Administrative Closures Cannot Insulate Preliminary Injunctions from Review: Sixth Circuit Adopts a Practical-Effect/Pending-Motion Test and Orders Tailoring of Tennessee’s Sex‑Offender Registry Injunction After Does #1‑9

Introduction

In John Doe v. William Byron Lee, the Sixth Circuit addressed two intertwined questions: whether a district court may forestall appellate review of a preliminary injunction by administratively closing a case and terminating, without prejudice, a pending motion to dissolve that injunction; and whether an earlier Sixth Circuit decision (Does #1‑9 v. Lee) requires narrowing a broad injunction that had barred Tennessee officials from enforcing the state’s sex‑offender registration framework against a pre‑2004 offender.

The plaintiff, John Doe, committed sex offenses before Tennessee’s 2004 statutory overhaul and argued that the state’s registration and reporting requirements, residency and work restrictions, and public dissemination of offender information collectively operate as retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court granted Doe a sweeping preliminary injunction barring the Governor and the Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) from enforcing any of Tennessee’s sex‑offender statutes. After the Sixth Circuit’s published decision in Does #1‑9 clarified the permissible scope of injunctive relief and the proper defendants, Tennessee moved to dissolve or tailor the injunction accordingly. Instead of ruling, the district court administratively closed the case, terminated the motion without prejudice, and instructed the parties to return after final judgment in Does #1‑9.

The Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that the administrative closure and termination of the dissolution motion had the practical effect of refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction, making the order immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). On the merits, the court held that Does #1‑9 constitutes an intervening change in decisional law requiring dissolution as to the Governor and tailored modification, if any, as to the TBI Director. The court remanded for proceedings consistent with Does #1‑9 and rejected Doe’s ancillary theories (civil conspiracy and due process ambiguity).

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the court, Judge Thapar announced four core holdings:

Appealability: A district court order administratively closing a case and terminating without prejudice a motion to dissolve or modify a preliminary injunction is an appealable order “refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions” under § 1292(a)(1). The court emphasized the practical-effect inquiry: where no motion remains pending, the order functions as a refusal.
Irreparable consequences and need for immediate review: Enjoining a duly enacted statute inflicts serious and irreparable harm on the state’s law enforcement and public safety interests. Only immediate appeal could effectually challenge the order, given the indefinite closure pending the Does #1‑9 remand.
Intervening change in law: Does #1‑9 qualifies as a change in decisional law justifying modification or dissolution of equitable relief under Agostini v. Felton and Sixth Circuit precedent (Sweeton v. Brown). District courts misread the Sixth Circuit’s Snyder decision; Does #1‑9 clarified that Tennessee’s entire scheme cannot be enjoined wholesale.
Merits and scope on remand: The injunction must be dissolved as to the Governor (for lack of an enforcement role) and tailored as to the TBI Director to only those provisions, if any, analogous to the discrete Michigan amendments invalidated in Snyder. Doe’s alternative arguments—civil conspiracy and due process ambiguity during the Does #1‑9 remand—do not sustain broad preliminary relief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981): Supplies the framework for appealability of orders with the practical effect of granting or denying injunctions: (1) practical effect, (2) serious, perhaps irreparable consequences, and (3) necessity of immediate review. The court applied Carson to treat the administrative closure and motion termination as an appealable refusal to dissolve or modify an injunction.
Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579 (2018): Reinforces that courts look to the substance, not labels, when determining appealability; a district court cannot shield injunctive decisions from review by calling them “docket management.”
Cooey v. Strickland, 588 F.3d 921 (6th Cir. 2009): A close analogue: where a district court’s order is “injunctive in nature and in effect,” it is reviewable under § 1292(a)(1). Cooey supports the court’s key inference that terminating a dissolution motion equals refusing to dissolve the injunction.
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997): Establishes that changes in statutory or decisional law justify modifying or dissolving equitable relief; it is error to refuse modification in light of such changes. Here, Does #1‑9 qualifies as such a change.
Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc): Confirms that when the legal premises underlying an injunction “have crumbled” due to intervening authority, courts must be willing to alter the relief.
Does #1‑5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016): The benchmark Ex Post Facto case concerning Michigan’s registry: Snyder invalidated only two amendments to Michigan’s scheme. Tennessee district courts had misread Snyder to authorize wholesale injunctions; Does #1‑9 corrected that misreading.
Doe v. Lee (Does #1‑9), 102 F.4th 330 (6th Cir. 2024): The controlling, intervening Sixth Circuit decision. It:
- Held plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the Governor concerning enforcement of the Tennessee sex‑offender scheme;
- Directed modification of relief against the TBI Director, limiting any injunction to provisions analogous to those Snyder held unconstitutional.
In the present appeal, Does #1‑9 compels dissolution as to the Governor and tailored reconsideration as to the Director.
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003): Provides context that sex‑offender registries are regulatory, not punitive, when properly structured; supports the state’s interest in tracking and disclosure to prevent recidivism.
Thompson v. DeWine, 976 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2020): Reaffirms that enjoining a duly enacted statute is itself an irreparable harm to the state.
Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers): Stresses the state’s ongoing and concrete public safety interests; cited to show the gravity of depriving the state of its chosen enforcement tools.
Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019): A published panel opinion binds later panels; Does #1‑9 controls this case.
Blick v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 105 F.4th 868 (6th Cir. 2024): Applies the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to bar conspiracy claims among employees of the same entity, undermining Doe’s civil-conspiracy theory at the preliminary-injunction stage.
Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Market Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2020): A movant must make a clear showing to obtain preliminary relief; conclusory conspiracy allegations do not suffice.
Byrd v. Haas, 17 F.4th 692 (6th Cir. 2021): The appellate court is a court of review, not first view; fact-bound enforcement-role disputes are left for the district court on remand.

