Abandonment of Termination in Parental-Rights Cases: Binding Effect of DFPS’s In-Court Statements in D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

I. Introduction

In D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, No. 24-0840 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), the Supreme Court of Texas confronted a stark procedural and constitutional problem in a parental-rights termination case: may a trial court terminate a parent’s rights when the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) has, on the record and through its designated representative, unequivocally said it is not seeking termination—and never corrects that statement?

Justice Evan A. Young, writing for the Court (with Justice Hawkins not participating), held that it may not. The Court announced a clear rule tailored specifically to termination cases:

In parental-termination cases, a court may not terminate parental rights in the face of an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement made by someone speaking on the department's behalf that withdraws termination as a requested form of relief.

This opinion sits at the intersection of civil procedure (abandonment of claims, stipulations, pleadings, and trial conduct) and the substantive constitutional protection of parental rights. The Court uses the case to reaffirm that termination of parental rights is uniquely grave in civil law and that technical or contextual ambiguity cannot override an express, uncorrected abandonment of the request to terminate.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Family Circumstances

The case concerns “Mother” (D.V.) and her child, E.D. Mother has a history of violent behavior and drug use. After Mother reportedly assaulted her ex-boyfriend and one of her other two children, DFPS removed E.D. from her care and filed a petition to terminate both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

DFPS’s trial-position on Father shifted early: by the time of trial, DFPS wanted Father to be E.D.’s permanent sole managing conservator—that is, the parent with full legal authority over the child. Yet DFPS’s live pleading (its operative petition) still technically sought termination of both parents’ rights, even though, in reality, no one understood DFPS to still be seeking termination of Father’s rights.

B. Trial Before the Associate Judge

The trial took place before an associate judge via videoconference. DFPS had designated the caseworker as its Rule 267 representative. During the second day of trial, DFPS’s own counsel elicited critical testimony:

Q. … What is the Department's recommendation [to] the Court today?
A. The Department is seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]'s rights, and give permanent managing conservatorship of [E.D.] to [Father], and to limit [Mother]'s rights to parent non-conservator with no visitation and contact.

On cross-examination, Mother’s counsel sought clarification:

Q. And [the department] is not seeking to terminate [Mother]'s rights, but to ask the Court to name her as a parent non-conservator?
A. Correct.

This was an unambiguous statement, made by DFPS’s designated representative, and elicited by DFPS’s own counsel. DFPS’s attorney did not object, clarify, or correct it.

Later, other witnesses recommended termination:

• A Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer testified that CASA believed it was in E.D.’s best interest for Mother’s rights to be terminated and for Father and Grandfather to serve as joint managing conservators (with Father primary).
• E.D.’s attorney ad litem argued in closing that DFPS had “met its burden as far as termination,” but also asked the court, alternatively, to name Mother a non-possessory conservator if the court was not inclined to terminate.

Mother testified that she did not want her rights terminated and hoped at least for visitation, and ideally to regain custody. In closing argument, Mother’s counsel explicitly asked the court not to terminate her rights.

DFPS offered neither an opening statement nor a closing argument. Immediately after the attorney ad litem’s closing, the associate judge orally pronounced termination of Mother’s parental rights and later signed a final judgment terminating her rights and appointing Father as sole managing conservator.

C. De Novo Hearing and Court of Appeals

Mother requested a de novo hearing in the referring district court. That court initially refused to grant such a hearing, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a de novo proceeding. Upon remand, the district court adopted the associate judge’s ruling and again terminated Mother’s parental rights.

On appeal, Mother advanced several challenges, but preserved only one for higher review: that the associate judge lacked authority to terminate her parental rights after DFPS had affirmatively abandoned its pleading for termination at trial.

The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed in D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 716 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024). It recognized that a party may abandon claims by stipulation or concession, but, considering the “totality of the circumstances”—including:

• CASA’s recommendation to terminate;
• the attorney ad litem’s position that DFPS had met its burden on termination;
• the evidence supporting termination; and
• the fact that the key statement came from DFPS’s representative, not its lawyer—

the court of appeals held that DFPS had not, in fact, abandoned termination.

