Automatic Speedy Trial Act Tolling for “Any” Pretrial Motion—including Status-Conference Motions—and Deferential Review of Mid‑Trial Self‑Representation Requests

I. Introduction

United States v. Richards is a Sixth Circuit decision affirming convictions and a 480-month sentence for sex trafficking of minors, sexual exploitation of children, and felon-in-possession of a firearm. The case arose from events in early 2023 involving two 14-year-old girls (A.C. and L.W.) who left a group home, were taken to the defendant’s Cincinnati apartment, and were subjected to drug use, sexual assault, and commercial sexual exploitation.

On appeal, Kelly Richards raised five principal issues: (1) violation of the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right; (2) lack of probable cause and entitlement to a Franks hearing concerning search-warrant affidavits; (3) improper denial of his mid-trial request to represent himself; (4) improper limitation of cross-examination of the investigating agent under Rule 403 and the Confrontation Clause; and (5) substantive unreasonableness of a below-Guidelines sentence.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in full, holding:

No Speedy Trial Act violation: the 70-day clock had not expired because time was excluded for the suppression motion, post-hearing briefing and “under advisement” time, a government motion for a status conference, and additional pretrial motions. The court rejected arguments that the status-conference motion was not a “pretrial motion,” and that it needed to be “properly filed” under local rules to toll the clock.
No Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violation: after subtracting delay attributable to the defendant’s own motions, the remaining delay was not “uncommonly long,” so the claim failed at the threshold.
No Franks hearing required: alleged inconsistencies, omissions about phone-number ownership, and omission of a victim’s juvenile record did not constitute a substantial preliminary showing of intentional/reckless falsehoods or critical omissions.
Mid-trial self-representation properly denied: because the request came on the fourth trial day, the district court acted within its discretion.
Cross-examination limitation upheld: excluding questioning about United States v. Shelton under Rule 403 was within the court’s discretion and did not violate confrontation rights.
Sentence substantively reasonable: the below-Guidelines 480-month term was entitled to strong deference; the defendant did not meet the “heavy burden” to show unreasonableness.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Speedy Trial Act: automatic exclusions and treatment of filings

18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), § 3161(h)(1)(D), § 3161(h)(1)(H) (statutory framework): the panel applied the Act’s structure—70 days to trial, with automatic exclusions for pretrial motions and “under advisement” time.
United States v. Mentz: used for the mechanics of tolling—when motions require hearings, time is excluded from filing through hearing; supplemental filings requested by the court extend exclusion; and up to 30 days can be excluded while the court takes the matter “under advisement.” Richards relies heavily on Mentz to justify exclusion for post-hearing briefs and advisement time.
Henderson v. United States: invoked to rebut the defendant’s claim that post-hearing briefs were not “needed.” The panel emphasized the district court’s discretion to determine what is “needed” for “proper disposition,” citing Henderson v. United States for the proposition that trial courts are best positioned to decide what they require to resolve motions.
United States v. Richardson: supplied standards of review—de novo for legal interpretation of the Act and abuse of discretion for day-count decisions.
United States v. Clark: supported the waiver analysis where the defendant had made a “plain, explicit concession” below regarding tolling. Even though the panel proceeded to address the merits, United States v. Clark frames the risk defendants face when conceding clock computations in the district court.
United States v. Jenkins: supported exclusion for a motion “under advisement,” and the timing for when the clock resumes after adjudication of the motion.
United States v. Tinklenberg: pivotal to the court’s rejection of the defendant’s “status conference motion doesn’t count” theory. The panel treated Tinklenberg as controlling that “any pretrial motion” triggers automatic tolling without an inquiry into whether it actually caused delay.
United States v. Sherer: used to underscore breadth—if even a motion to dismiss under the Act tolls the clock, then a status-conference motion can as well.
Artuz v. Bennett and United States v. Cianciola: Richards tried to import “properly filed” concepts from habeas tolling; the panel rejected that analogy and, relying on United States v. Cianciola, treated “filed and docketed” as sufficient for Speedy Trial Act tolling.
United States v. Brown (11th Cir.) (as discussed): the panel treated this as out-of-circuit and inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s approach in United States v. Tinklenberg. Its role in the opinion is largely negative—an example the court declined to follow.

