Introduction

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court in Barnes v. Felix rejected the Fifth Circuit’s “moment-of-threat” rule for assessing police uses of deadly force and reaffirmed that Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims must be evaluated under the “totality of the circumstances” without a temporal cut-off. The case arose from a fatal traffic-stop shooting outside Houston after a stop for suspected toll violations. The officer, Roberto Felix, ordered the driver, Ashtian Barnes, to exit the vehicle; when Barnes began to pull away, Felix jumped onto the car’s doorsill and fired two shots into the vehicle, killing Barnes. The incident unfolded in seconds.

The lower courts granted and affirmed summary judgment for the officer by limiting their analysis to the “precise moment” when Felix clung to the moving car—approximately the two seconds before the first shot—concluding he reasonably feared for his life. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the “moment-of-threat” approach improperly narrows the Fourth Amendment inquiry and “puts on chronological blinders,” contrary to Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner’s totality-of-the-circumstances framework.

Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, concurred to emphasize the serious dangers inherent in traffic stops and the perilous split-second choices officers confront when drivers flee, while fully agreeing with the majority’s totality requirement.

Summary of the Opinion

• Holding: Courts may not restrict Fourth Amendment excessive-force analysis to the split-second “moment of threat” immediately preceding a shooting. The “totality of the circumstances” inquiry has no time limit and requires consideration of relevant facts and events leading up to the use of force.
• Disposition: Judgment of the Fifth Circuit vacated and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.
• Key Principle Reaffirmed: The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is objective reasonableness assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, considering the totality of the circumstances (Graham v. Connor; Tennessee v. Garner).
• Boundary of Decision: The Court expressly did not decide whether or how an officer’s own “creation of a dangerous situation” factors into the reasonableness analysis. That issue was neither addressed below nor presented in the petition (citing County of Los Angeles v. Mendez).
• Illustrative Precedent: Plumhoff v. Rickard demonstrates why earlier events can justify force “at the moment” it is used; prior reckless conduct during a lengthy chase informed the reasonableness of the shooting when the car briefly neared a standstill.

Factual Background

• Felix, patrolling near Houston, received an alert about a car with outstanding toll violations and initiated a stop.
• During a brief initial interaction, Felix smelled marijuana, asked about contraband, and directed Barnes to open the trunk. Barnes turned off the ignition as he opened the trunk from the driver’s seat.
• Felix ordered Barnes to exit the vehicle. Barnes opened the door but then restarted the car and began to move forward.
• Felix jumped onto the doorsill, shouted commands not to move, and within two seconds fired two shots into the vehicle. Barnes stopped the car and later died at the scene.
• Total elapsed time after the vehicle began moving: approximately five seconds.
• The district court and Fifth Circuit limited their reasonableness analyses to the two seconds before the first shot, finding the force reasonable at that instant.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): Established that claims of excessive force during seizures are governed by the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard, evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and assessed under the “totality of the circumstances.” Barnes relies on Graham’s central mandate and its caution against judging with “20/20 hindsight,” while insisting that the totality assessment must not be temporally truncated.
• Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985): Held that deadly force may not be used against a fleeing suspect unless the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others, and that, where feasible, a warning should be given. Barnes invokes Garner’s core balancing of the nature of the intrusion and governmental interests, and its emphasis on looking comprehensively at the context.
• Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Emphasized that there is no easy test for reasonableness and that courts must “slosh [their] way through the factbound morass,” often relying on video where available. Barnes quotes Scott to underscore that reasonableness is a nuanced, fact-intensive inquiry not conducive to an on/off, single-moment rule.
• Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014): Upheld officers’ use of deadly force at the end of a high-speed chase, reasoning that the danger posed throughout the chase informed the reasonableness at the moment shots were fired. Plumhoff is the opinion’s centerpiece illustration: it shows that earlier events can decisively shape how a reasonable officer would perceive and respond to the final instant.
• County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420 (2017): Rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “provocation rule” but left open whether and how an officer’s prior actions that foreseeably created a dangerous situation may be considered within the reasonableness analysis. Barnes reiterates Mendez’s narrowness and again declines to decide the “officer-created danger” question, while ensuring that earlier events are not categorically excluded from the totality assessment.
• Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006): Reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment’s touchstone is objective reasonableness. Barnes cites this to confirm the objective framing of the analysis.
• Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015): Although a Fourteenth Amendment case concerning pretrial detainees, it emphasized objective reasonableness and factors such as warnings and efforts to temper force. Barnes cites Kingsley to highlight that an officer’s steps to control or de-escalate can bear on reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context.
• Fifth Circuit authorities (e.g., Harris v. Serpas, 745 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 2014); Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 2011)): These decisions articulated and applied a “moment-of-threat” doctrine that circumscribed the inquiry to whether the officer was in danger at the precise moment he deployed deadly force. Barnes explicitly repudiates that narrowing as incompatible with the Supreme Court’s totality-of-the-circumstances requirement.

