Acceptance of Responsibility Cannot Be Denied Based Solely on Pre‑Notice Arrest Conduct: Third Circuit Vacates Sentence in United States v. Guerrero Grimaldos

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Not Precedential)

Date: September 24, 2025

Panel: Judges Restrepo, McKee, and Rendell (opinion by Judge Rendell)

Docket: No. 25-2179

Introduction

This appeal arises from the sentencing of Ruben Dario Guerrero Grimaldos (“Guerrero”) for immigration fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), predicated on his false answer to a criminal history question on a Form I‑751 Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence. The central questions on appeal were whether the district court erred (1) in denying the two‑level acceptance‑of‑responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) based exclusively on Guerrero’s attempt to flee during his arrest; (2) in imposing an upward variance without adequately addressing sentencing disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); and (3) in giving undue weight to Guerrero’s prior state sex‑offense conviction when sentencing him for federal immigration fraud.

The Third Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. Most notably, it held that a sentencing court may not deny § 3E1.1’s reduction based solely on arrest conduct where the defendant had no notice that the arrest concerned the federal offense of conviction. The court also flagged plain procedural error in the district court’s failure to meaningfully address the defendant’s colorable § 3553(a)(6) disparity argument and cautioned against effectively re‑punishing the defendant for his earlier state offense when sentencing him for the federal offense.

Although not precedential, the decision clarifies the permissible temporal and conceptual scope of § 3E1.1(a) within the Third Circuit and provides concrete resentencing guidance with broader practical resonance.

Summary of the Opinion

Main Holding (Acceptance of Responsibility): The district court committed legal error by denying the § 3E1.1(a) two‑level reduction based entirely on Guerrero’s arrest‑evasion conduct when there was no indication he knew he was being arrested for immigration fraud. Acceptance must be “for his offense,” which presupposes the defendant’s awareness of the offense at issue.
Harmless‑Error Argument Rejected: Even though the guideline range was 0–6 months whether the offense level was 6 or 8 (Criminal History Category I), the error was not harmless because the district court anchored and varied upward from offense level 8 to 10. Starting at level 6 could have materially altered the extent or rationale of the variance.
Procedural Error on § 3553(a)(6): The district court’s “rote recitation” of the § 3553(a) factors, without meaningfully addressing Guerrero’s specific and colorable sentencing disparity argument under § 3553(a)(6), was plain error under Third Circuit precedent.
Caution Against Re‑Punishing Prior State Conduct: The record suggested the sentence may have been substantially influenced by the prior state sex offense. The court emphasized that, on remand, the district court must sentence Guerrero for immigration fraud, not to re‑sentence him for unrelated prior conduct.
Remedy and Timing: Sentence vacated and remanded with an expectation of prompt resentencing in light of time served and the average sentences for similar cases.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Acceptance of Responsibility and Its Temporal Scope:

United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 1996): Established that post‑indictment conduct may be relevant in denying acceptance and clarified standards of review (legal issues de novo; factual findings for clear error). The panel cites Ceccarani as context but rules here that pre‑notice arrest conduct cannot, by itself, defeat § 3E1.1.
United States v. Harris, 751 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2014): Instructs courts to assess “the totality of the situation” in deciding § 3E1.1(a). The Third Circuit applies that holistic approach but draws a boundary: the totality cannot rest solely on arrest behavior when the defendant lacks notice of the federal offense.
United States v. Mercado, 81 F.4th 352 (3d Cir. 2023): Affirms denial of the reduction based on post‑plea misconduct. Mercado underscores that post‑charge (even post‑plea) behavior can bear on acceptance. By contrast, Guerrero’s case turns on the absence of offense‑specific notice at the time of arrest.
United States v. McCarthy, 32 F.4th 59 (1st Cir. 2022); United States v. McLaughlin, 378 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jeter, 191 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 1999): Sister circuits often limit relevant conduct to post‑offense, post‑charge, or at least post‑notice conduct, sometimes using a bright‑line “on notice” standard pegged to the filing of federal charges. The Third Circuit deliberately declines to adopt a comprehensive bright‑line rule, but embraces a narrower principle: arrest conduct cannot be the sole basis for denial where the defendant lacks notice that the arrest concerns the offense of conviction.
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948): Quoted to emphasize that arrests can happen to both the “innocent and the guilty,” reinforcing the need for offense‑specific knowledge in § 3E1.1’s application.

Harmless‑Error Framework for Guideline Miscalculations:

United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Raia, 993 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008): A miscalculated guideline starting point is rarely harmless; anchoring matters. Because the district court varied upward from an erroneously calculated offense level, the error could not be dismissed as harmless.

