Attorney Misconduct, Willful Default Strategies, and Sanctions Under Inherent Authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927: Commentary on Lee v. Hong v. Mommy's Jamaican Market Corp.

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Lee v. Hong v. Mommy's Jamaican Market Corp., No. 24‑2435 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2025) (summary order), though formally non‑precedential, is a substantial and pointed application of the court’s sanctioning power against an attorney who deliberately misled both the court and opposing counsel. It illustrates how federal courts deploy their inherent authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to address litigation strategies grounded in deceit—here, a deliberate tactic of allowing default, then seeking to vacate it on false pretenses.

The case arises out of a wage‑and‑hour dispute under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York labor law. The core appellate question, however, is not about wage law. Instead, it concerns whether the district court properly sanctioned defense counsel, Peter Lee, for:

Orchestrating a willful default strategy while covertly representing the defendants;
Misrepresenting his role and the timing of his retention;
Submitting declarations he knew to be false; and
Withholding an engagement agreement and then offering inconsistent explanations for that failure.

The Second Circuit affirmed the sanctions, finding that the district court’s factual determinations—particularly regarding Lee’s bad faith—were well supported by the record and comfortably within the court’s discretion.

Although issued as a summary order and expressly lacking precedential effect under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, the decision is legally and practically important. It reinforces:

The high, but met, evidentiary threshold (“clear and convincing evidence”) required to sanction counsel for bad faith;
The continuity of a court’s authority to impose sanctions even after an attorney withdraws and the merits of the case have concluded; and
The expectation that lawyers cannot exploit procedural mechanisms (like defaults and vacaturs) through misrepresentations without facing significant personal financial consequences.

II. Case Background

A. Parties and Substantive Claims

Plaintiff-Appellee: Sun Yeul Hong – an employee alleging wage‑and‑hour violations.
Defendants-Appellees: Mommy's Jamaican Market Corp. and individuals Kap Won Kim, Myong Su Kim, and Dae Kyu Kim.
Interested-Party-Appellant: Peter Lee – the attorney sanctioned by the district court.

Hong sued under the FLSA and New York labor law for unpaid wages and related violations. The immediate merits of those claims are not before the Second Circuit; the focus is instead on Lee’s conduct throughout the litigation.

B. The Default Judgment and Its Vacatur

Defendants did not timely answer or respond to the complaint. Based on that non‑response, the district court (Liman, J.) entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding damages and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Later, at the defendants’ behest (and based on representations about their lack of counsel and misunderstanding of the proceedings), the district court vacated the default judgment. Crucially:

Defendants represented they had not been represented by counsel earlier; and
They claimed their failure to respond was a misunderstanding of the litigation process.

Believing those assertions, the district court set aside the default and allowed the case to proceed to trial. At trial, the jury found all defendants liable except for defendant Dae Kyu Kim, who obtained a defense verdict.

C. Discovery of Attorney Misconduct and Sanctions

After trial, evidence emerged that substantially undermined the story that had been used to vacate the default:

Peter Lee had, in fact, been retained by defendants as early as January 2021.
An engagement letter in January 2021 specified that Lee would monitor the docket and “participate if and when default is entered.”
Defendants had paid Lee $5,000 two days after that engagement letter was sent.
Lee had repeatedly represented that he did not know of the action until October 2021 (or later), and that he did not represent the defendants earlier.
Defendants submitted declarations, drafted or facilitated by Lee, which falsely stated that Lee’s representation began much later than it actually did.
Lee failed to disclose the engagement letter during discovery and later offered conflicting explanations for this nondisclosure (first intentional but “reasonable,” then inadvertent forgetfulness).

The district court concluded that Lee had:

Pursued a strategy of intentional default,
Misrepresented the facts to obtain vacatur of the default judgment,
Submitted or relied on false sworn declarations, and
Attempted to cover up his misconduct by continuing to lie to the court.

On that basis, the district court imposed sanctions under both its inherent authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, ordering Lee to personally pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in prosecuting the case beyond the point where the initial default judgment had been entered.

