Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Plain‑meaning canon and statutory construction:
  • In re Implicated Individual, 2021 S.D. 61; Healy Ranch, Inc. v. Healy, 2022 S.D. 43; U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. S.D. Dept. of Revenue, 2022 S.D. 59; State v. Long Soldier, 2023 S.D. 37; Betty Jean Strom Tr. v. SCS Carbon Transport, LLC, 2024 S.D. 48.
  • These decisions supply the interpretive scaffolding: start with the statute’s text, give undefined words their ordinary meaning, and avoid construction where text is clear.
• Domicile versus residence distinction:
  • State ex rel. Jealous of Him v. Mills, 2001 S.D. 65; In re G.R.F., 1997 S.D. 112; Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
  • These authorities underscore the non‑equivalence of “domicile” (a person’s fixed, permanent home with intent to return) and “residence” (where one actually lives). The Court used this distinction to honor the Legislature’s choice of “resident.”
• Divorce jurisdiction cases as instructive:
  • Parsley v. Parsley, 2007 S.D. 58; Rush v. Rush, 2015 S.D. 56; Snyder v. Snyder, 35 N.W.2d 32 (Iowa 1948).
  • While not dispositive for Title 37, these cases emphasize that “actual residence” is more than a temporary abiding place and involves meaningful physical presence and ties. The Court drew on this to distinguish a 30‑day Airbnb stay plus mail forwarding from actual residence.
• Federal analog under materially similar facts:
  • Lapin v. EverQuote, Inc., 2023 WL 2072059 (D.S.D. 2023), aff’d, 2024 WL 1109067 (8th Cir. 2024).
  • The state court was not bound by the federal interpretation, but noted the alignment: under materially similar facts, a federal district court concluded Lapin was not a South Dakota resident for the relevant period.
• Cross‑title definitions and legislative intent:
  • SDCL 2‑14‑4; Benson v. State, 2006 S.D. 8; Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Dolly, 2018 S.D. 28.
  • The Court applied SDCL 2‑14‑4’s caveat—definitions in one statute do not port to others where a contrary intention appears—and declined to import residency definitions from the elections or driver’s license titles, which expressly limit their scope.
• Right to travel / durational residency:
  • Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
  • Used below by Lapin to argue that a durational requirement beyond 30 days would be unconstitutional. The Court found no durational requirement in Title 37 and therefore did not need to apply Dunn’s strict scrutiny analysis.
• Issue preservation:
  • FDJ, LLC v. Determan, 2024 S.D. 42; Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Ross, 521 N.W.2d 107 (S.D. 1994).
  • Grounded the Court’s refusal to entertain a new equal‑protection theory (that a fixed dwelling was required) raised for the first time on appeal.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in three steps: text, structure, and context.

1. Text: Ordinary meaning of “resident.”

   SDCL 37‑24‑47 prohibits certain “commercial e‑mail advertisement[s]” that are either sent from South Dakota or sent to a “South Dakota electronic mail address.” SDCL 37‑24‑41(14) defines a “South Dakota electronic mail address” three ways:

   • (a) addresses billed to a South Dakota mailing address by the email service provider;
   • (b) addresses ordinarily accessed from a computer in South Dakota; or
   • (c) addresses “furnished to a resident of this state.”

   Only subsection (c) was asserted. Because Title 37 does not define “resident,” the Court consulted ordinary meaning. Dictionaries capture both “actual residence” (living in a place) and “legal domicile.” Because the Legislature used “resident,” not “domiciliary,” the Court presumed it “said what it meant and meant what it said,” refusing to rewrite “resident” to mean “domiciliary.” This choice requires proof of actual residency for the (c) path.

2. Structure: “Resident” versus “domiciliary” and the three‑pronged definition.

   The three alternative prongs in SDCL 37‑24‑41(14) demonstrate that the Legislature contemplated concrete, objective connections to South Dakota. Subsections (a) and (b) are administrable, location‑anchored criteria (billing address in state; usual access from in‑state computers). Reading “resident” in (c) as physical residence aligns with this design. Reading it as mere domicile (driver’s license, voter registration, PMBs) would dilute the statutory scheme and invite forum shopping by itinerant plaintiffs with mail forwarding arrangements but no in‑state presence at the relevant time.

3. Context: Guidance from Parsley and Rush; rejection of cross‑title definitions.

   Although Parsley and Rush address divorce jurisdiction, they reinforce the distinction between “actual residence” and “temporary abiding place.” Lapin’s 30‑day Airbnb stay—paired with immediate departure for extended international travel and no substantial ties (job, lease, property, schooling)—was a temporary abode, not actual residence. Additionally, residency definitions in the Elections Code (Title 12) and the Driver’s License chapter (Title 32) are expressly limited to those titles. Under SDCL 2‑14‑4’s “contrary intention” clause, they do not transfer to Title 37.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the undisputed facts foreclosed Lapin’s reliance on SDCL 37‑24‑41(14)(c). He was not physically present in South Dakota when the emails were received, had no dwelling or employment in the state, and maintained only a PMB for mail forwarding. Summary judgment for Zeetogroup was therefore appropriate.

Impact and Practical Consequences

• Threshold standing under the anti‑spam statute tightened for itinerant plaintiffs: Plaintiffs who are “digital nomads” or otherwise lack physical presence in South Dakota when the emails are received cannot rely on the “resident” prong solely by pointing to a driver’s license, voter registration, or PMB. The opinion curbs opportunistic forum selection based on paper residency.
• Litigation strategy will shift to the other prongs of SDCL 37‑24‑41(14):
  • (a) “Billed in South Dakota” is viable chiefly for paid email services that issue bills to in‑state addresses; free webmail accounts typically won’t qualify.
  • (b) “Ordinarily accessed” from a computer in South Dakota may become the key route. Plaintiffs should expect to prove routine in‑state access (e.g., IP geolocation logs, device histories, employer network access within South Dakota).
• Compliance and exposure for advertisers and senders: Email marketers gain clarity: exposure under SDCL 37‑24‑47’s “to” clause requires that the recipient’s email address qualify as South Dakota‑linked under one of the three prongs. While the Court did not reach “advertiser” liability theories, defendants can use Lapin to challenge the threshold “South Dakota electronic mail address” element.
• Non‑portability of residency definitions across titles: The Court’s application of SDCL 2‑14‑4 signals that residency concepts in one statutory context (voting, licensing) will not automatically govern others (trade regulation, privacy, consumer protection). Future litigation should treat residency as context‑specific absent clear legislative cross‑referencing.
• No durational residency requirement, but timing matters: The statute contains no minimum days threshold. However, residency must exist at the relevant time (here, when the emails were received). Plaintiffs who become residents later cannot retroactively qualify earlier emails under prong (c).
• Open questions reserved:
  • What specific indicia suffice to establish “actual residence” for prong (c)? The Court suggests physical presence plus ties; it did not impose a “fixed dwelling” requirement and declined to decide related constitutional arguments not preserved.
  • What constitutes “ordinarily accessed” under prong (b)? The opinion leaves room for development of evidentiary standards (e.g., frequency, duration, and geolocation of access).
  • Scope of advertiser liability under the anti‑spam statute when third parties initiate the emails (an issue Lapin raised below but the courts did not reach due to the residency holding).