Accrual of Protection-Order Claims Under Pennsylvania’s Sexual Violence and Intimidation Act: Commentary on Weatherholtz v. McKelvey

Accrual of Protection-Order Claims Under Pennsylvania’s Sexual Violence and Intimidation Act: Commentary on Weatherholtz v. McKelvey

Commentary on Justice Dougherty’s Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, No. 57 MAP 2024 (Dec. 16, 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary examines Justice Dougherty’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Weatherholtz v. McKelvey, a decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressing a crucial procedural question under the Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §62A01 et seq. (“the Act”).

The core issue is when the six-year “catch‑all” statute of limitations in 42 Pa.C.S. §5527(b), held applicable to actions under the Act in K.N.B. v. M.D., 259 A.3d 341 (Pa. 2021), begins to run:

  • From the date of the underlying act of sexual violence or intimidation; or
  • From the date of an act or circumstance demonstrating a “continued risk of harm” to the plaintiff, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. §62A06(a)(2).

The majority, as described by Justice Dougherty, adopts the latter view and holds that the limitations period begins on “the date of the act or circumstance that demonstrates that a plaintiff, or appropriate individual, is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant.” Applying that rule, the majority treats the case as accruing when the appellant, Kristin Allyn Weatherholtz, encountered the appellee, Dylan Jacob McKelvey, at a flea market on June 6, 2022—more than a decade after the underlying sexual violence.

Justice Dougherty agrees in principle that a claim under the Act cannot accrue until the statutory element of “continued risk of harm” is satisfied, but he strongly disagrees with how the majority applies that principle to the facts and with the broader implications of its reasoning. He argues that:

  • The majority’s application effectively nullifies the six-year limitations period recognized in K.N.B.;
  • The majority’s construction lacks support in the statutory text;
  • The facts show that the appellant’s continued risk of harm existed well before 2022; and
  • The combined effect of K.N.B. and the present decision raises serious due process and constitutional concerns about the Act’s operation.

This commentary reconstructs the majority’s holding as reflected in the concurring/dissenting opinion, then analyzes Justice Dougherty’s statutory, precedential, and constitutional critique, and explores the likely impact of Weatherholtz on future litigation under the Act.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Statutory Framework

Under 42 Pa.C.S. §62A06(a), a plaintiff seeking a protection order under the Act must:

(1) assert that the plaintiff or another individual, as appropriate, is a victim of sexual violence or intimidation committed by the defendant; and

(2) prove by preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff or another individual, as appropriate, is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant.

In K.N.B. v. M.D., the Court held that actions under the Act are subject to the six‑year “catch‑all” statute of limitations in 42 Pa.C.S. §5527(b). The unresolved question, posed squarely in Weatherholtz, is when that six‑year period begins.

B. The Majority’s Holding (as Reflected in Justice Dougherty’s Opinion)

The issue presented, as framed by the appellant and recited by the Court, was whether the limitations period begins:

  • “from the date of the act of sexual violence or intimidation asserted”—corresponding to §62A06(a)(1); or
  • “from the date of the act or circumstance that demonstrated a continued risk of harm to the victim”—corresponding to §62A06(a)(2).

According to Justice Dougherty, the majority:

  • Rejects the Superior Court’s view that accrual is tied solely to the date the plaintiff became a victim of sexual violence or intimidation;
  • Holds that a plaintiff “has no basis for relief under the Act until the plaintiff is able to prove that he or she is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant”; and
  • Concludes that the statute of limitations “begins to run from the date of the act or circumstance that demonstrates that a plaintiff, or appropriate individual, is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant.”

The majority further states that:

  • The “continued risk of harm” element is “independent” and “separate and distinct” from the injury inflicted by the underlying sexual violence or intimidation; and
  • “In certain circumstances the continued risk of harm may arise on the same day of the act of sexual violence or intimidation,” but not always.

On the facts of Weatherholtz, the majority—accepting the trial court’s factual finding—treats June 6, 2022, when Weatherholtz unexpectedly encountered McKelvey at a flea market and experienced heightened “fear and anxiety,” as the point in time when she became “at a continued risk of harm” for purposes of §62A06(a)(2). Consequently, in the majority’s view, the cause of action accrued on that date, and the petition filed thereafter was timely within the six‑year window, even though the underlying sexual violence occurred more than a decade earlier.