Legal Reasoning

1) Appealability under § 1292(a)(1): Practical effect, irreparable consequences, and need for immediate review

The court applied Carson’s practical-effect framework to look beyond the label “administrative closure.” The decisive question: is the motion seeking dissolution or modification of the preliminary injunction still pending in the district court? Here, it was not—the district court terminated it without prejudice—so the order had the practical effect of refusing to dissolve or modify the injunction, squarely within § 1292(a)(1).

The court then confirmed two additional Carson considerations. First, the order posed serious, irreparable consequences: enjoining a duly enacted public-safety statute impairs the state’s law enforcement interests and cannot be remedied after the fact. Second, immediate review was essential; without it, the state would be locked out of enforcing its statutes for an indeterminate period while Does #1‑9 winds its way to final judgment, leaving no effective avenue to protect the state’s interests.

2) Intervening change in law warrants modifying or dissolving the injunction

The court relied on Agostini and Sweeton to emphasize that shifts in decisional law permit (and sometimes require) modifying equitable relief. District courts in Tennessee had read Snyder as warranting wholesale injunctions against the sex‑offender regime. Does #1‑9 rejected that reading and clarified both standing (no standing against the Governor) and scope (narrowly tailor any injunction against the TBI Director to provisions truly analogous to Snyder’s invalidated amendments). That clarification amounts to an intervening change in decisional law collapsing the foundation of the earlier, broad injunction. Refusing to correct the injunction in light of Does #1‑9 was an abuse of discretion.

3) Merits: Application of Does #1‑9 and rejection of alternative theories

As to the Governor: Does #1‑9 controls; the Governor is not an enforcer of the registry scheme. Any injunction against him must be dissolved for lack of standing and redressability.
As to the TBI Director: Does #1‑9 requires granular, provision-by-provision analysis to determine whether any particular Tennessee provision is analogous to the Michigan amendments Snyder invalidated. Most of Tennessee’s regime is constitutional; only truly analogous provisions, if enforced by the Director, may be preliminarily enjoined.
Civil conspiracy: The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars a conspiracy claim premised on agreements among state officials acting within a single governmental entity. Doe’s allegations were conclusory and insufficient to justify preliminary relief regardless.
Due process ambiguity: The asserted uncertainty about what rules would apply during the Does #1‑9 remand is mooted by the remand here with instructions to tailor the injunction. As the district court modifies the injunction, Doe will have clarity on what the TBI Director may enforce.
Unaddressed enforcement-role arguments: The panel declined to resolve fact-bound contentions about whether the TBI Director enforces the potentially unconstitutional provisions; those issues belong to the district court on remand.

