Abandonment of Dispositive Immigration Claims and the Distinct CAT “Acquiescence” Standard: Commentary on Chacon‑Brito v. Bondi

Abandonment of Dispositive Immigration Claims and the Distinct CAT “Acquiescence” Standard: Commentary on Chacon‑Brito v. Bondi

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Chacon‑Brito v. Bondi, No. 23‑7966 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 2025), though formally non‑precedential, is a pointed reminder of two recurring themes in immigration litigation:

  • The strict consequences of abandoning dispositive issues on petition for review by failing to brief them adequately; and
  • The doctrinally distinct standard for Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection, particularly the requirement of official “acquiescence,” as contrasted with the “unable or unwilling” standard for asylum and withholding of removal.

The case arises from an Ecuadorian mother, Ruth Lorena Chacon‑Brito, and her minor children, challenging a denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied all forms of protection; the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed; and the petitioners sought review in the Second Circuit.

The panel—Judges Carney, Sullivan, and Robinson—denied the petition, not because it squarely resolved complex questions of asylum, particular social group, or CAT law, but because the petitioners’ counsel failed to challenge the actual, dispositive grounds of the agency’s decision. In doing so, the court:

  • Applies longstanding rules about abandonment of unbriefed claims on appeal;
  • Reaffirms that the “one central reason” nexus standard applies to both asylum and withholding of removal (following Garcia‑Aranda v. Garland); and
  • Clarifies, in line with the regulations and a 2025 BIA decision (Matter of M‑S‑I‑), that CAT requires “acquiescence” by public officials, not merely proof that a government is “unable or unwilling” to control private actors.

In a notable coda, the court directs that a copy of the order be forwarded to its Grievance Panel, explicitly criticizing counsel’s brief for failing to address “multiple dispositive issues.” This elevates the decision from a routine denial to a cautionary document on professional responsibility and appellate practice in immigration cases.

II. Case Background and Procedural History

A. Parties

  • Petitioners: Ruth Lorena Chacon‑Brito and her minor children (C.A. M.-C. and A.V. M.-C.), natives and citizens of Ecuador.
  • Respondent: Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General (reflecting the then‑current holder of the office).
  • Counsel:
    • For Petitioners: Michael Borja, Esq., Borja Law Firm, P.C., Jackson Heights, NY.
    • For Respondent: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation.

B. Immigration Judge and BIA Decisions

The IJ (Ling, IJ) denied:

  • Asylum;
  • Withholding of removal; and
  • Protection under the CAT.

Key IJ findings (summarized from the Second Circuit’s description) included:

  1. Past harm did not rise to the level of persecution.
  2. No nexus between the harm (threats and demands for money) and any protected characteristic such as race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
  3. Failure to show state action: the Ecuadorian government was not shown to be “unable or unwilling” to protect her from the private individuals who threatened her and demanded money.
  4. For CAT, failure to show the requisite likelihood of torture with government acquiescence.

The BIA affirmed in a November 9, 2023 decision, apparently:

  • Agreeing that the harm did not amount to “persecution”;
  • Agreeing there was no adequate “nexus” to a protected ground;
  • Agreeing that the government’s alleged failure to protect did not meet the “unable or unwilling” threshold; and
  • Rejecting the CAT claim for failure to show both likely torture and acquiescence.
  • Notably, the BIA treated the proposed particular social group as cognizable, so PSG cognizability was not a ground for denial.

C. Petition for Review

On petition for review, the Second Circuit:

  • “Review[ed] the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA,” following Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005);
  • Applied substantial evidence review to factual findings, and de novo review to questions of law and the application of law to fact, citing Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018); and
  • Affirmed the denial of all forms of relief.

Crucially, the panel emphasizes that it denies the petition because the petitioner did not sufficiently challenge the dispositive grounds of the agency’s decision, not because it re‑evaluated and rejected those grounds on the merits.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

A. Asylum and Withholding of Removal

For asylum and withholding of removal, the court reiterates the well‑established requirements:

  • Past persecution or a well‑founded fear / likelihood of future persecution;
  • Persecution “on account of” a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion);
  • For both asylum and withholding, the protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the persecution, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) and Garcia‑Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 757 (2d Cir. 2022); and
  • The harm must be attributable to the government (directly or via private actors the government is unable or unwilling to control), citing Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 328 (2d Cir. 2020).