C. Justice Dougherty’s Position

Justice Dougherty’s stance is two‑fold:

  1. Agreement on the governing accrual principle:
    • He rejects the Superior Court’s approach, which effectively pegged accrual solely to the date of victimization (the first prong of §62A06(a)).
    • He agrees with the majority that “a plaintiff has no basis for relief under the Act until the plaintiff is able to prove that he or she is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant,” and thus that the second prong is essential to accrual.
  2. Disagreement on the application and implications:
    • He contends that on these facts, the appellant could have proven a continued risk of harm long before the 2022 flea‑market encounter, so the cause of action accrued earlier and is time‑barred.
    • He argues that the majority’s effective requirement of a later “act or circumstance”—and its willingness to treat a later spike in subjective fear as the starting point—undermines the very existence of a meaningful six‑year limitation recognized in K.N.B..
    • He warns that, combined with K.N.B.’s acceptance of wholly subjective fear and the Act’s minimal proof requirement for the underlying sexual violence (“assert” rather than “prove”), the majority’s approach may render the Act constitutionally suspect.

He therefore “respectfully dissent[s] in part,” concurring in the general legal framework (accrual depends on satisfying both statutory elements) but dissenting from the majority’s factual and doctrinal application and from its disregard of constitutional constraints.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. The Statutory Scheme and the Concept of “Continued Risk of Harm”

Section 62A06(a) creates a two‑element pathway to relief under the Act:

  1. Paragraph (a)(1) requires only that the plaintiff “assert” that she is “a victim of sexual violence or intimidation committed by the defendant.”
  2. Paragraph (a)(2) requires that the plaintiff “prove by preponderance of the evidence” that she “is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant.”

Justice Dougherty emphasizes the critical phrase “continued risk” and asks: “continued risk from what?” He answers that the only sensible reading is continued risk of harm flowing from the underlying instance of sexual assault or intimidation asserted by the plaintiff. In his view:

  • Nothing in the text requires a new or subsequent “act or circumstance” by the defendant beyond the original sexual violence or intimidation;
  • The statute simply demands proof that the victim remains at risk because of that prior conduct; and
  • That risk may, in many cases, arise immediately and persist continuously from the date of the assault, especially given the enduring trauma associated with sexual violence.

He therefore rejects any reading that treats the “continued risk” element as a freestanding event severed from the underlying wrongdoing, or that silently inserts a requirement of a later triggering act (such as recontact, stalking, or a renewed threat).

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. K.N.B. v. M.D., 259 A.3d 341 (Pa. 2021)

K.N.B. is the essential backdrop to Weatherholtz. In that case, the Court held:

  • Claims under the Act are subject to the six‑year “catch‑all” statute of limitations in 42 Pa.C.S. §5527(b); and
  • The statutory “continued risk of harm” requirement may be satisfied by the victim’s subjective fear alone and does not require that the fear be objectively reasonable.

Justice Dougherty notes that K.N.B. explicitly stated “a plaintiff’s fear of encountering the defendant” need not be objectively reasonable and can, standing alone, support a finding of continued risk. This is crucial for his analysis: if subjective fear is enough, then the question of when the cause of action accrues turns on when such fear first exists in a manner that could satisfy §62A06(a)(2) by a preponderance of the evidence.

Justice Dougherty also relies heavily on then‑Justice Saylor’s separate concurrence in K.N.B., which expressed “substantial doubts about whether [the Act] requires a process that can withstand constitutional scrutiny.” Justice Saylor raised multiple concerns:

  • Under paragraph (a)(1), a plaintiff need only assert being the victim of a crime; there is no explicit requirement to prove the underlying sexual violence or intimidation by any standard of proof before serious restraints are imposed on a defendant.
  • Orders under the Act carry significant consequences: restrictions on liberty and movement, reputational harm, potential loss of firearms, and possible incarceration for violations—even unintentional ones.
  • Allowing such severe consequences based on a “mere assertion, without proof, of criminality” coupled with proof of harm assessed on a subjective basis may fail “to comport with the fundamental fairness required of all government actions.”

Justice Dougherty views Weatherholtz as aggravating these constitutional concerns because the majority’s accrual rule, applied in conjunction with the K.N.B. framework, effectively permits repeated or extremely delayed use of the Act’s powerful remedies based solely on subjective fear stemming from unproven criminal allegations.

2. Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237 (Pa. 2021)

Rice supplies the general rule for when a cause of action “accrues” in Pennsylvania:

“In Pennsylvania, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion.”

Justice Dougherty uses this principle to argue that the accrual date under the Act is the first time the plaintiff could have met both elements of §62A06(a):

  • Assert victimization under (a)(1); and
  • Prove continued risk of harm under (a)(2) by a preponderance of the evidence.

