Affirming Probable Cause for Counterfeit‐Bill Arrests: Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff's Department

Introduction

In Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department, 24-630-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2025), Kelly Glover sued Onondaga County, its Sheriff’s Department and two deputies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law. Glover alleged that she was falsely arrested and imprisoned, subjected to an unlawful entry and seizure, denied due process and equal protection, and that the County had a custom of wrongful arrest. The underlying incident arose from Glover’s use of two counterfeit $20 bills at a Wegmans supermarket. After the supermarket reported the incident, Deputy Albanese—using surveillance footage and DMV photos tied to her rewards-card number—arrested Glover at home. Glover spent roughly four hours in custody, was strip-searched, then “unarrested” once video showed the bills likely came from an ATM. No charges were ever filed. Glover’s discovery requests were denied, and the district court deemed Defendants’ summary-judgment motion unopposed, granting it in full. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit unanimously held:

There was no abuse of discretion in denying Glover’s post-discovery motion to compel documents she previously told the court did not exist, nor in deeming Defendants’ summary-judgment motion unopposed when Glover failed to file a timely response or show how withheld materials were germane.
Deputy Albanese had probable cause to arrest Glover for first-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument under New York Penal Law § 170.30. Probable cause existed once he viewed her on video passing counterfeit bills, examined the bills himself, and Glover admitted to using them to purchase groceries.
Glover’s consent to entry negated any Fourth Amendment Payton violation. She voluntarily invited the deputy inside, only asking him to leave after he announced the arrest.
No Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim lay based on a delay in arraignment: she was released after about four hours without formal charges, well within the 48-hour “prompt”-determination window of County of Riverside v. McLaughlin.
Her Monell claim against the County failed because she suffered no constitutional injury from signing a release form and because no policy drove a false arrest (which did not occur).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff’s Dept. (63 F.3d 110): Elements of false‐arrest claims under § 1983 and New York law.
Weyant v. Okst (101 F.3d 845): Probable cause as a complete defense to false arrest.
Jaegly v. Couch (439 F.3d 149): Definition of probable cause—“knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information.”
Grant v. City of New York (500 F. Supp. 2d 211): Passing a counterfeit note plus identification authorizes arrest.
Payton v. New York (445 U.S. 573): Warrantless home entry for arrests absent consent or exigent circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (500 U.S. 44): “Prompt” judicial probable‐cause determination within 48 hours of arrest.
Monell v. Dept. of Social Services (436 U.S. 658): Municipal liability requires a constitutional violation and causal policy or custom.
Procedural‐discretion cases: First City, Texas-Houston, N.A. v. Rafidain Bank (150 F.3d 172), Jackson v. Fed. Express (766 F.3d 189), Alphonse Hotel Corp. v. Tran (828 F.3d 146).

Legal Reasoning

1. Procedural Discretion: The district court and magistrate judge acted within their broad discretion. Glover had months to discover materials, many of which she admitted did not exist. She never filed a proper Rule 56(d) affidavit showing that the withheld evidence was noncumulative and directly material to her defense. By missing deadlines and failing to rebut Defendants’ Rule 56(h) notice, she forfeited any opposition.

2. Probable Cause & Fourth Amendment: Under New York law, knowing use of counterfeit currency with intent to defraud triggers first-degree criminal possession charges (Penal Law §§ 170.15, 170.30). Probable cause does not demand conclusive proof of intent or knowledge: a reasonable officer may rely on suspect video footage, physical examination of suspicious bills, and the suspect’s own admissions. Deputy Albanese’s investigation supplied “reasonably trustworthy information” to believe Glover had committed a crime. Her subsequent “innocent explanation” about the ATM, while credited later, did not vitiate probable cause at the moment of arrest. And Glover’s voluntary consent to home entry foreclosed any Payton objection.

3. Due Process: The Fourteenth Amendment and McLaughlin require a prompt post-arrest probable cause determination, not an immediate arraignment. Glover’s short, four-hour detention pending unarrest did not violate any federal Due Process Clause.

4. Municipal Liability: Under Monell, a § 1983 plaintiff must show a constitutional violation and a municipal policy or custom causing it. Here, no false arrest (or any constitutional deprivation) occurred, so the County cannot be held liable—even if the release form were a policy artifact.

Impact

Glover reinforces settled Second Circuit standards:

Probable cause can rest on an officer’s common‐sense evaluation of a suspect’s conduct and available physical evidence—even if further investigation might exonerate the suspect.
Consent to entry must be assessed by the timing of the request: a pre-arrest invitation to investigate inside the home is valid, even if the arrestee later regrets it.
Short detentions ended by “unarrest” do not trigger constitutional arraignment requirements.
Procedural defaults in discovery and summary‐judgment practice are strictly enforced: parties must use Rule 56(d) properly or risk losing their day in court.

Future litigants will find that denials of late discovery motions and deeming unopposed motions are unlikely to be overturned absent clear abuse of discretion. Law enforcement officers gain comfort that preliminary exculpatory accounts do not nullify probable cause if it was objectively reasonable at the time of arrest.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A practical, non-technical standard: would a reasonable officer believe a crime was committed based on the facts known?
Warrantless Home Entry: Generally forbidden for arrests, except when the resident clearly consents or exigent circumstances exist.
Rule 56(d): Allows a party facing summary judgment to request more time to complete discovery, but only if it shows the desired evidence is crucial, not speculative.
Monell Liability: Cities or counties can only be sued under § 1983 if a systemic policy or custom causes a constitutional violation—not merely an individual officer’s misconduct.

Conclusion

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department affirms that officers need only a reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity—even amid competing “innocent” explanations—to make a lawful arrest. It underscores how courts will enforce procedural deadlines and discovery rules, and it illustrates the narrow scope of due process claims for brief pre-charge detentions. Finally, it reconfirms Monell’s requirement that a constitutional injury be linked to a municipal policy before local governments can be held liable under § 1983. Together, these principles provide clear guidance to practitioners and law enforcement alike on the boundaries of probable cause, home‐entry consent, discovery obligations, and municipal responsibility.