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit affirmed the sanctions in full. Its core holdings can be summarized as follows:

Standard of Review: The imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009)). An abuse occurs only if the district court applies an incorrect legal standard, makes clearly erroneous factual findings, or imposes sanctions outside the permissible range of decisions.
Bad Faith and Lack of Colorable Basis: Sanctions under both the court’s inherent authority and § 1927 require a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that:
- The challenged conduct was without a colorable (legally or factually supportable) basis; and
- The attorney acted in bad faith, i.e., for an improper purpose such as delay, harassment, or deception.
The panel held that those requirements were satisfied here.
Evidentiary Basis for Sanctions: The court emphasized:
- The January 2021 engagement letter expressly contemplating Lee’s involvement upon default;
- The $5,000 payment shortly after that letter;
- Lee’s shifting and inconsistent stories about his first contact with the defendants’ representative, Son Young Chi; and
- His knowing submission of false declarations from Mrs. Kim and failure to disclose the engagement letter.
Together, those facts amply supported a finding of knowing, bad‑faith misrepresentation.
Jurisdiction to Sanction and Waiver:
- Lee’s underdeveloped argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction him was deemed waived because it was not properly briefed on appeal.
- In any event, the district court clearly retained subject matter jurisdiction to impose sanctions as a collateral issue (Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990)). Withdrawal as counsel and conclusion of the merits did not extinguish this power.
Sanctions Were Compensatory, Not Punitive: The panel rejected Lee’s claim that the sanctions were impermissibly punitive. The district court awarded only those fees and costs attributable to having to litigate the case after the default judgment—litigation that would not have occurred but for Lee’s deception that induced vacatur. The fact that one defendant (Dae Kyu Kim) ultimately obtained a defense verdict did not convert the sanctions into “punishment” for a “successful” outcome; that verdict was a direct byproduct of Lee’s misconduct in reopening the case.
Affirmance on Any Ground: The panel noted that it could affirm on any ground supported by the record (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo, 882 F.3d 394, 412 n.13 (2d Cir. 2018)), and that the misrepresentation regarding Lee’s continuous representation, standing alone, justified affirmance. Had the district court known the truth, the litigation would have ended with the default judgment in late 2021.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Standards for Sanctions: Inherent Authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927

The Second Circuit situates the case within a familiar, but demanding, doctrinal framework.

1. Inherent Authority to Sanction Bad Faith Conduct

Federal courts possess an inherent authority to sanction parties and lawyers who abuse the judicial process. As the panel quotes from Ransmeier v. Mariani, 718 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2013), this includes authority to penalize those who act:

“in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”

Under Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012), and related cases, the exercise of this inherent power requires:

A finding that the conduct or claim at issue lacked a “colorable basis” (i.e., had no reasonable legal or factual foundation); and
A finding of bad faith—an improper motive such as harassment, delay, or knowing misrepresentation.

These findings must be supported by a “high degree of specificity” in the factual record (Wolters Kluwer, 564 F.3d at 114).

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1927: Vexatious Multiplication of Proceedings

Section 1927 provides that any attorney:

“who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”

In the Second Circuit, § 1927 also requires a showing of bad faith. The same “clear and convincing evidence” standard applies to both § 1927 and inherent-authority sanctions (Liebowitz v. Bandshell Artist Mgmt., 6 F.4th 267, 286 n.22 (2d Cir. 2021)).

Applied here, the theory is straightforward:

By falsely portraying the defendants as unrepresented and confused, Lee induced the vacatur of the default judgment.
That vacatur necessarily multiplied the proceedings—trial, further motion practice, and additional discovery all ensued.
Because that multiplication was founded on misrepresentation and deception, it was both unreasonable and vexatious within § 1927’s meaning.

3. Abuse of Discretion Review

The Second Circuit reiterates the highly deferential standard of review:

The appellate court does not reweigh evidence de novo.
It asks only whether the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous and whether the sanction imposed fell within the “range of permissible decisions.”

By embedding its analysis in robust documentary evidence (engagement letter, payment records, sworn declarations, and Lee’s changing stories), the district court insulated its factual findings from successful appellate challenge.

B. Application to Lee’s Conduct: Bad Faith and Lack of Colorable Basis

1. Continuous Representation Contrasted with Representations to the Court

A central factual pillar of the sanctions order was the January 2021 engagement letter, which:

Expressly retained Lee as counsel for defendants;
Directed him to monitor the federal docket; and
Envisioned his participation “if and when default is entered.”

The defendants paid Lee $5,000 two days after the engagement letter was sent, and Lee then performed services consistent with that agreement. The Second Circuit notes that even if the engagement letter were unsigned, mutual performance (payment and services rendered) demonstrated a valid attorney‑client contract (Kimm v. Kyu Sung Cho, 706 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2017)).

Against this backdrop, Lee repeatedly told the district court that:

He did not know about the case until October 2021; and
He did not represent defendants until October 2022 (per Mrs. Kim’s declarations).

These statements could not be reconciled with the January 2021 engagement and payment. The Second Circuit stresses that this alone justified affirmance: the district court vacated the default specifically because it believed defendants had been unrepresented and had innocently misunderstood the proceedings. Had Lee been truthful, the litigation would have ended with the default judgment.

