Actual Use, Not Intended Purpose: Deference to Trial Fact‑Finding in Zoning‑Based Challenges to RPTL § 420‑a Exemptions

I. Introduction

In Matter of First United Methodist Church in Flushing v. Assessor, Town of Callicoon, 2025 NY Slip Op 06526 (Nov. 24, 2025), the New York Court of Appeals revisited the intersection of religious/charitable real property tax exemptions, municipal zoning law, and the Court’s own limited power to review factual findings in Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) article 7 proceedings.

The case centers on a 73‑acre rural parcel in the Town of Callicoon, Sullivan County, purchased by the First United Methodist Church in Flushing, a Queens‑based congregation of about 1,000 members. The Church sought a tax exemption under RPTL § 420‑a, claiming that it used the land to grow vegetables for distribution to low‑income residents in Queens, with only occasional overnight church retreats. The Town denied the exemption, arguing that the Church’s use of the property as a “retreat center” or as a “church” violated the Town’s zoning code for the RU Rural District and that such a zoning violation is a complete defense to the exemption.

Following a nonjury trial, Supreme Court granted the Church’s petitions for the 2021 and 2022 tax years, and the Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed (230 AD3d 885 [3d Dept 2024]), with one Justice dissenting. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal, bringing the controversy to the Court of Appeals.

Chief Judge Wilson, writing for the majority, affirmed. The Court emphasized two core principles:

• In RPTL § 420‑a cases, the taxpayer bears the burden to prove entitlement to the exemption, while the municipality bears the burden to prove any zoning violation asserted as a defense.
• On an appeal where Supreme Court’s factual findings have been affirmed by the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals cannot reweigh the evidence or reassess credibility and will uphold the judgment if there is record support.

The decision clarifies that it is the actual or physical use of the property—not the owner’s stated intentions or labels (such as “retreat center” on forms or signage)—that controls for both the exemption analysis and for zoning‑violation defenses, and that appellate courts must defer to trial‑level fact‑finding where supported by evidence. A vigorous dissent by Judge Rivera, joined by Judges Singas and Troutman, underscores the sharp disagreement over how the record should be read and how rigidly zoning‑based defenses should be applied to religious and charitable uses.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties and the Property

The petitioner, First United Methodist Church in Flushing (“the Church”), is a nonprofit religious corporation based in Flushing, Queens, serving a predominantly Korean congregation of approximately 1,000 members.

In 2018, the Church purchased a 73‑acre parcel in Callicoon’s RU Rural District. For decades prior, the Town Supervisor’s family had farmed hay on about 25 acres of the parcel without a formal agreement or payment to the then‑owners and, later, to the Church. After purchase, the Church cleared about one acre and planted vegetables, which it said were harvested and taken back to Queens for distribution to low‑income residents.

B. The RU Rural District Zoning Framework

The Town’s zoning code describes the RU Rural District as designed to:

“allow the [T]own to grow while providing a reasonable measure of protection for agricultural activities and encouraging the preservation of open spaces and the rural character of the [T]own.”

It lists eight permitted uses, including:

• Agriculture (except intensive livestock operations)
• Nurseries, commercial greenhouses, vineyards, orchards, wood lots, and similar horticultural/forestry uses
• Wildlife preserves and hunting/fishing camps
• Cemeteries
• Commercial stables
• Single‑family dwellings
• Government facilities
• Fire, ambulance, and essential services

Any use not listed as “permitted” is “deemed to be specifically excluded.” A separate list of conditional uses includes, among nineteen others, “summer or day camps”; such conditional uses are allowed only with Planning Board approval and compliance with specified standards. The code provides that a proposed use similar to a listed conditional use is to be treated similarly.

C. The Religious Use Tax Exemption Applications

Under RPTL § 420‑a(1)(a), real property:

“owned by a corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for religious [or] charitable … purposes and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes”

is exempt from real property taxation, subject to certain conditions and exceptions.

For the 2021 tax year, the Church filed an exemption application, which the Town Assessor denied. The denial letter is not in the record, but at trial the Assessor testified that she based the denial on the content of the application, not on independent knowledge of how the property was being used. The Church then pursued:

• a grievance before the Board of Assessment Review (denied), and
• an RPTL article 7 proceeding in Supreme Court challenging the denial.

