Affirmation of District Court’s Discretion in Supervised Release Revocation and Plain-Error Review

Introduction

United States v. Johnson, No. 24-2372-cr (2d Cir. June 2, 2025), presents a routine—but instructive—illustration of appellate review of a district court’s decision to revoke supervised release. Defendant–Appellant James Johnson, a felon convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for unlawful possession of a firearm, completed a 30-month prison term and began a three-year term of supervised release in September 2023. Over the next ten months, Johnson accrued multiple Grade C violations—drug use, failure to report, unauthorized absences, and non-compliance with treatment—prompting two interim modifications (home detention and a Residential Reentry Center placement) and, ultimately, a revocation hearing. The District Court (D'Agostino, J.) imposed nine months’ imprisonment followed by a two-year term of supervised release. Johnson appealed, challenging procedural and substantive reasonableness under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Second Circuit unanimously affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals held that:

Johnson’s challenge to procedural reasonableness fails under plain-error review. The district court adequately considered the statutory sentencing factors, did not commit any clear or obvious error even if it misstated the number of modifications to Johnson’s supervision, and gave a reasoned explanation of its decision.
Johnson’s substantive challenge likewise fails. The imposed sentence (9 months’ incarceration + 2 years’ supervised release) is within the guideline range (5–11 months) and statutorily permitted (up to three years of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h)). It is neither “shockingly high” nor beyond the bounds of reasonableness.
The district court’s exercise of discretion in weighing Johnson’s youth, treatment needs, criminal history, and pattern of violations was proper; no exceptional circumstances warrant reversal.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Second Circuit’s opinion anchors its analysis on well-established sentencing and plain-error standards:

United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008): Weight accorded to § 3553(a) factors is committed to district courts’ discretion; appellate courts review for reasonableness.
Davis v. United States, 589 U.S. 345 (2020): Clarifies that factual and procedural errors in sentencing are subject to plain-error review if not preserved.
United States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2020): Presumption that the sentencing judge considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors absent evidence to the contrary.
United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2006): No requirement for the district court to parse each argument on record; a concise explanation may suffice.
United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020): A minor factual misstatement at sentencing does not automatically establish plain error absent demonstration of prejudice.
United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam): Substantive unreasonableness review is highly deferential; reversal occurs only in exceptional cases.
United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008): Defines substantive reasonableness and instructs that sentences outside the guideline range are not per se unreasonable.
United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009): Reinforces that non-shockingly high or low sentences within statutory bounds will be upheld.

These authorities collectively regulated the appellate lens: if the district court gave an adequate explanation, stayed within statutory and guideline limits, and did not commit clear legal or factual error, the sentence stands.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in two stages:

Procedural Reasonableness & Plain-Error Review:
- Because Johnson did not object at sentencing, the Court applies plain-error review (Davis). The four elements—error, clear or obvious nature, substantial rights affected, and serious impact on judicial integrity—were not met.
- Johnson’s contention that the district court failed to acknowledge his youth and recent guideline amendments is unfounded. Under Rosa, a court is presumed to have considered all § 3553(a) factors, and under Fernandez, it need not expressly address every argument.
- A stray misstatement—saying there were three modifications instead of two—did not prejudice Johnson because the court accurately recited the factual history elsewhere (Moore).
Substantive Reasonableness:
- The two-year supervised release term is within the statutory maximum of three years under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) and consistent with U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(g)(2).
- Sentences are subject to deferential review and overturned only in exceptional circumstances (Ingram). Johnson’s pattern of repeated, early supervised-release violations and the district court’s finding that nine months plus two years of release “sufficient but not greater than necessary” meet § 3553(a) objectives (deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation).
- The sentence is neither “shockingly high” nor unsupported by law (Rigas), and thus is substantively reasonable.

Impact

While summary orders lack precedential effect in the Second Circuit, Johnson reinforces several points of broader significance:

Deference to District Courts: Trial judges enjoy broad discretion in weighing mitigating and aggravating factors; appellate courts will not micromanage unless unmistakable error appears.
Plain-Error Threshold: Defendants bear a heavy burden to show that an unpreserved sentencing error is clear, prejudicial, and undermines public confidence.
Guideline Amendments: Retroactivity or applicability of guideline amendments may influence sentencing arguments but will not override a properly explained, reasonable sentence.
Supervised Release Revocations: Courts may impose new supervised release terms up to the statutory maximum upon revocation, and multiple modifications before revocation underscore a pattern of non-compliance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release: A period of monitoring (similar to parole) following imprisonment, during which a person must comply with court-imposed conditions (drug tests, reporting, treatment).
Grade C Violations: Under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a), minor violations (e.g., failure to report, missed tests) that expose a defendant to a short sentence range (5–11 months here).
Plain-Error Review: The most deferential standard on appeal, applied when a party did not object below. Requires an error that is clear, affects outcome, and undermines judicial integrity.
§ 3553(a) Factors: Statutory sentencing guideposts—seriousness of offense, history of defendant, deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation, guidelines range, need for consistency.

Conclusion

United States v. Johnson reaffirms that district courts possess wide latitude in fashioning revocation sentences for supervised release non-compliance, provided they articulate a coherent rationale tied to § 3553(a) objectives. Appellate courts will uphold such sentences under deferential plain-error and substantive-reasonableness standards absent clear legal or factual mistakes or an otherwise “shockingly” excessive outcome. Practitioners should note the heavy burden imposed by plain-error review, the procedural sufficiency of concise but focused sentencing explanations, and the permissible scope of supervised-release sanctioning under 18 U.S.C. § 3583.