Procedural Reasonableness and § 3553(a)(6):

United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2010): When a defendant advances a colorable argument under any § 3553(a) factor, the court must address it as part of its meaningful consideration. This is especially necessary for § 3553(a)(6) (sentencing disparities) and even more so when the sentence is outside the Guidelines.
United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 2012): A “rote recitation” of the § 3553(a) factors is insufficient to show meaningful consideration of a disparity argument. The panel relies on Begin to identify plain error here.

Plain‑Error Review:

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 2014): The standard for plain error (error that is plain, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings). The court applies this framework to identify the § 3553(a)(6) error while noting it remands primarily on § 3E1.1 grounds.

Guarding Against De Facto Re‑Punishment for Unrelated Prior Crimes:

United States v. Lee, 974 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2020): Quoted to caution against “plenary resentencing” for prior offenses under the guise of § 3553(a). A sentencing court may consider history and characteristics, but it cannot impose a sentence to re‑punish unrelated past crimes.

Other Citations: The panel also references Noem v. Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. 1017 (2025), in describing the possibility that immigration enforcement actions can be misdirected or administrative, underscoring why arrest behavior is an unreliable proxy for acceptance when the defendant lacks offense‑specific notice.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Text of § 3E1.1(a): “Acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” The court’s analysis begins with the Guideline’s text. A reduction applies only when the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” That phrase limits the inquiry both substantively and temporally: “for his offense” presupposes that the defendant knows what that offense is. Without offense‑specific notice at the time of the conduct being evaluated, the defendant cannot meaningfully accept responsibility for that offense. Hence, using pre‑notice arrest evasion as the sole basis to deny § 3E1.1(a) is legal error.

2) Purpose of § 3E1.1: Encouraging Guilty Pleas and Resource Conservation. The panel aligns its textual reading with § 3E1.1’s core policy goal: promoting early acceptance and conserving adjudicative resources. If arrest evasion—before the defendant knows the federal offense at issue—could itself torpedo § 3E1.1(a), defendants would have diminished incentives to plead guilty, undermining the Guideline’s purpose. The court cites sister circuits (Jeter; Wade) that ground their rules in this same policy logic.

3) No Bright‑Line Rule, But a Clear Floor. The Third Circuit leaves open whether it will adopt a broader “on notice” bright‑line rule defining the permissible temporal window for evaluating acceptance (e.g., from indictment forward). Instead, it sets a clear minimum: a court cannot deny § 3E1.1(a) based solely on arrest conduct when the defendant has no notice that the arrest concerns the offense of conviction.

4) Harmless Error Rejected Because of Upward Variance Anchoring. The government urged harmlessness because the guideline range (0–6 months) was unchanged whether the offense level was 6 or 8 at CHC I. But the district court varied upward to offense level 10 (imposing 12 months). Starting from the correct offense level (6) could materially change the perceived need or extent of an upward variance. Following Zabielski, Raia, and Langford, the panel concludes it cannot be sure the incorrect guideline anchor did not affect the sentence.

5) Procedural Error: Failure to Address § 3553(a)(6) Disparities. Guerrero’s sentencing memorandum advanced a specific disparities argument: similarly situated § 1546(a) defendants (offense level 6, CHC I) often receive short or non‑custodial sentences (with an average of three months), and at least 16% receive no imprisonment. The district court merely recited the § 3553(a) factors without engaging this argument. Under Merced and Begin, where a defendant advances a colorable disparity claim—especially when the ultimate sentence is outside the Guidelines—the court must provide a reasoned response. The failure to do so was plain error.

6) Substantive Direction: Avoid De Facto Re‑Punishment for Unrelated Prior Conduct. The panel reads the record as heavily focused on Guerrero’s prior state sex offense, including special supervised release conditions tailored to that offense and comments characterizing him as “a danger to the community” based on conduct for which he had already been sentenced. The panel stresses that § 3553(a) does not authorize plenary resentencing for unrelated prior crimes. On remand, the court must ensure that any reference to the state offense serves a legitimate sentencing purpose (such as history and characteristics) and does not distort the punishment for the federal immigration fraud.

Impact and Practical Implications

Within the Third Circuit (even though non‑precedential): This opinion provides persuasive guidance that:

Acceptance‑of‑Responsibility Determinations: District courts should not deny § 3E1.1(a) solely on the basis of pre‑notice arrest conduct. Courts should focus on offense‑specific acceptance cues (timeliness of plea, truthful admission, cessation of related criminal conduct) once the defendant is on notice of the charge.
Sentencing Explanations and § 3553(a)(6): When defendants present concrete disparity data, district courts must grapple with it on the record—particularly when imposing an upward variance. Rote recitations of § 3553(a) will not suffice for meaningful appellate review.
Use of Prior Convictions at Sentencing: Courts may consider history and characteristics, but should not transform the federal sentencing into a vehicle for re‑punishing a prior, dissimilar state offense. Tailored supervised release conditions and rhetoric that mirror the prior offense must be justified as reasonably related to the federal offense and the statutory purposes of sentencing.
Harmless‑Error Scrutiny: Guideline miscalculations that appear range‑neutral can still prove consequential if they shape the court’s variance decision. Anchoring matters, and errors in the starting point rarely qualify as harmless.
Expedited Resentencing: The panel’s closing remarks underscore concern for timeliness where the “average” sentence for similar cases is short and the defendant has already served significant time. Expect closer attention to speedy resentencing when time‑served may soon overtake a reasonable sentence.