For the 2022 tax year, the Church again challenged the taxable status of the property before the Board of Assessment Review (denied), followed by a second article 7 proceeding. Supreme Court joined the 2021 and 2022 matters for trial.

D. Trial Evidence on Actual Use

The case proceeded to a bench (nonjury) trial. Three witnesses testified:

• Shung Kim, the Church’s chairperson, for the Church.
• The Town Assessor, for the Town.
• The Town Supervisor, who lives and farms directly across the street from the property, also for the Town.

1. Shung Kim’s testimony Kim testified that the Church initially purchased the property with the intent to operate a retreat center and to hold retreat [and] prayer meetings. But, he said, the Church’s actual use of the property “ended up” being primarily the cultivation of vegetables for distribution to low‑income residents in Queens. Volunteers from the congregation would travel to the property mainly to assist with:

• harvesting the crops, and
• transporting them back to Queens.

Kim acknowledged that there were occasional overnight stays:

• a youth group visit, and
• an elderly Bible class group visit,

each consisting of around 8–10 people, staying overnight and engaging in Bible study, singing hymns, [and] sharing information. No witness defined “retreat” beyond its ordinary, colloquial meaning.

On cross‑examination, Kim admitted that:

• In the 2021 exemption application, he had written, among other things, that the Church was offering members use of the property for retreat, prayer training, and etc., and that two adjacent buildings would be used as a prayer house, chapel and church retreat center.
• He described the property’s intended and actual use in sworn interrogatory responses as only for religious purposes—such as Bible study, prayer meeting, annual retreat and group meeting.
• He characterized an August 2021 event as a young adult retreat.

A photograph of a sign on the property reading Jubilee Retreat Center was also admitted into evidence.

2. The Town Assessor’s testimony The Assessor testified that she denied the 2021 exemption based solely on the content of the Church’s application, without investigating how the property was actually being used. She recalled only a short list of prayer services (in Chinese) as evidencing activity on the site and did not have evidence that the property was “regularly used other than as a farm.”

3. The Town Supervisor’s testimony The Town Supervisor testified that:

• His family had farmed hay on 25 acres of the 73‑acre parcel for about 50 years without a formal agreement.
• He continued to harvest hay with the Church’s knowledge and without paying rent.
• He tilled land to help the Church grow vegetables.
• He had observed that the Church was growing vegetables on a portion of the land, which he believed was smaller than the Church claimed.
• He did not observe any overnight “retreat” gatherings on the property.

E. Supreme Court and Appellate Division Decisions

Supreme Court denied the Town’s summary judgment motion (on the 2021 petition) and its motion to dismiss the 2022 petition, then conducted the trial. After trial and post‑trial briefing, Supreme Court:

• Found all witnesses credible, specifically crediting Kim’s account of the Church’s abandoned intent to run a retreat center and the subsequent actual use of the property for farming.
• Concluded that the use did not violate the zoning law:
  • Occasional retreats with organized prayer did not constitute “regular organized religious services” required under the zoning code to qualify as a “church.”
  • The use of the property did not constitute an accessory use to a “church” on the site.
• Held that the property was exempt under RPTL § 420‑a for both 2021 and 2022.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed (230 AD3d 885 [3d Dept 2024]), with one Justice dissenting. The majority:

• Accepted Supreme Court’s factual findings.
• Agreed that the Town had not met its burden to prove a zoning violation that would defeat the exemption.
• Held that the Town’s other “alternative zoning violations” were not preserved at trial and, in any event, had no support in the record (230 AD3d at 890 n 2).

The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. By the time of the Court of Appeals decision, the Church no longer owned the property (fn 2), but the case remained live as to the past tax years.

III. Summary of the Court of Appeals’ Decision

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, leaving in place the exemptions for the 2021 and 2022 tax years.

