Actual Notice Is Not Enough: Particularised Falsity & Strict Pleading in Online Defamation – Commentary on LaNasa v. Stiene (Second Circuit, 2025)

1. Introduction

LaNasa v. Stiene arose out of a bitter, highly-public feud within the tabletop-gaming community. Plaintiffs—entrepreneur Justin LaNasa and two entities he controlled, TSR, LLC and Dungeon Hobby Shop Museum, LLC—claimed that YouTube commentator Erik Stiene and his spouse, Rachel Stiene, defamed them, intentionally inflicted emotional distress, and committed prima facie tort through a series of colourful online broadcasts and social-media posts. The Eastern District of New York dismissed all claims: as to Rachel for insufficient service of process (Fed. R. Civ. P. 4; 12(b)(5)), and as to Erik for failure to state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)). The Second Circuit has now affirmed in a non-precedential summary order, reinforcing two bedrock principles:

1. Actual notice does not cure defective service of process, and
2. Online defamation plaintiffs must plead specific falsity and overcome the robust constitutional and common-law protections for opinion, rhetoric, and “mere insults.”

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Service of Process: Because Rachel Stiene was never personally served and no valid substitute service was effected, all claims against her were dismissed. Actual notice and attorney correspondence could not salvage the defect.
• Defamation per se: The alleged statements fell into four non-actionable categories—protected opinion, insults, non-injurious remarks, and assertions not adequately pleaded as false. Plaintiffs’ conclusory denial of truth was insufficient.
• Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED): The conduct alleged—verbal threats and reposting a publicly available family photo—did not meet New York’s “extreme and outrageous” threshold.
• Prima Facie Tort: The claim duplicated the failed defamation theory and lacked the required, itemised special damages.
• Disposition: District court judgment affirmed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Service of Process (Rule 12(b)(5))

The court confirmed the non-negotiability of Rule 4. Plaintiffs relied on:

• Emails indicating Rachel “knew” about the lawsuit.
• An alleged oral acknowledgement by defence counsel.

But the docket lacked a proof of service naming Rachel, and plaintiffs never sought an extension or alternative service under Rule 4(m) / Rule 4(e)(2)-(3). Under Omni, strict compliance—not informal awareness—is mandatory.

3.2.2 Defamation per se (Rule 12(b)(6))

1. Opinion & Hyperbole: Applying the Celle/Steinhilber factors, most statements were labelled as subjective commentary typical of YouTube “rant streams”—language such as “scraping the bottom of the privy” or “warrior for the old ways” lacks verifiable truth value.
2. Mere Insults: Epithets (“ignorant c**t”) are non-actionable; they convey disgust, not fact.
3. Non-injurious Facts: Statements like “their museum is for profit” do not inherently expose one to public contempt.
4. Failure to Plead Falsity: For statements that could be defamatory (“he included a Nazi in his company”), plaintiffs offered only a blanket denial. Under Tannerite, they had to allege specific facts showing falsity; they did not.

3.2.3 IIED

New York sets a “high bar” for outrageousness. The court found:

• No physical approach or credible threat of imminent harm.
• The reposted family photograph was already circulating online; its use, though distasteful, was not “atrocious.”

Thus elements (1) and (4) of IIED (outrageousness and severe distress) failed as a matter of law.

3.2.4 Prima Facie Tort

The claim was dismissed on two independent bases:

• It was merely a re-labelled defamation claim (McKenzie).
• Plaintiffs lacked itemised special damages—general allegations of therapy costs and emotional trauma do not pass Rule 9(g)’s particularity requirement.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

1. Process Discipline in Digital-Era Litigation: The ruling is a pointed reminder that plaintiffs cannot litigate via Twitter or email. Lawyers must perfect service or face summary dismissal, even where defendants actively discuss the lawsuit online.
2. High Pleading Bar for Online Defamation: Content creators often mix fact, opinion, sarcasm, and user-generated content. The Second Circuit’s treatment shows that plaintiffs must surgically isolate falsifiable statements and plead why they are false.
3. Strategic Use of State Tort Theories: Attempting IIED or prima facie tort as “back-ups” will fail unless plaintiffs satisfy stringent elements distinct from defamation.
4. Non-Precedential Yet Persuasive: Although a Summary Order (Local Rule 32.1.1), district courts within the Circuit often look to such orders for guidance; expect citation in motions to dismiss online-speech cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary Order: A short, unpublished appellate decision with no formal precedential force, but citable under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
• Rule 12(b)(5) vs 12(b)(6): 12(b)(5) targets flaws in service of process; 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the factual allegations.
• Pure vs Mixed Opinion: “Pure” opinion states the underlying facts or signals speculation; “mixed” opinion implies undisclosed defamatory facts and can be actionable.
• Defamation per se: Certain categories (e.g., imputing serious crime) are presumed harmful; but the statement must still be false and not privileged.
• IIED’s ‘Outrageous’ Standard: Conduct must be beyond decency—mere offensiveness, threats without immediacy, or public-domain photos rarely qualify.
• Prima Facie Tort: A catch-all for intentionally injurious conduct not otherwise unlawful, requiring (a) disinterested malevolence and (b) dollar-specific special damages.

5. Conclusion

LaNasa v. Stiene delivers a concise but forceful lesson in federal civil practice and New York defamation law. Litigants must:

1. Serve defendants correctly—actual notice is irrelevant without Rule 4 compliance.
2. Plead defamation with factual precision, overcoming robust opinion and hyperbole protections, especially in the boisterous online arena.
3. Recognise the formidable hurdles of IIED and prima facie tort; they are not easy escape routes when a defamation claim falters.

While technically non-precedential, the decision reinforces existing doctrine and will likely be cited in future motions involving social-media speech, streaming-platform commentary, and the procedural pitfalls of internet-age litigation. For practitioners, the take-away is simple: follow the rules, plead the facts, and do not rely on notoriety or notice to paper over deficiencies.