Critically, because K.N.B. allows subjective fear to satisfy the “continued risk” element, a plaintiff can “first maintain the action to a successful conclusion” at the point when such fear can be credibly established—not when a new external act, such as a chance encounter, occurs years later. On the record in Weatherholtz, the appellant admitted to pre‑existing fear and anxiety stemming from the original incident; therefore, in Dougherty’s view, she could have brought a successful claim long before 2022.

3. Weatherholtz v. McKelvey, 305 A.3d 103 (Pa. Super. 2023)

The Superior Court decision, reversed by the Supreme Court, concluded that the statute of limitations is “premised upon the first prong of §62A06(a), i.e., the cause of action accrues on the date the petitioner became a victim of sexual violence or intimidation.”

Justice Dougherty explicitly disavows this approach:

  • He agrees with the majority that the second prong—continued risk of harm—is an essential element, and a plaintiff “has no basis for relief” until that element can be established;
  • Thus, he acknowledges that the cause of action may accrue later than the underlying act of sexual violence in some cases; but
  • He thinks the present case is not one of those instances because the record shows longstanding fear predating the flea‑market encounter.

4. Retroactivity: 1 Pa.C.S. §1926

Justice Dougherty notes that McKelvey raised a separate “legitimate question” about whether the 2015 Act can be applied retroactively to underlying acts of sexual violence that occurred before its enactment, citing:

1 Pa.C.S. §1926 (“No statute shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the General Assembly.”).

He acknowledges, however, that the majority finds this argument waived for failure to raise it below and for lack of a cross‑petition for allowance of appeal. Thus, the Court does not resolve whether retroactive application of the Act to pre‑2015 conduct is permitted or whether such application would implicate ex post facto or due process concerns. Justice Dougherty flags this as an open constitutional and interpretive question for future cases.

5. Enforcement and Consequences: 42 Pa.C.S. §§62A07, 62A12–62A14

The opinion references several enforcement provisions to underscore the gravity of an order under the Act:

  • §62A07(b)(1): A protection order may prohibit the defendant from any contact with the victim and may restrain the defendant from entering the victim’s residence, place of employment, business, or school.
  • §§62A12–62A14: Violation of an order can lead to criminal charges, arrest, confinement for up to six months, and fines, even for unintentional violations (such as chance proximity to the victim).

Justice Dougherty emphasizes that these are not trivial inconveniences; they implicate fundamental rights to liberty, movement, reputation, and association, and they carry quasi‑criminal consequences imposed on the basis of a civil proceeding with a preponderance standard and, under current doctrine, without proof of the underlying criminal act.

C. Justice Dougherty’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Interpretation of “Continued Risk of Harm”

Justice Dougherty’s analysis begins with the statutory language:

  • The plaintiff must “prove by preponderance of the evidence that [she] is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant.”
  • The statute does not say “prove the existence of a later act or circumstance” by the defendant.
  • The term “continued” naturally suggests a risk extending from the past into the present, not a risk that springs into existence on some later occasion.

He argues:

  • The phrase “continued risk” answers itself: the risk must be “continued” from an earlier harm—here, the underlying sexual violence or intimidation;
  • Nothing in the statute demands a separate, subsequent “act or circumstance”; and
  • To read such a requirement into the text is to engage in judicial amendment, not statutory interpretation.

He recognizes that the majority disclaims holding that a separate act or circumstance is always required, but he sees that disclaimer as inconsistent with how the majority applies the rule to this record, given that the only identified accrual point is the 2022 encounter.

2. Accrual and Subjective Fear on the Facts of the Case

Drawing on Rice and K.N.B., Justice Dougherty reasons that the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff first has:

  • A claim of victimization under §62A06(a)(1); and
  • Sufficient proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, of “continued risk of harm” under §62A06(a)(2), which can be established by subjective fear alone.

The crucial factual point in Weatherholtz is the appellant’s own testimony:

  • She testified that after the flea‑market encounter she “definitely had more fear and anxiety,” explicitly acknowledging that she already had fear and anxiety before that date.
  • The trial court observed that the encounter “brought up a new wave of anxiety and fear such as she had experienced previously” and that “her fear and anxiety worsened” afterwards.

Justice Dougherty reads this as undisputed evidence that:

  • The appellant had been living with fear and anxiety since the original incident of sexual violence; and
  • Her fear and anxiety were not newly created in 2022 but only heightened.