Legal Reasoning

The Court grounds its decision in first principles: the Fourth Amendment’s measure of “objective reasonableness” requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances” known to the officer, and that analysis demands attention to the “totality of the circumstances.” The opinion makes two pivotal points.

1. No temporal cut-off in reasonableness analysis. While the situation at the precise moment of force often matters most—because the constitutional inquiry targets the reasonableness of the officer’s decision at that time—the context that precedes that moment cannot be “hermetically sealed off.” Earlier events may sharpen or diffuse the apparent threat posed at the end. The opinion emphasizes that such context may favor either side: prior conduct may make otherwise ambiguous movements look threatening, or may reveal them to be innocuous.
2. The Fifth Circuit’s “moment-of-threat” doctrine conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. By confining the inquiry to the last two seconds—i.e., the instant Felix clung to a moving vehicle—the lower courts precluded consideration of why the stop occurred, what the officer knew or perceived, what commands or measures he used, and whether earlier interactions would alter how a reasonable officer should understand the final seconds. The Court likens this to evaluating Plumhoff by freezing the film at the car’s “near standstill,” eliminating the high-speed chase that made the driver’s next move perilous. Such “chronological blinders” are incompatible with the fact-dependent, context-sensitive approach the Fourth Amendment demands.

The Court rejects the respondent’s attempt to recast the Fifth Circuit doctrine as merely disallowing “creation-of-danger” theories. Whatever the doctrine might be elsewhere, the decisions below applied a timing-based limit. Because the case came to the Court on that reasoning, the Court addresses—and rejects—that narrowness. It also underscores that whether an officer’s earlier choices “created” the danger remains an open question not properly before it, echoing Mendez.

The Concurring Opinion’s Emphasis

Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence agrees fully with the majority and adds forceful context about the risks of traffic stops and the acute dangers when drivers flee. He canvasses the fraught options officers face—letting a driver go (with public-safety risks and perverse incentives), initiating a pursuit (often catastrophic for bystanders), attempting to disable a vehicle (dangerous and often ineffective), or physically engaging with a moving car (risking severe injury to the officer and others). He reminds courts to avoid “20/20 hindsight” and to appreciate the “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances on the ground. While nonbinding, his analysis will likely inform lower courts’ application of the totality standard where flight occurs.

Impact and Implications

1) Immediate doctrinal consequences

• End of the “moment-of-threat” rule in the Fifth Circuit and beyond: Lower courts may no longer confine their analyses to the instant before the use of force. Any similar “last two seconds” frameworks are incompatible with the Supreme Court’s directive.
• Temporal expansiveness of the totality analysis: Courts must evaluate relevant pre-seizure and pre-shooting facts, including reasons for the stop, information known to the officer (e.g., alerts, observations like odor of marijuana), the officer’s commands and warnings, attempts at control or de-escalation, the suspect’s responses and behavior over time, and the trajectory of the entire encounter.
• Fact development becomes more critical: Because earlier events must be considered, parties will need fuller evidentiary records: complete bodycam/dashcam footage, radio traffic, training materials and policies, eyewitness statements, and timeline reconstructions.

2) Litigation posture and summary judgment

• Fewer grants of summary judgment on a “snapshot” record: The requirement to evaluate the complete chronology can surface genuine disputes of material fact that preclude summary judgment, particularly in deadly-force cases formerly resolved by focusing on the final moments alone.
• Qualified immunity remains a separate inquiry: Although not addressed in the opinion, defendants may still argue qualified immunity on remand. Barnes clarifies the substantive standard going forward; whether the law was “clearly established” at the time of this 2016 incident will be assessed under then-existing precedent, not today’s clarification. Expect qualified immunity arguments to contend that the rejection of the “moment-of-threat” rule was not clearly established at the time.