The court holds that:

  • Chacon‑Brito abandoned review of three core IJ/BIA findings:
    1. That her past harm did not rise to the level of persecution;
    2. That she failed to demonstrate the requisite nexus to a protected ground; and
    3. That she failed to show the Ecuadorian government was unable or unwilling to protect her from her persecutors.
  • These issues were not meaningfully briefed; mere passing or conclusory references were insufficient.
  • Under Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023), issues not adequately presented are deemed abandoned.
  • Her argument that the agency applied the wrong nexus standard for withholding (claiming that “one central reason” does not apply) is “misplaced,” because Garcia‑Aranda conclusively holds that the “one central reason” standard applies to both asylum and withholding of removal.

B. CAT Relief

For CAT, the court restates the governing law:

  • An applicant must show that it is “more likely than not” that she will be tortured, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); and
  • The torture must be inflicted “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).

The court rejects Chacon‑Brito’s legal contention that she need only show that the Ecuadorian government is “unable or unwilling” to protect her (i.e., the asylum/withholding standard), holding that this view is:

  • Contrary to the CAT regulations, which explicitly require public official “acquiescence”;
  • In tension with Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2020), where the court noted that the relationship between the “unable” prong in asylum/withholding and CAT acquiescence remains for the BIA to flesh out; and
  • Inconsistent with Matter of M‑S‑I‑, 29 I. & N. Dec. 61, 64 (B.I.A. 2025), which explicitly states that the “acquiescence” standard under CAT is distinct from the “unable or unwilling” standard.

The court adds that, apart from a conclusory statement, the petitioner did not substantively argue:

  • That torture is “more likely than not”; or
  • That an Ecuadorian public official would acquiesce in such torture.

Thus, the CAT claim is also treated as essentially abandoned, again invoking Debique and Garcia‑Aranda’s emphasis on the two‑step nature of CAT analysis (likelihood of torture + acquiescence).

C. Referral to the Grievance Panel

In a striking closing paragraph, the court:

  • Forwarded a copy of its order to the court’s Grievance Panel;
  • Noted that the brief filed by petitioners’ counsel “fails to address multiple dispositive issues, thereby dooming Chacon‑Brito’s appeal”; and
  • Explained that the brief “primarily argues that the proposed social group is cognizable,” an issue that was not even in dispute because “the agency deemed it cognizable.”

This explicit admonition underscores the court’s concern about the quality and professional adequacy of representation, especially in high‑stakes removal cases.

IV. Legal Analysis

A. Standards of Review and the Substantial Evidence Framework

The panel reiterates the familiar framework of judicial review of immigration decisions:

  • Scope of Review: When the BIA affirms the IJ and issues a brief decision, the court reviews the IJ’s decision “as supplemented by the BIA,” per Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005).
  • Factual Findings: Reviewed under the “substantial evidence” standard. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
  • Legal Questions and Mixed Questions: Questions of law and the application of law to fact are reviewed de novo, as noted in Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).

While the court does not deeply re‑engage with the underlying factual record (because of abandonment), the opinion is a reminder that, once substantial evidence deference applies and factual findings are not contested, those findings form an essentially immovable foundation for the panel’s review.

B. Abandonment of Issues on Petition for Review

The doctrinal centerpiece of the decision is abandonment (sometimes described as “waiver”) of claims due to inadequate briefing at the appellate level. The court relies on two key authorities:

  • Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023)
    The Second Circuit there stated: “We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant's brief, and an appellant's failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.” This sets a strict standard: silence or near‑silence in the brief is treated as a forfeiture of the issue.
  • Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005)
    In Yueqing Zhang, the court deemed a claim abandoned where the brief “devote[d] only a single conclusory sentence to” it. That standard is echoed here: a fleeting or conclusory reference does not preserve an issue for appellate review.

