Amendment 821’s Zero‑Point Offender Reduction Is Discretionary: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Denial Under § 3582(c)(2) Where § 3553(a) Factors Predominate

Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in United States v. Henry Carabali Solis (No. 24-12727, Mar. 31, 2025), affirming the denial of a sentence-reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) predicated on Amendment 821 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Amendment 821 (Part B) created § 4C1.1, a two-level decrease for certain “zero-point offenders,” and was made retroactive by the Sentencing Commission through § 1B1.10(d).

Solis—who had been the master of a drug-laden vessel carrying approximately $27 million (wholesale) in cocaine—sought a reduced sentence based on his eligibility for the new two-level reduction. He argued that the district court failed to give sufficient consideration to the Commission’s retroactivity policy and to post-sentencing developments, including his amended guideline range and rehabilitation.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court acted within its broad discretion: it recognized the governing policy statements, considered the § 3553(a) factors, permissibly placed great weight on the seriousness of the offense, and was not obligated to reduce the sentence merely because the defendant qualified for Amendment 821 relief. The panel also refused to consider Solis’s rehabilitation arguments raised for the first time in his reply brief and reiterated that—even when properly raised—post-sentencing rehabilitation is a matter committed to the district court’s discretion.

Although unpublished and resolved on the non-argument calendar, the decision provides timely guidance for the wave of § 3582(c)(2) motions invoking Amendment 821: eligibility is not entitlement, and district courts may deny relief where the § 3553(a) factors—particularly offense seriousness—militate against a reduced term.

Summary of the Opinion

Standard of review: Denials under § 3582(c)(2) are reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse occurs when the court applies the wrong legal standard, uses improper procedures, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.
Two-step framework (Dillon): If a defendant is eligible because the applicable guideline range was later lowered by a retroactive amendment listed in § 1B1.10(d), the court must then consider the § 3553(a) factors to decide whether—and by how much—to reduce the sentence. The decision is discretionary.
Policy statement controls and confers no entitlement: The court emphasized § 1B1.10’s language that a reduction “may” be appropriate in the court’s sound discretion and does not entitle a defendant to a reduced term.
District court’s reasoning was sufficient: The district court expressly acknowledged § 1B1.10, referenced the parties’ filings addressing the § 3553(a) factors, and explained that the “large and serious” nature of the offense—Solis was the master of a boat carrying $27 million in cocaine—justified denial. The appellate court held this was sufficient and reasonable.
Post-sentencing rehabilitation argument forfeited: Because Solis raised post-sentencing rehabilitation for the first time in his reply brief, the argument was not considered. In any event, the weight accorded to rehabilitation is within the district court’s discretion.
Holding: Affirmed. No abuse of discretion occurred; the district court permissibly denied a reduction despite Amendment 821 eligibility.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Caraballo‑Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2017): Framed the abuse-of-discretion standard for § 3582(c)(2) denials. This set the deferential appellate posture applied to the district court’s ruling.
United States v. Jordan, 582 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2009): Elaborated what constitutes abuse of discretion—incorrect legal standard, improper procedures, or clearly erroneous fact-finding—guiding the panel’s review.
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010): Established the two-step process: (1) determine eligibility under the retroactive amendment and § 1B1.10; (2) consider § 3553(a) to decide whether a reduction is warranted. The panel’s discussion mirrors Dillon’s structure.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 and commentary: The policy statement authorizes—but does not mandate—reductions and permits consideration of post-sentencing conduct. The panel relied on § 1B1.10’s “no entitlement” language to uphold the discretionary denial.
United States v. Frazier, 823 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2016): Confirmed that district courts decide the weight afforded to each § 3553(a) factor. This underpinned the acceptance of the district court’s emphasis on offense seriousness.
United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2009): Clarified that a district court need not articulate every § 3553(a) factor if the record shows they were considered; also recognized courts “may” consider post-conviction conduct in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings.
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007): Even when mitigating evidence is not discussed expressly, the record can still show it was considered; this supported the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation.
United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1997): A short order that references the parties’ filings can be sufficient where those filings address the pertinent § 3553(a) factors—precisely what occurred here.
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011): Post-sentencing rehabilitation may be “highly relevant” to several § 3553(a) factors, but Pepper does not compel a particular weight; it leaves room for district court discretion.
United States v. Doyle, 857 F.3d 1115 (11th Cir. 2017): Reaffirmed that the consideration and weight given to post-sentencing rehabilitation remains within the district court’s discretion even after Pepper.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2023): Provided the abuse-of-discretion framework—failure to consider key factors, reliance on improper factors, or unreasonable balancing—none of which the panel found here.
United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008): Emphasized the breadth of district court discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors, reinforcing the affirmance.
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): A court may attach “great weight” to a single § 3553(a) factor, such as offense seriousness, and appellate courts will not second-guess that weighting if the result is reasonable.
United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004): Appellate preservation rules: issues not raised in the opening brief are forfeited and cannot be raised for the first time in a reply. This foreclosed Solis’s attempt to rely on rehabilitation arguments raised belatedly.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning tracks the established § 3582(c)(2) framework and emphasizes the non-entitlement nature of retroactive guideline reductions.