Key holdings include:

1. Burden of proof reaffirmed:
   • The taxpayer bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an RPTL § 420‑a exemption.
   • The municipality bears the burden of demonstrating that a zoning code violation exists and thereby defeats an otherwise valid exemption.
2. Standard of review is “narrow” for affirmed findings of fact: The Court reiterated that, where both Supreme Court and the Appellate Division have made and affirmed factual findings, the Court of Appeals is “without power to review findings of fact if such findings are supported by evidence in the record” (quoting Congel v Malfitano, 31 NY3d 272, 293‑294 [2018]).
3. “Actual or physical use” governs the exemption analysis: Echoing Matter of Lackawanna Community Dev. Corp. v Krakowski, 12 NY3d 578 (2009), the Court repeated that RPTL § 420‑a is concerned with the actual use of the property, not the owner’s intentions. Evidence such as application forms, interrogatory responses, and signage expressing an intent to use property as a “retreat center” does not displace trial‑level findings of actual use (here, farming for charitable distribution).
4. The Town failed to prove a zoning violation for each tax year: The Town argued variously that the Church was operating:
   • a “church or synagogue” on the property,
   • a “retreat center” as an accessory use to a church, and
   • in a pre‑trial brief only, that the Church was operating a “summer or day camp” as a conditional use without approval.
   The Court held that:
   • Supreme Court properly rejected the “church” and “accessory retreat center” theories based on its factual findings.
   • The “summer or day camp” theory was effectively abandoned and unsupported by evidence at trial or post‑trial.
   • The Town did not establish, with respect to either 2021 or 2022, that any disallowed use occurred in those specific tax years.
5. Deference to trial court on mixed or disputed evidence: Responding to the dissent’s characterization of the record as showing uncontroverted zoning violations, the majority emphasized that much of the evidence cited by the dissent went to intent rather than actual use, and that Supreme Court, having observed the witnesses, was entitled to credit Kim’s testimony about actual farming use and occasional incidental religious activities. The Court refused to reweigh that evidence.
6. Exemption statutes are strictly but not destructively construed: Citing People ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc., Inc. v Haring, 8 NY2d 350 (1960), the Court reiterated that while tax exemptions are construed strictly against claimants, the interpretation must not be “so narrow and literal as to defeat [the statute’s] settled purpose,” here “encouraging, fostering and protecting religious and educational institutions.”

In dissent, Judge Rivera would have reversed and dismissed the petitions, reasoning that the Church’s own admissions and documents—showing repeated retreats and religious gatherings—constituted uncontroverted evidence of zoning violations (uses not permitted in the RU Rural District, and not approved as conditional uses). In her view, those violations provided a complete defense to the exemptions under Matter of Oxford Group—Moral Re‑Armament, MRA, Inc. v Allen, 309 NY 744 (1955).

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

A. RPTL § 420‑a and the “Used Exclusively” Requirement

RPTL § 420‑a(1)(a) exempts from taxation real property:

“owned by a corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for religious [or] charitable … purposes … and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes.”

Several key points from prior decisions:

• Exclusive use does not require that every square foot be used every minute for exempt purposes; incidental or minor non‑exempt uses may not defeat the exemption so long as the primary use is exempt (see cases such as New York Botanical Garden v Assessors of Town of Washington, 55 NY2d 328 [1982]).
• The burden of proof on exemption entitlement rests with the taxpayer (see Matter of Maetreum of Cybele, Magna Mater, Inc. v McCoy, 24 NY3d 1023, 1024‑1025 [2014]; New York Botanical Garden, 55 NY2d at 334).
• Actual use is dispositive: in Lackawanna Community Dev. Corp. v Krakowski, 12 NY3d 578 (2009), the Court stressed that RPTL is “concerned with” the “actual or physical use of the property” in deciding exemption status (12 NY3d at 581).

In First United Methodist Church, the actual use the majority credits is the cultivation of vegetables on about one acre for charitable distribution to low‑income Queens residents, together with long‑standing hay cultivation by the neighboring farm. Those are uses plainly consistent with “agriculture,” a permitted use in the RU Rural District, and charitable in nature. Occasional overnight gatherings for Bible study and hymn singing are treated as incidental in the trial court’s view.