Impact

A. Appellate jurisdiction and docket management

The opinion sets a clear, administrable rule for the Sixth Circuit: when a district court administratively closes a case and terminates a motion seeking to dissolve or modify a preliminary injunction, the order will ordinarily be treated as an appealable refusal to dissolve or modify under § 1292(a)(1). The court’s “pending-motion” articulation offers a practical screening tool—if the request for injunctive relief is no longer pending, the order is functionally injunctive in nature and open to interlocutory review. District courts cannot use administrative closure or motion termination as a shield against appellate oversight of preliminary injunctions.

B. Tailoring preliminary relief in Ex Post Facto registry litigation

The decision reinforces a shift toward narrow, provision-specific injunctions in challenges to sex‑offender registries. Wholesale injunctions against entire statutory schemes will not survive where most provisions are regulatory and constitutional, and where prior circuit precedent (Snyder) invalidated only discrete amendments in another state’s scheme. Plaintiffs must show a close analogy between the challenged provisions and Snyder’s invalidated amendments; the burden includes clarifying who enforces which provisions to establish redressability.

C. Proper defendants and enforcement roles

Following Does #1‑9, plaintiffs cannot ordinarily obtain injunctive relief against a Governor who plays no direct enforcement role in the regime at issue. Plaintiffs must target officials who actually enforce the specific provisions that allegedly violate the Constitution; otherwise, standing and redressability fail.

D. State enforcement interests as irreparable harm

The opinion reiterates a line of Sixth Circuit authority that enjoining duly enacted statutes inflicts irreparable harm on the state. This principle will continue to weigh heavily in the preliminary-injunction balance, especially where the statutes protect public safety. Litigants and courts should expect that broad injunctions disabling a state’s enforcement apparatus will undergo exacting appellate scrutiny.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Preliminary injunction: A temporary court order that maintains the status quo and prevents alleged harm before a final judgment is reached. Because it can have sweeping practical consequences, appellate courts scrutinize its scope and the process by which it is granted.
Administrative closure: A docket-management tool allowing a court to pause a case without entering final judgment. It is not supposed to determine substantive rights. If used to terminate motions relating to injunctions, it may be treated as an appealable refusal to dissolve or modify.
§ 1292(a)(1) interlocutory appeal: A statutory exception to the rule against piecemeal appeals. It permits immediate appeals from orders granting, refusing, modifying, or dissolving injunctions (or refusing to dissolve or modify them), including orders that have the practical effect of those actions.
Practical-effect test (Carson): Courts look at what an order does, not what it’s called. If an order effectively grants or denies injunctive relief and causes serious harm that cannot be corrected later, and immediate appeal is necessary, appellate jurisdiction attaches.
Intervening change in decisional law (Agostini/Sweeton): When the legal landscape shifts, courts should revisit and, if necessary, modify or dissolve ongoing injunctive relief built on now‑incorrect legal premises.
Ex Post Facto Clause: The Constitution prohibits laws that retroactively impose punishment. In the registry context, this inquiry asks whether the scheme is punitive in effect as applied to pre‑enactment offenders; many courts treat registries as civil/regulatory unless specific features cross the punitive line.
Standing and enforcement: To sue a state official for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show the official enforces the challenged provision; otherwise, a court cannot redress the injury by enjoining that official.
Intracorporate conspiracy doctrine: Employees of the same governmental entity, acting within the scope of their employment, generally cannot legally conspire with each other for purposes of civil conspiracy claims.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion delivers two practical, precedential directives. First, administrative closures and related docket maneuvers cannot insulate preliminary injunctions from interlocutory review: if a motion to dissolve or modify is terminated, the order will be treated as a refusal subject to immediate appeal. Second, district courts must tailor injunctive relief in light of intervening circuit precedent. Here, Does #1‑9 compels dissolution as to the Governor and a narrow, provision-by-provision inquiry as to the TBI Director, rather than a blanket injunction against Tennessee’s sex‑offender laws.

Beyond its immediate effect on Tennessee’s registry litigation, the opinion strengthens a broader framework for preliminary injunction practice: focus on the practical effect of district court orders; recognize state enforcement interests as irreparable harms; and recalibrate equitable relief when higher courts clarify governing law. The result is a more disciplined approach to equity—guarded, targeted, and grounded in current precedent.