Behavior‐Based Probable Cause and Grand Jury Presumption in §1983 Claims: Heredia v. City of New York

1. Introduction

The case of Heredia v. City of New York reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on appeal from the Eastern District of New York. Diego Heredia, a former art‐gallery manager, brought 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution after being arrested and prosecuted on state burglary charges. He challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of New York, the NYPD, two detectives, and fictitious John Does. Central issues were (1) whether probable cause supported his arrest based on coworker identifications and circumstantial evidence, and (2) whether a grand‐jury indictment presumptively barred his malicious prosecution claim.

2. Summary of the Judgment

On March 31, 2025, a three‐judge panel affirmed the district court’s summary‐judgment dismissal of all claims. The Court of Appeals held as a matter of law that:

There was probable cause to arrest Heredia for burglary, grounded on a former colleague’s identification by mannerisms, corroborative testimony about clothing, gallery access codes and keys, and text messages about gallery closure.
The grand jury’s indictment of Heredia created a rebuttable presumption of probable cause for prosecution; Heredia offered no evidence of fraud, perjury, or bad‐faith police conduct to overcome that presumption.

Accordingly, the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims failed, and summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Sotomayor v. City of New York, 713 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2013): standard for de novo review of summary judgment in §1983 cases.
Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 2012): definition of probable cause as “reasonably trustworthy information.”
Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2017): treatment of probable cause as mixed question of law and fact; legal question when facts are undisputed.
Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2007): court’s role in determining probable cause when factual record is clear.
Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 2006): officer’s duty ends once probable cause is established; no ongoing duty to investigate to a higher standard.
Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150 (2d Cir. 2021): malicious prosecution elements and the grand jury presumption rule under New York law.
McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2006) & Colon v. City of New York, 455 N.E.2d 1248 (N.Y. 1983): grand jury indictment creates a rebuttable presumption of probable cause, overcome only by proof of fraud, perjury or bad‐faith police conduct.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court first addressed the false arrest claim. Under §1983, absence of probable cause is an essential element. The panel found undisputed that:

A gallery employee identified the burglar by mannerisms and gait in surveillance footage.
Another colleague corroborated the clothing match.
Heredia had prior access to alarm codes and keys, and had texted about holiday closure.

Taken together, these facts constituted “reasonably trustworthy information” supporting probable cause. The Court emphasized that probable cause is a low threshold—less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt—and that once established, officers are not required to continue an investigation.

Turning to the malicious prosecution claim, the Court applied New York law governing §1983 malicious prosecution torts. An indictment by a grand jury gives rise to a presumption of probable cause which can only be rebutted by evidence of deliberate misrepresentations or suppressed evidence. Heredia presented no evidence of such misconduct or bad faith. Consequently, probable cause for prosecution remained intact as a matter of law, barring his claim.

3.3 Impact

This decision reaffirms two key principles in Second Circuit jurisprudence:

Behavioral or mannerism‐based identifications, when considered alongside corroborative circumstantial evidence, may satisfy probable cause requirements for arrest.
The grand jury’s indictment presumption remains potent in §1983 malicious prosecution claims unless plaintiff produces concrete proof of prosecutorial or police misconduct.

Future litigants and lower courts will likely cite Heredia to support dispositive motions in cases where identification rests on non‐facial characteristics and where the grand jury record is unavailable.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A reasonable belief, based on trustworthy facts, that a person committed a crime; lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Summary Judgment: A ruling when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Grand Jury Presumption: Under New York law, an indictment assumes probable cause to prosecute unless shown to be tainted by fraud, perjury, or bad faith.
§1983 Claim for False Arrest: Requires that the arrest occurred without probable cause and caused a deprivation of liberty.
Malicious Prosecution: A claim that arises when someone is prosecuted without probable cause and the prosecution ends in the plaintiff’s favor (or without conviction), plus proof of malice and damages.

5. Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s decision in Heredia v. City of New York underscores that: (1) a single reliable identification—here based on mannerisms—combined with supporting evidence suffices for probable cause; and (2) a grand jury indictment is a powerful shield in malicious prosecution claims unless a plaintiff can point to clear misconduct in the grand‐jury process. Together, these holdings reinforce law‐enforcement and prosecutorial discretion and set clear expectations for §1983 litigants challenging arrests or charges in New York.