the incident are speculative; the Bell court rejected an affidavit based on conditions observed 14 months post-accident.

Bristol v Biser, 230 AD3d 1098 (2d Dept 2024). Recites the black-letter rule for premises liability in snow-and-ice cases: liability attaches where the owner/possessor created the condition or had actual/constructive notice of it, with time to remedy.

Rothman v Fairfield Mastic, LLC, 226 AD3d 934 (2d Dept 2024). Key for summary judgment burdens in slip-and-fall cases and the requirement to establish when the area was last inspected/cleaned. The court relied on Rothman to find the store’s routine inspections adequate to negate constructive notice.

Bader v River Edge at Hastings Owners Corp., 159 AD3d 780 (2d Dept 2018). Supports dismissal where a defendant shows lack of creation and lack of notice, particularly by evidencing reasonable inspection practices.

Darbinyan v 1806 Ocean Realty, LLC, 185 AD3d 1003 (2d Dept 2020). Explains that actual knowledge of an ongoing and recurring dangerous condition can supply constructive notice for each recurrence—but a generalized awareness is not enough.

Meade v New York City Hous. Auth., 189 AD3d 1390 (2d Dept 2020). Reinforces the rule that to disprove constructive notice, defendants must establish when inspections/cleaning occurred relative to the incident.

Bombino-Munroe v Church of St. Bernard, 163 AD3d 616 (2d Dept 2018). Supports dismissal for lack of creation/notice where the record shows no actual or constructive knowledge of the condition.

Cruz v Rampersad, 110 AD3d 669 (2d Dept 2013). Clarifies that a general awareness of slippery conditions is insufficient to establish constructive notice of the specific condition that caused the accident. The court invoked this principle against both Washingtonville Donuts and Lucky.

Legal Reasoning

A. Snow Contractor Liability under Espinal

The court applied Espinal’s first exception—launching a force or instrument of harm—and held that Monteverde’s actions did not create or exacerbate a dangerous condition. Critically:

No evidence established the existence of snow piles near the accident area on the day of the fall or on any particular prior date.
The plaintiff himself had delivered the night before and saw no ice in the same location.
The plaintiff’s expert’s theory—melt and refreeze from alleged plow piles—was speculative without proof of those piles and inadmissible where based on unsubmitted weather records and outside the expert’s meteorological competence.

By ruling that conjecture about snow pile runoff cannot, without more, raise a triable issue, the court underscored the need for concrete, contemporaneous evidence of contractor-created hazards to trigger Espinal liability.

B. Possessor/Operator and Lessee Liability—Creation, Actual Notice, Constructive Notice

The court reaffirmed the standard that property owners and those in possession or control are liable only if they created the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive notice and a reasonable time to address it. For Washingtonville Donuts and Lucky, the record showed:

No creation of the icy condition by either defendant.
Absence of complaints or reports of ice in the area prior to the incident.
Regular “travel-path” inspections, including at closing, with no indication of ice.

This satisfied their prima facie burden under Rothman to negate constructive notice by establishing when the area was last inspected and that no hazard was observed. The plaintiff’s counter—generalized knowledge of recurring ice—was insufficient. As Cruz v Rampersad explains, general awareness does not equal constructive notice of the specific patch that caused the fall. And Darbinyan’s “ongoing and recurring condition” doctrine requires proof of actual knowledge of a recurring, specific hazard—not merely that icy conditions can occur in winter.

C. Expert Evidence: Qualification, Foundation, and Temporal Proximity

The court’s evidentiary rulings are a pointed reminder of summary judgment rigor:

Qualification: An expert must be competent in the discipline at issue. A civil engineer was not competent to interpret and apply meteorological data (Leicht).
Foundation: Reliance on third-party weather records that are not in evidence is hearsay (Zakarin). Annex the records or use properly certified meteorological data.
Temporal nexus: Inspections or observations made long after the accident—here, 14 months—lack probative value and are speculative (Werny).

These evidentiary failures prevented the plaintiff from creating a triable issue on either the contractor’s liability or the notice issues for the premises defendants.

Impact and Practical Consequences

1. For Snow and Ice Contractors

Bell reinforces that contractors are shielded from third-party tort claims absent strong proof that they created or worsened the hazardous condition. Plaintiffs will need contemporaneous photographs, testimony, logs, or other objective indicia showing the presence and location of contractor-created snow piles or other work-product linking the contractor to the hazard.

