Awareness of a Lawsuit ≠ Notice of Service: Reframing Craddock’s First Element in Alternative‑Service Defaults (Tabakman v. Tabakman)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam decision in Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman, No. 24‑0919 (Tex. Dec. 5, 2025), is a significant refinement of Texas default-judgment jurisprudence under the longstanding Craddock doctrine. While rooted in a divorce proceeding, the opinion has implications across all civil litigation involving default judgments—particularly where service of process is obtained by alternative means (such as posting on a door) rather than by personal delivery.

The core holding: a defendant’s awareness that a lawsuit has been filed does not, by itself, defeat relief under Craddock when the defendant credibly asserts that she never received the citation—even if service was validly effected by alternative service. In other words, knowledge of the existence of the lawsuit is not the same as knowledge that one has been served, and failure to answer can still be excused where the defendant lacked actual notice of service despite proper constructive service.

The Court reverses the Fourteenth Court of Appeals and holds that:

• Jenna’s failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference; and
• She satisfied the remaining Craddock elements (meritorious defense; no undue delay or injury), entitling her to a new trial.

The decision deepens the Court’s recent trend of strongly disfavoring default judgments and insisting that doubts—whether about service, notice, or excuse—be resolved against the party who obtained the default.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Marital Breakdown and Filing of Divorce

After thirteen years of marriage and one child, Jenna left the marital home to live with her parents, citing alleged mistreatment by her husband, Gary. In that same month, Gary filed for divorce and informed Jenna that he had done so. Jenna, however, testified that she was scared, lacked funds to retain a lawyer, did not know what to do, and assumed she would be personally served with “divorce papers.”

Jenna’s father corroborated that they were expecting in‑person service and “waited for service of process.” Personal service attempts repeatedly failed.

B. Alternative Service and Default Proceedings

After “months of multiple unsuccessful service attempts,” Gary obtained an order for alternative service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b). The process server:

• Posted the citation, original petition, and order authorizing alternative service on the front door of Jenna’s parents’ house (where she was staying); and
• Never personally encountered or saw Jenna at the residence.

No answer was filed. Gary then moved for a default judgment. At the hearing on that motion, the trial court orally rendered a default divorce judgment.

C. Jenna Learns of the Default and Quickly Appears

Unaware of the hearing or service by posting, Jenna contacted an attorney when Gary allegedly threatened to abscond with their child and the family dog. Within approximately three weeks:

• Her attorney filed an answer; and
• Filed a motion for new trial under Craddock.

Despite Jenna’s appearance, the trial court signed the written default divorce decree a few days later. Jenna did not challenge on appeal the trial court’s action in signing the decree after she had appeared. The controversy instead centered on whether she met the equitable standard for a new trial under Craddock.

D. Trial Court and Court of Appeals Rulings

Following an evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court found:

• Jenna had “set up” a meritorious defense (thus satisfying the second Craddock element); but
• She was “consciously indifferent” in failing to answer; and
• She failed to show that a new trial would not harm or injure Gary (thus failing the first and third Craddock elements).

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, addressing only the first Craddock element:

• It held that Jenna’s ignorance of having been served and her failure to take steps to avoid or secure service did not negate conscious indifference.
• It relied on evidence that Gary had told her about the lawsuit and warned her that someone was trying to serve process.
• Because Jenna’s factual assertions were deemed “controverted,” the court deferred to the trial court’s resolution of the conflict against her.

