Any Overlap Triggers the Single-Refiling Bar: Seventh Circuit Affirms Strict Application of Illinois’s Savings Statute in Singer v. City of Chicago

Introduction

In Brian S. Singer v. City of Chicago, No. 24-2469 (7th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025), a Seventh Circuit panel (Judges Scudder, St. Eve, and Maldonado) affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as untimely under Illinois’s two-year limitations period and, critically, as an impermissible second refiling under Illinois’s savings statute, 735 ILCS 5/13-217.

The decision addresses a recurring practical problem: when plaintiffs split related controversies into multiple lawsuits or voluntarily dismiss and refile, how far does Illinois’s “single refiling” rule reach? The court held that the bar applies where a subsequent action shares any operative facts with a previously dismissed suit—regardless of whether the later case adds different defendants or layers other, unrelated allegations.

Although designated a “nonprecedential disposition” (citable only under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), the order synthesizes and applies Illinois Supreme Court and appellate authority in a way that will guide litigants and district courts confronting the savings statute and its intersection with federal civil rights claims.

Summary of the Opinion

Singer filed three lawsuits arising out of his October 2016 arrest by Chicago police:

Singer I (state court, Oct. 2017): Pro se complaint alleging unlawful arrest and beating by Chicago police; voluntarily dismissed without prejudice in Jan. 2018 with stated intent to refile in federal court.
Singer II (federal court, mid-2018): Initially pro se, later with counsel; primarily targeted his condominium association and related actors for discrimination and other alleged misconduct from 2012–2016, but also alleged that they made “false police reports which helped incite the CPD officers” to falsely arrest and beat him in Oct. 2016. He reserved the right to add the City and officers and sought damages for arrest-related injuries. Voluntarily dismissed without prejudice in Oct. 2018.
Singer III (federal court, Jan. 2019): Brought by current counsel against the City and individual officers under § 1983 for illegal detention and excessive force during the 2016 arrest; sought damages for the same injuries.

The district court held that Singer III was untimely and barred as an impermissible second refiling under the Illinois savings statute. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding:

Illinois’s savings statute gives plaintiffs only one opportunity to refile an action arising from the same operative facts after a dismissal.
Singer II counted as the single refiling of Singer I because, even though it added different parties and broader allegations, it included claims that arose from the 2016 arrest and sought arrest-related damages.
Identity of defendants does not control; the inquiry is whether the actions share the same operative facts. The statute’s bar can apply even when the later suit names different defendants.
Pro se status did not change the analysis where Singer had counsel at critical stages and is bound by procedural rules.

Result: Affirmed. Singer III was time-barred and barred by the savings statute’s single-refiling rule.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985): The Supreme Court requires federal courts to borrow state statutes of limitations and tolling/revival rules for § 1983 claims. The Seventh Circuit accordingly applied Illinois’s two-year personal-injury limitations period and the Illinois savings statute to Singer’s § 1983 claims.
First Midwest Bank v. Cobo, 124 N.E.3d 926 (Ill. 2018): Illinois’s high court frames the test under the savings statute pragmatically—courts look to timing, scope, origin, and motivation to decide whether two suits share the same “cause of action,” i.e., the same operative facts. Cobo also links this inquiry to res judicata’s “identity of cause of action,” while clarifying that the savings statute does not require identity of parties or a final merits judgment to bar a subsequent suit.
River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883 (Ill. 1998): Provides the transactional, pragmatic approach to defining a “cause of action,” focusing on whether claims arise from the same core of operative facts, not on the specific legal theories or labels.
D'Last Corp. v. Ugent, 681 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997): A second action is a refiling of the first if it includes any claims based on the same facts—even when the second action also asserts additional claims based on different facts. This is the linchpin for the court’s “any overlap triggers the bar” holding.
Evans ex rel. Evans v. Lederle Laboratories, 167 F.3d 1106 (7th Cir. 1999): The savings statute’s single-refiling rule applies regardless of whether the plaintiff brings subsequent suits against different defendants; identity of defendants is not dispositive if the suits arise from the same operative facts.
Watkins v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 105 N.E.3d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018): The bar applies when defendants named in the first suit “could have been included” in the subsequent filing, but were not. Singer’s explicit reservation of the right to add the City and active efforts to identify officers underscored that overlap.
Muhammad v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2008): Seventh Circuit application of the Illinois single-refiling rule in federal court; further confirmation that federal courts in Illinois enforce the state’s one-refiling limit.
Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2016): Standard of review—de novo on dismissal; accept well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences for the plaintiff.
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993): Pro se litigants are bound by procedural rules. The panel cites this to reject leniency arguments where counsel participated at crucial junctures in each of Singer’s suits.

Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit adopted Illinois’s pragmatic, transactional approach to “cause of action” under the savings statute. The court emphasized three pillars:

Any overlap in operative facts suffices. Even if Singer II was largely about condominium-related discrimination and misconduct spanning 2012–2016, it also alleged that condominium actors made false reports that “helped incite” CPD’s allegedly unlawful arrest and beating in October 2016, and it sought damages for injuries from that arrest. Under D’Last and Cobo, that partial overlap tethered Singer II to the same operative facts as Singer I (the arrest), making Singer II the one permitted refiling.
Identity of defendants is irrelevant to the operative-facts test. Citing Cobo, Evans, Watkins, and Muhammad, the court stressed that whether two suits arise from the same operative facts does not turn on how the plaintiff labels the complaint or whom he sues. The single-refiling rule applies even if a later suit adds or swaps defendants, so long as the factual nucleus overlaps. In practical terms, the question is “what happened,” not “who is named.”
Pro se status does not expand the refiling privilege. Though Singer filed initial complaints pro se, he voluntarily dismissed the first two suits with counsel’s guidance and had counsel involved early in Singer II. McNeil underlines that litigants—even pro se—must adhere to procedural rules. The court saw no basis to relax the single-refiling bar.

Once Singer II was deemed the single refiling of Singer I, Singer III (filed January 2019) became an impermissible second refiling and was untimely under the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims accruing in October 2016 (see Wilson v. Garcia).

Impact and Practical Implications

This decision underscores the unforgiving nature of Illinois’s savings statute in serial-litigation scenarios. Key takeaways for litigants and counsel, particularly in § 1983 practice:

Consolidate claims and defendants in your one chance to refile. The statute affords a single “do-over” after voluntary dismissal. If you intend to sue multiple actors for the same event (e.g., a police encounter allegedly sparked by third-party conduct), include all related claims and defendants in the refiling. A later, separate suit anchored to any part of the same incident will likely be barred.
Avoid gratuitous overlap. If you pursue a distinct controversy (e.g., long-running housing discrimination), ensure the complaint does not plead, seek damages for, or otherwise incorporate the facts of a separate event you might later sue on (e.g., a police arrest). Even a single paragraph connecting the two can trigger the single-refiling bar for the later suit.
Different defendants won’t save a later suit. Swapping parties does not avoid the bar if the factual nucleus overlaps. Courts will ask whether the omitted defendants “could have been included” in the prior refiling.
Be strategic about timing and identity of unknown officers. Where police officer identities are not yet known, consider:
- Using available investigative tools (e.g., targeted discovery, FOIA, early Rule 26(f) planning) before voluntarily dismissing;
- Pleading against the City and “unknown officers” and later amending;
- Evaluating relation-back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) when substituting named officers for placeholders.
Repeated voluntary dismissals with plans to add officers later risk exhausting the single-refiling privilege.
Nonprecedential but persuasive. While this order is nonprecedential, it cogently applies controlling Illinois Supreme Court authority and will likely be relied upon for persuasive value in similar disputes across the Seventh Circuit’s district courts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Illinois Savings Statute (735 ILCS 5/13-217): A remedial rule allowing a plaintiff, after a voluntary dismissal (or certain other non-merits dismissals), to refile the action within one year—even if the limitations period has otherwise run. Critically, Illinois allows only one such refiling. After that, a second refiling is barred if it arises from the same operative facts.
Single-Refiling Rule: The one-time refiling privilege is exhausted the first time you file another case arising from the same operative facts, even if that “refiling” adds more claims or different defendants, or bundles in unrelated factual allegations.
“Same Operative Facts” (Transactional Test): Courts look pragmatically at whether two suits stem from the same core event(s). Overlap in time, place, origin, motivation, injuries sought, and requested relief can tie cases together—even if the legal theories differ.
Res Judicata Analogy (Without Party Identity): The “same cause of action” test under the savings statute mirrors res judicata’s “identity of cause of action,” but the savings statute can bar a later suit even without identity of parties or a prior final judgment on the merits.
Pro Se Litigants and Procedural Rules: Self-represented parties receive some leniency in pleading, but they still must follow procedural rules. Having counsel at key stages eliminates any argument for added leeway.
Section 1983 and State Time Limits: Federal § 1983 claims borrow state personal-injury limitations (two years in Illinois) and state tolling/revival rules (including the savings statute). Strategic missteps in state or federal court can therefore foreclose federal civil rights claims.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Singer reaffirms a clear, strict rule under Illinois law: once a plaintiff refiles an action after a voluntary dismissal, any later suit sharing any operative facts with that earlier action is barred by the savings statute’s single-refiling limit, regardless of whether the plaintiff targets different defendants or adds other allegations. Singer’s second suit, by intertwining the 2016 arrest with broader condominium disputes and seeking arrest-related damages—plus expressly reserving the right to add the City and officers—consumed his one refiling. His third suit was therefore both time-barred and barred by the statute.

For litigants and counsel, the message is unambiguous: treat your one refiling as your last opportunity to assemble all claims and defendants tied to the same event. Avoid mixing fact patterns you may want to litigate separately. And do not expect pro se status or party substitutions to insulate a later action from the savings statute’s one-and-done refiling rule.