3) Police practices, training, and policies

• Training must account for holistic judicial review: Departments should expect courts to scrutinize the whole sequence, including whether officers used warnings, maintained safe positioning, and avoided escalating tactics where feasible. Policies discouraging shooting at moving vehicles or physically engaging with moving cars may become salient in reasonableness assessments.
• Concurrence as context in flight scenarios: Justice Kavanaugh’s emphasis on the risks of flight suggests courts should weigh the public-safety implications of allowing a driver to speed off when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s response.

4) Open questions preserved

• Officer-created danger: The Court again declines to decide whether, or how, an officer’s own decisions that foreseeably create or escalate a dangerous situation factor into the reasonableness calculus beyond ordinary totality-of-circumstances analysis. After Barnes, lower courts may consider earlier officer conduct as part of the context, but no separate “provocation” or per se “creation-of-danger” rule has been endorsed.
• Weighting factors within the totality: Barnes mandates a broader lens, but it does not prescribe how to balance particular factors. Garner and Graham still govern the balance between the governmental interest (including risks from flight) and the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Objective reasonableness”: The officer’s use of force is judged from the standpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene, not based on the officer’s subjective intent or perfect hindsight.
• “Totality of the circumstances” (no time limit): Courts must consider all relevant facts leading up to and including the use of force. There is no rule limiting analysis to the final instant before force is used.
• “Moment-of-threat” rule: A doctrine (applied by the Fifth Circuit) that confined analysis to whether the officer reasonably feared for life at the split-second of the shooting. Barnes rejects this approach as incompatible with Fourth Amendment precedent.
• Deadly force under Garner: Generally permissible only if the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others, and, if feasible, the officer should give a warning.
• Plumhoff principle: Earlier events—such as a dangerous chase—can justify force used at the end; the final moment is interpreted in light of the entire chain of events.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983: The federal statute allowing civil suits for constitutional violations by state actors, including alleged excessive force by police officers.
• Summary judgment: A court’s decision without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Barnes makes it less likely that a case will be resolved on a truncated factual snapshot in deadly-force cases.
• Qualified immunity (not decided here): Shields officials from civil liability unless they violated clearly established law. Barnes clarifies the substantive reasonableness standard; whether officers are immune may still turn on pre-existing law at the time of the incident.
• Officer-created danger / provocation (not decided here): Whether an officer’s own actions creating danger weigh against reasonableness beyond ordinary totality analysis remains unresolved; Mendez rejected a distinct “provocation rule,” and Barnes again declines to address the issue.

Practical Guidance for Courts and Litigants Post-Barnes

For Trial and Appellate Courts

• Evaluate the full timeline: the basis for the stop, information known to the officer, instructions and warnings given, suspect responses, officer positioning, and escalation/de-escalation efforts.
• When video exists, review the entire recording rather than the final moments, consistent with Scott v. Harris.
• In jury instructions and reasoned opinions, articulate how earlier events inform the officer’s perception of threat when force was used.
• Avoid categorical exclusions of earlier conduct; instead, explain whether and why specific past facts are relevant or not.

For Plaintiffs

• Develop the record on pre-shooting interactions, including warnings, compliance opportunities, and relative severity of the precipitating offense.
• Use training policies and expert testimony to contextualize officer decisions and safer alternatives where feasible, while recognizing the split-second nature of many encounters.

For Defendants

• Contextualize the final moment with earlier conduct that heightened the perceived threat (e.g., flight, noncompliance, dangerous maneuvers), consistent with Plumhoff.
• Preserve qualified immunity arguments focused on whether the law was clearly established at the time of the incident.

Conclusion

Barnes v. Felix cements an important clarification in Fourth Amendment excessive-force jurisprudence: courts cannot wear “chronological blinders.” The constitutional inquiry into objective reasonableness has no temporal restriction and must consider the entire, relevant course of events. By rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s “moment-of-threat” rule, the Court restores fidelity to Graham and Garner’s totality-of-the-circumstances framework and aligns practice with the logic of precedents like Plumhoff.

At the same time, the Court expressly reserves judgment on whether and how an officer’s “creation” of danger counts within the reasonableness analysis, leaving room for continued development in the lower courts. The concurrence underscores the real-world perils officers and communities face during traffic stops and flight, reminding courts to weigh those risks carefully within the totality framework and to avoid hindsight bias.

The upshot is both simple and consequential: In use-of-force cases, context matters—all of it. Barnes ensures that future excessive-force litigation will be decided on a complete picture rather than a frozen frame.