Ambiguity Controls: Eleventh Circuit Holds Parkland Mass Shooting Is a Single “Occurrence” Under Florida Law; Early Declaratory Actions Are Justiciable and Fee-Shifting Applies to Threatened Denials

Introduction

In Sheriff of Broward County v. Evanston Insurance Company, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a summary judgment declaring that the 2018 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting constitutes a single “occurrence” under the Sheriff’s public-entity excess liability policy. The decision resolves a high-stakes dispute over how many self-insured retentions (SIRs) the Sheriff must exhaust before excess coverage attaches and clarifies several important points under Florida law: (1) the definition of “occurrence” commonly used in liability policies—“an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions”—is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the insured; (2) a declaratory-judgment action to resolve coverage may proceed even before final liability judgments, where the insured demonstrates a substantial likelihood of future injury; (3) the “sophisticated insured” exception plays no role in Florida’s contra proferentem rule for ambiguous coverage terms; and (4) pre–March 2023 Florida fee-shifting statutes for insureds apply where the insurer denies or threatens to deny benefits and the insured obtains a favorable judgment.

The parties’ core disagreement was whether each injury-causing gunshot (or each victim) constituted a separate “occurrence” triggering numerous $500,000 SIRs, as the insurer contended, or whether the entire shooting spree was a single “occurrence” resulting in only one SIR, as the Sheriff argued. The district court sided with the Sheriff and awarded attorney’s fees; the Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Hull and joined by Judges Jill Pryor and Luck, affirmed across the board.

Summary of the Opinion

Justiciability and standing: The Sheriff presented an “actual controversy” suitable for declaratory relief. Sixty pending tort suits, more than $1 million in defense “claim expenses” already paid for Parkland suits, and a documented insurer position requiring multiple SIRs created a substantial likelihood of future injury. The court rejected the insurer’s attempt to fold merits arguments into the standing analysis.
Occurrence: Under Florida law, the policy’s definition of “occurrence” is ambiguous. Applying the Florida Supreme Court’s Koikos line of cases, the ambiguity must be construed in favor of the insured. On these facts, the Parkland shooting is treated as a single “occurrence,” so only one $500,000 SIR applies (plus the separate $500,000 annual aggregate deductible).
Sophisticated insured and extrinsic evidence: Florida recognizes no “sophisticated insured” carveout to contra proferentem, and courts do not resort to extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities in insurance policies.
Florida sovereign immunity caps: The statutory cap on tort damages against state agencies did not defeat standing because claim expenses can satisfy the SIR and the deductible is annual and aggregate (not tied to the Parkland event alone).
Attorney’s fees and costs: The court affirmed an award under Fla. Stat. § 626.9373 (surplus lines), holding that the insurer’s letter stating it had “no obligation to pay” until multiple SIRs were exhausted was at least a threatened denial of benefits; coupled with the insured’s favorable declaratory judgment, this satisfied Florida’s pre-2023 fee-shifting framework.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion is heavily grounded in the Florida Supreme Court’s treatment of “occurrence” and related doctrinal pillars. Its key precedents include:

Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co. (Fla. 2003): Central to the case. Koikos addressed the same policy definition of “occurrence” and adopted the “cause theory,” focusing on the act that caused injury rather than the insured’s negligent omissions. Crucially, Koikos deemed “occurrence” ambiguous as applied to a shooting and resolved that ambiguity in favor of the insured. In Koikos, that pro-insured construction happened to yield multiple occurrences (each gunshot), which increased the insured’s per-occurrence coverage. The Eleventh Circuit reads Koikos as an ambiguity holding, not a bright-line rule that every gunshot is its own occurrence.
Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Fla. 2005): The Florida Supreme Court’s subsequent clarification of Koikos. Taurus expressly describes Koikos as an ambiguity case and reaffirms that ambiguous policy terms must be construed in favor of the insured.
Maddox v. Florida Farm Bureau General (Fla. 1st DCA 2014): Applies Koikos to hold that the same “occurrence” definition is ambiguous in a dog-bite scenario; again, ambiguity triggers construction in the insured’s favor.
Barnett v. Department of Financial Services (Fla. 2020) and Guttenberg v. School Board of Broward County (Fla. 2020): Sovereign-immunity counterparts holding that the Parkland shooting is a single “incident or occurrence” under Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5). While statutory construction differs (strictly construed against waiver), these cases show Florida courts treat the Parkland shooting as a single event in analogous contexts.
GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cutler Presbyterian Church (11th Cir. 2005): The insurer relied on language there suggesting each trigger pull is a separate occurrence. The Eleventh Circuit distinguishes its own case, explaining that GuideOne did not resolve the ambiguity question and predated Taurus’s clarification. Federal courts applying state law defer to later state supreme court pronouncements; thus GuideOne does not control the ambiguity analysis.
Declaratory justiciability: Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. (U.S. 1941) and Eleventh Circuit cases like A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. (2019), Del Valle v. Trivago (2022), and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (U.S. 1992) support the forward-looking standing inquiry and the proposition that insurance coverage disputes can be justiciable before final liability judgments.
Construction principles: Shiloh Christian Center v. Aspen Specialty (11th Cir. 2023) and Washington National Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman (Fla. 2013) reaffirm Florida’s rule that ambiguities are resolved in favor of coverage without resort to extrinsic evidence.
Fee-shifting: Johnson v. Omega Ins. Co. (Fla. 2016) (incorrect denial + judgment), Bassette v. Standard Fire (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (threatened denial suffices), and All Underwriters v. Weisberg (11th Cir. 2000) (attorney’s fee obligation under Florida statute is substantive) underpin the fee award under § 626.9373.