B. Burdens of Proof in Exemption and Zoning‑Defense Cases

The Court restates the conventional burdens as follows:

• Taxpayer’s burden (exemption): The party claiming an RPTL § 420‑a exemption must prove:
  • ownership by a qualifying entity (religious or charitable corporation), and
  • that the property is used exclusively (with allowable incidental uses) for religious, charitable, or other statutorily listed exempt purposes.
• Municipality’s burden (zoning defense): A municipality that seeks to defeat the exemption by asserting that the use is in violation of zoning law bears the burden of proof on that defense. The Court relies on Matter of Eternal Flame of Hope Ministries, Inc. v King, 16 NY3d 778, 779 (2011), which made clear that the municipality must prove the zoning violation.

The allocation matters: once the Church proved its exempt use under § 420‑a, the Town had to show a zoning violation as of each relevant tax status date. The majority’s core holding is that the Town failed to carry that burden in light of Supreme Court’s factual determinations.

C. Zoning Violations as a Complete Defense: Oxford Group

The dissent’s doctrinal anchor is Matter of Oxford Group—Moral Re‑Armament, MRA, Inc. v Allen, 309 NY 744 (1955), which held that use of property in violation of applicable zoning laws is a complete defense to a claimed tax exemption. That is, even if an organization is religious or charitable and otherwise meets § 420‑a’s “exclusively used” requirement, a zoning‑law violation defeats the exemption claim.

The majority does not dispute this principle. Instead, its decision operates at two other levels:

• What, factually, counts as a zoning‑law violation in this setting; and
• Whether the Court of Appeals may re‑read the record and override Supreme Court’s resolution of disputed evidence.

Thus, Oxford Group remains good law; First United Methodist Church is about proof and review, not about weakening the doctrine that illegal uses cannot enjoy § 420‑a exemptions.

D. Appellate Review of Factual Findings

The majority heavily cites Adirondack Mtn. Reserve v Board of Assessors of Town of N. Hudson, 64 NY2d 727 (1984), and Congel v Malfitano, 31 NY3d 272 (2018), to frame its limited role:

“In a case such as this, with affirmed findings of fact, our scope of review is narrow. This Court is without power to review findings of fact if such findings are supported by evidence in the record” (31 NY3d at 293‑294 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Because both Supreme Court and the Appellate Division resolved factual disputes in the Church’s favor, and because there was some evidence (Kim’s in‑court testimony, corroborated by the Town Supervisor’s observations) supporting that resolution, the Court of Appeals treats those findings as binding.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Allocation and Application of Burdens of Proof

The majority begins by confirming the dual burdens:

• The Church had to show it qualified under § 420‑a: a religious corporation using the property exclusively for religious and/or charitable purposes.
• The Town had to show a zoning violation as a defense for each tax year at issue.

The Appellate Division “correctly applied” those burdens in affirming Supreme Court’s decision (230 AD3d at 888‑891), and neither party seriously disputed this allocation before the Court of Appeals.

Having accepted the Church’s exemption entitlement (in light of Supreme Court’s findings of actual charitable farming use), the majority turns directly to whether the Town carried its burden to prove a zoning violation relevant to 2021 and 2022. It holds that the Town did not.

B. “Actual or Physical Use” vs. Intended Use

The majority’s principal doctrinal contribution is the sharp line it draws between:

• Actual/physical use of the property, and
• Intended use as expressed in application forms, interrogatory answers, or signage.

Quoting Lackawanna, the Court reiterates that:

“[i]t is the actual or physical use of the property that the Real Property Tax Law is concerned with” (12 NY3d at 581).

The dissent argues that evidence of intent (e.g., the “Jubilee Retreat Center” sign, the 2021 application, and Kim’s interrogatories) is probative of how the Church actually used the property and should inform the fact‑finder’s understanding of the events. The majority firmly rejects that approach in a footnote:

“The dissent’s assertion that evidence of intended use is probative to determining actual use … is not supported by citation to legal authority and lacks a basis in our case law. Moreover, the dissent’s desire to weigh the claimed probative value of intended use against the evidence about actual use demonstrates the impermissible reweighing of facts underlying its analysis.” (fn 3)

In effect, the majority holds:

• Evidence of intent may exist, but its interpretation and weight are for the trial court; and
• The Court of Appeals will not use such evidence to second‑guess a trial court’s determination of what the actual on‑the‑ground use was, so long as there is supporting evidence.

