Introduction

In United States v. Heriberto Carbajal-Flores, No. 24-1534 (7th Cir. July 16, 2025), the Seventh Circuit confronted whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A)—which prohibits firearm possession by noncitizens “illegally or unlawfully in the United States”—comports with the Second Amendment after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. The panel (Judges Rovner, Brennan, and St. Eve), in an opinion by Judge Brennan, reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and held that § 922(g)(5)(A) is constitutional under the text-and-history framework. Crucially, the court rejected the district court’s as‑applied ruling that would have allowed a “trustworthiness/dangerousness” carveout for an unlawfully present noncitizen, and it instructed that district courts need not conduct individualized assessments of unlawful aliens under this subsection.

The case arises from a 2020 episode in Chicago’s Little Village where the defendant, an unlawfully present Mexican national, fired a pistol on a public street during civil unrest. A grand jury indicted him under § 922(g)(5)(A). After Bruen, the defendant repeatedly sought dismissal, culminating in a district court ruling that the statute is facially valid but unconstitutional as applied to him because he was a “trustworthy adherent to the law.” The government appealed.

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion establishes two pivotal propositions in the circuit: (1) § 922(g)(5)(A) aligns with a longstanding Anglo-American tradition of disarming persons who have not sworn allegiance to the sovereign, and (2) as-applied “dangerousness” challenges are inapposite to this subsection because the relevant historical principle is allegiance, not individualized dangerousness.

Summary of the Opinion

• Framework: Applying Bruen as clarified by Rahimi, the court assessed whether § 922(g)(5)(A) fits within the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, using the “how” and “why” analogical metrics.
• Textual step: Without deciding whether unlawfully present aliens are among “the people,” the court assumed arguendo that they are covered by the Second Amendment and proceeded to the historical inquiry. It noted its earlier decision in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez (2015) treated some unlawful aliens as covered, and that Bruen/Rahimi did not abrogate that threshold point.
• Historical tradition: The court traced a continuous tradition from English common law through the Founding and into the 19th century of conditioning arms-bearing on allegiance. People outside the polity—including aliens without sworn allegiance, British loyalists, and (historically and regrettably) certain disfavored groups—were disarmed unless and until they swore an oath.
• Analogy to § 922(g)(5)(A): The statute disarms only those aliens who are “illegally or unlawfully” in the United States, i.e., those who have not naturalized and taken the statutory oath of renunciation and allegiance (8 U.S.C. § 1448). The modern statute thereby mirrors the historical pattern both in its reason (“why”: allegiance as a marker of trustworthiness to the sovereign) and its mechanism (“how”: disarmament persists unless and until an oath is sworn).
• Facial challenge: Because the statute is consistent with the underlying principles of the historical regulatory tradition, it survives Bruen’s text-and-history test. The defendant did not carry the burden to show “no set of circumstances” exists under which the statute would be valid.
• As-applied challenge: The district court erred in conducting a case-specific “dangerousness” inquiry. Whereas some courts leave room for as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession) due to possible overinclusiveness relative to a “dangerous persons” principle, § 922(g)(5)(A) tracks the allegiance principle and is not overinclusive in that way. District courts “need not conduct individualized assessments of illegal aliens” for § 922(g)(5)(A).
• Procedural note: The court declined the appellee’s request for summary affirmance based on alleged noncompliance with Circuit Rule 30; any omissions in the appendix were neither blatant nor outcome-determinative.
• Disposition: Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Detailed Analysis

I. The Governing Second Amendment Framework After Bruen and Rahimi

The court follows Bruen’s two-step method: (1) interpret the Second Amendment’s plain text and determine whether it presumptively covers the person and conduct; and, if so, (2) ask whether the government has demonstrated that the regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Rahimi clarifies the analogical exercise: courts look to “how” and “why” earlier regimes burdened the right and whether the modern law aligns with those principles, without demanding a “dead ringer” historical twin.

II. Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms; acknowledged historical limits. The opinion draws on Heller’s discussion of pre-existing rights and permissible categories of regulation.
• McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010): Incorporated the Second Amendment; emphasized it is not a “second-class right.”
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Set the text-and-history test and cautioned that not all history is equally probative; emphasized founding-era sources and consistent post-ratification practice.
• United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Refined Bruen’s analogical reasoning; courts should assess “how” and “why” past laws burdened the right to ensure modern laws fit the underlying principles, not an exact replica.
• United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015): Pre-Bruen; held some unlawful aliens fall within “the people.” The panel notes interest-balancing portions are abrogated, but Bruen and Rahimi did not undermine Meza-Rodriguez’s threshold inclusion for textual coverage.
• Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018 (7th Cir. 2023): Provided guidance for analyzing § 922(g)(1) challenges under Bruen. The panel distinguishes the felon context (possible “dangerousness” line) from the allegiance-based alienage context.
• Range v. Attorney General, 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc): Found § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to a nonviolent fraudster; illustrates as-applied room where the “dangerousness” tradition may be overinclusive. The panel contrasts that approach with § 922(g)(5)(A)’s allegiance logic.
• United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024): Recognized a tradition of disarming dangerous groups; cited to situate the felon-in-possession debate.
• United States v. Medina-Cantu, 113 F.4th 537 (5th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Sitladeen, 64 F.4th 978 (8th Cir. 2023): Post-Bruen cases noting earlier holdings that illegal aliens are not among “the people” were not unequivocally abrogated; used to show the textual question remains open elsewhere.
• United States v. Jimenez-Shilon, 34 F.4th 1042 (11th Cir. 2022): Discussed founding-era understandings, including dictionary definitions and alienage-linked restrictions.
• United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (various concurrences): Collected colonial laws that disarmed disaffected persons; illustrates the depth of the historical record.
• Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting): Provided detailed historical analysis on disarming groups deemed untrustworthy (e.g., Catholics, loyalists), emphasizing allegiance as a historical marker; the panel draws from this lineage.

The opinion also marshals leading treatises and sources—Blackstone, Vattel, St. George Tucker, and Joseph Story—and a range of colonial and early state enactments (oath statutes, disarmament of nonassociators, and other allegiance-based measures). While acknowledging that some discriminatory statutes (e.g., against enslaved people and Native Americans) are indefensible under modern constitutional norms, the court uses them to illuminate the throughline: in practice, arms bearing was historically tied to being within the political community and owing allegiance.

III. The Textual Step: Are Unlawfully Present Aliens Among “the People”?

The court notes that the Supreme Court has not definitively resolved whether “the people” in the Second Amendment is limited to citizens. Heller, borrowing from United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, suggested the phrase refers to persons who are part of the national community or have sufficiently developed connections to it. Meza-Rodriguez previously concluded that some unlawful aliens qualify, and that point was not disturbed by Bruen/Rahimi. Other circuits, by contrast, have excluded unlawful aliens categorically or assumed inclusion without deciding.

Critically, the Seventh Circuit sidesteps a definitive answer here: even assuming the defendant is covered by the Second Amendment’s text, the government prevails at the historical step. This move makes the holding durable regardless of future developments on the textual scope of “the people.”

IV. The Historical Tradition: Allegiance as the Limiting Principle

A. English Common Law and the English Bill of Rights

• Blackstone distinguished “natural-born subjects” (allegiance by birth) from “aliens” (born outside the dominions), with aliens historically holding fewer rights. Many civil capacities (e.g., holding land) were conditioned on allegiance.
• Landholding and arms-bearing were historically linked; statutes limited arms to landed persons. The same allegiance logic that barred aliens from land also supported restricting arms possession.
• Parliament’s disarmament of Catholics (treated as owing allegiance to the Pope) demonstrates an allegiance-based restriction; those who swore the requisite oaths could regain arms.
• Naturalization provided a path to the full incidents of subjectship; the key inflection point was the oath of allegiance.