On discretionary review, the Supreme Court reverses.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court of Texas holds:

1. First Craddock Element – No Intentional Failure / No Conscious Indifference
   Jenna satisfied the first element by:
   • Testifying that she expected personal service and did not know that alternative service by posting could be used;
   • Stating she was unaware of any actual service on her—no papers were personally handed to her, left with family, or brought to her attention; and
   • Providing corroborating testimony from her father regarding construction at the house, security protocols, and the absence of notice of any paperwork posted on the door.
   The Court stresses that:
   • A mistake of law (believing that only personal service was possible) can satisfy this element.
   • Alternative service returns show how service was attempted, but not when or whether the defendant received actual notice.
   • Awareness of a lawsuit does not impose a duty to answer absent proper service; knowledge of service is different from knowledge of filing.
   Gary did not “controvert” Jenna’s explanation; therefore, her excuse, if true, negated conscious indifference.
2. Second Craddock Element – Meritorious Defense
   The trial court correctly found that Jenna “set up” a meritorious defense. Among several defenses, she:
   • Asserted a reimbursement claim to her separate estate for funds used as the down payment on the marital home; and
   • Supported that claim with testimonial and documentary evidence.
   At the Craddock stage she was not required to conclusively prove her separate-property claim or overcome the community-property presumption by clear and convincing evidence. She needed only a prima facie showing of a legally valid defense.
3. Third Craddock Element – No Undue Delay or Injury
   Jenna satisfied her initial burden by:
   • Alleging that a new trial would not cause undue delay or injury;
   • Representing that she was ready for trial;
   • Agreeing to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred in obtaining the default; and
   • Acknowledging that attorney’s fees relating to the new-trial motion could be awarded.
   The burden then shifted to Gary, who:
   • Asserted financial harm (fees for managing community property and selling the marital home); and
   • Claimed that undoing custody and possession provisions would strain the child.
   The Court held these showings insufficient because Gary did not demonstrate how any of these harms would prejudice his ability to present the merits at a new trial. General inconvenience, cost, and family strain are not the type of “injury” that defeats the third Craddock element.
4. Disposition
   Without oral argument, the Supreme Court:
   • Grants the petition for review;
   • Reverses the court of appeals; and
   • Remands to the trial court for a new trial.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Legal Background: Default Judgments and the Craddock Doctrine

1. Strong Policy Against Default Judgments

The Court situates the case within the broader policy articulated most recently in In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024). Texas law:

• “Greatly disfavors” default judgments;
• Prefers adjudication on the merits to enhance accuracy, fairness, and legitimacy through the “adversarial clash”; and
• Views default judgments as merely tolerated mechanisms to prevent defendants from disabling courts by simply refusing to appear.

Lakeside Resort also emphasized:

• The concerns with ex parte proceedings;
• The “inherent unfairness” to the absent party; and
• The “threat to judicial integrity” created by a heightened risk of erroneous judgments enforced by state power.

Critically, Lakeside Resort held that any doubts about a default judgment must be resolved against the party who obtained it—a theme the Court repeats here to justify generous application of Craddock.

2. The Craddock Test

The three‑part equitable test from Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1939, opinion adopted), governs motions to set aside default judgments:

1. The failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but due to accident or mistake;
2. The defendant sets up a meritorious defense; and
3. The motion is filed at such a time that granting a new trial will not result in delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.

Subsequent decisions, such as In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006), In re Marriage of Williams, 646 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2022), and Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009), reaffirm that once these elements are met, a new trial must be granted.

The Court also notes that, separate from Craddock, trial courts retain broad discretion to grant new trials for “good cause” under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320, especially given that default judgments are “fundamentally” different from other judgments. But in Tabakman, the Court rests squarely on Craddock.

B. First Craddock Element: Non‑Intentional, Non‑Indifferent Failure to Answer

1. The Standard: “Why Did the Defendant Not Appear?”

The “overarching question,” as restated from Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Drewery Construction Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. 2006), is:

Why did the defendant not appear?

The Court emphasizes several key principles:

• A failure to answer is not “intentional” merely because it is deliberate; and
• “Conscious indifference” is more than mere negligence (Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., 913 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1995)).

In this context, the Court again cites Fidelity & Guaranty: intent or conscious indifference means the defendant “knew it was sued and did not care.” The controlling fact is the absence of an intentional failure to answer, not the quality of the excuse. As Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012), put it:

“[S]ome excuse, although not necessarily a good one, will suffice to show that a defendant’s failure to file an answer was not because the defendant did not care.”