2. Submission of False Declarations

Lee argued on appeal that he merely relied in good faith on declarations from defendant Kap Won (Mrs. Kim), which asserted that:

Lee did not represent the defendants until October 2022; and
Defendants had previously been unrepresented and confused by the lawsuit.

The Second Circuit rejects this characterization as “meritless” and “specious.” Lee knew the declarations were untrue because:

He had been retained in January 2021;
He had been paid for that representation shortly thereafter; and
He had, by his own admissions, been monitoring the litigation and involved in strategic decisions.

Submitting declarations he knew to be false, and testifying in accordance with them, rendered his conduct “without legal or factual basis” (Wolters Kluwer, 564 F.3d at 114). This is a textbook example of litigation conduct lacking any colorable foundation.

3. Failure to Disclose the Engagement Letter and Contradictory Explanations

A further dimension of Lee’s misconduct was his failure to disclose the January 2021 engagement letter in response to discovery obligations. When confronted, he oscillated between:

An initial explanation that he had intentionally withheld the letter because he believed in good faith that it was outside the scope of the discovery order; and
A later claim that he had simply “forgotten” about the letter and its relevance.

The Second Circuit highlights these shifting explanations as evidence of bad faith rather than reasoned judgment. One cannot simultaneously argue:

“I deliberately withheld this document because I reasonably believed it was not discoverable,” and
“I forgot about this document, so any failure to produce it was inadvertent.”

These contradictions erode any plausible claim of good faith and strongly support the district court’s finding that Lee’s nondisclosure was deliberate and deceptive.

C. Jurisdiction to Sanction and Waiver of Appellate Arguments

1. Sanctions as a Collateral Issue: Authority After Case Conclusion

Lee suggested (without meaningful development) that the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction him, particularly after his withdrawal as counsel and the conclusion of trial. The Second Circuit swiftly disposes of this contention:

The argument was not developed in his opening brief; instead, he merely incorporated by reference an earlier letter to the district court, which in fact contained no jurisdictional analysis. Under Meyer v. Seidel, 89 F.4th 117 (2d Cir. 2023), and Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697 (2d Cir. 2000), such perfunctory treatment constitutes waiver.
Even if preserved, the argument would fail. Under Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), federal courts plainly retain jurisdiction to decide “collateral issues”—such as sanctions—even after the underlying case has been resolved or dismissed. Withdrawal as counsel does not immunize attorneys from accountability for prior conduct in the same case.

The panel emphasizes that both:

Subject matter jurisdiction (the power to decide the sanctions issue), and
Personal jurisdiction over Lee (as a participant in the case),

persisted during the sanctions proceedings and were not extinguished by case closure or withdrawal.

2. Waiver by Inadequate Briefing

The panel’s waiver analysis is also instructive. It underscores that:

Arguments not properly briefed—with developed legal reasoning and citation—are forfeited on appeal.
Incorporating prior letters or filings by reference, “for the sake of brevity,” does not satisfy appellate briefing standards, especially when the referenced materials do not in fact contain the claimed argument.

This reinforces a recurring appellate practice rule: counsel must fully and directly present arguments in the opening appellate brief; anything else risks abandonment.

D. Character of Sanctions: Compensatory vs. Punitive

Lee further contended that the sanctions imposed were punitive rather than compensatory. The distinction is important because:

Compensatory sanctions reimburse the victim (or the court) for the actual costs incurred due to the misconduct.
Punitive sanctions punish and deter, awarding sums not strictly tied to actual, provable losses.

The Second Circuit endorses the district court’s characterization: the sanctions were compensatory. Specifically:

The court quantified and awarded the fees and costs that the plaintiff incurred in litigating the case after the original default judgment.
But for Lee’s deception (which induced the vacatur), those post‑default proceedings would never have occurred.
Thus, the award covered “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct” within the meaning of § 1927.

Lee’s focus on Dae Kyu Kim’s defense verdict was misplaced. The panel notes that this outcome was not a “successful” defense in the sense relevant to sanctions analysis; it was an incidental result of litigation that itself was rendered necessary only by Lee’s fraud.

E. Appellate Deference and Affirmance on Any Ground

The panel underscores that it may affirm on “any ground appearing in the record” (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo, 882 F.3d 394, 412 n.13 (2d Cir. 2018)). Even if some aspects of the district court’s reasoning had been debatable, the central misrepresentation—Lee’s false denial of his continuous representation—would suffice to sustain the sanctions.