For Defense Counsel:

Develop a record demonstrating offense‑specific acceptance (early plea, remorse, cooperation) and highlight the absence of post‑notice misconduct undermining acceptance.
Present concrete, data‑driven § 3553(a)(6) disparity arguments; insist on a reasoned response on the record.
Object to any reliance that effectively re‑punishes unrelated prior crimes; request findings tethered to the federal offense and statutory purposes.

For Prosecutors:

If opposing acceptance, tie your argument to conduct that post‑dates offense‑specific notice, or to offense‑related behavior inconsistent with acceptance.
When urging an upward variance, be prepared to address disparity data and to articulate case‑specific reasons that distinguish the defendant from the comparison set.

For District Courts:

State clearly the factual basis for granting or denying § 3E1.1(a), mindful of the offense‑specific and notice‑sensitive contours highlighted here.
Engage directly with any colorable § 3553(a)(6) argument; explain how the sentence avoids unwarranted disparities or why differences are warranted.
Ensure that discussion of prior offenses advances legitimate § 3553(a) purposes without becoming de facto resentencing for those prior crimes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) (Acceptance of Responsibility): A two‑level reduction in the offense level if a defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for the offense of conviction. Courts consider factors like truthful admission of the conduct, timely plea, and cessation of offense‑related behavior. A guilty plea is not an automatic entitlement, but it is significant evidence of acceptance.
“Notice” in this context: The defendant’s awareness that federal prosecutors are interested in the offense of conviction. Some circuits treat indictment as the notice point. The Third Circuit left the outer boundary open but held that without any notice that the arrest concerns the offense of conviction, arrest conduct cannot be the sole reason to deny acceptance.
Guideline “Anchoring” and Variances: Sentencing starts with a calculated guideline range. Even if the range is the same under different offense levels, the initial offense level can anchor the judge’s view of the case. If the court then “varies” upward (imposes a higher sentence than the range suggests), starting from an incorrect offense level can influence the extent and rationale of that variance.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): Lists factors courts must consider in imposing a sentence. Key in this case were:
- § 3553(a)(2)(B) and (C): Deterrence and protection of the public.
- § 3553(a)(6): Need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants.
Plain Error Review: On appeal, when a party did not object below, the court looks for an error that is clear and obvious, affects substantial rights (e.g., changes the outcome), and seriously affects the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings.
Harmless Error: Even if an error occurred, a sentence is affirmed if the government shows the error did not affect the outcome. Miscalculations at the guideline stage are rarely harmless because of the anchoring effect.
Upward Variance vs. Departure: A “variance” is a sentence outside the guideline range based on the § 3553(a) factors. A “departure” relies on specific guideline provisions authorizing movement from the range. Here, the district court imposed an upward variance, not a guideline departure.
Not Precedential: The Third Circuit flagged this opinion as non‑precedential under I.O.P. 5.7, meaning it does not bind future panels; still, it provides persuasive, detailed guidance for district courts within the Circuit.

Conclusion

United States v. Guerrero Grimaldos establishes an important clarifying principle in the Third Circuit’s sentencing jurisprudence: a district court may not deny § 3E1.1(a)’s acceptance‑of‑responsibility reduction based solely on pre‑notice arrest conduct where the defendant does not know the arrest pertains to the offense of conviction. The ruling is rooted in the text and purpose of § 3E1.1 and is reinforced by the practical reality that arrest behavior—before offense‑specific notice—does not reliably reflect acceptance or rejection of responsibility for the charged offense.

Beyond § 3E1.1, the decision reinforces two cardinal sentencing imperatives. First, courts must meaningfully address colorable § 3553(a)(6) disparity arguments, particularly when varying upward. Second, a defendant’s prior conviction should not transform the federal sentencing hearing into a surrogate resentencing for that prior crime; the federal sentence must be tailored to the federal offense and the statutory purposes of sentencing.

On remand, the district court is directed to apply the two‑level acceptance reduction, address the disparity arguments, and recalibrate the sentence to ensure it punishes only the federal immigration fraud. The panel’s closing reminder to expedite resentencing underscores a broader theme: timeliness is integral to justice, especially where average sentences are short and time served accumulates quickly.