C. Evaluation of the Town’s Zoning‑Violation Theories

The Town advanced three overlapping theories as to how the Church’s use violated the RU Rural zoning:

1. The Church was operating a “church or synagogue” on the property.
2. The Church was operating a “retreat center” as an accessory use to a “church or synagogue.”
3. (Raised only at the summary judgment stage) The Church was running a “summer or day camp” or a similar conditional use without Planning Board approval.

1. “Church or Synagogue” and accessory use Supreme Court addressed the first two arguments directly, finding:

• Occasional retreats, even involving prayer and Bible study, did not constitute “regular organized religious services” such that the property qualified as a “church” under the zoning code.
• Because the property was not used as a “church,” it could not support a retreat center as an “accessory use” to a church.

The majority notes that, on the record, Supreme Court could reasonably find that:

• The primary use was farming for charitable purposes (agriculture being a permitted use in the RU Rural District); and
• Any religious gatherings were sporadic and incidental, not sufficient to transform the use into an impermissible “church” or accessory retreat center.

2. “Summer or Day Camp” theory As to the “summer or day camp” theory, the majority points out:

• The Town raised this only once, in passing, in a brief supporting its pre‑trial summary judgment motion.
• It offered no evidence at trial linking the Church’s activities to the code’s definition of “summer or day camp” or any similar conditional use.
• It did not elicit testimony as to what “retreat” meant in the Church’s practice or how those retreats actually operated.
• It did not tie any such use to the relevant tax years, despite Supreme Court’s explicit instruction that each tax year required an independent determination.

The Appellate Division deemed these “alternative zoning violations” unpreserved and unsupported (230 AD3d at 890 n 2), and the majority notes that the Town had “abandoned” the summer/day camp argument by failing to develop it at trial or post‑trial (fn 6).

Thus, legally, the only properly litigated zoning theories are:

• impermissible “church or synagogue” use, and
• an impermissible accessory “retreat center” use,

both of which Supreme Court rejected based on its factual findings, which the Appellate Division affirmed.

D. Treatment of Evidence and Credibility

The majority’s practical stance is straightforward: trial judges decide whom to believe.

Supreme Court found all witnesses credible but credited Kim’s testimony regarding:

• the Church’s abandonment of a plan to operate a retreat center, and
• the Church’s actual use of the property as primarily a vegetable farm for charitable distribution.

The Town Supervisor’s testimony—that he saw the Church growing vegetables, that he himself used much of the land continuously for haying, and that he did not observe retreat‑like overnight gatherings—corroborated Kim’s account. The majority highlights that:

“Despite the Supervisor’s frequent and unfettered presence on the property and residence across the street, he observed no uses in violation of the zoning code and only uses consistent with it, in which he actively participated.” (fn 5)

By contrast, evidence such as:

• the 2021 exemption application’s use of the term “retreat center” and description of proposed improvements,
• the sworn interrogatory responses describing intended and actual use as including “annual retreat and group meeting,” and
• the “Jubilee Retreat Center” sign,

was viewed as demonstrating intent or self‑labeling, not dispositive of what actually occurred on the property during the 2021 and 2022 tax years. Supreme Court had that evidence before it and still concluded that the primary actual use was farming and that any retreat‑like activity was minimal and incidental.

The majority’s key message is that, as long as there is some record support for those conclusions, the Court of Appeals will not overturn them by elevating documentary “intent” statements over in‑court testimony and local observation.

E. Engagement with the Dissent

Judge Rivera’s dissent takes a very different view of the record and of how strictly to enforce zoning defenses:

• She emphasizes the Church’s own sworn statements and the sign identifying the property as a “Jubilee Retreat Center” as uncontroverted evidence that retreats and religious gatherings occurred on the property in the relevant tax years.
• She reads this as establishing that the Church used the property as a retreat center, which is not a permitted use in the RU Rural District and was never approved as a conditional use.
• Under Oxford Group, any such violation is a complete defense to the claimed exemption.

