Accomplice Liability for First-Degree Murder in Delaware: Intent to Facilitate the Killing Conduct and Strict, Pre-Offense Withdrawal Under 11 Del. C. §§ 271 & 273

I. Introduction

Henry v. State (Del. Dec. 9, 2025) arises from a fatal April 14, 2023 shooting at the Wexford Village apartment complex in Laurel, Delaware. Jhalir Henry (“Henry”), Donregus Holland, and Shyheem Latham-Purnell were indicted for Murder First-Degree and related firearms and conspiracy offenses. Latham-Purnell later pleaded guilty to Manslaughter and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. After a six-day bench trial, the Superior Court acquitted Holland but convicted Henry of all charges and imposed a life sentence.

On appeal, Henry challenged the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing principally that: (1) he could not be convicted of first-degree murder absent proof he specifically intended to kill Corey Mumford (an unintended victim), and (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove accomplice liability or, alternatively, showed he terminated his complicity before the offense. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed solely on accomplice liability and did not reach the Superior Court’s other rationale.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Henry was guilty of first-degree murder as an accomplice under 11 Del. C. § 271(2). Even if Henry did not fire the fatal shots, the record supported the inference that he coordinated with the shooter(s), actively participated “from start to finish,” and did not effectively withdraw under 11 Del. C. § 273.

The Court emphasized that withdrawal requires affirmative steps that “wholly deprive” one’s prior assistance of effectiveness or timely warning to police (or comparable prevention efforts), and Henry’s claimed “doing nothing” briefly, firing in a different direction, and partial movement around the building did not satisfy § 273.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• Hopkins v. State, 293 A.3d 145 (Del. 2023)

  The Court used Hopkins for the standard of review: de novo review of the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal and the familiar sufficiency test— whether “any rational trier of fact,” viewing evidence and inferences favorably to the State, could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This framing mattered because Henry’s appeal sought recharacterization of inferences (e.g., his role at the scene) that the sufficiency standard protects if rational.

• Kellam v. State, 341 A.3d 475 (Del. 2025)

  Kellam was cited for the proposition that an accomplice may be guilty of murder even without pulling the trigger. Its function here is to confirm doctrinally that the Court’s affirmance could rest entirely on accomplice liability under § 271(2), without proving Henry was the shooter.

• Hassan-El v. State, 911 A.2d 385 (Del. 2006) (citing Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278 (Del. 1991))

  These cases supply the controlling lens for accomplice intent under § 271: the question is not whether each accomplice personally had the “specific intent to commit murder,” but whether he intended to “promote or facilitate the principal’s conduct constituting the offense.” By invoking Hassan-El and Claudio, the Court grounded its conclusion that an accomplice’s culpability can attach where the accomplice intended to aid the conduct that results in the killing—particularly where a killing is a foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal undertaking.

  The Court quoted Claudio for the related point that if a murder is a foreseeable consequence of the underlying felonious conduct, the accomplice’s intent “includes the intent to facilitate the happening of this result,” and a factfinder need not find that defendants “specifically intended” the consequential result. In practical terms, this supports liability where the evidence shows coordinated armed action designed to facilitate a shooting episode that results in death.

• Lee v. State, 44 A.3d 922 (Table), 2012 WL 1530508 (Del. Apr. 30, 2012)

  Lee reinforced the strictness of Delaware’s withdrawal/renunciation doctrine: even verbal disagreement or partial distancing can be insufficient where the defendant continues to participate and does not take concrete steps to stop the crime or neutralize his own contribution. The Court used Lee to validate the inference that Henry’s conduct did not meet § 273’s demand for meaningful severance from the criminal venture.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Accomplice liability for intentional murder under § 271(2)

The Court’s affirmance turns on the structure of Delaware accomplice liability: a defendant is guilty of an offense committed by another when, “intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense,” he solicits, aids, counsels, agrees, or attempts to aid planning or commission of the offense. The key is the intent to promote or facilitate the principal’s criminal conduct.

Applying that framework, the Court accepted as rational the trial judge’s inference of coordinated action: (i) a “caravan” from Hollybrook to Wexford, (ii) synchronized arrival and positioning, (iii) Henry exiting with the shooters and firing shots, (iv) Henry moving toward the back/corner of building 105 during the episode, and (v) collective flight in the same vehicles. Even if Latham-Purnell fired the fatal shots, the combination of pre-arrival coordination, contemporaneous gunfire, tactical movement, and unified escape supported a finding that Henry aided and abetted the murder.

2. Withdrawal/termination under § 273 requires affirmative, pre-offense neutralization or prevention

The Court treated § 273 as demanding more than passive nonparticipation or ambiguous conduct at the scene. A defendant must (a) terminate complicity prior to commission of the offense and (b) either “wholly deprive” his complicity of effectiveness (e.g., disarm the shooter, retract key assistance) or give timely warning / make a proper effort to prevent the offense.

Henry’s asserted withdrawal—standing in the parking lot “doing nothing” briefly and firing “in the opposite direction”—did not “show he had abandoned his criminal purpose,” did not neutralize his prior assistance, and did not represent a genuine prevention effort. The Court also stressed the evidentiary significance of Henry’s continued presence, continued gunfire, movement toward the area of the fatal shooting, and coordinated departure—all consistent with ongoing participation rather than a clean break.

C. Impact

This decision reinforces several practical rules for Delaware homicide prosecutions involving multiple participants:

• Accomplice murder liability is robust where coordinated armed conduct supports an inference of intent to facilitate the killing conduct. The State need not prove the accomplice fired the fatal shot if the record supports facilitation of the homicidal episode.
• Withdrawal is narrow and action-forcing. “Hanging back,” firing elsewhere, or momentary inactivity will not typically satisfy § 273 without affirmative neutralization (e.g., taking back a weapon) or prevention (e.g., warning police).
• Sufficiency review will preserve reasonable inferences of coordination. The “rational trier of fact” standard gives trial factfinders wide latitude to infer agreement and facilitation from synchronized travel, roles during the event, and joint flight.

Going forward, defendants seeking to invoke § 273 should expect courts to demand proof of concrete, preventative steps that actually reduce the likelihood or effectiveness of the offense, not merely evidence of equivocal conduct during the criminal episode.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Accomplice liability” (§ 271): You can be convicted of a crime committed by someone else if you intentionally help, encourage, plan, or otherwise facilitate that crime. You do not have to be the person who performs the final act (here, pulling the trigger).
• “Intent to promote or facilitate”: The mental state focuses on whether the defendant meant to help the principal carry out the criminal conduct, not whether the defendant personally carried out every element.
• “Foreseeable consequence” (from Claudio): If a death is a predictable outcome of the joint criminal conduct being facilitated, a factfinder may attribute the result to the accomplice’s intended facilitation of that dangerous conduct.
• “Termination of complicity” / withdrawal (§ 273): It is not enough to stop helping in a passive way. The accomplice must take steps that either undo the effectiveness of his earlier help or actively attempt to prevent the crime (including warning authorities).

V. Conclusion

Henry v. State affirms a first-degree murder conviction on the strength of accomplice liability: where evidence supports coordinated participation in a shooting episode, an accomplice may be convicted of intentional murder even without firing the fatal shots. The decision also underscores that § 273 withdrawal is demanding—requiring affirmative, pre-offense action that neutralizes prior assistance or meaningfully attempts to prevent the crime. Collectively, the opinion solidifies Delaware’s emphasis on facilitation-based culpability and strict limits on late-stage or ambiguous claims of withdrawal in group-violence cases.