B. Colonies and Founding-Era America

• Colonial governments disarmed persons outside the polity and those who refused loyalty oaths. Revolutionary governments disarmed persons “disaffected to the cause of America,” while allowing those who swore allegiance to retain arms.
• Post-Declaration, several states enacted “Test Acts” disarming nonassociators—again, a direct allegiance screen.
• Although some early state constitutions protected arms-bearing for “citizens,” aliens did not share the right absent naturalization and oath-taking. This continues the principle that allegiance demarcated arms-bearing.

C. Early Republic and 19th Century Understandings

• St. George Tucker and Joseph Story treated the right to bear arms as incident to citizenship; aliens by birth remained under common-law disabilities unless naturalized, which required renouncing foreign allegiance and taking the oath—after which they gained the same rights as citizens.
• Post-ratification state constitutions and commentary reinforced the citizenship-linked understanding of the right, consistent with the founding-era practice.

V. Application to § 922(g)(5)(A): “How” and “Why” Fit

• Why (purpose): Historically, arms restrictions aimed to ensure political loyalty and public trustworthiness—allegiance to the sovereign. Unlawfully present aliens, by status, have not sworn allegiance to the United States. Congress’s disarmament of this group therefore aligns with the same underlying concern.
• How (mechanism): Historically, disarmament persisted unless and until an oath of allegiance was taken. Section 922(g)(5)(A) mirrors that structure: it applies to those “illegally or unlawfully” present and ceases to apply once the person naturalizes and swears the statutory oath (8 U.S.C. § 1448).
• Analogy: Because § 922(g)(5)(A) comports with the historical principles that underpinned permissible regulations, the statute fits within a “permissible category of regulations” under Rahimi’s articulation of Bruen.
• Facial posture: Under the facial challenge standard—requiring proof that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid—the defendant’s challenge fails.

VI. As‑Applied Challenges and the Rejection of a “Dangerousness” Carveout for § 922(g)(5)(A)

The court recognizes that other circuits have entertained as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) because the “dangerous persons” tradition might not justify disarming all felons, especially nonviolent ones. But the court holds that § 922(g)(5)(A) presents a different tradition: allegiance, not dangerousness. Since the statute tracks that allegiance principle, it is not overinclusive in the way felon prohibitions might be. Consequently, district courts “need not conduct individualized assessments of illegal aliens” for purposes of § 922(g)(5)(A), and the district court erred in doing so here.

Importantly, the court expressly “express[es] no views” on whether as-applied challenges may succeed under other subsections of § 922(g). The holding is cabined to (g)(5)(A).

VII. Procedural Note: Circuit Rule 30

The defendant sought summary affirmance on the theory that the government’s appendix failed to comply with Circuit Rule 30. The Seventh Circuit declined, noting that any omissions were not blatant or unjustified and, in any event, were not outcome-determinative.

Impact and Future Litigation

A. Immediate Consequences in the Seventh Circuit

• District courts within the Seventh Circuit should treat § 922(g)(5)(A) as constitutional under Bruen and Rahimi, grounded in the allegiance tradition.
• No individualized “dangerousness” or “trustworthiness” hearings are required (or appropriate) for unlawfully present aliens charged under (g)(5)(A).
• Prosecutors need not develop case-specific dangerousness records to defend (g)(5)(A); historical allegiance sources suffice. Defendants cannot obtain dismissal by showing personal law-abidingness or community ties.

B. The “Who Are ‘the People’?” Question

The Seventh Circuit did not resolve whether unlawfully present aliens are among “the people.” It preserved Meza-Rodriguez’s approach insofar as Bruen/Rahimi did not abrogate that textual point, but it rested the holding on the historical prong. This may lessen inter-circuit friction because, despite differing views on the textual step, many circuits ultimately uphold § 922(g)(5)(A). Still, the underlying split about coverage could invite further Supreme Court clarification.