2. The Two‑Step Burden Framework

As in In re R.R., the Court applies a two‑step burden analysis:

1. The defendant satisfies her burden if:
   • Her factual assertions, if true, negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct; and
   • The plaintiff does not controvert those assertions.
2. If the plaintiff does controvert, the trial court may weigh credibility and resolve conflicts—but that is predicated on there actually being conflicting evidence on the same point.

3. Jenna’s Excuse and Why It Suffices

Jenna’s explanation had three main components:

• Mistaken Belief About Personal Service
  She believed that divorce papers would be served on her personally. Although that is a mistake of law (because alternative service is authorized by Rule 106(b)), the Court—citing Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992)—holds that a mistake of law can satisfy the first Craddock element.
• No Effort to Evade Service and No Notice of Service Attempts
  Jenna testified that she took no steps to avoid service and was unaware of any personal service attempts:
  • No process server personally contacted her;
  • No one knocked on the door for her; and
  • No one left documents with her or brought any paperwork to her attention.
  Her father corroborated that:
  • Construction was ongoing at the house on the day of alternative service;
  • The community’s security guard should have notified him of any process server; and
  • He never received such notice, saw nothing posted on the door, and did not receive any documents from the construction crew.
• Prompt Action Once She Learned of the Default
  Upon learning of the default (triggered by Gary’s alleged threat to abscond with the child and dog), Jenna:
  • Retained counsel; and
  • Filed an answer and a motion for new trial within approximately three weeks, before the judge signed the written default decree.
  This prompt response strongly supports the absence of indifference: a defendant who “does not care” does not move quickly to protect her rights at the first genuine opportunity.

The Court concludes that these assertions, if true, negate intentional or consciously indifferent failure to answer before the oral rendition of judgment.

4. Extending Prior “Lost Citation” and “Forgotten Papers” Cases

The Court aligns this case with earlier decisions where excuses involving lost or mislaid lawsuit papers sufficed to satisfy the first Craddock element:

• Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012)
  A citation left in a stack of papers on a desk and forgotten during a busy holiday period was a sufficient excuse, if supported by explanation.
• Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2012)
  Misplacing or failing to recall seeing suit papers may negate intentional failure if some explanation is provided.
• Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Drewery Construction Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006)
  Not recalling receiving suit papers is a viable excuse, with the Court noting that “people often do not know where or how they lost something—that is precisely why it remains ‘lost.’”

In all of these cases, the Court required:

• A plausible narrative explaining non-receipt or misplacement; and
• Some corroboration from those most likely to know what happened to the papers or what steps were taken to find them.

In Tabakman, the Court extends that logic “with greater force” to:

“the excuse of not having received the citation when alternative service has been effectuated.”

A defendant may not know how or why she failed to see papers posted on a door, especially in a household with construction crews or intermediaries. Provided she and corroborating witnesses give a plausible account that, if believed, shows non‑receipt, the first Craddock element is satisfied.

5. Key Clarification: Lawsuit vs. Citation and Duty to Act

The Court draws a sharp line between:

• Commencement of a lawsuit (the filing of a petition, Rule 22); and
• Service of citation—the formal notice directed to the defendant, commanding her to appear, warning of default, and creating a duty to respond (Rule 99(c)).

Relying on Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2002) and Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990), the Court reiterates:

“Absent service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge of a pending suit does not place any duty on a defendant to act.”

Thus:

• Knowing a lawsuit exists is not enough to create a duty to answer;
• A defendant is not per se “consciously indifferent” because she does not rush to file an answer based solely on informal knowledge of a filing; and
• The court of appeals erred by treating Jenna’s awareness of the lawsuit as equivalent to awareness of having been served.

The Court also distinguishes In re R.R., where “not understanding a citation and then doing nothing following service” is insufficient. That rule applies when the defendant has actually received the citation. Here, Jenna’s complaint was that she never received it at all.

6. Alternative Service and Actual Notice

A crucial doctrinal point is the distinction between:

• Valid service (the constitutional and procedural adequacy of the method used); and
• Actual notice (whether the defendant in fact saw or learned of the citation).