Legal Reasoning

1) A Live Case or Controversy Existed

The court rejects the insurer’s contention that the Sheriff sought an advisory opinion. The Sheriff faced 60 lawsuits and had already incurred more than $1 million in defense “claim expenses.” Evanston had repeatedly taken the position—via reservation-of-rights letters culminating in a September 2020 letter—that each victim or gunshot would be treated as a separate “occurrence,” thereby requiring numerous SIRs. That concrete dispute over coverage and prerequisites to payment presented a substantial likelihood of future injury.

Critically, the court refuses to let the insurer “smuggle” merits arguments into the standing analysis. The insurer’s premise—that multiple occurrences are required—cannot defeat standing, because for standing purposes the court assumes the plaintiff’s merits reading could be correct. On that assumption, the Sheriff had already paid enough claim expenses to meet one SIR for Parkland, and evidence (declarations and spreadsheets) indicated the separate $500,000 annual aggregate deductible was satisfied by judgments and settlements on other covered claims during the policy period. Given that the deductible is aggregate and not per-occurrence, Florida’s sovereign-immunity damages cap on the Parkland suits does not render the controversy speculative.

The panel is careful to note what it does not decide. It does not hold as a matter of law that the deductible was satisfied for coverage purposes; it only concludes that, for justiciability, the record showed a substantial likelihood the Sheriff would suffer injury absent a declaration. Nor does it decide whether “claim expenses” can satisfy the deductible given an endorsement removing claim expenses from “ultimate net loss”—that coverage question is left for another day because it is unnecessary to establish standing.

2) “Occurrence” Is Ambiguous and Must Be Construed in Favor of the Insured

The central coverage question turns on the Koikos/Taurus line. The policy defines “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” Florida law holds this definition is ambiguous when applied to multi-victim intentional torts; it can reasonably be read to refer to the entire spree or to each injury-causing act. Under Florida’s contra proferentem rule, that ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured.

The court recognizes Koikos adopted the cause theory and focused on the immediate injury-causing act (the shootings), not the insured’s negligent omissions. But Koikos did not create a rigid “each shot equals an occurrence” rule; rather, it found ambiguity and then construed the policy to benefit the insured. In Koikos, treating each gunshot as a separate occurrence increased the insured’s available per-occurrence coverage limits. Here, by contrast, the insured gains from a one-occurrence characterization because it reduces the number of SIRs. The governing principle is the same: when language is equally susceptible to more than one reasonable reading, Florida courts choose the construction that favors coverage.

The panel also draws support from Guttenberg and Barnett—recent Florida Supreme Court guidance treating Parkland as a single “incident or occurrence” under the sovereign-immunity cap. While statutory and policy interpretation differ, these decisions reinforce the reasonableness of viewing the Parkland shooting as a single event.

3) No “Sophisticated Insured” Exception; No Resort to Extrinsic Evidence

The insurer urged a “sophisticated insured” exception to contra proferentem and invited the court to consider extrinsic evidence of policy negotiations. Florida law recognizes neither move. Ambiguity is resolved for the insured without regard to subjective contracting histories. The court cites Shiloh Christian Center and Ruderman to emphasize that Florida’s approach is textual, not intent-driven, when it comes to ambiguous policy language.

4) Attorney’s Fees and Costs under Fla. Stat. § 626.9373 (pre–March 2023)

The court affirms fees and costs because both statutory preconditions are met: (1) an incorrect denial of benefits (or at least a threatened denial) and (2) a judgment in favor of the insured. The September 28, 2020 letter stated that Evanston had “no obligation to pay” until multiple SIRs were exhausted—an incorrect position given the court’s one-occurrence holding. Bassette makes clear a threatened denial suffices. The policy was issued and suit filed before the March 2023 repeal of Florida’s fee-shifting statutes; the repeal is prospective only, so the old statutes apply.

5) Standards of Review

The panel applies de novo review to jurisdiction, summary judgment, and policy interpretation, and reviews the attorney’s fees legal standard de novo, factual findings for clear error, and the ultimate fee award for abuse of discretion. None of these standards yields reversible error.

Impact

The opinion has significant consequences for public entities, insurers (especially surplus lines), and litigants in mass-casualty contexts governed by Florida law.