Applied to Chacon‑Brito’s case:

  • Her appellate brief effectively ignored or touched only in passing the central IJ/BIA findings that:
    1. She did not suffer “persecution” as a matter of law;
    2. She had no nexus between harm and a protected ground; and
    3. The Ecuadorian government was not shown to be “unable or unwilling” to protect her.
  • These findings are each independently dispositive of asylum and withholding. Even had she fully prevailed on her main argument about the validity of her particular social group, the unchallenged findings would still defeat relief.
  • Because she did not meaningfully challenge those findings, the court treats them as binding and unreviewed.

Thus, the panel’s denial of the petition is primarily procedural, not substantive: the appeal failed because counsel did not confront the actual grounds on which the agency denied relief.

C. Asylum and Withholding: Persecution, Nexus, and State Action

1. Persecution: “An Extreme Concept”

The Second Circuit cites Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011), for the proposition that “persecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” This reflects the court’s longstanding view that:

  • Not all serious harms rise to the level of “persecution”;
  • There is a threshold of severity—physical harm, significant threats, extreme economic deprivation, or similarly grave mistreatment.

The panel also relies on KC v. Garland, 108 F.4th 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2024), to re‑emphasize that:

“‘[U]nfulfilled threats alone’ rarely qualify as persecution. Instead, an applicant must show that the threat was ‘imminent or concrete’ or ‘so menacing as itself to cause actual suffering or harm.’”

In Chacon‑Brito’s case, the harm appears to have centered on threats and demands for money by private actors in Ecuador. The agency found these did not reach the persecution threshold, and because that finding was not meaningfully contested on appeal, it stands.

2. Nexus: “One Central Reason” for Both Asylum and Withholding

A key holding, reaffirmed in this case, is that the statutory “one central reason” standard:

  • Applies to both asylum and withholding of removal, per Garcia‑Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 757 (2d Cir. 2022); and
  • Requires the protected ground (e.g., membership in a particular social group) to be at least one central reason for the persecution—not merely incidental or subordinate.

Chacon‑Brito argued that the IJ and BIA applied the wrong legal standard to her withholding claim, apparently contending that the “one central reason” test should not apply to withholding. The panel rejects this, pointing unequivocally to Garcia‑Aranda.

Because the agency found no nexus even under the correct standard—and because that finding was not challenged—the nexus element fails as a matter of appellate procedure.

3. State Action: Government Unable or Unwilling to Control Private Actors

The court reiterates the rule from Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 328 (2d Cir. 2020):

“To qualify as persecution the conduct at issue must be attributable to the government, whether directly because engaged in by government officials, or indirectly because engaged in by private persons whom the government is unable or unwilling to control.”

This is the classic “unable or unwilling” test for asylum/withholding. In this case:

  • The IJ and BIA found that the Ecuadorian government was not shown to be unable or unwilling to protect Chacon‑Brito from the private threats and extortion she alleged.
  • On appeal, counsel’s references to this issue were only “passing” and insufficient to preserve the claim.

Again, the failure to challenge a dispositive element independently sustains the denial of relief.

D. CAT Protection: The Distinct “Acquiescence” Standard

1. Governing Regulations

Under the CAT regulations:

  • The applicant must show that it is “more likely than not” that she will be tortured, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); and
  • “Torture” must be:
    • “Inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); and
    • “Acquiescence” requires, under § 1208.18(a)(7), that the public official be aware of the activity and thereafter breach a legal responsibility to intervene (in substance).

2. Rejecting the “Unable or Unwilling” CAT Theory

Chacon‑Brito advanced a legal theory that the panel squarely rejects: that for CAT, she only had to show that the Ecuadorian government would be “unable or unwilling” to prevent private harm. The court responds:

  • This theory is “contrary to the regulations,” which explicitly demand a showing of consent or acquiescence by public officials.
  • The panel cites:
    • Scarlett, 957 F.3d at 336, where the Second Circuit left to the BIA on remand the task of determining “how the ‘unable’ prong of the unwilling‑or‑unable standard, as applicable to withholding claims, might translate to identifying government acquiescence in torture under the CAT.”
    • Matter of M‑S‑I‑, 29 I. & N. Dec. 61, 64 (B.I.A. 2025), which clarifies:
      “[T]he acquiescence standard for CAT protection differs from the unable-or-unwilling standard for asylum and withholding of removal; the potential for private actor violence coupled with a speculation that police cannot or will not help is insufficient to prove acquiescence.”

