Acknowledgment-of-Receipt Not Required: Corroborated Sworn Statements Can Defeat Summary Judgment on PLRA Exhaustion, and District Courts Must Assess Perttu’s Jury-Trial Mandate Before Holding a Pavey Hearing

Introduction

In James K. Breyley, III v. Larry Fuchs, et al., the Seventh Circuit vacated a grant of summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin prison officials on the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The case arises out of a December 24, 2016 assault on prisoner James Breyley at the New Lisbon Correctional Institution and his allegation that officials failed to protect him and were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.

The district court concluded that Breyley had not timely filed an inmate complaint within the 14-day period required by Wisconsin’s inmate complaint system and relied on Lockett v. Bonson to hold that the absence of an acknowledgment-of-receipt, coupled with the inmate’s failure to promptly follow up, defeated exhaustion. The Seventh Circuit, however, distinguished Lockett, emphasizing that a prisoner’s sworn declaration corroborated by contemporaneous evidence (here, a journal entry and references in a subsequent complaint) is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact on exhaustion, thereby precluding summary judgment.

The opinion also integrates a significant procedural development from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Perttu v. Richards (2025): when PLRA exhaustion is intertwined with the merits of a legal claim protected by the Seventh Amendment, parties are entitled to a jury trial on exhaustion. On remand, the district court must therefore determine whether a Pavey hearing (a judge-led evidentiary hearing on exhaustion) remains appropriate or whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury to resolve the exhaustion dispute.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit (Judge Pryor writing, with Judge Lee; Judge Wood retired and did not participate, with the decision issued by a quorum under 28 U.S.C. § 46(d)) vacated the district court’s summary judgment for the defendants and remanded. The panel held:

There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Breyley filed his inmate complaint on January 2, 2017 (within the 14-day window), based on his sworn declaration, a contemporaneous journal entry (“Filled out IC Form”), and the content of his February 1 complaint referencing the earlier, “lost” filing.
Lockett v. Bonson does not control because, unlike the “bald assertion” in Lockett, Breyley offered corroborated evidence to support his timely filing. The absence of an acknowledgment-of-receipt is not dispositive when other competent evidence supports filing.
Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense on which defendants bear the burden. Conflicting evidence on timely filing and the availability of the process precludes summary judgment.
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Perttu v. Richards, the district court must first determine whether the exhaustion issue is intertwined with the merits of the Seventh Amendment-protected claims; if so, the parties are entitled to a jury trial on exhaustion. If not, the traditional Pavey hearing framework may apply.

Factual and Procedural Background

On December 24, 2016, another inmate repeatedly punched Breyley in the face, fracturing his nose. Despite known risks, prison officials allegedly took no preventive steps. After a doctor recommended specialist care within a week, medical staff allegedly refused to arrange timely treatment.

On January 2, 2017—nine days post-incident—Breyley obtained and completed an inmate complaint form, placed it in his cell door for collection per instructions, and claimed in the complaint that officials failed to protect him and obstructed timely medical care. He received no acknowledgment of receipt. On February 1, he asked an Institution Complaint Examiner (ICE) about the missing acknowledgment; the ICE said there was no record of a complaint. The ICE advised him to file anew and to note that he had previously placed a complaint in his door and recorded the filing in his journal. He did so that day, referencing his journal and letters to other inmates. The new complaint and appeal were rejected as untimely.

In federal court nearly three years later, defendants moved for summary judgment on failure to exhaust, asserting that no complaint was filed within 14 days. They conceded that January 2 would have been timely but contended there was no evidence of such a filing, submitting an inmate complaint history (showing no January 2 complaint) and an ICE declaration. In opposition, Breyley submitted a sworn declaration, a copy of his January 2 journal entry (“Filled out IC Form”), and references in his February 1 complaint. The district court, relying on Lockett, granted summary judgment. This appeal followed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002): Establishes the Seventh Circuit’s “strict compliance” approach to PLRA exhaustion: prisoners must follow the prison’s rules for timing and place. The court acknowledges this baseline but emphasizes that strict compliance exists alongside the doctrine of “unavailability.”
Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006): A foundational “unavailability” case. When prison officials do not respond to a properly filed grievance or engage in affirmative misconduct that prevents exhaustion, administrative remedies are deemed unavailable. This principle tempers strict compliance; the Seventh Circuit invokes Dole to underscore that exhaustion requirements cannot be used to trap prisoners when the system malfunctions or is obstructed.
Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2019): In Lockett, the prisoner offered only a “bald assertion” of timely filing, provided no acknowledgment of receipt, and did not contact anyone regarding the missing acknowledgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for non-exhaustion. Here, the court distinguishes Lockett because Breyley’s evidence was not “bald”: he offered a sworn declaration, a contemporaneous journal entry, and references in a subsequent complaint corroborating his timely filing.
Smallwood v. Williams, 59 F.4th 306 (7th Cir. 2023): Confirms that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense; defendants bear the burden. This allocation matters at summary judgment, where all inferences are drawn in the prisoner’s favor. The court applies Smallwood’s burden framework to conclude the record presents a genuine fact dispute.
Jones v. Lamb, 124 F.4th 463 (7th Cir. 2024): Confirms de novo review of summary judgment decisions and recognizes that administrative remedies are unavailable when prison officials fail to timely respond to grievances. The court uses these principles to evaluate whether the record precludes summary judgment.
Hernandez v. Lee, 128 F.4th 866 (7th Cir. 2025): Two pertinent points: (1) a prisoner need not exhaust unavailable remedies; and (2) a sworn declaration can be sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute on exhaustion. The panel leverages Hernandez to hold that Breyley’s sworn declaration—corroborated by his journal and subsequent complaint—is evidence adequate to defeat summary judgment.
Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948 (7th Cir. 2024): When there is conflicting evidence relevant to exhaustion, dismissal is unwarranted and remand is appropriate. The court relies on Jackson to justify vacatur and remand here.
Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008), and Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2015): Define the traditional Seventh Circuit procedure for resolving disputed exhaustion: when not apparent from the record, the district court “must” hold an evidentiary hearing (now colloquially, a “Pavey hearing”). The panel notes this default but then addresses how the Supreme Court’s new decision alters the procedural landscape.
Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025): The Supreme Court holds that parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when the issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim for which the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury. This reconfigures the Pavey process: before convening a Pavey hearing, the district court must assess whether Perttu requires the exhaustion dispute to be sent to a jury.

Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three principal steps: the evidentiary sufficiency of the prisoner’s submissions, the allocation of burdens, and the procedural consequences after Perttu.

1) Evidentiary Sufficiency: More Than a “Bald Assertion”

The district court analogized to Lockett, where the inmate presented only an uncorroborated assertion of timely filing. In contrast, Breyley offered a sworn declaration stating he filed his complaint on January 2, wrote to other inmates about it, and recorded it in his journal; he also provided the January 2 journal entry (“Filled out IC Form”) and a February 1 complaint explicitly referencing a lost January 2 submission.
Relying on Hernandez, the panel holds that a sworn declaration, particularly when backed by contemporaneous documentation, can create a genuine dispute of material fact about exhaustion. The court declines to make the prison’s acknowledgment-of-receipt system the sole evidentiary touchstone for proving filing, distinguishing Lockett on that basis.

2) Burdens and Summary Judgment

Under Smallwood, defendants bear the burden on the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion. At the summary judgment stage, the question is whether the defendants have shown there is no genuine dispute of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence viewed favorably to the prisoner.
Defendants submitted an inmate complaint history and an ICE declaration stating there was no January 2 complaint. But given the contrary evidence—sworn declaration, journal entry, and internal references—there is a classic factual dispute. Under Jackson v. Esser and general summary judgment principles, such disputes are for a factfinder, not resolution on paper.
The court also reiterates that administrative remedies are not an inflexible hurdle: under Dole and Jones v. Lamb, remedies are “unavailable” if officials fail to respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise thwart the process. That principle, while not dispositive here, reinforces why a lack of acknowledgment cannot automatically defeat a prisoner who otherwise produces competent evidence of filing.

3) Procedural Path on Remand in Light of Perttu

Traditionally, disputed exhaustion is resolved at a Pavey hearing, an evidentiary proceeding before the judge. The panel clarifies that a Pavey hearing “is not something to be waived”; it is a tool the district court uses to resolve contested exhaustion when appropriate.
But the Supreme Court’s decision in Perttu v. Richards interposes a new threshold inquiry: if the exhaustion dispute is “intertwined with the merits” of a claim for which the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury, the parties are entitled to a jury trial on exhaustion.
The Seventh Circuit does not decide whether exhaustion here is intertwined with the merits (e.g., failure to protect and deliberate indifference claims) and remands for the district court to make that determination. The upshot is that district courts must now conduct a Perttu analysis before convening a Pavey hearing; if Perttu applies, the exhaustion issue must be sent to the jury, potentially with special interrogatories or bifurcation as needed.

Impact

On PLRA Exhaustion Litigation

Corroborated prisoner evidence will more often defeat early summary judgment. Sworn declarations supported by contemporaneous records (journals, letters, dated requests) and internal filings can create triable issues on exhaustion, even when prison logs lack a corresponding entry.
Lockett is narrowed to its facts. Courts should resist treating the absence of an acknowledgment-of-receipt as dispositive, especially where the prisoner proffers corroborating evidence. This recalibration will likely reduce dismissals premised solely on missing administrative receipts or internal non-receipt notations.
Unavailability remains a meaningful safety valve. In systems that fail to respond or where filings go missing, Dole and related cases preserve the principle that prisoners need not do the impossible. This opinion’s reasoning implicitly recognizes routine points of failure in cell-door collection and prison mail systems.

On District Court Procedure Post-Perttu

Perttu screening before Pavey. District courts in the Seventh Circuit (and beyond) must now decide whether the exhaustion dispute is intertwined with the merits of claims at law (e.g., § 1983 damages). If yes, a jury must resolve the exhaustion question; if no, the court may proceed with a Pavey hearing.
Practical trial management. When exhaustion and merits are intertwined, courts may use special verdict forms or interrogatories to have the jury decide discrete exhaustion facts while trying merits issues, avoiding duplicative proceedings and inconsistent credibility determinations.
More factfinding, fewer paper dismissals. The combined effect of the evidentiary holding and Perttu will likely increase the frequency of evidentiary hearings or jury determinations on exhaustion, moving resolution from summary judgment to factfinding stages.

