Introduction

In Codorun Farms Inc. v. West Manchester Township, No. 25-1143 (3d Cir. Oct. 31, 2025) (not precedential), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of a single-count 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a violation of substantive due process. Codorun Farms claimed that a series of municipal enforcement actions—ending a prior practice of removing illegally dumped trash from its roadside frontage, issuing a zoning citation for debris accumulation, and issuing a building-permit violation after Codorun installed stone pillars—were carried out with “malicious intent,” “ill will,” and “animus” as part of a campaign to target the farm after a Right-to-Know Law dispute.

The District Court granted the Township defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the Third Circuit affirmed. The panel (Judges Hardiman, Freeman, and Chung; opinion by Judge Chung) held that the challenged conduct constituted executive action and thus had to satisfy the demanding “shocks the conscience” standard. Allegations of animus and retaliatory motivation, without egregious conduct of a constitutional magnitude, do not clear that bar—particularly in the land-use and zoning context, where the Third Circuit has repeatedly cautioned against constitutionalizing “garden-variety” disputes.

Although the decision is not precedential under the Third Circuit’s Internal Operating Procedures, it reinforces two recurring and practically important propositions in § 1983 land-use litigation:

• Executive enforcement actions affecting a particular property owner are evaluated under the “shocks the conscience” standard, not rational-basis review; and
• Allegations of improper motive or animus, standing alone, do not shock the conscience in routine zoning and enforcement disputes.

Summary of the Opinion

The court distilled Codorun’s claim to three municipal enforcement episodes following Codorun’s acceptance of money from the Township in exchange for abandoning a Right-to-Know Law request:

• The Township ended a longstanding practice of removing illegally dumped trash from Codorun’s roadside property and later cited Codorun for debris accumulation under a zoning ordinance. The Zoning Hearing Board upheld the citation, but the York County Court of Common Pleas reversed, finding the ordinance unconstitutionally vague.
• The Township issued a notice of violation for constructing stone pillars without a building permit; the Zoning Hearing Board ultimately granted Codorun a variance over the Township’s opposition.
• Codorun alleged the Township’s actions were motivated by “malice,” “ill will,” and “animus” amounting to a coordinated campaign to harm it financially and reputationally.

The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal on two grounds:

• Classification of the challenged actions as executive, not legislative: Because the actions targeted Codorun specifically (and not a large segment of the community), the court applied the executive-action strand of substantive due process.
• Failure to allege conscience-shocking conduct: Even accepting allegations of animus as true, the complaint alleged, at most, a typical land-use enforcement dispute. Under United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington and Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, improper motive and ordinary enforcement steps do not meet the “shocks the conscience” threshold.

The court also rejected Codorun’s argument that the District Court failed to accept its factual allegations as true. The District Court expressly assumed animus at the pleading stage and nonetheless found the allegations insufficient as a matter of law under the controlling standard. Any separate Fourth Amendment or “dirt piles” theory was forfeited for lack of development on appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State University, 227 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 2000):

  Nicholas provides the foundational taxonomy for substantive due process claims in the Third Circuit. It distinguishes between challenges to legislative acts (generally applicable laws and broad regulations) and executive acts (case-specific decisions affecting one or a few persons). Legislative acts are reviewed under rational-basis scrutiny; executive acts must “shock the conscience.” Nicholas also emphasizes that a plaintiff must identify a protected property or liberty interest as a threshold matter. The panel notes the property-interest threshold was undisputed here.

• United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003):

  United Artists is a pivotal land-use decision in which the Third Circuit rejected a subjective “improper motive” test and adopted the “shocks the conscience” standard for executive-action substantive due process claims arising from zoning and development disputes. The opinion in Codorun leans on this case to reiterate that allegations of animus or ill will, by themselves, are not enough; the conduct itself must be egregious in a constitutional sense.

• Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2004):

  Eichenlaub further tightened the reins on substantive due process in the zoning arena. It held that even a litany of municipal irritants—unnecessary inspections, enforcement missteps, delays in permits and approvals—does not ordinarily “shock the conscience.” Codorun’s allegations map closely onto the types of conduct Eichenlaub labeled insufficient, and the panel underscores that only “the most egregious official conduct” qualifies.

• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009):

  The familiar plausibility standard governs Rule 12(b)(6) motions. While well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, legal conclusions and naked assertions are not. The Third Circuit applied Iqbal to confirm that, even taking animus allegations as true, the complaint’s factual scenario fails as a matter of law to state a conscience-shocking claim.

• Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) and Jaroslawicz v. M&T Bank Corp., 962 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 2020):

  These cases supply the standards of review: plenary appellate review of dismissal orders and the requirement to accept factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The panel cites them to frame and validate its approach to the pleadings.

• Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area School District, 99 F.4th 639 (3d Cir. 2024):

  Montemuro supports deeming arguments forfeited when not developed in the district court or on appeal. The panel invokes Montemuro to set aside Codorun’s undeveloped Fourth Amendment and “dirt piles” contentions.

Legal Reasoning and Application

The court’s analysis proceeds in two steps: categorization and constitutional sufficiency.

1. Categorization: Executive v. Legislative Acts

   The court treats each challenged action—the cessation of trash removal at Codorun’s frontage, the debris citation, and the building-permit citation—as executive in character. The key criterion from Nicholas is scope: legislative acts apply to large segments of society; executive acts typically apply to one person or a small subset. Codorun’s complaint did not allege that the Township adopted any generally applicable rule or policy curtailing trash removal for many residents; rather, the alleged change affected Codorun in connection with its specific property and dispute history. That situates the controversy squarely in the executive sphere.

   This step matters because it determines the governing standard. If the acts were legislative, rational-basis review would apply. As executive actions, they must “shock the conscience”—a much higher hurdle.

2. Constitutional Sufficiency: The “Shocks the Conscience” Standard

   Under United Artists and Eichenlaub, land-use plaintiffs must show more than hostility, ill will, or even targeted enforcement. The conduct must be so egregious as to offend fundamental fairness in a constitutional sense. Examples of what does not meet the standard include:

   • Unnecessary or overzealous inspections and code enforcement;
   • Delays in permits or approvals;
   • Adverse decisions by zoning boards, even if later overturned elsewhere;
   • Typical municipal give-and-take and hardball tactics common to zoning disputes.

   Applying this framework, the court concludes that:

   • Stopping a discretionary, longstanding practice of picking up illegally dumped trash along Codorun’s property edge is an executive service decision aimed at a single property. Even if it flowed from “litigation” animus (as the zoning officer acknowledged), that motivation is not dispositive under United Artists; the focus is on egregiousness of conduct.
   • Issuing a debris citation premised on that trash, and a building-permit citation for stone pillars installed without permits, are quintessential code-enforcement steps. That a county court later found the debris ordinance unconstitutionally vague, and that Codorun ultimately secured a variance, does not transform these enforcement actions into conscience-shocking behavior.
   • Codorun’s assertions that the Township intended to inflict “financial and reputational harm” are qualitatively similar to allegations rejected in Eichenlub as part of “garden-variety” land-use friction. Absent allegations of corruption, extortion, self-dealing, or an extreme abuse of power, such conduct does not state a substantive due process violation.

Finally, the panel dispenses with Codorun’s procedural challenge to the District Court’s handling of the pleadings. The District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations of “personal animosity,” yet held that animus—even if proven—does not satisfy the conscience-shocking standard. That is a legal conclusion about the insufficiency of the alleged facts, not an impermissible credibility determination at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although non-precedential, Codorun reinforces settled principles that will continue to shape pleading and litigation strategy in land-use disputes within the Third Circuit:

• Substantive due process remains an ill-suited vehicle for routine land-use grievances.

  The court again signals a strong reluctance to constitutionalize local code enforcement. Plaintiffs alleging a campaign of “targeting,” retaliatory motive, or municipal hardball should expect dismissal unless they can allege truly egregious conduct—think extortion, bribery, self-dealing, or physical abuse of power.

• Executive action is the default classification for individualized enforcement and service decisions.

  Plaintiffs sometimes try to recast targeted enforcement as “legislative” to obtain more forgiving rational-basis review. Codorun shows that without facts indicating a generally applicable rule or policy affecting a large segment of the community, courts will treat the conduct as executive and apply the much higher “shocks the conscience” standard.

• Animus or retaliatory motive alone is not enough.

  The Third Circuit’s land-use cases consistently decouple subjective intent from constitutional injury. Even explicit ill will or political payback, without more, will rarely cross the constitutional line in executive-action cases.

• Alternative constitutional pathways may be a better fit in some disputes.