D. Petition for Review and Supreme Court Disposition

Mother sought review in the Supreme Court of Texas, arguing that DFPS’s in-court statement, never repudiated, amounted to a binding abandonment of its request for termination. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed.

The Court:

• Reversed the court of appeals’ judgment.
• Reversed the portion of the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights.
• Rendered judgment that Mother be appointed a non-conservator parent (or non-possessory conservator), consistent with DFPS’s stated trial position.
• Remanded to the district court to enter judgment consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision and address any remaining issues.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court holds that in parental-termination cases:

1. A party’s claims for relief may be abandoned not only by formal amendment of pleadings but also by stipulation or concessions made in the course of trial.
2. DFPS’s designated representative, when expressly asked about DFPS’s position, stated that the agency was not seeking termination of Mother’s parental rights, but rather seeking to limit her rights and appoint Father as permanent managing conservator with Mother as a non-conservator parent without visitation.
3. That statement was unequivocal and unambiguous, and DFPS’s counsel never corrected or disavowed it at any point during trial.
4. Given the uniquely grave nature of termination proceedings—where parental rights are of “constitutional dimensions” and where courts impose heightened evidentiary and appellate standards—DFPS’s unequivocal, unrepudiated trial statement constituted abandonment of its termination request.
5. As a result, the trial court had no authority to terminate Mother’s parental rights, because a court cannot grant relief a party has abandoned.

The Court therefore reverses the termination and renders judgment awarding Mother the exact status DFPS had asked the trial court to impose—non-conservator (or non-possessory conservator) parent, with Father as managing conservator.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976)

Wiley is central to Texas’s long-standing recognition that termination of parental rights is an extraordinary remedy. Future-Chief Justice Pope wrote:

“Actions which break the ties between a parent and child can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons,” and so “in an action which permanently sunders those ties,” the “proceedings [should] be strictly scrutinized.”

The D.V. Court builds on this language to stress that termination cases are not ordinary civil disputes. This “strict scrutiny” of procedures informs why an unequivocal declaration by DFPS withdrawing termination cannot be lightly brushed aside by contextual speculation or “totality of circumstances.”

2. Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967)

Leithold famously stated:

“Technical rules of practice and pleadings are of little importance in determining issues concerning the custody of children.”

The D.V. Court invokes this to make two related points:

• Courts must be cautious in mechanically applying civil-procedure constructs (like pleading formalities) without accounting for the special context of child custody and parental-rights termination.
• At the same time, parties are still bound by the core rules—especially those concerning what relief may be granted. But in termination cases, the Court insists that ambiguities be resolved in favor of preserving, not severing, parental rights.

3. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985)

In Holick, the Court recognized that termination requires proof by clear and convincing evidence, a standard the Legislature later codified in Texas Family Code § 161.001(b). D.V. cites Holick and § 161.001(b) to underscore that termination is constitutionally and statutorily exceptional: the State’s burden of proof is higher than in ordinary civil cases.

That heightened standard of proof reinforces the Court’s insistence that termination cannot be ordered when DFPS has told the court it is not seeking that remedy and has never reasserted it. If termination demands such rigorous evidentiary proof, it cannot proceed on a claim that has procedurally evaporated.

4. In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)

In re E.R. (quoting the U.S. Supreme Court in Santosky) described termination of parental rights as encumbering a value “far more precious than any property right” and therefore warranted “special rules.”

D.V. leans heavily on this conceptual framework: because termination implicates fundamental rights, courts must adopt and enforce procedural safeguards that may be more demanding than those applicable in routine civil disputes. One such safeguard, the Court holds, is honoring DFPS’s unequivocal withdrawal of the termination request unless DFPS clearly says otherwise.

5. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019)

In re N.G. recognized a “unique” appellate review requirement in termination cases when a parent challenges certain predicate grounds. D.V. cites N.G. as evidence that Texas law consistently treats termination proceedings as categorically distinct, requiring elevated protections at multiple stages—trial, proof, and appeal.