In short, CAT imposes a stricter, more specific form of state involvement than asylum or withholding. It is not enough that a government is ineffective or perceived as weak; there must be some level of official awareness and a legally significant failure to act.

3. Abandonment of the Substance of the CAT Claim

Beyond the legal standard, the court notes that Chacon‑Brito’s brief did not meaningfully argue:

  • That she is more likely than not to be subjected to torture; or
  • That Ecuadorian officials would consent to, instigate, or acquiesce in such torture.

With only a “conclusory statement without citation,” the panel treats the CAT claim as essentially abandoned, again invoking Debique and Garcia‑Aranda, which emphasize that CAT analysis is inherently two‑pronged (likelihood of torture + acquiescence).

E. Particular Social Group (PSG) Claims and Misplaced Appellate Focus

One of the more telling aspects of the order is the court’s criticism that the petitioner’s brief:

  • “Primarily argues that the proposed social group is cognizable,”
  • Even though “the agency deemed it cognizable,” meaning PSG cognizability was not an adverse finding and not a live issue on appeal.

This illustrates a common problem in appellate immigration practice:

  • Counsel must target arguments to the adverse holdings in the BIA decision; re‑litigating or defending portions the applicant actually won is, at best, irrelevant and, at worst, fatal when it crowds out briefing on dispositive issues.
  • Even if the PSG issue were complex or interesting doctrinally, it is legally immaterial if the IJ/BIA accepted the PSG and denied on other grounds (e.g., lack of nexus, lack of persecution, state protection).

In effect, the court is saying: Even if we fully agreed with you on your best-developed argument, you would still lose because you never challenged the actual reasons you lost below.

F. Professional Responsibility: Referral to the Grievance Panel

The order’s concluding reference to the court’s Grievance Panel is rare and significant:

  • Forwarding the order to the Grievance Panel signals concern that counsel’s performance may not meet professional standards expected of members of the appellate bar.
  • The specific criticism—that counsel failed to address “multiple dispositive issues” and instead argued non‑dispositive points—suggests a possible failure of competence in representing a client in life‑altering litigation.

For practitioners, this is a strong warning:

  • Read the IJ and BIA decisions carefully. Identify all independent bases for denial.
  • Address each dispositive issue with legal and factual argument. Silence, or a single conclusory sentence, will generally be treated as abandonment.
  • Do not spend the bulk of an appellate brief on issues that the client actually won below. Doing so not only wastes limited word count but may prompt professional scrutiny.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited: Their Role in the Decision

The panel relies on a constellation of prior cases and regulations. Each plays a targeted role:

A. Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2005)

Cited for the proposition that the court reviews the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA when the BIA issues a relatively brief affirmance. This defines the scope of the administrative record under review.

B. Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2018)

Cited for the standard of review: factual findings under the substantial evidence standard; legal questions and mixed questions reviewed de novo.

C. Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011)

Provides the characterization of persecution as “an extreme concept,” limiting what harms qualify as persecution. It supports the IJ/BIA’s restrictive view of threats and extortion absent other aggravating factors.

D. KC v. Garland, 108 F.4th 130 (2d Cir. 2024)

Establishes that unfulfilled threats, absent imminence or concrete menacing quality, usually do not amount to persecution. This underpins the agency’s and court’s skepticism that the threats in this case rise to persecution.

E. Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2014)

Cited for the principle that when a claim is based on a particular social group, the applicant must establish both:

  • That the proposed PSG is “cognizable” (i.e., meets the requirements of immutability, particularity, and social distinction); and
  • That the persecution is motivated by membership in that group.