On Prison Administration and Recordkeeping

Receipt systems will remain relevant but not controlling. Prisons cannot rely exclusively on acknowledgment systems to defeat exhaustion where the prisoner adduces credible evidence of filing. Institutions may respond by tightening chain-of-custody protocols (e.g., barcode scanning, timestamped logs) to reduce disputes.
Training and documentation. Officers instructing inmates to place forms in cell doors should be trained on collection procedures and documentation. Missteps or gaps may now more readily lead to triable disputes, prolonging litigation and increasing institutional burdens.

Complex Concepts Simplified

PLRA Exhaustion: The PLRA requires prisoners to use the prison’s grievance system (and follow its steps and deadlines) before suing in federal court about prison conditions. If the prison’s system is not actually available—because officials do not respond or block access—the law does not require exhaustion.
Affirmative Defense: “Failure to exhaust” is a defense raised by defendants; they must prove it. At summary judgment, they must show there’s no real factual dispute that the prisoner failed to exhaust.
Summary Judgment: A pretrial decision based on papers alone. The court grants it only if there’s no genuine dispute about any material fact and the moving party is entitled to win under the law. If the sides present conflicting, competent evidence on a key fact, a trial or evidentiary hearing is required.
Pavey Hearing: A judge-led evidentiary hearing (unique to exhaustion issues in the Seventh Circuit) to resolve factual disputes about whether the prisoner exhausted the grievance process. Historically required when the record alone could not resolve the issue.
Perttu’s “Intertwined with the Merits” Rule: If the facts about exhaustion overlap with (or are inseparable from) the facts that decide the underlying legal claim for which a jury is guaranteed (e.g., damages under § 1983), then the jury must decide exhaustion. The judge cannot resolve it alone in a Pavey hearing.
Strict Compliance vs. Unavailability: Strict compliance means prisoners must follow grievance rules. Unavailability is the exception—when the system breaks down or is blocked, strict compliance gives way because the law does not demand the impossible.

Application to the Record

The Seventh Circuit identifies concrete, corroborated evidence of a timely filing: a sworn declaration describing the January 2 submission, contemporaneous journaling, and references in the February 1 complaint indicating a “lost” complaint. In the face of the defendants’ contrary records (no log entry; ICE declaration), the dispute turns on credibility and factfinding, not paper resolution.

The district court’s emphasis on the missing acknowledgment-of-receipt and the prisoner’s delay in following up mirrors Lockett’s logic. But because this case includes evidence beyond a “bald assertion,” the panel expressly declines to treat an acknowledgment as the litmus test for exhaustion and rejects the notion that a prisoner’s failure to immediately follow up is dispositive where other strong evidence supports timely filing.

What the Decision Does Not Decide

The court does not find that Breyley in fact exhausted or that remedies were unavailable; it holds only that the record contains a genuine factual dispute precluding summary judgment.
The court does not decide whether the exhaustion question is intertwined with the merits. That determination is left to the district court under Perttu. Depending on the district court’s finding, exhaustion may be tried to a jury (with merits) or resolved at a Pavey hearing.

Practice Implications and Guidance

For plaintiffs: Preserve contemporaneous records (journals, letters to inmates or staff, request forms) and submit sworn declarations detailing when and how filings were made. These materials can defeat summary judgment even without a prison acknowledgment-of-receipt.
For defendants: While internal logs and declarations remain important, they may be insufficient to win on paper when confronted with corroborated inmate testimony. Build comprehensive evidentiary records (collection protocols, chain-of-custody details, staff testimony) to address alleged filing dates and availability issues.
For district courts: After Perttu, assess whether the exhaustion dispute is intertwined with the merits before scheduling a Pavey hearing. If intertwined, plan for jury resolution, potentially using special interrogatories to segregate exhaustion findings.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Breyley v. Fuchs makes two important contributions. First, it clarifies that a prisoner’s corroborated sworn declaration is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact on PLRA exhaustion, limiting the reach of Lockett and rejecting the notion that acknowledgment-of-receipt is the exclusive proof of filing. Second, in light of Perttu v. Richards, it instructs district courts to determine whether exhaustion disputes are intertwined with the merits before defaulting to a Pavey hearing; if they are, the Seventh Amendment entitles the parties to a jury trial on exhaustion.

Together, these rulings shift PLRA exhaustion disputes away from rigid reliance on internal receipt systems and toward fact-sensitive adjudication. They also recalibrate the procedure for resolving disputed exhaustion facts, ensuring harmony with the Seventh Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee when exhaustion and merits are inextricably linked. The case thus reinforces a balanced approach to PLRA exhaustion—strict compliance where the system functions, and a meaningful unavailability safety valve when it does not—administered through factfinding processes that respect both evidentiary realities and constitutional trial rights.