Given that K.N.B. permits purely subjective fear to satisfy the continued‑risk element, he concludes that:

  • The appellant could have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she was “at a continued risk of harm” before June 6, 2022; and therefore
  • Under Rice, the cause of action accrued when she first could have successfully maintained the action—well before the flea‑market encounter.

By contrast, the majority, by setting accrual at June 6, 2022, implicitly treats the existence of increased fear at that date as the first legally cognizable manifestation of continued risk, thereby disregarding the appellant’s own admission of earlier fear and the trial court’s finding of prior anxiety.

3. Function of the Statute of Limitations and the Risk of “Infinite” Exposure

Justice Dougherty warns that the majority’s approach “all‑but eviscerates the six‑year statute of limitations” recognized in K.N.B.. His reasoning is structural:

  • A statute of limitations exists to impose a temporal boundary on the assertion of claims, providing certainty and repose.
  • If accrual may be indefinitely delayed until the plaintiff subjectively experiences some new “act or circumstance” that increases her fear—without any new actionable misconduct by the defendant—then the defendant’s exposure effectively becomes perpetual.
  • Victims of sexual violence commonly suffer long‑term trauma; fresh waves of fear or anxiety are predictable and may arise repeatedly throughout life, sometimes spontaneously or based on indirect triggers (e.g., memories, therapy, media exposure).

He encapsulates the danger as follows:

  • Under the majority’s logic, the plaintiff can “restart the clock at any given moment, for the rest of time, by simply invoking the same fears and emotions—even if [the defendant] has done nothing new whatsoever.”
  • In practical terms, this deprives §5527(b) of any meaningful effect in this context, reducing the statute of limitations to a formal shell.

He does acknowledge that, under the majority’s framework, a plaintiff must still file within six years of each newly recognized “act or circumstance” that demonstrates continued risk, but he views this as no real limitation if such “acts or circumstances” can consist solely of the victim’s subjective emotional state and can reoccur without any renewed conduct by the defendant.

4. Constitutional Concerns: Due Process and Fundamental Fairness

Building on Justice Saylor’s K.N.B. concurrence, Justice Dougherty expresses deep concern that the combined doctrinal structure may no longer be compatible with due process requirements:

  1. Minimal proof of underlying misconduct:
    • The Act requires only an “assertion” that the plaintiff is a victim of sexual violence or intimidation committed by the defendant.
    • No explicit requirement exists that the plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the underlying criminal act occurred, before life‑altering restraints are imposed.
    • This deviates from the usual civil rule that a party asserting the affirmative of an issue bears the burden of proof.
  2. Subjective and potentially unreasonable fear:
    • K.N.B. permits a protective order based on purely subjective fear, without requiring that such fear be objectively reasonable.
    • Thus, a defendant may be subjected to restrictive orders not because of any proven continuing misconduct but solely because of one person’s internal emotional response to past, unproven allegations.
  3. Severe restraints and quasi‑criminal consequences:
    • Orders restrict liberty of movement and association and may bar defendants from residences, workplaces, or places of worship.
    • Violation can lead to arrest, confinement for up to six months, and fines, even if the violation is unintentional.
    • Defendants may lose the right to possess firearms and may suffer employment and reputational harms.
  4. Temporal and quantitative expansion of exposure:
    • Under the majority’s accrual rule, the plaintiff may bring protective‑order actions decades after the alleged incident, “as many times as he or she wishes,” so long as some form of subjective fear can be demonstrated anew.
    • This creates the possibility of lifetime exposure to serious constraints, based on allegations never tested in a criminal court, and never proven in a civil court beyond the minimal requirements of the Act.

In Justice Dougherty’s words, the Court has created a regime in which plaintiffs may obtain orders against a defendant:

  • “without any proof of sexual violence or intimidation”;
  • “without an intentional act by the defendant” (at the time of the petition);
  • “without a reasonableness inquiry as to the plaintiff’s fear”; and
  • “ad infinitum.”

Taken together, he questions how such a process can “pass constitutional muster” given the fundamental fairness required by due process norms in imposing serious liberty‑restraining sanctions.

5. Retroactivity and Possible Ex Post Facto Concerns

While the Court does not reach the issue due to waiver, Justice Dougherty flags retroactivity as an additional constitutional dimension:

  • The Act was enacted in 2015.
  • Applying it to underlying acts of sexual violence that occurred before 2015 raises questions under 1 Pa.C.S. §1926, which disfavors retroactive application absent a clear legislative command.
  • Because violations of an order can lead to criminal liability, a regime that effectively attaches new punitive consequences to pre‑enactment conduct may also raise ex post facto concerns.

