Introduction

In United States v. Hines, No. 23-3905 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024) (not recommended for publication), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a Batson challenge to the government’s peremptory strike of the only black panelist who reached the jury box. The case arose from an armed bank robbery prosecution in the Northern District of Ohio. During voir dire, Juror 28 disclosed that her brother had been charged in a highly publicized public-corruption matter in Cuyahoga County and that she believed he had been treated unfairly by law enforcement. The prosecutor expressed concern that federal authorities may have been involved in the corruption probe and moved to strike the juror. Defense counsel objected under BATSON v. KENTUCKY.

On appeal, the sole issue was Batson’s step three—whether the district court clearly erred in rejecting a claim of purposeful racial discrimination. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court permissibly credited the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation: perceived bias against federal law enforcement based on the juror’s familial experience, even though the prosecutor lacked on-the-spot proof that federal authorities were involved in that prior matter.

• Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Panel: Judges Kethledge, Thapar, and Larsen; Opinion by Judge Thapar
• Disposition: Affirmed
• Publication: Not recommended for publication (nonprecedential)

Summary of the Opinion

The government used a peremptory strike on Juror 28, a black juror whose brother had been charged in a widely publicized corruption case. She told the court she believed her brother had not been treated fairly by law enforcement. The prosecutor explained that, because some individuals tied to that matter were federally investigated and because the same federal agencies (the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office) were involved in Hines’s case, Juror 28 might be biased against federal authorities. The district court accepted this explanation and denied the Batson challenge.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Applying the deferential clear-error standard to the district court’s step-three determination, the panel held that:

• The prosecutor’s explanation was race-neutral and credibly tied to potential bias against the prosecuting sovereign, given the juror’s stated belief that her brother was treated unfairly and the plausible (though unproven) federal tie to that corruption probe.
• Comparators identified by the defense were materially different: many had only state-level infractions or did not express negative views of law enforcement.
• The government’s contemporaneous voir dire of another nonminority juror to test for federal involvement showed a consistent, nondiscriminatory line of inquiry.
• Characterizing Juror 28 as “upset” about her brother’s treatment did not misstate the record, especially given the district court’s superior vantage point to assess tone and demeanor and the defense’s failure to contemporaneously object to that characterization.

The court concluded there was no clear error in finding no purposeful discrimination and thus affirmed Hines’s convictions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• BATSON v. KENTUCKY, 476 U.S. 79 (1986): Establishes that peremptory strikes motivated by race violate the Equal Protection Clause and sets the three-step framework. The opinion invokes Batson’s core rule and its emphasis that peremptories can be exercised “for any reason” so long as the reason is race-neutral, then requires step-three inquiry into purpose.
• PURKETT v. ELEM, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam): Clarifies that at step two the prosecutor’s burden is light—any facially race-neutral reason suffices, even if implausible or trivial; the weight and credibility of the reason are evaluated at step three.
• Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019): Reiterates that a strike violates Batson if motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent; endorses robust comparative-juror analysis and cautions that misstatements of the record by the prosecutor can signal pretext. The panel applies Flowers’ “motivated in substantial part” standard and engages with the misstatement argument.
• MILLER-EL v. COCKRELL, 537 U.S. 322 (2003): Emphasizes that step-three focuses on the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s justification and permits comparative analysis of similarly situated jurors. The Sixth Circuit quotes its focus on persuasiveness.
• MILLER-EL v. DRETKE, 545 U.S. 231 (2005): Holds that disparate treatment of comparably situated nonminority jurors can indicate discriminatory intent. The panel relies on Miller-El’s comparator logic to discount the defense’s comparisons where material differences existed (federal nexus and expressed distrust of law enforcement).
• SNYDER v. LOUISIANA, 552 U.S. 472 (2008): Notes that assessing the prosecutor’s credibility is “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province,” yet also illustrates that appellate courts can find clear error when record evidence contradicts proffered reasons. The Sixth Circuit cites Snyder for the deferential standard and deems that deference dispositive in this case.
• United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2004): Upholds strikes where a juror’s family members had been jailed, reinforcing that personal or familial negative experiences with the criminal justice system are race-neutral grounds.
• United States v. Al-Din, 631 F. App’x 313 (6th Cir. 2015): Affirms a strike where a juror expressed a belief in systemic unfairness—again supporting the legitimacy of bias concerns when a juror articulates distrust.
• United States v. Gore, 118 F.4th 808 (6th Cir. 2024): Restates that the key question is whether the proffered reason is reasonable and does not suggest a discriminatory purpose; underscores the clear-error standard at step three. The panel quotes Gore in framing the inquiry.

Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit’s analysis is anchored in Batson step three and the clear-error standard. Several strands of reasoning converge:

• Credible race-neutral rationale: Juror 28 stated that law enforcement treated her brother unfairly. The prosecutor tied that sentiment to the same sovereign and agencies potentially involved in her brother’s matter (the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office) and indisputably involved in Hines’s case. Concern about bias against the prosecuting sovereign is a paradigmatically race-neutral basis for a peremptory strike.
• Proof not required on the spot: The panel expressly holds it is “unreasonable to expect the government to have instantaneous proof” regarding the extent of federal involvement in an unrelated, publicly reported corruption probe during voir dire. The district court could credit the prosecutor’s suspicion as plausible given the juror’s own references to a “big case” and to another county official tied to a federal probe.
• “Bare suspicion” and peremptory latitude—cabined by step three: The opinion states that “bare suspicion can justify a peremptory strike,” citing Batson’s permission to use peremptories for “any reason” that is race-neutral. Importantly, the court does not end the inquiry there; it still assesses credibility and consistency, ultimately finding no clear error in the district court’s assessment that the suspicion reflected a genuine, nonracial worry about bias against federal authorities.
• Comparative juror analysis: The defense’s proposed comparators failed on materiality. Other jurors described purely state offenses (DUI, disorderly conduct, leaving the scene). None combined an apparent or possible federal nexus with an expressed belief that law enforcement acted unfairly toward a close family member. Conversely, when a nonminority juror (Juror 30) mentioned marijuana arrests, the government probed whether they occurred on federal land, showing a consistent, nondiscriminatory methodology focused on federal involvement.
• Demeanor and the “upset” characterization: The prosecutor described Juror 28 as “upset.” Although the juror did not use that word, she said her brother was not treated fairly. The district court, with better access to tone and demeanor, found no mischaracterization. The defense’s failure to object contemporaneously also diminished the inference of pretext. Under Snyder, such demeanor calls are owed deference absent contrary record evidence.
• Timing and sole black panelist: The defense emphasized that the strike came when the only black panelist entered the box. The court did not treat this as dispositive, focusing instead on the articulated, case-linked reason and the lack of similarly situated nonminority comparators who were treated differently.

In sum, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court reasonably concluded the strike was motivated by concern about juror bias toward federal law enforcement rather than race. Given the trial court’s vantage point and the record’s support—juror’s statement of unfair treatment, plausible federal tie, and consistent voir dire probing—the appellate court saw no clear error.

Impact and Practice Implications

Although nonprecedential, Hines is likely to be cited for several practical propositions in Batson litigation:

• Prosecutors may justify a peremptory strike by articulating concern about bias against the prosecuting sovereign when a juror:
  • expresses negative views of law enforcement based on personal or familial experience; and
  • references a matter with plausible federal involvement—even if counsel lacks real-time proof during voir dire.
• “Bare suspicion” language will be noticed. Hines reinforces that peremptories need not rest on admissible evidence or confirmed facts. That said, step three still requires a credibility assessment. Consistency in voir dire (e.g., probing federal involvement across jurors) can be decisive in showing nonracial motivation.
• Comparator specificity matters. To show pretext, defense counsel must identify nonminority jurors who share the salient features of the government’s proffered reason—here, both the potential federal nexus and a negative law-enforcement experience. Comparators with only state-law incidents or with favorable views of police will typically fail.
• Record-building is critical. If the prosecutor’s characterization of a juror’s demeanor or attitude is disputed (e.g., “upset”), contemporaneous objection and a request for the court’s findings can be pivotal. Absent such a record, appellate courts tend to defer to the trial judge’s impressions.
• Defense strategies going forward:
  • Ask the court to require the prosecutor to explain why alleged federal involvement matters and whether the same rationale was applied to other jurors.
  • Press for a consistent record of questions to all jurors touching on federal-state distinctions.
  • Document the absence of any real federal link where possible (e.g., “Was the case in federal court?” “Were federal agents involved?”).
  • Identify and preserve truly comparable nonminority jurors for step-three comparative analysis.
• Judicial vigilance remains necessary. The “instantaneous proof not required” and “bare suspicion” formulations could be misused to mask discriminatory motives. Trial courts should continue to demand specific, case-linked reasons and assess consistency across the venire, as Flowers, Miller‑El, and Snyder instruct.
• Nonprecedential but persuasive. Though not binding, the opinion may influence district courts within the Sixth Circuit when evaluating suspicion-based, sovereign-focused rationales at Batson step three.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Peremptory challenge: A party’s ability to strike a prospective juror without stating a cause. Peremptories are limited in number and cannot be exercised for a discriminatory reason.
• Batson challenge: An objection that a peremptory strike was motivated by race (or other protected class). Triggers a three-step inquiry.
• Batson’s three steps:
  • Step 1: The opponent of the strike makes a prima facie showing of discrimination.
  • Step 2: The proponent offers a race-neutral reason for the strike (a light burden).
  • Step 3: The court decides whether the opponent proved purposeful discrimination (the critical credibility stage).
• Race-neutral reason: Any explanation not inherently tied to race (e.g., concern about bias against law enforcement). It need not be persuasive at step two; persuasiveness is tested at step three.
• Clear error standard: On appeal, the court asks whether the district court made a definite and firm mistake. Because trial judges observe demeanor first-hand, their credibility findings at step three receive substantial deference.
• Comparative juror analysis: Comparing struck jurors with seated jurors to see whether the stated reason for a strike applies equally to others who were not struck. If it does, that can suggest pretext.
• Sovereign-specific bias: Concern that a juror harbors bias against the specific prosecuting entity (e.g., federal authorities), which can be a valid, race-neutral basis for a strike.

Conclusion

United States v. Hines underscores the deference appellate courts accord to trial judges at Batson’s third step. The Sixth Circuit held that a prosecutor’s suspicion of federal involvement in a juror’s family member’s case—paired with the juror’s stated belief that law enforcement acted unfairly—can be a credible, race-neutral basis for a peremptory strike, even absent real-time proof of federal participation. The court’s comparator analysis highlights the need for material similarity: a federal nexus and an expressed negative view of law enforcement distinguished Juror 28 from others.

While nonprecedential, Hines will likely be invoked to support sovereign-focused, suspicion-backed justifications where the record shows consistent voir dire and a plausible link to potential juror bias. At the same time, Flowers, Miller‑El, and Snyder continue to require searching, context-rich inquiry into pretext. The key takeaways are that credibility, consistency, and comparator rigor drive outcomes, and that defense counsel must build a meticulous record to overcome the high bar of clear-error review at Batson step three.