2. Sixth Amendment speedy trial

Barker v. Wingo: provided the four-factor test, but the panel stopped at the threshold “length of delay” step.
United States v. Loud Hawk: supplied authority for treating length of delay as a “threshold” inquiry before analyzing the remaining Barker factors.
United States v. Robinson, United States v. Brown, United States v. Gardner: used to situate the “presumptively prejudicial” timeframe and to justify the conclusion that the non-defendant-caused delay was not “uncommonly long.”
United States v. Howard: used for the rule that defendant-caused delay does not count toward the constitutional delay calculation.
United States v. Lester: supplied plain-error review because the Sixth Amendment claim was not preserved in the district court.

3. Search warrants and Franks hearings

Franks v. Delaware: the governing test for challenging warrant affidavits; the panel applied its “presumption of validity” and “substantial preliminary showing” requirements.
United States v. Gilbert: supplied the “light most favorable to the Government” principle when reviewing denial of a suppression motion.
United States v. Higgins: a key modern Sixth Circuit authority for the Franks standard and heightened burden for omissions (“intent to mislead” and “critical” to probable cause).
United States v. Sanders (en banc): strengthened the panel’s framing of Franks as a “tall task,” reinforcing the presumption of validity and the demanding showing required.
United States v. Rose: used to reject the idea that mere inconsistencies among witnesses establish falsehood in a warrant affidavit.

4. Self-representation mid-trial

Faretta v. California: established the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation, which the panel recognized but treated as limited by timing.
Jones v. Bell and Hill v. Curtin: used to emphasize that timing matters and the right is strongest when invoked well before trial.
Pierce v. Underwood: supplied the conceptual basis for deference—mid-trial decisions are fact-bound and “utterly resist generalization,” supporting abuse-of-discretion review.
Robards v. Rees, United States v. Martin, United States v. Conteh: supported the conclusion that denying self-representation requests after trial begins is routinely upheld, and that the district court acted within discretion.
United States v. Sullivan: cited by analogy to illustrate trial-management considerations relevant to mid-trial requests.
United States v. Powell: acknowledged intra-circuit variation in standards of review, but the panel chose abuse-of-discretion for mid-trial requests.

5. Cross-examination, Rule 403, and confrontation

United States v. Ralston: supplied standard of review (abuse of discretion) and Confrontation Clause framing (“wide latitude” to limit cross-examination).
Fed. R. Evid. 403 and Fed. R. Evid. 608(b): 403 balanced marginal probative value against confusion; 608(b) was the relevance route the defense claimed (truthfulness impeachment).
United States v. Shelton: the proposed impeachment source; the panel read Shelton to say the agent “answered honestly under oath,” undercutting probative value.
Delaware v. Fensterer: used to reaffirm that confrontation guarantees an “opportunity for effective cross-examination,” not limitless cross on every desired topic.
United States v. Holden: used to hold that a “narrow limitation” does not violate confrontation where the jury has sufficient information to evaluate the defense theory.

6. Substantive reasonableness of sentence

United States v. Rayyan: supplied abuse-of-discretion review for substantive reasonableness.
United States v. Patterson: provided the presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences; the panel extended the logic that a below-Guidelines sentence is even harder to attack.
United States v. Lynde: supplied the “heavy burden” framing when challenging a below-Guidelines sentence as too high.
United States v. Owen: supported district court discretion in declining a downward variance based on “remoteness” of criminal history.