The Court notes:

• Alternative service under Rule 106(b) is designed for situations where proof of actual notice is impractical;
• A return showing that papers were posted on a door proves how and when service was executed; but
• It is “no evidence” of when the defendant received actual notice (State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1993)).

The Court analogizes to:

• Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 713 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2025) (actual vs. constructive notice of judgment under Rule 306a); and
• Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987) (Rule 21a service creates a presumption of receipt that “is not evidence” and vanishes upon opposing evidence of non‑receipt).

In Tabakman, the process server never saw Jenna and there was no evidence—other than the posting itself—that Jenna ever learned of the citation. The Court therefore holds:

• The existence of a valid alternative‑service return does not by itself “controvert” a defendant’s testimony that she never received the citation; and
• Jenna’s evidence of non‑receipt stands uncontroverted for Craddock purposes.

7. Result: First Element Satisfied, Court of Appeals Reversed

Because Jenna’s excuse, if true, negated intentionality and conscious indifference, and because Gary did not actually controvert her account of non‑receipt, the Court holds the first Craddock element was satisfied as a matter of law. The court of appeals erred by:

• Conflating knowledge of suit with notice of service; and
• Treating the alternative‑service return as evidence that Jenna actually received the citation.

C. Second Craddock Element: “Setting Up” a Meritorious Defense

1. Standard: Prima Facie Defense, Not Proof of Victory

Under Dolgencorp v. Lerma, a defendant “sets up” a meritorious defense by:

• Alleging facts which, if true, legally constitute a defense; and
• Supporting those allegations with affidavits or other evidence providing prima facie proof of that defense.

The Court emphasizes:

• This standard ignores controverting evidence—the question is whether the defendant has a viable defense on its face, not who would ultimately win at trial.
• The defendant need not carry a heightened or final evidentiary burden at the Craddock stage; she need only show that there is something worth litigating on the merits.

2. Jenna’s Reimbursement / Separate-Property Defense

Jenna asserted a reimbursement claim from the community estate to her separate estate, alleging that:

• She contributed separate funds to the down payment on the marital home; and
• Those contributions entitled her to reimbursement or recognition of a separate‑property interest.

She supported this with:

• Testimonial evidence; and
• Documentary proof (presumably financial records, though the opinion does not detail them).

Gary argued that she failed to overcome the community‑property presumption in Texas Family Code § 3.003, which requires clear and convincing evidence to establish separate property. The Supreme Court rejects this critique at the Craddock stage as imposing “too high of a burden.” Whether Jenna will ultimately prove her separate interest is a question for trial; for present purposes, she adequately “set up” a defense.

D. Third Craddock Element: No Undue Delay or Injury

1. The Burden-Shifting Framework

The third Craddock element is regularly misunderstood. The Court, citing Dolgencorp and Director, State Employees Workers’ Compensation Division v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994), clarifies:

1. The defaulting defendant bears an initial burden to:
   • Allege that granting a new trial will not cause delay or injury; and
   • Offer to do what is reasonable (e.g., pay costs) to place the plaintiff in essentially the same position as if no default had occurred.
2. If the defendant makes that showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate specific injury or prejudice that a new trial would cause.

Crucially, “injury” in this context means prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to present the merits of the case at a new trial, not mere inconvenience or additional litigation costs.

2. Jenna’s Showing

Jenna:

• Alleged that a new trial would cause no undue delay or injury;
• Stated she was ready for trial;
• Agreed to pay Gary’s reasonable costs in obtaining the default; and
• Conceded the trial court could award attorney’s fees related to the new-trial motion.

This met her initial burden and shifted the onus to Gary.

3. Gary’s Claimed Injuries and Why They Fail

Gary claimed:

• Financial harm from attorney’s fees linked to managing the community estate and selling the marital home; and
• Emotional and logistical strain on the child if the default’s custody and visitation orders were disturbed.

The Court holds that:

• These showings are too general; they do not explain how they would disadvantage Gary in presenting his case at a new trial.
• The Evans standard explicitly rejects generic financial hardship or inconvenience as “injury” for Craddock purposes.