The dissent contends that:

• The majority mischaracterizes Kim’s testimony as suggesting a change from retreat‑center plans to exclusive farming use; he never said retreats ceased.
• Even if the primary use was farming, the unpermitted additional use as a retreat center still constitutes a zoning violation that defeats the exemption.
• The Town’s retreat‑use argument was preserved, and Supreme Court erred by failing to confront the fact that retreats themselves were not permitted uses.

The majority responds to the dissent primarily by:

• Reasserting the narrow scope of review.
• Distinguishing between intent and actual use.
• Noting that the trial court, after observing witnesses, reasonably could credit Kim’s description of the youth visit as farming‑oriented with incidental religious study, rather than as a zoning‑defining “retreat.”
• Pointing out that the Town did not prove, in a tax‑year‑specific way, the extent and nature of any retreat activities.

This exchange reveals a deeper disagreement:

• The dissent sees the record as having only one reasonable reading: impermissible retreat use occurred, defeating the exemption.
• The majority sees the record as ambiguous and interpretable, and thus within the trial court’s fact‑finding prerogative, which the Court of Appeals may not override.

VI. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

For non‑specialists, several core concepts underlie this decision:

• RPTL § 420‑a exemption This New York statute allows many religious and charitable organizations not to pay property tax on land they own, if:
  • they are genuinely organized and operated for religious/charitable (or similar) purposes; and
  • they use the property “exclusively” for those purposes (allowing some minor incidental non‑exempt uses).
• “Used exclusively” This does not mean the property must be full‑time in active religious or charitable use. It means that the primary use (considering all the facts) must be for the exempt purpose. Occasional incidental activities do not automatically kill the exemption.
• Permitted vs. conditional uses in zoning A zoning code typically:
  • lists permitted uses (things you may do as of right, such as “agriculture” in the RU Rural District), and
  • lists conditional uses (uses allowed only if an approval is obtained and conditions are satisfied, like “summer or day camps”).
  Anything not listed as permitted (or specially approved as conditional) is generally prohibited.
• Zoning violation as a “complete defense” Even if property qualifies for § 420‑a on its face, if the owner is using the property in a way that violates local zoning, that misuse defeats the exemption. New York does not reward illegal land use with tax‑exempt status.
• Burden of proof The side that carries the burden must bring enough evidence to convince the court of its claim:
  • The Church had to prove it used the land for religious/charitable purposes.
  • The Town had to prove that the Church’s use broke the zoning rules.
• Standard of review Trial courts (like Supreme Court here) hear witnesses, assess credibility, and decide facts. Appellate courts review those decisions:
  • The Appellate Division can re‑examine facts to some extent.
  • The Court of Appeals’ power is much more limited: if Supreme Court’s factual findings are affirmed by the Appellate Division and there is some evidence in the record to support them, the Court of Appeals cannot substitute its own view of the facts.
• Article 7 proceeding This is the procedural vehicle by which property owners challenge tax assessments or denials of exemptions in New York Supreme Court.
• “Actual use” vs. “intended use” For tax and zoning purposes, what the owner actually does with the property is usually more important than what they say they plan or intend to do. Naming a site “Retreat Center” on a sign or form is not decisive if, in reality, it is used mainly as a farm.

VII. Likely Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Religious and Charitable Property Owners

The decision offers several important lessons for religious and charitable organizations:

• Actual charitable use can carry the day Where a property is genuinely being used for agricultural production for charitable distribution—as here—the Court is willing to view that as an exempt use under § 420‑a, even if occasional religious gatherings occur on site.
• Be careful with labels and paperwork Although the majority downplays documentary expressions of intent, they still played a major role in prompting the Town’s challenge and the dissent’s critique. Calling a property a “retreat center” on forms or signage invites scrutiny. Organizations should:
  • describe uses accurately and precisely, and
  • avoid expansive labels that could imply unpermitted or non‑exempt uses.
• Incidental religious activities are not necessarily fatal Occasional overnight stays for Bible study and hymn singing, in the majority’s framework, can be treated as incidental where the trial court so finds, especially if the primary use is plainly within a permitted zoning category (like agriculture).
• Trial record is critical Once the trial court credits an organization’s description of its actual use, and that finding is affirmed by the Appellate Division, it is extremely difficult for the municipality to overturn it at the Court of Appeals level. Organizations should therefore:
  • present detailed, credible testimony about actual use;
  • provide corroborating witnesses (as the Church effectively did with the Town Supervisor’s testimony); and
  • document charitable activities (distributions, volunteer work, etc.).