6. Legate v. Legate, 28 S.W. 281 (Tex. 1894)

Legate expresses the deep presumption in favor of natural parents:

“[T]he law presumes that the best interest of the child will be subserved by allowing it to remain in the custody of the parents ….”

By invoking Legate, the Court situates D.V. within a century-plus line of authority that places a heavy thumb on the scale against unwarranted severance of parental rights. This presumption counsels that where DFPS itself has renounced termination, courts must not reintroduce that remedy absent an unmistakable reaffirmation by the agency.

7. Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great Western Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. 2019)

Pathfinder explains that when parties stipulate to limit the issues to be tried, other issues are effectively waived:

“When parties stipulate that only certain questions will be tried, all others are thereby waived.”

D.V. applies this logic directly. A stipulation (or its equivalent) that DFPS is not seeking termination is functionally identical to a stipulation that termination is not among the questions to be tried. Once so narrowed, the court cannot lawfully award termination, any more than it could award a type of monetary relief expressly taken off the table in a commercial case.

8. In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.)

Shaw held that when DFPS has stipulated it is not seeking termination, a trial court cannot order termination. The Supreme Court expressly embraces this proposition and extends it: even when the stipulation comes through a designated representative’s testimony, it is binding absent clear repudiation, especially in termination cases.

9. In re N.H., No. 02-22-00157-CV, 2022 WL 4374638 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 22, 2022, no pet.)

In N.H., a private provider under contract with DFPS testified that DFPS was not seeking termination as to one child, and the court of appeals held that the provider, in that context, “effectively served as the Department’s agent.” D.V. endorses that reasoning and finds this case even clearer, because here the statement came from DFPS’s formally designated Rule 267 representative.

10. In re I.L., 580 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, pet. dism’d), and In re J.M., 352 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.)

The court of appeals in D.V. relied on these cases to support its “totality of the circumstances” approach to interpreting stipulations and abandonment. Those cases note that courts may look at the language used, pleadings, allegations, and parties’ “attitudes” toward issues to decide whether a claim was abandoned.

The Supreme Court does not reject those cases outright. Instead, it:

• Assumes, for argument’s sake, that a totality-based approach may be appropriate in ordinary civil litigation; but
• Holds that such an approach is “inadequate—or at least incomplete—for parental-termination cases,” where unique constitutional and statutory protections require a more stringent rule.

11. In re A.L.R., 646 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. 2022)

In A.L.R., the Court held that a service plan labeling court-ordered requirements as “requested tasks” failed to give parents adequate notice of their mandatory nature and could not support termination. D.V. cites this to reinforce that precision in communicating the stakes to parents is critical. Likewise, a live pleading requesting termination serves a notice function—but when DFPS later abandons that relief in court, it must be taken seriously.

B. Core Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Termination Cases Are Not Just “Ordinary Civil Litigation”

The Court begins by emphasizing the uniqueness of termination proceedings:

• Parental rights are “of constitutional dimensions.” (Wiley)
• Termination encumbers interests “far more precious than any property right.” (E.R./Santosky)
• Evidence of grounds for termination must be clear and convincing. (Holick, Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b))
• Parents are entitled to appointed counsel in many termination cases. Tex. Fam. Code § 107.013(a).
• Appellate review is more protective in termination cases than in other civil appeals. (N.G.)

From these principles, the Court draws a key methodological conclusion: while civil procedure rules still apply, they must be implemented with heightened sensitivity. What might suffice as “context” or a “totality of circumstances” in a tort or contract case cannot override an explicit, unambiguous renunciation of a remedy in a termination case.

2. Abandonment of Claims at Trial and Stipulations

Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301, courts may grant judgment only on claims properly before them. A claim can be abandoned:

• Formally, under Rule 165, by amendment or recorded abandonment, or
• By stipulation or de facto narrowing of issues at trial, as recognized in Pathfinder and similar decisions.

D.V. reaffirms that a party cannot both:

• expressly stipulate that it is not seeking a particular type of relief; and
• later accept or defend a judgment awarding that very relief.