The Court further references In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2021), which held that allowing a litigant to establish a separate‑property claim in a post‑judgment proceeding need not upset the underlying divorce decree, custody, or support orders. By analogy, permitting a new trial here—particularly to adjudicate a reimbursement/separate‑property claim—does not cause cognizable injury. Even if aspects of custody or visitation must be revisited, that is not the type of prejudice that defeats a new trial under Craddock.

The Supreme Court therefore concludes that Jenna met the third element and Gary failed to show concrete, merits-related prejudice.

E. Service Challenge: Proper But Not Dispositive

Jenna also argued that service itself was defective. Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected that argument, finding service valid. The Supreme Court:

• Reviewed the record; and
• Concluded that no reversible error existed regarding service itself.

Invoking Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital, 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024), the Court declined to elaborate, stating that further discussion would not aid the jurisprudence of the State.

This reinforces a key point: even where service is constitutionally and procedurally valid, equitable relief under Craddock may still be required if the defendant, in good faith, did not obtain actual notice and quickly sought to litigate on the merits.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Default Judgment

A default judgment occurs when:

• A plaintiff sues and properly serves a defendant; but
• The defendant fails to file an answer by the deadline.

The court can then enter judgment for the plaintiff without the defendant’s participation. Because this deprives the defendant of adversarial process, courts tightly scrutinize default judgments.

B. The Craddock Test (In Plain Terms)

To get a default judgment set aside and obtain a new trial, a defendant must show three things:

1. “I wasn’t intentionally ignoring the lawsuit.”
   The failure to respond was an accident, mistake, or misunderstanding—not a deliberate decision to do nothing.
2. “I have a real defense.”
   If I am allowed to go to trial, I can put on evidence that might change the outcome—not just technical objections.
3. “Re‑opening the case won’t unfairly hurt the plaintiff.”
   Letting us re‑litigate won’t put the plaintiff in a worse position in terms of proving the case, beyond normal inconvenience and cost.

C. “Conscious Indifference”

“Conscious indifference” is:

• More serious than ordinary negligence or oversight; and
• Means effectively: “I knew about the suit and just didn’t care enough to respond.”

If the defendant offers some plausible excuse that, if believed, shows concern or confusion rather than disregard, the first Craddock element is usually met unless the plaintiff can disprove it.

D. Alternative Service vs. Actual Notice

• Alternative Service (Rule 106(b))
  When personal service is impractical, the court can authorize methods like posting on a door, leaving papers with someone else, or other means reasonably calculated to give notice.
• Actual Notice
  The defendant actually sees or learns of the citation and understands that she has been formally required to respond by a certain date under threat of default.

Tabakman underscores that a plaintiff may have validly served a defendant without the defendant ever actually seeing the citation. That difference matters for equitable relief from default.

E. Meritorious Defense

A “meritorious defense” does not mean the defendant will win. It means:

• There is a legally recognized defense (for example, a separate-property claim in a divorce); and
• There is some evidence supporting it.

The court does not weigh credibility or decide contested facts at this stage; it simply ensures that reopening the case would not be pointless.

F. “Injury” or Prejudice Under Craddock

“Injury” for the third Craddock element means something like:

• Critical witnesses are no longer available;
• Evidence has been irretrievably lost; or
• The plaintiff’s ability to present the case has been significantly undermined by the delay.

It does not mean:

• Having to pay more legal fees;
• Suffering delay in finality; or
• Enduring the typical burdens of further litigation.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Clarifying the Role of Alternative Service in Default Proceedings

This decision reshapes litigants’ expectations around alternative service and defaults in Texas:

• For plaintiffs: While alternative service remains a valid tool, securing a default judgment after alternative service is now more vulnerable to Craddock relief if the defendant promptly appears and credibly asserts lack of actual notice.
• For defendants: Even if service was technically proper, a genuine, documented lack of actual notice—especially in alternative-service scenarios—can support setting aside a default if the defendant acts quickly.