In Chacon‑Brito’s case, the PSG itself was accepted as cognizable, but the nexus prong was unchallenged and thus fatal.

F. Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2020)

Cited for two propositions:

  • The asylum/withholding rule that persecution must be attributable to the government, either directly or because the government is unable or unwilling to control private actors.
  • The recognition that how the “unable” prong relates to CAT’s “acquiescence” requirement is a matter the BIA has room to address; this contextualizes the court’s reliance on Matter of M‑S‑I‑ for that very point.

G. Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023)

Core abandonment case: issues not adequately argued in a brief are deemed abandoned. This doctrine is applied aggressively here to both asylum/withholding and CAT issues.

H. Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2005)

Recognizes that a single conclusory sentence is insufficient to preserve a claim. Used here to classify certain arguments as effectively abandoned.

I. Garcia‑Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752 (2d Cir. 2022)

Important on two fronts:

  • Confirms that the “one central reason” nexus requirement applies to both asylum and withholding.
  • Clarifies that CAT analysis is a two‑step inquiry: (1) likelihood of torture and (2) government acquiescence, both of which must be satisfied.

J. Matter of M‑S‑I‑, 29 I. & N. Dec. 61 (B.I.A. 2025)

A relatively new (in the opinion’s timeline) BIA precedential decision, cited to underscore:

  • The difference between CAT’s acquiescence standard and the “unable or unwilling” test for asylum/withholding; and
  • The insufficiency of mere speculation that police cannot or will not help, coupled with private violence, to prove acquiescence.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Asylum vs. Withholding of Removal
  • Asylum: Discretionary relief that can lead to lawful permanent residence. Requires a well‑founded fear of persecution, where a protected ground is at least one central reason for that persecution.
  • Withholding of removal: Mandatory relief if the person shows it is more likely than not that they will be persecuted on account of a protected ground. Harder to win (higher probability), but once eligibility is established, the government must withhold removal to that country. Under Second Circuit law, the same “one central reason” nexus standard also applies.
2. Convention Against Torture (CAT) Protection
  • Separate from asylum/withholding; no protected ground is required.
  • The applicant must show:
    1. It is more likely than not they will be subjected to torture if removed; and
    2. The torture would be inflicted by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.
  • “Acquiescence” means the authorities know (or should know) about the likely torture and then breach their duty to intervene.
3. “Persecution”
  • A severe level of harm—more than harassment or general danger.
  • Often involves serious physical harm, death threats with real likelihood of being carried out, sexual violence, or severe economic harm.
  • Unfulfilled threats usually do not qualify unless they are extremely menacing and cause real suffering.
4. “Nexus” and “One Central Reason”
  • “Nexus” means the reason why the persecutor targets the applicant.
  • For asylum and withholding, a protected ground must be at least one central reason—the persecutor’s motive cannot be purely financial or personal if the claim rests on, for example, political opinion or social group membership.
5. “Unable or Unwilling” vs. “Acquiescence”
  • Unable or unwilling (asylum/withholding): The government either cannot control the persecutors or deliberately chooses not to help, thereby making private harm attributable to the state.
  • Acquiescence (CAT): A stricter concept—requires some level of awareness + failure to act that amounts to tacit approval or at least indifferent tolerance of torture.
  • Chacon‑Brito’s error was to argue that the “unable or unwilling” standard sufficed for CAT, which the court rightly rejects.
6. “Particular Social Group” (PSG)
  • A PSG is one of the five protected grounds in asylum/withholding law.
  • It must usually have:
    1. Immutability (the characteristic is innate or fundamental);
    2. Particularity (clear boundaries—who is in, who is out); and
    3. Social distinction (society recognizes the group as distinct).
  • In this case, the PSG was accepted as cognizable; the problem lay elsewhere (persecution, nexus, state protection).
7. Abandonment/Waiver on Appeal
  • If a petitioner does not make a developed legal and factual argument on an issue in their appellate brief, the court treats that issue as abandoned.
  • Even a sentence or two may be insufficient if they are merely conclusory and not supported by reasoning or citation.
  • Once an issue is abandoned, the court normally will not consider it, even if it might be meritorious.