In this context, DFPS’s representative’s statement that “[t]he Department is seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]'s rights” and that it was “not seeking to terminate [Mother]’s rights” functioned as a stipulation taking termination off the table.

3. The Role and Authority of DFPS’s Designated Representative

DFPS argued, and the court of appeals agreed, that the abandonment was less clear because the statement came from the agency’s representative, not its lawyer. The Supreme Court rejects that distinction:

• DFPS had formally designated the caseworker as its representative under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 267 and Texas Rule of Evidence 614.
• The point of a designated representative is to provide a human “face and physical presence” for a non-natural party and to communicate the party’s positions in court.
• The representative was answering a direct question from DFPS’s own lawyer about “the Department’s recommendation,” not her personal opinion.

The Court explicitly limits its holding to termination cases and does not declare that a designated representative always “binds” the agency in every context. But in this specific setting—where:

• a fundamental right is at stake;
• the representative was properly designated;
• the statement was unequivocal; and
• counsel never corrected it—

that statement is treated as DFPS’s binding abandonment of termination.

The Court further underscores that if DFPS’s actual position differs from what its representative said, “counsel must alert the court and the parent to the real position to avoid being bound.”

4. Rejection of the “Totality of the Circumstances” Approach (as Applied Here)

The court of appeals had reasoned that in context—CASA and the attorney ad litem recommending termination, evidence supporting termination, and Mother’s lawyer asking the court not to terminate—DFPS’s statement should not be treated as an abandonment of termination.

The Supreme Court dismantles each component:

• CASA and attorney ad litem positions: What matters is whether DFPS seeks termination, not whether other participants think DFPS has met its burden or believe termination is in the child’s best interest.
• Evidence supporting termination: The same evidence could also support lesser relief, such as restricting Mother’s conservatorship and visitation without terminating rights. There is no requirement that DFPS’s evidence be tailored exclusively to one remedy.
• Mother’s counsel asking not to terminate: This is not inconsistent with DFPS’s abandonment. Counsel may have been reminding the court that termination was legally improper once DFPS withdrew its request. It would be perverse, the Court notes, to treat a party’s plea for the court to respect the abandonment as a basis to disregard the abandonment.

In short, the Court holds that none of these contextual factors can override an unequivocal, unrepudiated abandonment of termination by DFPS.

5. The Live Pleadings Do Not Save Termination

DFPS’s live petition continued to request termination. But the Court assigns this little weight:

• Without such a pleading, there would be nothing to abandon—so the pleading’s very presence is a necessary precondition for later abandonment, not a contradiction of it.
• The very same pleading still requested termination of Father’s rights, even though DFPS clearly and openly advocated at trial that Father be made sole managing conservator. Plainly, the live pleading did not reflect DFPS’s trial posture as to Father.

Given that dissonance, it is no “huge leap,” the Court says, to recognize that DFPS could also abandon its termination claim against Mother despite the stale language of the live petition.

The Court also notes the dual role of termination pleadings:

• They serve as critical notice to parents of the potential for permanent severance of their rights.
• They trigger other protections, such as the right to appointed counsel (Tex. Fam. Code § 107.013(a)).

But once DFPS concludes that termination is no longer warranted, the Court expects the agency to acknowledge that on the record, and to treat such abandonment as definitive absent speedy and explicit correction.

6. The New Rule: Effect of DFPS’s Unequivocal, Unrepudiated Statement

The Court states its holding in clear terms:

“We hold that an unequivocal assertion by the department—including its designated representative—that it does not seek termination constitutes withdrawal of a request for that relief unless clearly repudiated.”

Key elements of the rule:

• “Unequivocal” – the statement cannot be ambiguous or hedged.
• “Assertion by the department” – this includes statements made by the designated representative in response to questions about DFPS’s position.
• “Unless clearly repudiated” – DFPS can correct a misstatement, but only through prompt and clear repudiation on the record.

