Affirmation of Murder-for-Hire and Witness Tampering Standards; Good-Faith Exception for CSLI: United States v. Age

Introduction

In United States v. Age (5th Cir. Apr. 25, 2025), Louis Age Jr., his son Louis Age III, Stanton Guillory, and Ronald Wilson challenged their convictions and life sentences for the murder-for-hire of federal witness Milton Womack and related witness-tampering offenses. Womack had cooperated against the Ages in an earlier Medicare fraud prosecution and helped burn a school for insurance proceeds. When he entered a separate plea and agreed to testify, Age Jr. conspired with others to silence him. A jury convicted all four defendants on ten counts, including conspiracy and substantive offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1513, 1958, and § 1001. On appeal they raised issues of evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, attorney-client privilege, Sixth Amendment Massiah and Confrontation Clause claims, Fourth Amendment CSLI suppression, Rule 404(b) “other-acts” evidence, Rule 902(11) authentication, and jury‐selection challenges under the Jury Selection and Service Act and fair cross-section requirement.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court in full. Reviewing sufficiency of evidence de novo and preserved errors for abuse of discretion (or plain error where unpreserved), the Court found overwhelming direct and corroborated testimony tying Age III and Guillory to a paid hit, plus evidence that Age Jr. and Age III tampered with both Womack and co-defendant Ayanna Age. The panel upheld admission of intrinsic “other acts” (arson, chop-shop violence, fraud schemes), properly applied the good-faith exception to CSLI orders under § 2703(d), and rejected Massiah, Confrontation and hearsay objections to jailhouse informant testimony. It held that third parties lack standing to assert Womack’s attorney-client privilege, Denver’s forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine applied, and no Sixth Amendment seve­rability or jury‐instruction defects existed. Finally, it deemed the jury wheel and process consistent with the JSSA and Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section rule.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• United States v. Garcia (517 F.2d 272): “Garcia hearing” for conflicts of interest in representation.
• Flanagan v. United States: Sixth Amendment waiver standards.
• United States v. Henry (447 U.S. 264): Paid jailhouse informants as government agents.
• Illinois v. Krull (480 U.S. 340): Good-faith exception to exclusionary rule for reliance on statutes later held unconstitutional.
• In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data (5th Cir. 2013): § 2703(d) orders to obtain CSLI without a warrant.
• Carpenter v. United States (585 U.S. 296): Warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment for CSLI.
• Crawford v. Washington (541 U.S. 36): Confrontation Clause’s testimonial hearsay rule.
• Giles v. California (554 U.S. 353): Forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to Confrontation Clause.
• Massiah v. United States (377 U.S. 201): Sixth Amendment right to counsel; informants as agents.
• Duren v. Missouri (439 U.S. 357): Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section test.
• United States v. Maskeny (5th Cir. 1980): Absolute‐disparity threshold for jury pools.

Legal Reasoning

Sufficiency of the Evidence. Multiple eyewitnesses (Jackson, Marigny, Lewis) tied Age III and Guillory to hiring and performing the murder, corroborated by phone records, jail calls, and paid-off testimony. Ayanna’s testimony documented threats and intimidation by Age Jr. and Age III. The panel found no miscarriage of justice and applied plain-error review where issues were unpreserved.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic “Other-Acts.” Evidence of arson, chop-shop violence, staged collisions, Medicare fraud and gang shootings was inextricably intertwined with the charged conspiracies (motive, identity, plan) and properly admitted under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and intrinsic-evidence doctrines. Any error in admitting unrelated gang murders was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence.

CSLI and Good-Faith Exception. The Government obtained CSLI under § 2703(d) orders after a district split but before binding 5th Cir. precedent. Under Krull, reliance on § 2703(d) was objectively reasonable; the good-faith exception rendered the evidence admissible despite Carpenter.

Jailhouse Informant & Confrontation. The panel held Crawford was not a government agent under Massiah—he acted unprompted, with only admonishments not to question Wilson—and his testimony was nontestimonial (private inmate conversations). Limitations on cross-examination under Rule 609(b) and Rule 613 did not violate the Sixth Amendment. Forfeiture-by-wrongdoing under Rule 804(b)(6) allowed Womack’s prior statements.

Attorney-Client Privilege. Co-defendants lack third-party standing to assert Womack’s privilege. The “close relation” prong of third-party standing fails when the party seeking to bar testimony actively seeks to silence the witness for self-interest.

Jury Selection. Under the JSSA and Sixth Amendment, Duren’s three-prong test for fair cross-section was not met: (1) African Americans are distinctive; (2) absolute disparity (11.84%) in qualified panels fell below the circuit’s threshold; (3) underrepresentation resulted from individual non-response rather than systematic exclusion. Pari materia, no substantial failure to comply with the Act’s plan.

Impact

This decision reaffirms that:

• Paid murder-for-hire convictions rest on direct testimony corroborated by circumstantial proof.
• Intrinsic evidence of related crimes—arson, insurance fraud, staged collisions, gang violence—is admissible to complete the narrative of a conspiracy.
• Reliance on § 2703(d) orders before binding precedent is protected by the good-faith exception, insulating CSLI from exclusion even post-Carpenter.
• Forfeiture-by-wrongdoing extinguishes Confrontation Clause objections when the defendant procured the witness’s absence.
• Third parties cannot assert another’s attorney-client privilege absent a close, representative relationship.
• Fair cross-section jury claims require more than turnout disparities; absolute disparity thresholds and proof of systematic exclusion must be satisfied.

Lower courts will cite Age for the robust application of plain-error review in complex multi-defendant prosecutions, and for clarifying the interplay of new Fourth Amendment law on CSLI with preexisting statutory orders.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Good-Faith Exception

Court-created rule that evidence obtained under a statute reasonably believed valid is admissible even if the statute is later ruled unconstitutional.

Cell-Site Location Information (CSLI)

Data from phone towers showing a phone’s past movements. Pre-Carpenter, obtained on lesser standards; post-Carpenter, generally requires a warrant.

Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing (Rule 804(b)(6))

Hearsay exception: a defendant who silences a witness forfeits the right to exclude that witness’s out-of-court statements.

Massiah Principle

Once indicted, a defendant has a right to counsel; government agents (including informants) may not deliberately elicit incriminating statements without counsel present.

Fair Cross-Section Test (Duren)

Defendant must show (1) distinctive group, (2) underrepresentation in jury pools, (3) systematic exclusion. If proven, the burden shifts to the Government to justify.

Conclusion

United States v. Age stands as a comprehensive affirmation of federal criminal-procedure principles in high-stakes murder-for-hire prosecutions. It underscores stringent evidentiary standards for conspiracy, clarifies the scope of “other-acts” admissibility, and applies the good-faith exception to CSLI orders even after evolving Fourth Amendment law. The Court’s rejection of expansive privilege claims and its faithful application of the fair-cross-section test preserve both government accountability and individual rights. Going forward, Age will guide trial and appellate courts in balancing complex constitutional, statutory and evidentiary frameworks.