Introduction

This published Eleventh Circuit opinion arises from federal convictions of Travis McMichael, Gregory McMichael, and William “Roddie” Bryan following the killing of Ahmaud Arbery in Satilla Shores, a neighborhood in Glynn County, Georgia. After state murder convictions and life sentences, the defendants were tried federally and convicted of interference with rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) and attempted kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). Travis and Gregory were also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, premised on the § 245 offense.

On appeal, the defendants did not raise constitutional challenges; instead, they mounted sufficiency-of-the-evidence attacks on both federal counts and related predicate findings. Central issues included:

• Whether the government proved the § 245 elements “because of … race” and “because [the victim was] enjoying [a] facility … provided or administered by [a] State or subdivision.”
• What “provided or administered by” means for neighborhood roads; whether title/ownership is necessary or whether public maintenance and openness suffice.
• Under § 1201(a)(1), whether an automobile is an “instrumentality of interstate commerce” when used wholly intrastate, and whether the kidnap “for ransom or reward or otherwise” element can be satisfied by motives such as vigilante aims or personal gratification.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full. Notably, the court announced two important clarifications: (1) automobiles are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce for purposes of § 1201(a)(1), even when used purely locally; and (2) under § 245(b)(2)(B), “provided or administered by” does not require government ownership or title—county maintenance and public access can suffice.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standard of review: De novo review of sufficiency challenges, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and permitting reasonable inferences.
• § 245(b)(2)(B):
  • The “because of” requirement carries a but-for causation standard (consistent with Burrage v. United States). Sufficient evidence showed that Gregory McMichael and William Bryan acted because of Arbery’s race, including extensive proof of racial animus and differential treatment.
  • “Facility” includes city streets; sufficient evidence showed defendants acted “because of” Arbery’s use of the streets of Satilla Shores, as the pursuit and killing occurred on and used the roads to block his movement.
  • “Provided or administered by” a state or subdivision does not require title; county maintenance, public access, and budgetary support sufficed to prove the Satilla Shores roads were covered facilities.
• § 1201(a)(1) attempted kidnapping:
  • “For ransom or reward or otherwise” is broadly satisfied by any benefit; the jury could infer vigilante motives, reputational benefits as “crime-stoppers,” or personal satisfaction.
  • Automobiles are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Thus, using the truck to pursue and hem in Arbery satisfied the jurisdictional element, even without interstate travel.
• Evidentiary rulings: Admission of NICB manufacturing records with a misdated authentication was, at most, harmless; hearsay objections to neighborhood Facebook posts were unpreserved and not outcome-determinative.
• Dissent (Calvert, J.): Agrees with the majority except on the per se automobile holding. Would adopt a case-by-case approach to “instrumentality,” citing federalism concerns and arguing Congress did not intend § 1201 to federalize any kidnapping involving a car used intrastate.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Driving the Decision

• Causation under “because of”: The court followed Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014), applying a but-for standard to § 245(b)(2)(B), reinforced by Eleventh Circuit precedent (United States v. Feldman, 936 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2019)).
• “Facility” includes streets: The court aligned with United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002), and United States v. Cazares, 788 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2015), treating public streets as covered “facilities” under § 245(b)(2)(B).
• “Provided or administered by” a State: Drawing on ordinary-meaning tools (Webster’s 3d; Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012); United States v. Chinchilla, 987 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2021)), the court held that maintenance and management suffice. It analogized to:
  • United States v. White, 846 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1988): city regulations and policing of a privately organized parade constituted “administered.”
  • United States v. Griffin, 585 F. Supp. 1439 (M.D.N.C. 1983): permitting and police oversight meant a city “administered” a parade.
• Instrumentality of interstate commerce—automobiles:
  • Three Lopez categories: channels; instrumentalities/ persons/things; and activities with substantial effects (United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
  • Ballinger (en banc): Congress may regulate instrumentalities (including automobiles) even when the harm is purely local (United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
  • Convergence with other circuits: United States v. Windham, 53 F.4th 1006 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Protho, 41 F.4th 812 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Frazier, 129 F.4th 392 (7th Cir. 2025). Carjacking cases likewise treat cars as instrumentalities (e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995)).
  • Related Supreme Court foundations: Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
• “Ransom or reward or otherwise”: Extremely broad in Eleventh Circuit precedent—“any benefit” suffices (United States v. Lewis, 115 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1988)); other circuit examples include reputational or moralistic aims (e.g., Parker, 103 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1939); Brooks v. United States, 199 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1952)).
• Standards of review and preservation: The court reiterated robust deference to jury inferences (United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Watts, 896 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2013)), and applied the manifest miscarriage of justice bar to unpreserved sufficiency claims (United States v. Fries, 725 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2006)).