The Court stresses what “best practice” requires:

• Trial preparation should ensure that a misstatement of DFPS’s position does not occur in the first place; but
• If a misstatement does occur, “rapid correction … is indispensable, given the gravity of the proceedings.”

The Court does not fully define the temporal or substantive parameters of “clear repudiation”—it leaves for future cases what exactly suffices and how quickly the repudiation must occur. Here, there was no effort at correction at all, making the case straightforward under the newly articulated rule.

7. Remedy

Mother’s petition asked the Supreme Court to render judgment appointing her as a non-conservator (or alternatively, non-possessory conservator). This is exactly what DFPS’s representative had requested at trial.

Because:

• DFPS abandoned its termination request;
• The trial court had no authority to grant termination; and
• There was a clear, alternative remedy that DFPS affirmatively sought;

the Supreme Court does more than remand—it:

• Reverses the termination; and
• Renders judgment that Mother be appointed parent non-conservator (or non-possessory conservator), with further proceedings in the district court only as needed to implement this arrangement and resolve any remaining issues.

C. Impact and Implications

1. For DFPS and Government Litigation Practice

The opinion will likely have concrete operational consequences for DFPS:

• Training of caseworkers and trial staff: DFPS must ensure that designated representatives understand the legal consequences of stating DFPS’s position in open court. A mistaken statement that DFPS is no longer seeking termination—if not swiftly corrected—will bind the agency.
• Increased involvement of agency counsel: Lawyers must be vigilant. When a representative’s testimony misstates DFPS’s objectives, counsel must immediately clarify or repudiate that statement on the record—through redirect questioning, corrections, or closing argument.
• Deliberate use of abandonment: In some cases, DFPS may intentionally abandon termination after a parent’s progress or changed circumstances. D.V. encourages candid acknowledgment of such shifts, without fear that courts will treat abandonment as mere “context” and proceed to terminate anyway.

2. For Parents and Their Counsel

Parents’ attorneys gain a powerful procedural protection:

• Listening for abandonment: Counsel should carefully monitor DFPS’s on-the-record statements. If DFPS (or its representative) clearly disavows termination and never corrects that disavowal, counsel should:
  • object to any later attempt to argue for termination; and
  • preserve the issue for appeal if the court nevertheless terminates.
• Appellate strategy: As shown in D.V., even if other issues fail or are waived, a preserved argument that termination was unauthorized after DFPS abandoned the claim can be dispositive.

Parents themselves benefit because the decision:

• Reaffirms that their rights are the subject of special procedural protection, not simply one more civil law interest; and
• Ensures that they are not subject to termination when the State has formally backed away from seeking that extreme remedy.

3. For Trial Courts

Trial courts must now:

• Track carefully what forms of relief each party actually seeks by the close of evidence, not just what is in the live pleadings.
• Treat an unequivocal on-the-record withdrawal of termination by DFPS as binding unless DFPS clearly repudiates it.
• Refrain from “reviving” termination based on:
  • evidence capable of supporting termination,
  • therapy or CASA recommendations, or
  • the child’s attorney ad litem’s independent view,
  unless an actual party before the court has properly pleaded and pursued termination.

In practice, judges might:

• Engage in clarifying colloquies at the end of evidence: explicitly ask DFPS, on the record, “Does the Department still seek termination?” and ensure the answer is unmistakable.
• Encourage clear statements of requested relief during closing arguments and in pretrial orders.

4. For the Law of Civil Procedure More Broadly

Although the Court expressly “reserves” for another day the broader question of how abandonment and stipulations work in ordinary civil suits, D.V. provides a template:

• It confirms that formal pleadings are not the sole determinants of what relief can be awarded; real-time trial conduct and stipulations matter.
• It underscores that a party is bound by its own unequivocal statements of position in court, especially when uncorrected.

But the Court limits its holding to parental-termination cases; litigants should not assume an identical rule will automatically apply in commercial or tort settings. Nonetheless, D.V. will likely be cited in future procedural disputes about when and how claims are deemed abandoned at trial.

V. Key Legal Concepts Clarified

To make the opinion more accessible, several core concepts deserve brief, plain-language explanation.