Occurrence aggregation in mass-casualty events: Where a policy uses the standard “accident, including continuous or repeated exposure” definition, Florida courts will likely deem “occurrence” ambiguous and construe in favor of the insured. In shootings and similarly continuous harmful exposures, insureds can credibly argue for single-occurrence treatment.
SIR strategy and budgeting: Public entities with per-occurrence SIRs may only owe one SIR for a shooting spree, materially affecting defense and settlement strategy across dozens of suits.
Drafting and underwriting response: Carriers wishing to avoid this result must draft clearer aggregation language. Options include:
- Defining “occurrence” to expressly treat each injury-causing act or each claimant as a separate occurrence
- Adding batch/aggregation clauses that unambiguously group series of related acts as one occurrence for limits or SIR purposes, as desired
- Using dedicated assault and battery endorsements with precise occurrence and sublimit mechanics
- Clarifying how claim expenses interact with SIRs and deductibles, especially where endorsements modify “ultimate net loss”
Declaratory-judgment timing: The court encourages early resolution of coverage disputes. Even without final judgments, insureds can seek declaratory relief where defense costs mount and the insurer articulates a restrictive coverage position. Insurers should expect that robust documentary showings (invoices, declarations) will satisfy Article III at summary judgment.
Sovereign-immunity caps do not foreclose coverage disputes: Florida’s damages caps do not bar standing when defense expenses can satisfy SIRs and aggregate deductibles can be met by other claims.
Fee exposure tied to coverage posture: Reservation-of-rights letters that say the insurer has “no obligation to pay” unless the insured satisfies disputed preconditions may be deemed denials or threatened denials, triggering fee shifting if the insured prevails.
No sophisticated-insured safe harbor: In Florida, ambiguity is resolved for coverage regardless of the insured’s sophistication. Underwriters cannot rely on a judicial relaxation of contra proferentem for public entities or large commercial insureds.

Unresolved questions remain for future cases:

Interaction between the deductible endorsement and claim expenses: The court did not decide whether claim expenses can satisfy the aggregate deductible where an endorsement removes claim expenses from “ultimate net loss.” Expect further litigation and drafting responses on this point.
Occurrence definition where policies use materially different language: This ruling turns on the standard Koikos definition. A policy with unambiguous claimant-by-claimant or act-by-act occurrence language could produce the opposite result.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Occurrence: A policy term used to measure limits and the number of retentions/deductibles. Here defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” Florida deems this ambiguous in multi-injury events.
Cause theory vs. effect theory: Under the cause theory, courts identify the immediate act causing the injury to define the occurrence; the effect theory counts injuries or victims. Florida adopts the cause theory but still finds ambiguity as applied, requiring pro-insured construction.
Self-Insured Retention (SIR): A per-occurrence amount the insured must pay (including defense costs) before the excess insurer must indemnify “ultimate net loss.” In this policy, claim expenses paid by the insured apply to the SIR.
Annual aggregate deductible: A separate, policy-year-wide deductible the insured must satisfy across all covered occurrences before the excess insurer pays “ultimate net loss” in excess of SIRs. It is not per occurrence and does not erode the SIR.
Claim expenses vs. ultimate net loss: Claim expenses generally include defense costs, legal fees, and certain litigation costs. An endorsement here removed claim expenses from “ultimate net loss” and made them payment “in addition to” limits, but the policy still applied claim expenses to the SIR. Whether claim expenses can also satisfy the aggregate deductible was not decided.
Reservation-of-rights vs. denial: A reservation-of-rights letter preserves defenses. But if it states the insurer has no present obligation to pay unless disputed preconditions are met, Florida courts may treat it as a denial or threatened denial for fee-shifting purposes.
Contra proferentem: The rule that ambiguous insurance policy terms are construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. Florida applies this rule strictly, without a “sophisticated insured” exception and without looking to extrinsic evidence.
Declaratory-judgment standing: To sue for a declaration, a plaintiff need not have suffered final, completed harm. It is enough to show a substantial likelihood of future injury, supported by evidence at summary judgment (e.g., invoices, sworn declarations).
Florida fee-shifting statutes (pre–March 2023): Sections 626.9373 (surplus lines) and 627.428 (admitted carriers) permitted attorney’s fees to insureds who obtained a favorable judgment following a denial (or threatened denial) of benefits. The 2023 repeal applies prospectively only.

Conclusion

Sheriff of Broward County v. Evanston Insurance Company is a consequential affirmation of Florida’s pro-insured approach to ambiguous coverage terms, especially the ubiquitous definition of “occurrence.” The Eleventh Circuit crystallizes that Koikos is an ambiguity case, not a per se “each gunshot” rule, and applies the Florida Supreme Court’s framework to hold that the Parkland mass shooting is a single “occurrence” under the Sheriff’s excess policy. The court simultaneously endorses early declaratory actions where defense costs and insurer positions create a concrete controversy, rejects a sophisticated-insured exception to contra proferentem, and confirms that threatened denials can trigger fee-shifting under Florida’s pre-2023 statutes when the insured prevails.

For insurers, the opinion signals that absent precise, unambiguous drafting, courts applying Florida law will resolve uncertainty in favor of coverage—even for large, sophisticated public entities—and may treat mass-casualty events as single occurrences. For insureds, it underscores the value of early declaratory relief to resolve costly SIR/deductible disputes and the potential to recover fees when an insurer’s coverage position proves incorrect. Overall, the decision strengthens Florida’s textual, insured-favorable approach to ambiguous policy language and clarifies procedural and remedial pathways in complex, high-exposure coverage litigation.