  Where facts suggest punitive measures tied to protected activity (e.g., petitioning or speech), a First Amendment retaliation theory may align more closely with the alleged wrong. If the grievance centers on arbitrary differential treatment vis-à-vis similarly situated properties, a “class-of-one” Equal Protection claim (subject to its own limitations) may be more apt. Codorun did not pursue, and thus the court did not address, such theories.

• State law remedies and administrative outcomes do not automatically constitutionalize the dispute.

  Codorun’s success in state court (void-for-vagueness) and before the local zoning board (variance) underscores that administrative and state-law relief may be available without elevating the matter to a federal substantive due process violation.

• Monell and individual liability issues remain academic where no constitutional violation is alleged.

  Because the panel affirmed on the absence of a constitutional violation, it had no need to reach whether Codorun adequately pled municipal liability, policymaker action, or the propriety of naming individual defendants. Litigants should remember that, even if a substantive due process claim survived, Monell would require pleading a municipal policy, custom, or failure to train as the moving force behind the injury.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantive vs. procedural due process:

  Procedural due process concerns the fairness of procedures before the government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property (notice, hearing, opportunity to be heard). Substantive due process limits the government’s power to act at all in certain arbitrary, oppressive, or conscience-shocking ways, regardless of procedure.

• Executive vs. legislative acts:

  Legislative acts are rules of general applicability (ordinances, broad regulations) affecting many people. Executive acts are individualized decisions or enforcement steps (citations, permit denials, on-the-ground service choices) aimed at particular persons or properties. This classification dictates the standard: rational-basis review for legislative, “shocks the conscience” for executive.

• “Shocks the conscience” standard:

  A demanding test reserved for only the most egregious abuses of government power—conduct that is brutal, invidiously discriminatory, extortionate, corrupt, or otherwise so oppressive that it offends fundamental fairness. In land-use cases, it is rare for ordinary enforcement—even if sloppy or hostile—to meet this standard.

• Rational-basis review:

  A deferential standard under which a law is upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Plaintiffs typically lose under this test unless a statute is truly arbitrary or irrational.

• Pleading sufficiency (Iqbal/Twombly):

  Complaints must contain enough well-pleaded facts to make a claim plausible, not merely possible. Courts accept factual allegations as true at the motion to dismiss stage but need not accept legal conclusions couched as facts.

• Forfeiture vs. waiver:

  Forfeiture occurs when a litigant fails to raise or develop an argument in a timely way; courts will not consider it on appeal. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. The panel found Codorun forfeited certain undeveloped arguments (e.g., Fourth Amendment).

• Void-for-vagueness (state court ruling here):

  A doctrine under which a law is invalid if it is so unclear that persons of common intelligence must guess at its meaning. The county court’s vagueness ruling addressed the ordinance’s text; it did not dictate the federal substantive due process outcome, which focused on the nature and egregiousness of the Township’s enforcement conduct.

• Right to Know Law (Pennsylvania):

  Pennsylvania’s public records law. Codorun accepted money to abandon a pending RTKL request. While the sequence of events suggested a retaliatory motive to Codorun, the Third Circuit reiterated that motive alone does not establish a substantive due process violation for executive actions.

Conclusion

Codorun Farms Inc. v. West Manchester Township is a clear, if non-precedential, reaffirmation of the Third Circuit’s consistently narrow view of substantive due process in the land-use enforcement context. The opinion underscores three core points:

• Individualized zoning and code-enforcement steps are executive actions, not legislative enactments, and therefore trigger the “shocks the conscience” test.
• Allegations of malice, animus, or retaliatory motivation, without more, do not shock the conscience—especially where the conduct consists of ordinary inspections, citations, or permitting disputes.
• At the pleading stage, courts may accept animus allegations as true and nevertheless dismiss for failure to state a claim because the alleged conduct, not the alleged motive, is constitutionally insufficient under United Artists and Eichenlaub.

For practitioners, the decision serves as a reminder to choose claims with care in land-use disputes: substantive due process is a poor fit for typical enforcement friction. Where constitutional claims are viable, they often lie, if at all, in more tailored doctrines (such as First Amendment retaliation or equal protection), or under state law. For municipalities, Codorun offers persuasive assurance that, absent egregious abuses, routine enforcement—even if accompanied by hard feelings—will not be converted into federal constitutional litigation.