Accommodation Cannot Compel Illegality: Second Circuit Reaffirms that Title VII Does Not Require Employers to Violate State Vaccination Rules, and Uniform Mandates Do Not Support ADA “Regarded As” Claims

Introduction

In Braccia v. Northwell Health Systems (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2025) — a non-precedential summary order — the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Title VII religious-discrimination and ADA disability-discrimination claims brought by multiple New York healthcare employees against their employer, Northwell Health Systems. The case arises from Northwell’s August 2021 mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy and New York State Department of Health’s then-operative emergency regulation (10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2.61) requiring certain healthcare entities to “continuously require” covered personnel to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19, allowing only medical, not religious, exemptions.

The plaintiffs alleged that Northwell unlawfully denied their requests for religious accommodations (and, as to one plaintiff, a disability-related accommodation) and then terminated them for noncompliance with the vaccination policy. The district court (E.D.N.Y., Merchant, J.) dismissed the amended complaint in full, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Although a summary order does not have precedential effect, the panel’s reasoning closely tracks and synthesizes binding circuit law and recent Supreme Court guidance, offering a clear and practical roadmap for future litigation involving religious accommodations where compliance would contravene governing law, and for ADA claims predicated on uniform vaccination mandates.

Summary of the Opinion

Reviewing de novo the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the Second Circuit affirmed on two principal grounds:

• Title VII (religious failure-to-accommodate): The plaintiffs forfeited any disparate-treatment theory on appeal. As to failure to accommodate, the only accommodations they requested — masking, weekly testing, and social distancing — would not have satisfied Section 2.61, which permitted no religious exemptions for covered “personnel.” Because an accommodation that requires an employer to violate the law constitutes an undue hardship as a matter of law, Northwell was not required to grant the requested accommodations. The court noted that plaintiffs did not allege they sought reassignment out of the Section 2.61 “personnel” category (the only potential path to an accommodation recognized in prior Second Circuit authority).
• ADA (single plaintiff, Rose Taylor): The complaint’s disability allegations were conclusory and did not plausibly plead a qualifying disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Further, a “regarded as” disability theory fails as a matter of law where the adverse action stems from a company-wide vaccination mandate applied uniformly to all employees. The court therefore affirmed dismissal of the ADA claim.

The court relied on and aligned with Groff v. DeJoy’s clarified “undue hardship” standard while emphasizing that no accommodation duty arises where compliance would be illegal. It also underscored that uniform vaccine mandates cannot, without more, support ADA “regarded as” claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Baker v. The Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2006); Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2002): These decisions set the Second Circuit’s familiar framework for religious failure-to-accommodate claims under Title VII: the plaintiff must (1) have a bona fide religious belief conflicting with a job requirement; (2) inform the employer; and (3) be disciplined for noncompliance. If those elements are met, the employer must reasonably accommodate unless doing so imposes an undue hardship.
• Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023): The Supreme Court clarified that “undue hardship” under Title VII requires showing that the accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of the employer’s business, rejecting the earlier “de minimis” gloss associated with Hardison. In Braccia, the panel applied Groff to emphasize that the risk of violating law and the concomitant exposure to penalties and licensure consequences easily qualifies as undue hardship.
• We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 368 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam): Addressing the same New York regulation (Section 2.61), the court explained that the only way to accommodate a religious objection would be to reassign the employee out of the definition of covered “personnel.” Braccia adopts that logic: by requesting masking/testing/social distancing alone, plaintiffs sought accommodations that could not legally satisfy Section 2.61, and they did not plead seeking reassignment outside the rule’s scope.
• Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 129 F.4th 182 (2d Cir. 2025) (per curiam): A controlling, published opinion stating a categorical rule: an accommodation requiring the employer to violate the law imposes an undue hardship. Braccia relies on Russo to dispose of Title VII accommodation claims premised on measures that would contravene Section 2.61.
• Does 1–2 v. Hochul, No. 22-2858, 2024 WL 5182675 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2024) (summary order): Applying Groff’s standard to Section 2.61, the court held that risk of financial penalties and licensure suspension or revocation suffices to establish undue hardship. Braccia follows this line, confirming that legal penalties and licensing jeopardy meet Groff’s “substantial increased costs” threshold.
• D’Cunha v. Northwell Health Sys., No. 23-476, 2023 WL 7986441 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2023) (summary order): Specifically addressed Northwell and held that compelling it to violate Section 2.61 would be an undue hardship. Braccia reiterates this point as applied to the plaintiffs’ requested accommodations.
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Establishes the plausibility standard for pleadings and rejects threadbare recitals. Braccia invokes Iqbal to reject conclusory ADA allegations lacking factual detail on how a condition substantially limits major life activities.
• Davis v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 804 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Morey v. Windsong Radiology Grp., 794 F. App’x 30 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order): These articulate ADA elements and require plaintiffs to plead facts showing a substantial limitation of a major life activity. Braccia finds plaintiff Taylor’s allegations insufficient under these standards.
• Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024); Apuzza v. NYU Langone Long Island, 2025 WL 763425 (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 2025) (summary order): These decisions foreclose ADA “regarded as” claims where adverse action arises from a neutral, company-wide vaccination mandate. Braccia applies that rule to dismiss the “regarded as” theory.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s analysis proceeds in two tracks, mirroring the claims.