7. Pro se supplementation while represented

United States v. Wilder: used to deny the defendant’s late-filed motion to add a pro se supplement while represented by counsel, reinforcing the usual rule against hybrid advocacy on appeal.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Speedy Trial Act: the opinion’s core operational rule

The panel’s Speedy Trial Act analysis is notable for its insistence on the statute’s automatic-exclusion mechanics. Two propositions drive the result:

Post-hearing briefing and advisement time are excludable when the district court requests briefs. Once the district court asked for post-hearing briefs on the suppression motion and then took the matter “under advisement,” the panel treated the interval as excluded under the combined operation of the motion exclusion and the advisement exclusion (as described through United States v. Mentz and Henderson v. United States). The defendant’s claim that the briefs were not “needed” failed because the district court explicitly stated it would consider them before ruling.
“Any pretrial motion” means any—without a causation-of-delay inquiry. The government’s “motion for a status conference” qualified as a “pretrial motion” or “proceeding,” and it tolled the clock automatically. The opinion rejects importing a “properly filed” requirement from habeas contexts, focusing on the Act’s text (it says “filing,” not “proper filing”) and the Supreme Court’s instruction in United States v. Tinklenberg that “any” pretrial motion triggers exclusion.

Functionally, the opinion strengthens a formal, text-first approach: once a motion is filed and docketed, the Speedy Trial Act’s exclusions apply, and appellate review will be reluctant to second-guess the district court’s expressed need for supplemental briefing.

2. Sixth Amendment speedy trial: threshold gatekeeping

The court applied Barker v. Wingo only after a threshold check and treated defendant-caused delay as excluded from the calculation. Because the defendant’s own motions and continuance requests accounted for much of the elapsed time, the remaining period was not “uncommonly long” under United States v. Robinson. Citing United States v. Loud Hawk, the panel stopped the analysis at step one.

3. Franks challenges: separating “inconsistency” from “intentional/reckless falsity”

The panel’s Franks analysis emphasizes disciplined categorization:

Contradictions between witnesses do not, without more, establish that the affiant included knowing or reckless falsehoods. The opinion treats trauma-context variability as insufficient to satisfy the Franks mens rea requirement.
Omissions face a higher bar: intent to mislead plus criticality to probable cause. Here, alternative explanations (aliases; corroborating evidence linking numbers and IP addresses) prevented an inference of intent to mislead.
Impeachment-type information (a victim’s juvenile history) was not “critical” to probable cause given the other evidence described in the affidavits.

The throughline is deference to the probable-cause showing where multiple corroborative strands exist (messages, ads, images, IP addresses, and victim accounts), and skepticism toward attempts to convert credibility disputes into Franks violations.

4. Mid-trial Faretta requests: discretion and trial management

The opinion’s self-representation holding is structurally important: it selects abuse-of-discretion review for mid-trial requests and justifies that choice with trial-management realities (Pierce v. Underwood) and timing limitations on Faretta (Jones v. Bell; Hill v. Curtin). With the request arriving on the fourth day, just before the defense case, the district court’s denial was treated as a permissible protection of orderly proceedings, especially where counsel was performing competently and communication had not completely broken down.

5. Cross-examination limits: 403 balancing plus confrontation sufficiency

The panel upheld exclusion of questioning about United States v. Shelton on two related grounds:

Evidence law (Rule 403/608(b)): whatever marginal probative value Shelton had on truthfulness was substantially outweighed by the risk of confusing the issues (different case, different charges, years earlier, and Shelton itself indicating the witness “answered honestly under oath”).
Confrontation Clause: under Delaware v. Fensterer, the defense is guaranteed an opportunity for effective cross, not limitless cross. Because the defense could present its “web of lies” theory through other means, the limitation did not deprive the jury of the ability to evaluate the defense.

6. Substantive reasonableness: deference intensified by a below-Guidelines variance

The district court varied downward from a Guidelines recommendation of life to 480 months. The panel treated this as making the defendant’s appellate burden especially high, citing the presumption of reasonableness framework and the “heavy burden” language. It also credited the district court’s consideration of national sentencing data and the aggravating significance of going to trial in a case requiring minor victims to testify, coupled with the court’s findings about lack of remorse and testimony deemed untruthful.