B. For Assessors and Municipalities

For municipalities, First United Methodist Church is a cautionary decision on both pleading and proof:

• Develop and preserve zoning defenses fully If a town believes a property is being used as a type of disallowed use (e.g., a retreat center akin to a “summer or day camp”), it must:
  • identify the particular zoning categories at issue,
  • obtain and present factual evidence tying the property’s actual operations to those categories, and
  • do so in a timely way at trial, not solely at the motion stage.
  Abandoned or undeveloped theories are effectively lost on appeal.
• Investigate actual use, not just application language The Assessor here relied heavily on the Church’s written application language and not on independent observation or investigation. The Court’s emphasis on actual use suggests that assessors should:
  • inspect the property,
  • document observed uses (frequency, scale, nature), and
  • gather testimony (from neighbors, code enforcement, etc.) about real‑world operations.
• Tax‑year specificity matters Zoning violations must be proven as of the relevant tax status dates and tax years. General statements that a property has been used as a retreat at some point may not suffice if not clearly tied to 2021 and 2022, or whatever years are at issue.
• Understand the limits of Court of Appeals review Once a case is tried and decided on a factual record, and the Appellate Division affirms, the Court of Appeals will rarely disturb those findings. Municipalities must therefore treat the trial as their critical and perhaps only real opportunity to prove a zoning‑based defense.

C. For Tax Certiorari and Zoning Litigation Generally

The decision reinforces several broader themes in New York tax and land‑use jurisprudence:

• Fact‑intensive, property‑use disputes are trial‑centric Whether a property is “really” being used for an exempt purpose, or in violation of zoning, is highly fact‑specific. First United Methodist Church underscores that:
  • courts will defer to trial‑level findings when supported by the record; and
  • appeals are not opportunities to relitigate facts under the guise of legal error.
• Actual use over declared plans or branding Future cases involving mixed uses, especially with religious organizations acquiring rural or semi‑rural tracts, will likely cite this decision for the proposition that:
  • what actually happens on the property governs,
  • not merely how the owner describes the property in literature or official forms.
• Continuing vitality of zoning defenses The decision leaves intact the rule that zoning violations defeat tax exemptions. Municipalities remain free to invoke Oxford Group where they can:
  • clearly identify a forbidden use, and
  • marshal strong, tax‑year‑specific evidence that such a use is actually occurring.
  What the case does is to raise the bar on the quality and completeness of that proof, particularly when the organization can present plausible exempt uses.

VIII. Conclusion

Matter of First United Methodist Church in Flushing v. Assessor, Town of Callicoon does not revolutionize New York’s law on religious and charitable property tax exemptions, but it does sharpen several key principles:

• Actual, physical use—not stated intentions or labels—controls the analysis under RPTL § 420‑a and for zoning‑based defenses.
• Burdens are divided: the taxpayer must prove its exemption; the municipality must prove any zoning violation that would negate it.
• Factual findings by a trial court, when affirmed by the Appellate Division, are virtually unassailable at the Court of Appeals if supported by some evidence in the record.
• Zoning violations remain a complete defense to tax exemption claims, but only where clearly pleaded, fully developed at trial, and supported by concrete proof of actual misuse in the tax years at issue.

The majority and dissent’s deep disagreement over the record illustrates an enduring tension: how strictly should courts scrutinize religious and charitable uses when municipalities invoke zoning laws, and how much weight should be given to an organization’s own descriptions of its mission and activities? The Court’s answer here tilts toward deference to trial‑level fact‑finding and to the protective purpose of § 420‑a, while leaving municipalities with a potent, but demanding, zoning‑based defense where illegal uses can be convincingly shown.

Going forward, First United Methodist Church will stand as a leading citation for the proposition that actual use and trial‑court credibility determinations are central in disputes over religious property tax exemptions—and that appellate courts, especially the Court of Appeals, will not turn declarations of intent or branding into a substitute for on‑the‑ground proof.