First, for Title VII religious discrimination, the court limits its review to a failure-to-accommodate theory because plaintiffs did not brief disparate treatment on appeal, thereby forfeiting it. On the accommodation claim, the opinion accepts as true that plaintiffs had sincere religious objections and requested accommodations. The legal question becomes whether Northwell was obliged to provide accommodations that would have contravened Section 2.61.

The court answers that question with settled doctrine: an employer need not grant an accommodation that would violate the law, because such an accommodation necessarily imposes an undue hardship on the conduct of its business. Citing Russo (a published, precedential decision) and integrating Groff’s “substantial increased costs” standard, the panel emphasizes that violating a binding state regulation exposes healthcare employers to statutory penalties and threatens licensure, consequences that comfortably meet Groff’s heightened test. Further, following We The Patriots, the court underscores that the only conceivable accommodation consistent with Section 2.61 would be reassignment out of the “personnel” category — and plaintiffs did not allege they sought such reassignment. Instead, they requested masking, testing, and social distancing, measures that did not satisfy Section 2.61’s mandate and thus would have required unlawful noncompliance. As a result, the complaint did not plausibly state a Title VII failure-to-accommodate claim.

Second, on the ADA claim by Rose Taylor, the court applies the familiar five-element framework and focuses on whether Taylor adequately pleaded a qualifying disability or a “regarded as” theory. Her allegations — that she has a neurological disorder limiting various major life activities — are conclusory recitations of statutory terms without facts explaining how the condition substantially limits those activities. A declaration appended to the complaint stating that a physician believed vaccination risks outweighed benefits for her is likewise conclusory and does not cure the deficiency. The court therefore holds that the disability prong is not plausibly pleaded. The “regarded as” theory independently fails under Sharikov and Apuzza because a uniform vaccination mandate, applied to all employees, does not single out an individual as impaired. Accordingly, the ADA claim was properly dismissed.