VII. Impact and Future Implications

A. Formal Non‑Precedential Status vs. Practical Influence

The order is expressly labeled a “SUMMARY ORDER” with “no precedential effect.” Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, it may be cited, but it does not bind future panels like a published opinion.

Nevertheless, its:

  • Clear restatement of abandonment doctrine;
  • Firm rejection of an “unable or unwilling” CAT standard; and
  • Explicit reliance on Matter of M‑S‑I‑ and Garcia‑Aranda

make it a strong persuasive authority in future litigation, especially where similar briefing deficiencies or CAT arguments arise.

B. Reinforcing Garcia‑Aranda on the “One Central Reason” Standard

By relying on Garcia‑Aranda and rejecting the argument that the “one central reason” standard does not apply to withholding, the court solidifies that holding’s position in Second Circuit law. Practitioners must now assume that:

  • In both asylum and withholding contexts, they must:
    • Identify a protected ground;
    • Show that this ground is one central reason for the harm; and
    • Defeat any arguments that the harm is purely criminal, financial, or personal in motive.

C. Clarifying the CAT Standard with the Help of Matter of M‑S‑I‑

By invoking Matter of M‑S‑I‑, the court signals agreement with the BIA’s formal differentiation between:

  • Asylum/withholding’s “unable or unwilling” test; and
  • CAT’s “acquiescence” requirement.

This will likely:

  • Encourage IJs and the BIA to treat CAT claims as doctrinally distinct rather than an afterthought to asylum/withholding claims;
  • Require more precise CAT evidence focused on official awareness, consent, or deliberate non‑intervention; and
  • Make it more difficult to bootstrap a failed “unable or unwilling” claim into a CAT claim without additional, targeted evidence of state involvement in torture.

D. Raising the Bar for Appellate Immigration Practice

The referral of counsel to the Grievance Panel is likely to have an outsized effect on immigration practice in the Second Circuit:

  • It signals that poorly constructed briefs, especially in life‑or‑death cases, may have professional consequences.
  • It underscores that the court expects:
    • Full engagement with each adverse ground of the agency’s decision;
    • Accurate statement of existing law (e.g., not mischaracterizing CAT standards); and
    • Prioritization of issues that can actually change the outcome.

For noncitizens, this underscores the stakes of effective legal representation on appeal; for practitioners, it serves as a cautionary tale.

VIII. Conclusion

Chacon‑Brito v. Bondi may be a summary order without formal precedential effect, but it is a sharp and instructive document in several respects.

First, it illustrates—in a stark, outcome‑determinative way—the doctrine of abandonment of issues on appeal. Because petitioner’s counsel did not address the IJ/BIA’s findings on:

  • Whether the harm rose to “persecution,”
  • Nexus to a protected ground,
  • The government’s inability or unwillingness to control private actors, and
  • The two essential prongs of CAT (likelihood of torture and acquiescence),

the court treated those issues as abandoned and denied the petition on that procedural basis. This reinforces that immigration appeals are won—or lost—based on targeted, issue‑specific briefing.

Second, the decision reaffirms and operationalizes two important substantive points:

  • The “one central reason” nexus standard applies to both asylum and withholding of removal, following Garcia‑Aranda.
  • The CAT standard of “acquiescence” is distinct from, and stricter than, the asylum/withholding “unable or unwilling” standard, as reflected in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18 and Matter of M‑S‑I‑.

Finally, the referral to the Grievance Panel highlights the court’s concern for the quality and integrity of advocacy in immigration cases. It sends a message to the bar: appellate work must be precise, focused on dispositive issues, and faithful to governing law—especially when the stakes include possible persecution or torture upon removal.

In the broader legal landscape, Chacon‑Brito stands as:

  • A cautionary lesson in appellate practice and professional responsibility;
  • A reaffirmation of the doctrinal lines between asylum/withholding and CAT protection; and
  • A reminder that, even in non‑precedential orders, the courts continue to refine and reinforce key principles governing protection for noncitizens under U.S. immigration law.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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