Thus, the sanctions survive any challenge because:

The district court’s factual findings were supported by documentary evidence;
The legal standard applied was correct and consistent with binding precedent; and
The sanction imposed (fee‑shifting to compensate the plaintiff) fell squarely within the permissible range of remedies for bad‑faith conduct under inherent authority and § 1927.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009)

Wolters Kluwer establishes:

The abuse‑of‑discretion standard for reviewing sanctions; and
The need for specific factual findings supporting bad faith and lack of colorable basis.

The Second Circuit uses this case to frame the standard of review and to stress that it will not disturb the district court’s ruling absent:

An erroneous view of the law;
A clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence; or
A sanction that is outside the “range of permissible decisions.”

2. Ransmeier v. Mariani, 718 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2013)

Ransmeier restates the inherent power of courts to sanction parties and lawyers who act “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” This principle anchors the court’s authority to sanction Lee apart from any specific rule or statute, based on the need to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.

3. Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012)

Enmon articulates the dual requirement for inherent‑power sanctions:

No colorable basis; and
Bad faith (improper motive).

That framework is directly imported into this case: Lee’s reliance on declarations he knew to be false, coupled with a strategic plan to exploit default and vacatur, plainly lacks a colorable legal or factual basis and was driven by improper motives (delay and manipulation of process).

4. Liebowitz v. Bandshell Artist Mgmt., 6 F.4th 267 (2d Cir. 2021)

Liebowitz—itself a sanctions case involving a serially noncompliant attorney—clarifies that:

Bad faith must be proven by clear and convincing evidence for both § 1927 sanctions and inherent‑authority sanctions.

The Second Circuit cites its footnote 22 to remind that the same elevated standard applies here, which the court concludes is easily met on these facts.

5. Meyer v. Seidel, 89 F.4th 117 (2d Cir. 2023)

Meyer is cited for the principle that appellate arguments that are made only perfunctorily, or without developed reasoning, are deemed waived. This supports the panel’s conclusion that Lee waived his jurisdictional challenge by failing to adequately brief it.

6. Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697 (2d Cir. 2000)

Lyndonville similarly addresses waiver and is used to reinforce the idea that bare, undeveloped assertions do not preserve issues for appellate review.

7. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo, 882 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2018)

John Wiley stands for the rule that an appellate court may affirm a lower court’s decision on any ground supported by the record, whether or not the district court relied on that particular ground. Citing it allows the panel to emphasize that even if some aspects of the district court’s reasoning were unnecessary or imperfect, the misrepresentations surrounding Lee’s representation alone warrant affirmance.

8. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990)

Cooter & Gell is the Supreme Court’s seminal decision holding that a federal court retains jurisdiction to decide collateral issues—such as sanctions—after the underlying case has become moot, settled, or dismissed. The Second Circuit relies on this to reject any suggestion that the district court’s power dissipated upon conclusion of the wage‑and‑hour litigation or Lee’s withdrawal as counsel.

9. Kimm v. Kyu Sung Cho, 706 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order)

Kimm is referenced for the proposition that a valid contract can arise from mutual performance even in the absence of a signed writing. This undermines Lee’s contention that the unsigned engagement letter needed no disclosure or consideration. The court treats the engagement as a binding attorney‑client relationship based on payment and services rendered.

VI. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Inherent Authority of the Court

“Inherent authority” refers to powers federal courts possess by virtue of being courts, independent of statutes or rules. These include:

Controlling their own proceedings;
Protecting the integrity of the judicial process; and
Sanctioning abusive, dishonest, or bad‑faith litigation conduct.

Inherent‑power sanctions are reserved for particularly egregious cases—like knowingly lying to the court or committing what the district court aptly described as “fraud” upon the court.

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Section 1927 targets attorneys who “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiply proceedings. Key points:

It applies only to attorneys (not parties personally) and only to conduct that expands or prolongs litigation beyond what is necessary.
In the Second Circuit, it requires bad faith: mere negligence or error is insufficient.
The remedy is fee‑shifting: the attorney can be ordered to pay the “excess” costs and fees caused by the misconduct.

3. “Colorable Basis” and “Bad Faith”

Colorable basis means a claim or position that has at least some reasonable legal or factual support—even if it ultimately fails.
Without colorable basis means there is no reasonable argument or evidence to support the position—it is baseless.
Bad faith means the conduct is undertaken for an improper purpose:
- To harass an opponent;
- To cause unnecessary delay;
- To mislead the court; or
- To secure an advantage through deception rather than the merits.

In this case, Lee’s submission of declarations he knew were false and his concealment of the engagement letter were quintessentially “without colorable basis” and in bad faith.

4. Clear and Convincing Evidence

“Clear and convincing” is a heightened standard of proof, more demanding than a “preponderance of the evidence” but short of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It requires:

That the evidence make the facts “highly probable,” and
That the court have a firm belief or conviction in their truth.