1. Termination of Parental Rights

Termination permanently severs the legal relationship between a parent and child. The parent loses:

• the right to physical possession of the child,
• the right to make decisions about the child’s education, medical care, and upbringing,
• inheritance rights through the child (and vice versa), and
• other legal incidents of the parent–child relationship.

Because this remedy is irreversible and profoundly consequential, it is considered among the most drastic civil actions a court can take.

2. Managing Conservatorship and Non-Conservator / Non-Possessory Conservator

• A managing conservator is the person (often a parent) with primary legal authority over a child—decisions about health, education, residence, etc. A sole managing conservator holds those rights alone.
• A non-possessory conservator (sometimes referred to here as “parent non-conservator”) generally retains legal status as a parent but may have limited or no possession or access rights, and few if any decision-making powers.

In D.V., DFPS wanted Father as sole managing conservator and Mother to retain only the minimal legal status of a non-conservator parent, with no visitation and no contact—rather than complete termination of her rights.

3. Clear and Convincing Evidence

“Clear and convincing” evidence is a higher standard of proof than a “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not) but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (used in criminal cases).

In termination proceedings, this means the evidence must produce in the factfinder’s mind a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations supporting termination.

4. Live Pleadings

“Live pleadings” are the current operative court filings stating a party’s claims and requested relief at the time of trial. A petition that has been superseded by amendment is no longer “live”; the most recent version controls.

In D.V., DFPS’s live petition continued to request termination of both parents’ rights, even though its actual trial position was that Father should be permanent managing conservator and termination was not sought as to him—and, as it turned out, no longer sought as to Mother either.

5. Stipulations and Abandonment

• A stipulation is an agreement between parties about certain facts or issues, often made in court or in writing, to narrow what must be decided at trial.
• Abandonment of a claim occurs when a party, explicitly or effectively, no longer pursues that claim. Formally, this can occur by amending pleadings to remove a claim. Functionally, it can occur when a party’s in-court statements or stipulations show it no longer seeks a particular form of relief.

In D.V., DFPS’s representative’s testimony—elicited by DFPS’s own attorney and never corrected—served as a functional abandonment of the termination claim.

6. CASA and Attorney ad Litem

• A CASA (Court Appointed Special Advocate) is a trained volunteer appointed to advocate for the best interests of a child in court. CASA often provides recommendations but is not itself a party seeking relief (unless separately joined).
• An attorney ad litem is a lawyer appointed to represent the child’s legal interests, not DFPS’s or the parent’s. The attorney ad litem may support or oppose termination based on his or her assessment of the child’s best interest, but that does not itself create or sustain a termination claim unless combined with appropriate pleadings and party status.

In D.V., both CASA and the attorney ad litem favored termination, but DFPS (the party with the live termination claim) expressly disavowed seeking that relief. The Supreme Court held that CASA’s and the ad litem’s views could not resurrect termination once DFPS had abandoned it.

VI. Conclusion

D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services establishes a concrete procedural rule with deep constitutional resonance: in parental-termination cases, when DFPS, through its designated representative, clearly and unambiguously states on the record that it is not seeking termination, and that statement is not clearly and promptly repudiated, termination is off the table. A trial court that nonetheless terminates parental rights exceeds its authority.

The decision:

• Reaffirms the uniquely protected status of parental rights in Texas law, grounded in constitutional principles and long-standing precedent.
• Clarifies that termination proceedings cannot be governed solely by flexible “totality of the circumstances” analyses common in other civil contexts when fundamental rights are at stake.
• Confirms that DFPS’s own words in court carry binding consequences, especially when spoken by its designated representative and left uncorrected by counsel.
• Ensures that parents will not be stripped of their rights based on a remedy that the State has expressly, and on the record, renounced.

Going forward, D.V. will shape the conduct of DFPS, parent attorneys, and trial courts alike. It calls for precision, candor, and vigilance in the articulation of requested relief in termination cases and ensures that, when the State decides not to pursue the most drastic remedy, courts honor that decision and refrain from imposing termination anyway.