Contractors should:

Document plowing locations, pile placement, and salting/sanding activities.
Maintain weather and service logs to show when and where work occurred.
Train crews to avoid creating runoff paths across pedestrian/vehicle travel lanes.

2. For Property Owners, Lessees, and Occupiers

The decision validates a strong defense based on routine inspection protocols. Defendants who can:

Specify when and by whom the area was last inspected,
Show that the inspection would have detected the hazard, and
Show that no hazard was noted and no complaints were received,

are well-positioned to defeat constructive notice. Bell also clarifies that “general awareness” of winter icing or a sloped grade does not equate to constructive notice of a specific patch at a particular time.

3. For Plaintiffs and Their Experts

Plaintiffs opposing summary judgment must:

Use experts qualified in the relevant discipline (meteorologists for weather; perhaps engineers for drainage/design theory).
Annex the meteorological data relied upon, preferably certified, and tie it to precise times surrounding the accident.
Avoid long-delayed, post hoc site inspections as the sole basis for causation opinions.
Gather contemporaneous evidence: photos, videos, 911 reports, store logs, incident reports, and witness accounts identifying the specific icy patch and its duration.

In the absence of such proof, courts will deem causation theories speculative and insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

4. Doctrinal Clarifications

Espinal “launching a force” requires demonstrable creation or exacerbation of the danger—melt/refreeze theories must be tied to actual piles or work-product traceable to the contractor.
Constructive notice hinges on “visible and apparent” conditions existing long enough to be discovered and remedied; routine inspection evidence is potent in negating this element.
Recurring condition doctrine requires proof of ongoing recurrence known to the defendant; generalized winter hazard awareness does not suffice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Judgment: A procedure to decide a case without trial when the moving party shows no genuine factual dispute requiring a jury. The moving party must first show entitlement to judgment; the burden then shifts to the opponent to raise a triable issue with admissible evidence.
Actual Notice vs. Constructive Notice:
- Actual notice: Defendant actually knew of the specific hazard.
- Constructive notice: The hazard was visible and apparent and existed long enough that the defendant should have discovered and fixed it.
Recurring Condition Doctrine: If a defendant knows about an ongoing, repeat hazard (e.g., a specific drain that regularly ices over), they may be imputed with notice of each recurrence. But mere awareness that ice sometimes forms in winter is not enough.
Espinal Exceptions: Limited circumstances in which a contractor, despite only having a contract with the owner/tenant, can be liable to third parties:
- Launched a force or instrument of harm (e.g., piled snow in a way that predictably creates ice where people walk or drive).
- Plaintiff relied on the contractor’s performance.
- Contractor entirely took over the owner’s duty to keep premises safe.
Admissible Expert Evidence: Experts must be qualified on the topic, rely on admissible data, and tie opinions to the relevant timeframe and conditions. Unsupported speculation or reliance on unsubmitted materials is inadmissible.

What Remains of the Case

The appeal and affirmance addressed claims against Monteverde, Washingtonville Donuts, and Lucky. The order indicates that only the branch dismissing claims against Lucky (among Bollenbach and Lucky’s joint motion) was at issue on appeal. The decision does not resolve any remaining claims against the owner, Bollenbach; those matters remain governed by the Supreme Court’s order as to that party and any further proceedings not covered by this appeal.

Conclusion

Bell v. Bollenbach & House, Inc. is a strong reaffirmation of three principles that frequently decide New York snow-and-ice slip-and-fall litigation at the summary judgment stage:

Snow-removal contractors are not insurers; without proof that they “launched” the harm under Espinal, they face no liability to third parties.
Premises defendants dispel constructive notice by showing timely, routine inspections and the absence of complaints; general awareness of winter hazards is not enough to impute notice of a specific icy patch.
Expert opposition must be competent, well-founded, and contemporaneously grounded; inadmissible hearsay and post hoc observations will not carry the day.

The decision’s practical message is clear: success or failure will often turn on the quality of documentation (inspections, complaints, service logs, photographs) and the rigor of expert proof tied to the precise place and time of the accident. Bell thus offers a roadmap for litigants—defense and plaintiff alike—on how to build or defeat a snow-and-ice case under New York law.