Accusing a Business of “Money Laundering” Is Not Mere Opinion: Moonbeam Gateway Marina, LLC v. Tai Chan (2025 NY Slip Op 03802)

1. Introduction

Moonbeam Gateway Marina, LLC (“Moonbeam” or “Plaintiff”) operates the Gateway Marina in Brooklyn pursuant to a 60-year lease from the National Park Service (NPS). On 27 May 2022, Tai Chan (“Defendant”), a marina customer, allegedly told another patron that Moonbeam “is engaged in money laundering,” depicting the company as a “shady” Nevada corporation. Moonbeam sued for defamation and related torts. Chan responded with a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7) & (g), characterizing the suit as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) and seeking attorney’s fees under Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a and 76-a. The Supreme Court, Kings County, granted the motion. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, holding that:

While the statements do involve a matter of public interest and thus invoke the anti-SLAPP framework,
Moonbeam nevertheless demonstrated a “substantial basis in law” for its defamation claims,
The accusation of money laundering constitutes a factual assertion capable of being proven true or false, not protected opinion, and
Because the claims survive, Chan is not entitled to SLAPP-based fees or costs.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Department unanimously reversed the trial court’s dismissal. Key holdings:

The alleged statement qualifies as speech on an “issue of public interest” because it accuses an entity operating under federal authority of criminal conduct; therefore, the anti-SLAPP statutes apply.
Even within the anti-SLAPP context, Moonbeam’s defamation per se claim shows a “substantial basis in law” by pleading falsity, publication, fault, and injury (defamation per se obviates special damages) and by alleging actual malice.
An outright assertion that a business “is engaged in money laundering” is a provably false factual statement, not non-actionable opinion or rhetorical hyperbole.
Because the plaintiff met the heightened anti-SLAPP burden, dismissal and fee-shifting under Civil Rights Law § 70-a(1)(a) were improper.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a & 76-a (2020 amendments) – Expanded New York’s anti-SLAPP protection to speech on “any subject other than a purely private matter.”
Tcharnyi v. Mendez, 221 AD3d 930 (2d Dept 2023) – Summarized the amended SLAPP definition; cited to frame the burden-shifting analysis.
Gottwald v. Sebert (Kesha), 40 NY3d 240 (2023) – Court of Appeals instruction that “public interest” is to be construed broadly.
Mable Assets, LLC v. Rachmanov, 192 AD3d 998 (2d Dept 2021) – Explained the “substantial basis in law” requirement and malice standard under § 76-a(2).
Gross v. New York Times Co., 82 NY2d 146 (1993) – Articulated the fact–opinion dichotomy for defamation actions; relied upon to deem “money laundering” accusation factual.
VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v. Sproule, 224 AD3d 78 (2d Dept 2023) – Clarified when defamation per se is available to corporate plaintiffs.
Reeves v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 232 AD3d 10 (1st Dept 2023) – Held that accusations of criminal wrongdoing by entities acting under government authority are matters of public interest.

B. Legal Reasoning

Anti-SLAPP Applicability
Statements accusing a government-authorized lessee of criminal conduct affect public oversight of public resources, thus squarely within § 76-a’s “public interest.” Chan therefore triggered § 76-a and the heightened pleading proof burden for Moonbeam.
Burden Shift & Substantial Basis
Once applicability was shown, Moonbeam had to demonstrate a “substantial basis in law.” The complaint did so by: (a) Pleading a specific false assertion (money laundering), (b) Alleging publication to a third party, (c) Claiming actual malice, and (d) Invoking defamation per se, eliminating the need for special damages. These allegations satisfy CPLR 3211(g) and § 76-a(2) at the pleading stage.
Fact vs. Opinion
The court applied Gross to hold that “is engaged in money laundering” suggests undisclosed facts susceptible of verification, unlike “shady company,” which is mere opinion. Because at least part of the challenged statement is factual, the entire defamation claim survives.
Fee-Shifting Denial
Under § 70-a(1)(a) a defendant may recover fees only when the suit lacked a “substantial basis” in both fact and law. Having found the opposite, the court necessarily denied fees.

C. Impact

The decision refines the intersection of defamation law and New York’s robust anti-SLAPP regime:

Confirms that accusations of criminal behavior—especially money laundering—are actionable facts, not opinions, even if couched in informal conversation.
Clarifies that operating under government authorization (e.g., leases, contracts) will likely render disputes “public interest,” invoking anti-SLAPP protections—but those protections are not absolute.
Emphasizes the importance for plaintiffs to plead “actual malice” and other defamation elements with particularity to satisfy the “substantial basis” threshold.
Signals to defendants that anti-SLAPP fee awards are not automatic; they hinge on plaintiffs’ inability to meet the statutory burden.
May chill cavalier allegations of financial crimes against businesses linked to public resources, as speakers can no longer rely on the opinion defense alone.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation): A lawsuit filed to intimidate or silence critics by burdening them with legal costs. New York’s anti-SLAPP statutes allow early dismissal and fee-shifting for such suits.
CPLR 3211(a)(7): A procedural rule permitting dismissal when a complaint fails to state a legal claim.
CPLR 3211(g): Special anti-SLAPP provision: after the defendant shows the case is a SLAPP, the plaintiff must show the claim has a “substantial basis in law.”
Defamation per se: Certain statements (accusing a crime, impugning a profession, etc.) are so harmful that the law presumes damages.
Actual Malice: For speech on matters of public interest, the plaintiff must show the speaker knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for truth.
Fact vs. Opinion Test: Courts ask whether a reasonable listener would believe a statement conveys provable facts or merely subjective opinion. Only the former is actionable.

5. Conclusion

Moonbeam Gateway Marina, LLC v. Tai Chan provides a nuanced roadmap for navigating defamation claims in the anti-SLAPP era. It marries two core principles: broad protection for speech on public issues and uncompromising accountability for false statements that allege criminal conduct. The Second Department’s reversal underscores that anti-SLAPP statutes are not a free-pass; defendants must still contend with viable defamation claims where plaintiffs plead falsity and malice with sufficient detail. Going forward, litigants should:

Anticipate anti-SLAPP challenges whenever speech touches on public resources or governance,
Plead actual malice early and clearly,
Recognize that statements implying undisclosed, verifiable facts—especially criminal wrongdoing—remain actionable, and
Understand that fee-shifting is tethered to the merits of a plaintiff’s claim.

Ultimately, this decision fortifies New York’s delicate balance between vigorous public discourse and protection against reputational harm, marking an important precedent for businesses, speakers, and courts alike.