Although not decided here, Weatherholtz highlights that defendants in future cases may press such arguments, particularly where the underlying incident substantially predates the Act and where the petition seeks orders that are punitive or quasi‑criminal in effect.

D. Impact and Future Implications

1. For Victims and Advocates

From the perspective of victims and their advocates, the majority’s accrual rule, as reconstructed from Justice Dougherty’s opinion, provides considerable flexibility:

  • Victims are not categorically barred from relief simply because the underlying act of sexual violence occurred more than six years earlier.
  • They may seek a protection order when the “continued risk of harm” becomes more acute or apparent—such as after an unexpected encounter, a renewed threat, or a newly recognized psychological impact.
  • This recognizes that trauma does not unfold on a fixed schedule and that risk may become more salient or provable at a later stage, including many years after the events.

However, Justice Dougherty’s critique suggests that, to preserve the legitimacy and durability of this framework against constitutional attack, future courts may have to:

  • Clarify what kinds of evidence suffice to demonstrate “continued risk of harm,” beyond bare assertions of emotional distress; and
  • Distinguish between truly new, risk‑enhancing developments (e.g., contact, threats, stalking) and mere resurgences of longstanding subjective fear unrelated to any new conduct by the defendant.

2. For Defendants

For defendants, Weatherholtz indicates a potentially long‑lasting exposure to protection‑order proceedings:

  • Even decades after the alleged incident, a defendant may face an order restricting movement, association, and sometimes firearm rights, based on a preponderance finding of subjective fear.
  • Because violation of such orders carries criminal consequences, defendants are effectively subject to ongoing quasi‑criminal regulation tied to an incident that may never have been criminally prosecuted or proven.

Justice Dougherty’s concerns highlight several strategic implications:

  • Defendants will likely place greater emphasis on contesting both the existence and the timing of “continued risk of harm,” arguing that fear is longstanding rather than newly emergent, and therefore that claims are time‑barred.
  • Constitutional challenges (facial and as‑applied) to the Act’s structure may become more common, focusing on due process, burden of proof, and retroactivity.
  • Litigants may argue that, at minimum, some form of objective reasonableness should be required for the plaintiff’s fear, to mitigate arbitrary or infinite exposure.

3. For Trial and Appellate Courts

Weatherholtz makes the “when” and “how” of continued risk a central factual and legal battleground:

  • Trial courts will need to make explicit findings about when the plaintiff’s continued risk of harm first arose, not merely whether risk exists at the time of the hearing.
  • Evidence regarding the plaintiff’s psychological state over time—therapy records, prior statements, and testimony about earlier fear or anxiety—will become increasingly important.
  • Appellate courts will be called upon to police the line between:
    • Valid applications of the Act to newly emergent or newly provable risks, and
    • Improper efforts to sidestep the statute of limitations through characterizing long‑standing trauma as a newly “demonstrated” risk.

Justice Dougherty’s opinion is likely to be cited by future litigants and judges who seek to cabin the majority’s language, insisting that the six‑year limitations period remain meaningful in practice.

4. For the Legislature

Weatherholtz, especially read alongside K.N.B., might prompt legislative reconsideration of the Act’s structure. Potential areas of adjustment include:

  • Clarifying the burden of proof for the underlying act of sexual violence or intimidation, potentially requiring proof by a preponderance (or higher) rather than mere assertion;
  • Defining “continued risk of harm” with greater precision, possibly distinguishing between:
    • Risk arising from ongoing or recent conduct by the defendant; and
    • Risk inferred solely from the plaintiff’s long‑term psychological trauma.
  • Articulating a clear accrual rule and, if desired, expressly authorizing or limiting retroactive application;
  • Considering an objective reasonableness component for the fear that underlies “continued risk,” in order to reduce the likelihood of arbitrary or constitutionally problematic applications.

Legislative clarification would help resolve some of the tensions Justice Dougherty identifies between victim protection and defendants’ constitutional rights.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Statute of Limitations

A statute of limitations is a law that sets a time limit for bringing a legal action. After that period expires, the claim is generally barred. The idea is to:

  • Encourage prompt assertion of rights;
  • Ensure evidence and memories remain fresh; and
  • Provide finality and peace to potential defendants.

Under 42 Pa.C.S. §5527(b), if no specific limitations period applies, a six‑year “catch‑all” period governs. K.N.B. held that this six‑year period applies to petitions under the Sexual Violence and Intimidation Act.

