Introduction

The appellate case Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy et al. v. Lakes, and Gerald R. Ford International Airport Authority addresses the critical issue of federal court jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1). The plaintiffs, representing Michigan state environmental agencies, sued the Gerald R. Ford International Airport Authority (hereafter "Airport Authority") for environmental contamination allegedly caused by the Airport Authority's use of Aqueous Film-Forming Foam (AFFF) containing per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). The crux of the dispute centers on whether the Airport Authority's adherence to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations renders it a federal actor, thereby justifying removal to federal court.

Summary of the Judgment

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. The district court had previously determined that the Airport Authority failed to meet the "acting under" requirement necessary for removal under §1442(a)(1). The appellate court agreed, emphasizing that merely complying with FAA regulations does not equate to acting under a federal officer. Consequently, the Airport Authority's attempt to establish federal jurisdiction based on regulatory compliance was unsuccessful.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Judgment extensively references several key cases to support its decision:

• Watson v. Philip Morris Cos. (551 U.S. 142, 2007): The Supreme Court clarified that mere compliance with federal regulations does not constitute "acting under" a federal officer for purposes of removal.
• Mays v. City of Flint (871 F.3d 437, 2017): The Sixth Circuit held that state officials implementing federally approved plans did not "act under" a federal officer.
• BENNETT v. MIS CORP. (607 F.3d 1076, 2010): Established that a contractor hired by the FAA and performing services under direct supervision constitutes "acting under" due to the contractual and supervisory relationship.
• IN RE COMMERCE OIL CO. (847 F.2d 291, 1988): Emphasized that firefighting services are typically local or state functions, not federal.
• Ohio State Chiropractic Ass'n v. Humana Health Plan Inc. (647 Fed.Appx. 619, 2016): Reinforced that detailed federal regulation does not equate to acting under a federal officer.

Legal Reasoning

The court delineated the requirements for removal under §1442(a)(1), focusing primarily on whether the Airport Authority was "acting under" a federal officer. The term "acting under" entails being under the "subjection, guidance, or control" of a federal officer and assisting in carrying out federal duties. The court found that the Airport Authority's compliance with FAA regulations did not satisfy this requirement because:

• Adherence to FAA regulations is part of a standard regulatory framework applicable to all certified airports, not indicative of a subordinate or agent relationship with the FAA.
• The FAA does not exert direct control over the Airport Authority's operations or employees beyond regulatory compliance.
• The Airport Authority's participation in federal grant programs does not establish a contractual or supervisory relationship that would qualify as "acting under."

Therefore, the court determined that the Airport Authority remained a state entity without the necessary federal connection for removal to federal court.

Impact

This judgment reinforces the principle that regulatory compliance with federal agencies does not automatically transform a state or local entity into a federal actor. The decision clarifies the boundaries of federal jurisdiction, particularly concerning environmental regulations and public safety standards. Future cases involving similar removal attempts will likely reference this ruling to assess whether the statutory criteria for "acting under" a federal officer are genuinely met, thereby maintaining a clear distinction between regulatory compliance and federal agency control.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Federal Officer Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1)

This statute allows for the removal of a case from state court to federal court if the defendant is deemed a federal officer or acting under a federal officer. The key criteria include:

• The party is "acting under" a federal officer.
• The actions are taken under the color of federal office.
• The party raises a colorable federal defense.

"Acting Under"

To "act under" a federal officer means that the party is subject to the direction, control, or supervision of a federal authority and is assisting in carrying out federal duties. Merely following federal regulations does not fulfill this requirement.

Aqueous Film-Forming Foam (AFFF)

AFFF is a firefighting agent used to suppress petroleum-based fires. It contains PFAS, which are environmental contaminants of concern due to their persistence and potential health risks.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit's affirmation in Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy et al. v. Lakes, and Gerald R. Ford International Airport Authority underscores the stringent interpretation of "acting under" within the federal officer removal statute. By clarifying that regulatory compliance does not equate to federal agency control, the court delineates the limits of federal jurisdiction over state and local entities. This decision not only impacts the immediate parties involved but also sets a precedent ensuring that removal to federal court is reserved for cases where a genuine federal nexus exists, thereby preserving the integrity of federal and state judicial boundaries.