Affirmation of “At the Crux” Misuse Standard in Aggravated Identity Theft under 18 U.S.C. §1028A

Introduction

United States v. Jason C. Weigand is a consolidated appeal from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, issued on June 2, 2025. Jason Weigand, a former financial advisor, was convicted on thirty counts of fraud, identity theft, money laundering, and related offenses in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. His scheme, spanning 2005–2019, involved impersonating clients (notably two widows, A.R. and A.H.), forging documents, hacking email accounts, and misappropriating over $574,000 of client funds. On appeal, Weigand raised three principal issues:

1. Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Dubin v. United States (599 U.S. 110 (2023)) invalidated his post-Dubin aggravated identity theft convictions;
2. Whether the District Court erred in applying a two-level Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for “vulnerable victims” under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1);
3. Whether the Court committed clear error in calculating the actual loss for sentencing purposes.

The Third Circuit unanimously affirmed Weigand’s convictions and sentence on all counts.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s rulings in three respects:

• Aggravated Identity Theft and Dubin: Applying plain-error review, the Third Circuit concluded that Weigand’s impersonations of A.R. went to the “who” of the transaction—opening and controlling a Charles Schwab account without authorization—and therefore fell squarely within 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Dubin’s “at the crux” doctrine did not disturb convictions based on core identity misuse.
• Vulnerable Victim Enhancement: Under the Zats three-prong test for § 3A1.1(b)(1), the Court found no clear error in the District Court’s determination that the sudden widows were particularly susceptible, that Weigand knew of their vulnerability, and that this vulnerability facilitated his scheme.
• Loss Calculation: The Third Circuit held that the government made a prima facie showing of $574,508.89 in actual victim loss, shifting the burden to Weigand to identify offsets or credits. The District Court’s reliance on the testimony of a government financial analyst was not clearly erroneous.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. Dubin v. United States (599 U.S. 110 (2023)): Requiring that aggravated identity theft under § 1028A only applies when the misuse of a means of identification is “at the crux” of the fraud—i.e., central to “who” is involved, not merely “how” or “when” services were provided.
2. United States v. Michael (6th Cir. 2018): Circuit precedent illustrating the distinction between incidental and core identity misuse.
3. United States v. Gladden (78 F.4th 1232 (11th Cir. 2023)): Articulating the plain-error standard for unpreserved jury-instruction challenges.
4. United States v. Olano (507 U.S. 725 (1993)) and Johnson v. United States (520 U.S. 461 (1997)): Supreme Court authorities defining the elements of plain-error review.
5. United States v. Zats (298 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2002)): Establishing the three-part test for “vulnerable victim” enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1).
6. United States v. Caraballo (88 F.4th 239 (3d Cir. 2023)): Directing clear-error review of guideline applications and factual findings.
7. United States v. Banks (55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 2022)): Interpreting the actual-loss guideline, emphasizing district courts’ responsibility to make reasonable loss estimates.
8. United States v. McClure‐Potts (908 F.3d 30 (3d Cir. 2018)): Articulating the burden-shifting framework once the government makes a prima facie loss showing.
9. United States v. Bryant (655 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2011)): Confirming defendants’ burden to prove offsets or legitimate services in loss calculations.

Each precedent shaped the Court’s approach to identity-theft scope, standards of appellate review, victim-enhancement criteria, and loss‐calculation rules.

Legal Reasoning

1. Aggravated Identity Theft under § 1028A: The Court applied a two-step analysis. First, under plain-error review, the Court asked whether the jury instruction misstated the law. Second, it considered whether Dubin’s “at the crux” requirement excluded Weigand’s impersonations. Because Weigand used A.R.’s name, date of birth, and Social Security number to open and operate an account in her name, the misrepresentation targeted “who” was involved—precisely the misuse § 1028A was designed to punish.

2. Vulnerable Victim Enhancement: Applying Zats, the Court found (a) A.R. and A.H. were emotionally fragile and financially unsophisticated widows; (b) Weigand, as their trusted advisor who attended their husbands’ funerals, both knew and exploited these vulnerabilities; and (c) this exploitation directly facilitated his scheme by inducing blind trust and suppressing outside oversight.

3. Loss Calculation: The Court reviewed the District Court’s $574,508.89 estimate for clear error. After accepting the government analyst’s tracing methodology, the Court held that Weigand failed to carry his burden to prove any offsets, credits, or legitimate‐service deductions tied to the misappropriated funds.

Impact

United States v. Weigand has three principal implications:

• It reaffirms that § 1028A’s aggravated identity theft prong encompasses impersonation schemes in which identity misuse is central to the fraud, insulating such convictions from post-Dubin attacks.
• It underscores the robust applicability of the “vulnerable victim” enhancement where emotional distress or isolation—particularly in fiduciary‐client contexts—creates an elevated sentencing range.
• It clarifies that once a government analysis establishes a prima facie loss figure, defendants face a heavy burden of producing verifiable offsets; district courts may rely on credible government‐expert testimony absent clear exculpatory evidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Aggravated Identity Theft (§ 1028A): A distinct crime requiring the unauthorized use of another’s personal identifiers (e.g., name, SSN) when that misuse is essential to committing another felony (e.g., wire fraud). It punishes impersonation at the heart of the fraud.
• Plain-Error Review: An appellate standard for unpreserved errors, requiring (1) error, (2) obviousness, (3) impact on substantial rights, and (4) a determination that correction is necessary for fairness.
• Vulnerable Victim Enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1): A two-level increase when the defendant knew (or should have known) that a victim’s mental or emotional condition rendered them particularly susceptible to the crime, and that condition materially facilitated the offense.
• Actual Loss Calculation: Courts must estimate the victims’ real economic loss, not merely intended loss. After the government presents a prima facie number, the defendant must identify and prove legitimate offsets or services.

Conclusion

United States v. Weigand stands as a comprehensive affirmation of aggravated identity theft’s reach when identity misuse is integral to a fraud scheme, even under the Supreme Court’s post-Dubin “at the crux” formulation. The decision also reinforces district courts’ discretion in sentencing enhancements for vulnerable victims and in crafting loss calculations grounded in reliable expert testimony. Together, these rulings will guide lower courts in applying § 1028A, U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, and § 2B1.1 consistently and with faithful deference to established precedent.