2. Accrual of a Cause of Action

“Accrual” refers to the point in time when a legal claim comes into existence and the clock on the statute of limitations starts running. Under Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, a claim accrues “when the plaintiff could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion,” meaning when all necessary elements of the claim can be established.

In this context, that means when the plaintiff can:

  • Assert she is a victim of sexual violence or intimidation by the defendant; and
  • Prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant.

3. Preponderance of the Evidence

“Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof in most civil cases. It means that something is more likely true than not—anything above 50% likelihood. It is a much lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which applies in criminal cases.

4. Subjective vs. Objective Fear

A subjective standard looks at the plaintiff’s personal, internal state (e.g., “I am afraid”), regardless of whether an average reasonable person would feel the same way. An objective standard asks whether a hypothetical “reasonable person” in the plaintiff’s situation would share that fear.

K.N.B. held that under the Act, the plaintiff’s fear does not have to be objectively reasonable; it can be purely subjective. This makes it easier for plaintiffs to satisfy the “continued risk of harm” element, but also raises due process concerns because defendants can face severe consequences based on purely internal, unverified reactions.

5. Retroactivity and Ex Post Facto Concerns

A law is “retroactive” when it is applied to events that occurred before the law was enacted. Under 1 Pa.C.S. §1926, Pennsylvania courts presume that statutes do not apply retroactively unless the legislature clearly says otherwise.

Ex post facto issues arise when:

  • A law retroactively imposes criminal punishment or increases the severity of the legal consequences for past conduct; and
  • Those changes disadvantage the person affected.

Because violations of protective orders can lead to arrest and imprisonment, using a 2015 Act to regulate conduct that occurred years earlier can raise questions about whether new, punitive consequences are being attached to old behavior.

6. Due Process and Fundamental Fairness

“Due process” is a constitutional requirement that the government act fairly and follow proper procedures before taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. Fundamental fairness typically includes:

  • Notice of the allegations;
  • An opportunity to be heard;
  • Reasonable procedural protections; and
  • A rational connection between what is proven and the consequences imposed.

Justice Dougherty’s concern is that the Act, as applied after K.N.B. and Weatherholtz, may allow severe restrictions (and exposure to criminal penalties) without sufficient proof of wrongdoing and based solely on subjective, potentially unreasonable fear—thereby straining due process norms.

V. Conclusion

Weatherholtz v. McKelvey, as illuminated by Justice Dougherty’s concurring and dissenting opinion, refines and complicates Pennsylvania law under the Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act. The majority, according to his account, establishes a new and important rule: the six‑year statute of limitations for petitions under the Act begins when the plaintiff first becomes “at a continued risk of harm” from the defendant—measured by the occurrence of an “act or circumstance” that demonstrates such risk—rather than necessarily on the date of the underlying sexual violence or intimidation.

Justice Dougherty accepts the premise that accrual depends on satisfying the “continued risk” element, but he argues that:

  • On these facts, the appellant’s own testimony shows that her continued risk (in the form of subjective fear and anxiety) existed long before the 2022 flea‑market encounter; and
  • By treating that encounter as the first point of continued risk, the majority misapplies the statutory text, effectively allows plaintiffs to reset the limitations clock indefinitely, and undermines the practical force of the six‑year statute of limitations recognized in K.N.B..

His opinion also powerfully underscores the constitutional stakes. The Act:

  • Requires only an assertion—not proof—of underlying sexual violence;
  • Permits relief based on wholly subjective fear, without objective reasonableness;
  • Imposes serious restrictions on liberty, movement, reputation, and firearms; and
  • Exposes defendants to criminal sanctions for violations of those restrictions.

In combination with the majority’s expansive accrual rule, these features raise substantial questions about due process, fundamental fairness, and, in some cases, retroactivity. Weatherholtz thus stands at a critical crossroads: it expands access to civil protection for victims of sexual violence, but it also invites closer judicial and legislative scrutiny of how far such protection can constitutionally extend when the underlying wrong is unproven, the harm is assessed subjectively, and the temporal reach of the remedy approaches permanence.

Future cases will determine whether Pennsylvania courts adopt Justice Dougherty’s more constrained reading of the Act’s accrual and risk provisions—or whether the legislature steps in to recalibrate the balance between robust victim protection and the constitutional rights of those accused. Either way, Weatherholtz will be a central reference point in the ongoing development of Pennsylvania’s law on civil protection from sexual violence and intimidation.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Judge(s)

Dougherty, Kevin M.

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