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) § 245(b)(2)(B): “Because of” race and “because of” use of a public facility

The court applied but-for causation to both “because of” clauses. It held that a rational jury could find that Gregory McMichael and William Bryan acted because of Arbery’s race, relying on extensive evidence of their prior racist statements and associations of Black people with criminality. As to Gregory, the record additionally showed a less severe response to similar suspicions about a white person and his own tolerance for trespassing—undercutting neutral explanations. As to Bryan, the jury could infer from his language and his “instinct” reaction that race was determinative. The rule applied is forgiving to the verdict: multiple motives can exist, so long as race was the but-for “straw that broke the camel’s back.”

On “because of [Arbery’s] use” of a facility, the court accepted streets as a “facility” and found but-for causation because the chase ignited and unfolded on the roads, and the trucks were used to block street access. The defendants’ speculative alternative (that they would have chased him through private yards) did not displace the reasonable inference the jury actually drew.

2) § 245(b)(2)(B): “Provided or administered by” a State or subdivision

Here the court set a durable textual benchmark. Because § 245 does not define “provided” or “administered,” the court used 1960s dictionary meanings (“supply what is needed,” “manage/direct/superintend”), concluding the ordinary sense does not require ownership or title. That fits with White and Griffin, which recognized municipal “administration” of a privately organized parade through regulation and policing. The court then canvassed the record: county-maintained lists marking Satilla Shores roads as public; service tickets for road work and related issues; budgetary outlays for paving; and expert testimony that the county maintained the streets. Aerial imagery showed open access with no gates. On this evidence, the jury could reasonably find the roads were “provided or administered” by the county.

3) § 1201(a)(1): “For ransom or reward or otherwise”

The Eleventh Circuit’s longstanding view is that “almost any purpose” counts. The jury could infer several qualifying benefits here—vindication of vigilante desires; reputational enhancement as neighborhood protectors; or personal satisfaction from violence—each sufficient to satisfy the “otherwise” language.

4) § 1201(a)(1): Using an “instrumentality of interstate commerce”

The court expressly held that automobiles are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce, relying on Ballinger’s recognition of automobiles as instrumentalities and the Lopez taxonomy. That conclusion aligns with Sixth and Seventh Circuit authority and carjacking precedents. It does not require interstate use in the particular case; Congress may regulate instrumentalities even for wholly local, harmful uses. The trucks were driven and positioned on public roads to pursue and trap Arbery—quintessential vehicular use—satisfying the element.

Two additional points: (i) the court rejected the argument that using the truck as a blockade fell outside its anticipated use, noting the trucks were driven and parked on a road; and (ii) even if admitting NICB manufacturing records was error due to a misdated authentication, the error was harmless because the per se rule made manufacturing provenance irrelevant.

C. The Partial Dissent (Calvert, J.)

Judge Calvert concurred in all respects except the per se automobile holding. She would require a case-specific assessment of whether a vehicle was used as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, expressing three concerns:

• Federalism: Treating all automobiles as instrumentalities risks federalizing traditional state criminal matters and blurs the federal-state balance absent clear congressional direction (citing Jones v. United States and Bass).
• Statutory structure: Reading the “instrumentality” prong to capture any car use intrastate makes the separate “interstate transport” and “interstate travel” prongs in § 1201(a)(1) superfluous.
• Emerging circuit split: She aligns with the Tenth Circuit’s approach in United States v. Chavarria (2025), which rejected a per se rule for “motor vehicles,” favoring a limiting principle and distinguishing air/rail (uniquely interstate) from cars (routinely local).

The majority countered that different statutes regulating vehicles “in interstate commerce” reflect narrower policy choices by Congress compared to statutes (like § 1201) that refer to instrumentalities “of” interstate commerce; that Ballinger and multiple circuits already support the per se view; and that congressional power over instrumentalities does not require interstate use in the specific instance.