C. Impact

Speedy Trial Act practice in the Sixth Circuit: Richards reinforces that the Act’s motion-based exclusions are broad and automatic, and that a motion need not be “properly filed” under local rules to toll the clock so long as it is filed/docketed. It also signals that motions aimed at scheduling (e.g., status conferences) are not categorically outside § 3161(h)(1)’s exclusions.
Defense strategy on tolling disputes: The waiver discussion (via United States v. Clark) warns that concessions about clock calculations in the district court can foreclose appellate arguments. Practitioners should make any agreements conditional or clearly preserve objections.
Franks litigation: The decision exemplifies the modern Sixth Circuit’s demanding posture (particularly after United States v. Sanders (en banc)): credibility conflicts and impeachment points are unlikely to justify a Franks hearing absent a concrete showing of intentional/reckless affidavit falsity or critical omissions.
Mid-trial self-representation: Richards strengthens district courts’ managerial authority to deny late Faretta requests, reviewed deferentially, which may discourage tactical mid-trial pivots that risk disruption.
Impeachment via prior judicial criticism: The Rule 403 holding suggests that attempting to impeach a law-enforcement witness with collateral prior-case findings—especially from different jurisdictions/contexts— faces a steep relevance/confusion barrier.
Hybrid appellate advocacy: By relying on United States v. Wilder, the panel reiterates that represented appellants generally cannot add pro se supplements, particularly when late and duplicative.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Speedy Trial Act “clock” and “tolling”: The Act sets a default 70-day deadline to start trial, but it excludes (does not count) certain periods—especially time spent litigating pretrial motions. “Tolling” or “stopping the clock” means those excluded days do not count toward the 70.
“Under advisement” time: After a court has everything it needs to decide a motion, the Act permits up to 30 additional days to be excluded while the court considers the motion. In Richards, post-hearing briefs were treated as part of what the court needed before taking the issue under advisement.
Franks hearing: A special evidentiary hearing a defendant can obtain if he first makes a substantial preliminary showing that the warrant affidavit contains intentional/reckless lies (or intentionally misleading, critical omissions) and that probable cause would fail without them. It is not triggered by ordinary witness inconsistencies or general impeachment.
Self-representation (Faretta) and “timing”: A defendant can represent himself, but courts may deny a request made late—especially after trial begins—because switching gears mid-trial can disrupt proceedings. Richards treats that denial as a discretionary call for the trial judge.
Rule 403 balancing: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if it is likely to confuse the jury or distract from the real issues more than it helps prove a point. Richards approved excluding questioning about a prior unrelated case to avoid turning the trial into a mini-trial about that other matter.
Confrontation Clause limits: The Sixth Amendment guarantees a meaningful chance to cross-examine, not unlimited cross-examination on any topic defense counsel prefers. Courts may impose reasonable limits when the defense still can present its theory.
Substantive reasonableness: Appellate review asks whether the sentence is within the range of reasonable outcomes given the statutory factors. When a judge already imposed a below-Guidelines sentence, it is particularly difficult to argue the sentence is still “too high.”

V. Conclusion

United States v. Richards consolidates several defendant-facing doctrinal themes in the Sixth Circuit: the Speedy Trial Act’s motion exclusions operate automatically and broadly (including for scheduling-related motions once filed); Sixth Amendment speedy-trial analysis can end at the threshold when the net delay is not “uncommonly long,” especially where the defendant caused substantial delay; Franks hearings remain exceptional and demand concrete showings of intentional/reckless deception or critical omissions; mid-trial self-representation requests are reviewed deferentially and may be denied to preserve orderly trial administration; and Rule 403 and confrontation doctrine permit reasonable limits on collateral impeachment where the defense can still present its theory. The decision’s most practical legacy is its clear, text-driven reinforcement that “any pretrial motion” can stop the Speedy Trial Act clock once filed and docketed.

Automatic Speedy Trial Act Tolling for “Any” Pretrial Motion—including Status-Conference Motions—and Deferential Review of Mid‑Trial Self‑Representation Requests (United States v. Richards)