Affirmation of Article 78 as Adequate Post-Deprivation Remedy & Heightened “Class of One” Equal Protection Standard

Introduction

Grune v. Hernandez, No. 24-1803-cv (2d Cir. May 16, 2025), is a summary order affirming the dismissal of a civil-rights complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff-appellant Jeffrey Grune, proceeding pro se, sued Hazel Hernandez, a municipal code enforcement officer in New Lebanon, New York, for (1) violating his procedural due process rights by ordering his mobile home vacated without a hearing and (2) violating his equal protection rights through “class of one” discrimination. The District Court dismissed both claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the Second Circuit panel (Judges Sack, Wesley, Robinson) affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals held, first, that Grune’s “class of one” equal protection claim failed because he did not allege that any comparator—his landlord or a Mr. Munch—was so identically situated that differential treatment lacked any rational basis. Second, the Court found no procedural due process violation: Hernandez’s order to vacate was a “random, unauthorized” act by a municipal official, and New York’s Article 78 post-deprivation proceeding provides an adequate remedy.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000): Established the “class of one” doctrine—requiring intentional differential treatment with no rational basis.
• Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2019): Clarified that comparators in a “class of one” claim must be “extremely similar” and that differential treatment must be more than a mistake.
• DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 2003): Distinguished between general procedural schemes and “random, unauthorized” deprivations triggering only a post-deprivation remedy.
• Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2001) & Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d 877 (2d Cir. 1996): Held that Article 78 proceedings are constitutionally adequate post-deprivation remedies for random unauthorized acts.
• Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2005) & Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1985): Illustrate that high-ranking officials’ unauthorized actions still call for post-deprivation remedies where no pre-deprivation hearing was feasible.

2. Legal Reasoning

A. “Class of One” Equal Protection
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, Grune had to allege (i) intentional differential treatment by Hernandez, (ii) a comparator whose circumstances were “extremely similar,” and (iii) absence of any rational basis for diverging treatment. Grune’s allegations fell short: his landlord’s home was never inspected, nor shown to have suffered comparable damage; Mr. Munch’s property was vacant, in foreclosure, and the board specifically considered boarding or demolishing it to protect children—facts underscoring dissimilarity. Thus, no plausible “class of one” claim.

B. Procedural Due Process
The Court distinguished between (1) deprivations under established procedures (requiring pre-deprivation process) and (2) random, unauthorized acts (requiring only post-deprivation process). Hernandez’s unilateral “Order to Vacate and Repair” without a hearing was deemed random and unauthorized; by statute the Town’s Building Inspector ordinarily offers hearings (Town Code § 83-3), but none was provided. New York’s Article 78—an expedited state-court review of administrative action—affords a full post-deprivation remedy, satisfying due process under DiBlasio and Hellenic.

3. Impact

This summary order reaffirms two important principles for future § 1983 suits:

1. “Class of one” plaintiffs face a high bar: comparators must be virtually identical, and allegations of failure to investigate do not suffice.
2. Municipal code enforcement orders, even if issued without a hearing, will not violate due process if a prompt state-court post-deprivation remedy (Article 78) is available.

Municipal officers and defense counsel can rely on these principles to defeat comparable suits at the pleadings stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Class of One” Equal Protection: A claim that you were singled out by a government actor, treated differently from people in nearly identical situations, without any valid reason.
• Procedural Due Process: Constitutional guarantee that before the government deprives you of “life, liberty, or property,” it must provide notice and a meaningful hearing—unless the deprivation is random and unforeseeable, in which case a prompt after-the-fact hearing suffices.
• Article 78 Proceeding: A special, fast-tracked state-court action in New York to challenge local administrative decisions—considered an “adequate post-deprivation remedy.”

Conclusion

Grune v. Hernandez underscores the rigor of pleading a “class of one” equal protection claim and confirms that New York’s Article 78 proceedings satisfy procedural due process for random, unauthorized administrative orders. Although a non-precedential summary order, this decision offers clear guidance: when municipal officers err without a hearing, a state post-deprivation remedy will generally insulate them from § 1983 liability, and plaintiffs pursuing “class of one” claims must plead extreme factual parity with their comparators.