The Second Circuit concludes that the detailed documentary record here (engagement letter, payment, sworn declarations, inconsistent explanations) meets that standard for both lack of colorable basis and bad faith.

5. Abuse of Discretion

An “abuse of discretion” occurs when:

The trial court applies the wrong legal standard;
Relies on clearly erroneous factual findings; or
Reaches a decision that is outside the bounds of permissible choices given the facts and law.

Under this deferential review, the appellate court does not ask whether it would have imposed the same sanctions, but only whether the trial court’s decision was a reasonable one. Here, given the seriousness and clarity of Lee’s misconduct, affirmance was almost inevitable.

6. Summary Orders and Precedential Effect

The Second Circuit labels this a “Summary Order,” with an explicit caveat:

It has no precedential effect under Local Rule 32.1.1.
It may be cited under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, but courts are not bound to follow it as they would a published, precedential opinion.

Nonetheless, such orders can be persuasive authority and provide practical guidance regarding how the court applies established doctrines—especially in factual settings similar to those in future cases.

7. Jurisdiction Over Collateral Matters

“Collateral issues” are matters separate from the merits—for example, costs, fees, sanctions, and contempt. Under Cooter & Gell:

A federal court may resolve collateral issues even after the main dispute ends (through settlement, dismissal, or judgment).
Sanctions for past misconduct are not mooted by the termination of the substantive claims.

This principle ensures that attorneys cannot avoid accountability for their conduct by withdrawing or settling after engaging in sanctionable behavior.

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Litigators and Trial Counsel

The decision is a strong, practical reminder that:

Deliberate strategies that exploit procedural mechanisms (like default and vacatur) must still be grounded in truthful representations to the court.
Knowingly false declarations—even if signed by a client—expose counsel to personal financial liability.
Concealment of engagement agreements, or other key documents bearing on representation and strategy, may itself be sanctionable.
Withdrawal as counsel, or the mere passage of time, does not shield an attorney from later sanctions proceedings.

B. For Courts

The order affirms and illustrates:

The breadth of the district court’s inherent authority to sanction fraud on the court;
The permissibility of tying sanctions to the precise portion of litigation costs caused by misconduct (e.g., post‑default proceedings); and
The importance of making detailed, specific factual findings when imposing sanctions, to satisfy the “clear and convincing” and abuse‑of‑discretion requirements on review.

C. For Parties in Wage‑and‑Hour and Similar Litigation

From a litigant’s perspective, the case underscores that:

Plaintiffs who secure a default judgment should not be disadvantaged by defendants’ later misrepresentations that induce vacatur; and
Courts are willing to compensate plaintiffs for the additional fees and costs incurred when an attorney’s fraud reopens litigation that should have ended at default.

Although the substantive wage‑and‑hour issues are peripheral here, the decision is a clear signal in FLSA and NYLL practice that procedural gamesmanship by defense counsel—especially around defaults—will be closely scrutinized.

D. Persuasive, If Not Precedential, Authority

While non‑precedential, the order:

Reaffirms established doctrine on inherent authority and § 1927;
Highlights the high evidentiary threshold for sanctions and how it can be met; and
Demonstrates concrete fee‑shifting remedies when defaults are vacated based on misrepresentations.

Future litigants and courts in the Second Circuit are likely to cite it as persuasive support in attorney‑misconduct and sanctions disputes, especially where:

There is an alleged pattern of false declarations;
Engagement terms are concealed; or
Default/vacatur mechanisms are strategically manipulated through half‑truths or omissions.

VIII. Conclusion

Lee v. Hong v. Mommy's Jamaican Market Corp. is, formally, a summary order without precedential force. Substantively, however, it is a sharply drawn application of existing law to egregious attorney misconduct. It confirms that:

Counsel who pursue litigation strategies founded on deliberate misrepresentation—particularly around defaults and vacaturs—risk substantial personal financial sanctions under both courts’ inherent authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
Sanctions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence of bad faith and an absence of colorable basis, and by detailed factual findings. Here, engagement documentation, payment records, and contradictory explanations provided that evidentiary foundation.
Courts retain jurisdiction to impose sanctions after the conclusion of the merits and after attorney withdrawal, ensuring that misconduct does not escape review as a “collateral issue.”
Sanctions properly tailored to the additional litigation costs caused by the misconduct are compensatory, not punitive, even if they are substantial.

In the broader legal context, the decision is a significant cautionary tale: the integrity of the judicial process is paramount, and attorneys who compromise that integrity by deceit—especially in the sensitive context of default judgments—will not only jeopardize their clients’ positions but may also bear the financial consequences personally.