C. Beyond (g)(5)(A): Nonimmigrant Aliens and Other Status-Based Prohibitions

The opinion addresses only § 922(g)(5)(A). Whether its allegiance analysis extends seamlessly to § 922(g)(5)(B) (nonimmigrant aliens) remains open; parties can be expected to litigate whether temporary lawful presence without a naturalization oath sufficiently aligns with the historical allegiance tradition, or whether narrower tailoring or exceptions matter.

For other status-based prohibitions (e.g., those keyed to dangerousness, mental illness, or specific civil adjudications), Carbajal-Flores does not pre-judge as-applied challenges. Its lesson is that the relevant historical principle should control the fit: where the tradition is allegiance, individualized dangerousness is beside the point; where the tradition is dangerousness, individualized evidence may matter.

D. National Landscape and Supreme Court Trajectory

• The decision harmonizes with Rahimi’s emphasis on principles over historical twins and provides a structured application of the “how/why” test to an alienage restriction.
• By anchoring its reasoning in allegiance, the opinion strengthens the government’s position in defending § 922(g)(5)(A) nationally, even as circuits differ on the textual coverage of “the people.”
• The decision may influence how courts conceptualize status-based firearms regulations: not all such laws must trace to a “dangerous persons” tradition; a distinct allegiance tradition is historically attested and constitutionally relevant.

E. Practical Guidance

• Government litigants should foreground allegiance-based sources—Blackstone, English and colonial oath/disarmament statutes, Revolutionary-era nonassociator laws, and early American treatises—and explain the naturalization oath as the modern functional analogue.
• Defense litigants will find limited traction in individualized “good character” showings under (g)(5)(A); arguments must instead attack the historical pedigree or dispute the analogy’s “how/why” fit, a difficult undertaking given the breadth of cited materials.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “The people”: A constitutional term that generally refers to those within the national community; it may include some noncitizens depending on their connections. The court assumes coverage for this case without deciding.
• Facial vs. as-applied challenges:
  • Facial: Claims a law is unconstitutional in all or almost all applications; requires showing no set of valid circumstances.
  • As-applied: Challenges the law’s application to a particular person’s circumstances.
• Bruen’s “text-and-history” test: Courts first ask if the Second Amendment’s text covers the person/conduct; if so, the government must justify the modern restriction by pointing to a consistent historical tradition of analogous regulation.
• Rahimi’s “how/why” metrics: Evaluate (1) how a law burdens arms-bearing and (2) why it does so; if both align with historical principles, the law is likely constitutional even without an exact historical twin.
• Allegiance tradition: Historically, arms-bearing correlated with membership in the political community and sworn loyalty to the sovereign. Persons without allegiance were often disarmed unless they took an oath; modern naturalization oaths are the contemporary analogue.
• Nonassociators: People in the Revolutionary era who refused to take oaths of allegiance to the new state governments; often disarmed as a result.

Conclusion

United States v. Carbajal-Flores cements, within the Seventh Circuit, an allegiance-based understanding of the Second Amendment’s limits as applied to unlawful aliens. By tracing a continuous tradition from English common law through the Founding and early Republic, the court holds that § 922(g)(5)(A) aligns with historical principles that conditioned arms-bearing on sworn loyalty to the sovereign. The opinion’s most consequential doctrinal move is to decouple (g)(5)(A) from “dangerousness” jurisprudence: unlike felon-in-possession cases, there is no requirement or room for individualized trustworthiness assessments of unlawfully present aliens. District courts, therefore, should not conduct as-applied dangerousness inquiries under this subsection.

The decision clarifies Bruen’s analogical method and demonstrates how allegiance, as a historical principle, can justify status-based restrictions independent of a dangerousness rationale. While leaving open the ultimate scope of “the people” and the availability of as-applied challenges for other § 922(g) provisions, the Seventh Circuit sets a clear, historically grounded rule for § 922(g)(5)(A): disarmament of unlawfully present aliens is constitutional because the Second Amendment, as historically understood, tied the right to keep and bear arms to allegiance—a condition satisfied by the naturalization oath and not otherwise.