Impact and Implications

• Reaffirmation of “illegality-as-undue-hardship” post-Groff: Braccia fortifies a clear rule in the Second Circuit: even after Groff’s more demanding standard, an employer is not required to accommodate religious practice by violating a valid law or regulation. Exposure to legal penalties and licensure consequences counts as “substantial increased costs” in the conduct of business.
• Operational guidance for healthcare employers: Where a healthcare regulation mandates vaccination without religious exemptions for covered personnel, employers face no Title VII duty to offer accommodations (like masking/testing/social distancing) that would undermine or contradict the regulation. The only potentially viable accommodation, if feasible, is reassignment to a role outside the regulatory definition of “personnel.” Plaintiffs who do not plausibly plead such reassignment requests or possibilities are unlikely to survive a motion to dismiss.
• ADA pleading rigor: Plaintiffs must provide factual detail about the nature of the impairment and how it substantially limits specified major life activities; parroting statutory language is insufficient under Iqbal. For “regarded as” claims, Braccia echoes binding circuit law that uniform vaccine mandates do not show an employer regarded an individual as disabled.
• Preservation on appeal: The decision is a reminder that issues not briefed (e.g., disparate treatment) are forfeited. Appellants must squarely present and develop arguments to preserve them.
• Temporal considerations and mootness: Although Section 2.61 has since been repealed, Braccia shows that damages claims arising during the regulation’s operative period are still adjudicated under then-applicable law. Employers and employees litigating legacy COVID-19 disputes should anchor their arguments to the regulatory framework in effect at the time of the challenged conduct.
• Broader applicability beyond COVID-19: The core principle — accommodation cannot compel illegality — will reach beyond pandemic rules to other regulatory contexts (e.g., licensing, safety mandates). When a governing law leaves no room for the requested accommodation, the undue-hardship analysis will generally be straightforward.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Title VII religious accommodation: Employers must reasonably accommodate employees’ sincere religious beliefs unless doing so would cause an undue hardship. After Groff, undue hardship requires showing substantial increased costs in relation to the business. Violating law to accommodate is, by definition, an undue hardship.
• 10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2.61 (now repealed): This New York rule required covered healthcare “personnel” to be vaccinated against COVID-19 and permitted only medical exemptions. It left no legal space for religious exemptions for those in covered roles. The only possible “accommodation” consistent with the rule was moving an employee into a non-covered role.
• Reassignment as accommodation: In some settings, moving an employee to a different position can be a reasonable accommodation. In the Section 2.61 context, reassignment out of “personnel” was the only way to accommodate a religious objection lawfully. Plaintiffs in Braccia did not allege they sought such reassignment.
• ADA “disability” vs. “regarded as”: To qualify as disabled under the ADA, a person must have an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, have a record of such impairment, or be regarded as having one. A “regarded as” theory requires showing the employer perceived the person as having an impairment; a neutral policy applied to all employees (like a vaccine mandate) generally does not show this.
• Pleading standards (Iqbal/Twombly): Complaints must include enough factual matter to be plausible, not merely legal conclusions or labels. Saying “I have a disability that limits X” without facts describing how it limits X typically fails.
• Summary order: In the Second Circuit, summary orders do not have precedential effect, though they can be cited under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1. They often synthesize and apply binding precedents and are persuasive, especially when consistent with published circuit law.
• Forfeiture on appeal: Arguments not developed in an appellate brief are generally treated as forfeited and will not be considered.

Conclusion

Braccia v. Northwell Health Systems confirms two core propositions in Second Circuit law. First, Title VII does not require employers to grant religious accommodations that would violate governing law or regulation; such requests impose an undue hardship even under Groff’s strengthened standard. In the specific context of New York’s former healthcare vaccination rule, accommodations like masking, testing, and social distancing were not legally viable for covered personnel, and plaintiffs’ failure to plead reassignment out of that category was fatal. Second, ADA claims based on uniform vaccination mandates fail under a “regarded as” theory, and disability claims must be grounded in specific facts showing substantial limitation of major life activities, not conclusory recitations.

Although issued as a summary order, Braccia coheres with published circuit authority (notably Russo and Sharikov) and provides practical guidance to employers and employees alike: accommodation cannot compel illegality; exposure to penalties and licensure risks readily satisfies Groff’s undue-hardship test; and ADA plaintiffs must plead concrete facts, not labels. As pandemic-era disputes continue to wind through the courts and as future public-health or regulatory mandates emerge, these principles will shape the litigation landscape in the Second Circuit.