Eligibility vs. entitlement: Amendment 821 (Part B) added § 4C1.1, authorizing a two-level decrease for “zero-point offenders” whose instant offense lacks enumerated aggravators, and it is listed in § 1B1.10(d) for retroactive application. But § 1B1.10 expressly states that authorization “does not entitle” a defendant to a reduction. Thus, even if Solis qualified as a zero-point offender, the district court retained discretion to deny a reduction.
Consideration of § 3553(a): The district court cited the policy statement and the parties’ filings, which addressed the § 3553(a) factors. That is sufficient under Eleventh Circuit precedent. The district court then emphasized the “large and serious” nature of the offense—Solis captained a vessel containing approximately $27 million in cocaine—and stressed that the sentence should reflect that seriousness. Under Butler and Frazier, giving great weight to offense seriousness is permissible.
Original downward variance: The panel noted that Solis had already received a downward variance and a below-guidelines sentence at the original sentencing, which further supported the reasonableness of denying an additional reduction. That prior variance can properly inform the § 3553(a) analysis on a § 3582(c)(2) motion.
Post-sentencing rehabilitation and amended range:
- Forfeiture: Arguments about post-sentencing rehabilitation were raised for the first time in Solis’s reply brief and therefore were not considered on appeal (Campbell; Levy).
- Discretion even if considered: The panel reiterated that any consideration of rehabilitation is discretionary with the district court (Doyle), notwithstanding Pepper’s recognition of its potential relevance. Similarly, while the amended guideline range is part of the § 3582(c)(2)/Dillon framework, a lower amended range does not compel a reduction.
No abuse of discretion: The appellate court found no failure to consider pertinent factors, no reliance on improper ones, and no clear error of judgment in balancing the factors (Irey; Curtin). The district court’s explanation—though concise—was legally adequate (Williams; Eggersdorf; Amedeo).

Impact and Implications

While unpublished and not binding precedent (see 11th Cir. R. 36-2), this decision is instructive for § 3582(c)(2) litigation in the wake of Amendment 821:

Eligibility is not enough: Qualifying as a “zero-point offender” and having a reduced amended range do not create a right to a lower sentence. Courts may deny relief where § 3553(a) considerations, especially offense seriousness, predominately point against a reduction.
Seriousness can carry the day: District courts may attach “great weight” to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the need for just punishment. Large-scale drug trafficking—particularly leadership or critical roles—may justify denying an otherwise available reduction.
Prior downward variances matter: A sentence already below the advisory range can be a compelling reason to deny additional reductions under Amendment 821.
Appellate preservation is critical: Arguments, including those regarding post-sentencing rehabilitation and other intervening developments, must be raised in the opening brief. Raising them for the first time in reply will forfeit appellate review.
Explanation need not be lengthy: A brief order that references the parties’ filings and identifies the determinative § 3553(a) factors can suffice.
Practical defense takeaway: To maximize the chance of relief, defendants should build a robust record in the district court:
- Document eligibility under § 4C1.1 and precisely show how the amended range changes.
- Address each relevant § 3553(a) factor with concrete mitigation, including verified rehabilitation, disciplinary record, vocational progress, and release planning.
- Confront offense seriousness directly and explain why, notwithstanding the gravity, a modest reduction remains “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”
- Preserve all arguments for appeal by presenting them in the opening brief.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction: A limited mechanism allowing courts to reduce a sentence when the Sentencing Commission later lowers the relevant guideline range and makes that change retroactive. It is not a do-over of the original sentencing; it is a constrained reconsideration.
Amendment 821 and § 4C1.1 (Zero‑Point Offender): Provides a two-level decrease for defendants who received no criminal history points and whose instant offense lacks specified aggravating features (as enumerated in § 4C1.1(a)). The Commission listed the amendment in § 1B1.10(d), making it retroactive.
Policy statement § 1B1.10: Governs retroactive amendments. It authorizes discretionary reductions but states defendants are not entitled to a reduction by virtue of eligibility alone. It also allows courts to consider post-sentencing conduct.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard. A decision will be reversed only if the lower court used the wrong legal rule, employed improper procedures, made clearly erroneous factual findings, or unreasonably balanced the relevant factors.
§ 3553(a) factors: Statutory sentencing considerations, including the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the need for deterrence and public protection, the advisory guideline range, policy statements, and avoidance of unwarranted disparities.
Non‑argument calendar and per curiam: Cases decided without oral argument and by an unsigned panel opinion, typically where the law is settled and the outcome is clear from the record.
Downward variance: A sentence below the advisory guideline range based on § 3553(a) factors. A prior downward variance can weigh against further reductions during retroactive proceedings.
Forfeiture of arguments on appeal: Issues not raised in the opening brief are generally deemed forfeited and cannot be introduced for the first time in a reply brief.

Conclusion

United States v. Solis reinforces a central principle of retroactive guideline litigation: Amendment 821’s zero-point offender reduction is discretionary, not automatic. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial where the court recognized the applicable policy, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and permissibly assigned great weight to offense seriousness—particularly the defendant’s role as master of a vessel carrying an enormous quantity of cocaine—while also noting the original downward variance.

For practitioners, the decision underscores three practical imperatives: build a comprehensive § 3553(a) mitigation record in the district court, confront offense seriousness with concrete evidence of rehabilitation and reduced risk, and preserve all arguments in the opening appellate brief. For courts, Solis confirms that concise orders referencing the parties’ submissions and identifying the determinative factors will generally suffice, and that the balancing of § 3553(a) considerations remains a matter of broad discretion, even in the face of retroactive amendments ostensibly favoring a lower sentence.