Practically, plaintiffs may:

• Be more careful to choose methods of alternative service that maximize the likelihood of actual notice (e.g., combined posting and mailing where permitted); and
• Document any follow‑up communications where the defendant acknowledges having seen or heard of the citation.

B. Reinforcing the Distinction Between Service and Mere Knowledge of Suit

By re‑emphasizing Wilson v. Dunn and related authorities, the Court:

• Rejects the notion that defendants have an independent duty to monitor dockets or file answers based solely on word‑of‑mouth knowledge that a petition exists; and
• Protects unsophisticated or unrepresented parties from being branded “consciously indifferent” for not litigating proactively before being formally called into court via service.

This is particularly important in family law, where one spouse may be more legally knowledgeable or represented, and the other may be financially or emotionally vulnerable—like Jenna, who had left the marital home, feared her spouse, and lacked funds for counsel.

C. Strengthening the Policy Against Defaults

Tabakman is part of a line of recent cases (Lakeside Resort, Williams, Sandoval) emphasizing that:

• Default judgments are “greatly disfavored”; and
• Courts must lean toward adjudicating on the merits whenever reasonably possible.

By:

• Broadly reading what qualifies as an “excuse” under the first Craddock element;
• Keeping the standard for “meritorious defense” at a prima facie level; and
• Maintaining a high threshold for what counts as “injury” to the plaintiff,

the Court reduces the likelihood that default judgments—particularly in high‑stakes matters such as divorce, custody, and property division—will remain in place when the defaulted party quickly appears and expresses a desire to litigate.

D. Implications for Family Law Practice

Specific to family law, the case:

• Signals that default divorce decrees, especially where major property rights or parent‑child relationships are at stake, will be scrutinized closely under Craddock.
• Encourages trial courts to grant new trials more readily when a spouse who defaulted presents a plausible story of non-service and a viable property or custody defense.
• Confirms that claims to separate property or reimbursement are quintessential “meritorious defenses” that warrant reopening a default, consistent with In re Marriage of Sandoval.

Family law practitioners representing the filing spouse must now:

• Build a robust record not just of formal service, but of any indications that the other spouse actually saw and understood the citation; and
• Be prepared for courts to set aside defaults where the absent spouse’s explanation of non‑receipt is credible and supported by family or contextual evidence.

E. Guidance for Trial Courts

Tabakman provides concrete guidance to trial judges:

• When a defendant testifies that she never received the citation and supports her claim with corroborating witnesses or circumstances, a mere return of alternative service does not by itself “controvert” that account.
• Courts must distinguish between:
  • The validity of service for jurisdictional/due‑process purposes; and
  • The equitable inquiry under Craddock into whether actual notice was obtained, and whether the failure to answer was excusable.
• In evaluating the third element, courts should focus on whether a new trial would impair the plaintiff’s ability to prove the case, not on ordinary costs, inconvenience, or emotional difficulty in family restructuring.

VII. Conclusion

Tabakman v. Tabakman refines and reinforces Texas law on setting aside default judgments under Craddock in three key ways:

1. It draws a firm distinction between knowledge of a lawsuit and notice of being served with citation, holding that mere awareness of the suit does not establish conscious indifference.
2. It extends the Court’s prior “lost or forgotten citation” cases to the realm of alternative service, making clear that a credible assertion of non‑receipt—even when service was validly made by posting—can satisfy the first Craddock element, particularly when supported by other witnesses and prompt subsequent action.
3. It reaffirms a lenient, defendant‑protective interpretation of the second and third Craddock elements: defendants need only make a prima facie showing of a legally cognizable defense, and plaintiffs must show real prejudice to their ability to present the merits—not mere cost or inconvenience—to defeat a new trial.

In doing so, the Supreme Court advances its strong policy against default judgments and its commitment to decisions on the merits. The opinion is especially salient for family law and for civil cases relying on alternative service, signaling to practitioners and judges alike that Texas courts will err on the side of allowing litigants their day in court when actual notice of citation is plausibly lacking and the defendant acts quickly to participate.