D. Likely Impact and Future Litigation

• Kidnapping prosecutions in the Eleventh Circuit: Prosecutors need not prove interstate travel or communications if an automobile was used to commit or further the kidnapping. This materially lowers the jurisdictional bar for § 1201(a)(1) in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.
• Federal–state boundary: Expect renewed federalism-based challenges in “purely local” kidnapping cases, especially where a car’s involvement is incidental. The Calvert dissent and the Tenth Circuit’s contrary approach set conditions for an eventual Supreme Court review.
• Hate crimes enforcement under § 245:
  • “Provided or administered” clarified: Maintenance and public openness suffice. Governments need not hold title. This reading broadens coverage to commonly used community spaces that are publicly serviced (e.g., open neighborhood roads without gates), easing the government’s proof.
  • Causation: The court’s application of but-for causation to both “because of” clauses confirms prosecutors may use circumstantial evidence of bias and context to carry motive elements; juries can infer motive from language, patterns of behavior, and differential treatment.
• Evidence practice:
  • Racially charged statements and social media evidence can be powerful motive proof for § 245; here, defendants’ in limine challenge failed below and was not pursued on appeal.
  • Authentication missteps that are immaterial to a dispositive legal holding (e.g., per se instrumentality) are likely to be deemed harmless.
  • Unpreserved hearsay or sufficiency challenges face steep plain-error or miscarriage-of-justice thresholds.
• 924(c) implications: Although the defendants did not separately litigate whether § 245(b)(2)(B) is a “crime of violence,” the affirmance of the § 245 convictions sustained the 924(c) counts premised on those offenses. Future cases may squarely address the categorical status of § 245 as a crime of violence.

Complex Concepts, Simplified

• But-for causation (“because of”): A motive counts if, without it, the defendant would not have acted as he did. It need not be the only motive; it must be the decisive one.
• “Facility … provided or administered by” a State: The government need not own the facility. It suffices that the State or locality maintains, manages, or supports it (e.g., listing as public, providing maintenance, budgeting funds) and the public can use it.
• Instrumentality of interstate commerce: Tools or equipment by which interstate commerce is conducted—here, automobiles. Under this decision, using a car locally to commit a kidnapping satisfies § 1201’s instrumentality requirement.
• “For ransom or reward or otherwise”: The kidnap motive element is capacious; any benefit—tangible or intangible (reputation, gratification, vigilante aim)—can fulfill it.
• Sufficiency of the evidence: Appellate courts ask whether any reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, drawing all reasonable inferences for the verdict. They do not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility.
• Plain error/manifest miscarriage: Unpreserved arguments are reversible only if the error is plain and prejudicial, often described as necessary to prevent a “manifest miscarriage of justice.”

Key Takeaways

• The Eleventh Circuit now clearly treats automobiles as per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce for § 1201(a)(1), joining the Sixth and Seventh Circuits and deepening a developing split with the Tenth Circuit’s narrower, case-by-case view.
• Under § 245(b)(2)(B), “provided or administered by” does not require government ownership. County maintenance and public access can prove that a street is a covered facility.
• But-for causation governs the “because of” clauses in § 245; juries may rely on circumstantial evidence of bias and context.
• “For ransom or reward or otherwise” is extremely broad; intangible benefits satisfy the element.
• Evidentiary irregularities that do not affect the outcome (e.g., scrivener’s errors) are unlikely to warrant reversal.

Conclusion

United States v. William Bryan is a consequential Eleventh Circuit decision on two fronts. First, it cements a broad reading of § 245(b)(2)(B), confirming that publicly maintained, open-access neighborhood roads qualify as “provided or administered” facilities and that but-for causation applies to both the racial and facility-use motives. Second—and most significantly—it adopts a categorical approach to § 1201(a)(1)’s commerce element by holding that automobiles are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce, obviating the need for interstate travel or communications when a vehicle is used to commit or further a kidnapping within the Eleventh Circuit. The thoughtful partial dissent highlights the federalism and statutory-structure concerns such a rule raises and previews a circuit conflict already emerging. For now, prosecutors in the Eleventh Circuit have a clarified and, in important ways, simplified path to proving federal jurisdiction in both hate-crime prosecutions under § 245 and kidnapping cases under § 1201, while defense counsel should be prepared to litigate the limits of these holdings—especially the instrumentality question—preserving issues for potential further review.