A Bifurcated Test for “Cruel or Unusual”: Wyoming Supreme Court Clarifies Article 1, § 14 and Declines Categorical Protections for Emerging Adults

A Bifurcated Test for “Cruel or Unusual”: Wyoming Supreme Court Clarifies Article 1, § 14 and Declines Categorical Protections for Emerging Adults

Introduction

In Christopher Robert Hicks v. The State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 113 (Wyo. Oct. 21, 2025), the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a Rule 35(a) motion to correct alleged illegal sentences. Hicks, who was 19 at the time of two murders committed in 2005, was sentenced in 2006 to three consecutive life-without-parole (LWOP) terms—two from a jury’s rejection of the death penalty for the homicide of a 15-year-old victim (BC), and one from the district court for conspiracy in the killing of a roommate (Forquer).

In 2024, Hicks sought relief arguing: (1) mandatory LWOP for “emerging adults” (late adolescents) is categorically unconstitutional under the Wyoming Constitution and the Eighth Amendment; (2) Wyoming’s sentencing statutes violate the state constitution, particularly Article 1, §§ 14, 15, and 16; (3) his sentences violate state equal protection; and (4) he is entitled, at minimum, to a new sentencing hearing that fully considered youthfulness as a mitigating factor.

The Court resolved threshold justiciability defenses, then issued a sweeping merits decision. Most notably, it announced a Wyoming-specific, bifurcated test under Article 1, § 14 for “cruel or unusual” punishment, declined to extend juvenile-specific federal protections categorically to “emerging adults,” reaffirmed the heavy standard for facial constitutional challenges to statutes, and clarified the scope of Article 1, § 15’s “reformation and prevention” mandate. The ruling has broad implications for future sentencing challenges, state constitutional methodology, and the use of neuroscience and social science in constitutional litigation.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Threshold holdings:
    • Res judicata did not bar Hicks’s claims; the Court exercised discretion to reach the merits, as in Nicodemus v. State.
    • Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act notice (Wyo. Stat. § 1-37-113) does not apply to a Rule 35(a) motion; subject-matter jurisdiction existed.
  • Wyoming Constitution v. Eighth Amendment:
    • The Wyoming Constitution is textually distinct and can provide different protections. But Article 1, §§ 14, 15, and 16 do not establish categorical sentencing protections for “emerging adults.”
    • The Court declined to adopt the federal “evolving standards of decency” framework for state Article 1, § 14 review.
    • New state-law test: Article 1, § 14’s disjunctive “cruel or unusual” requires a bifurcated analysis:
      • Cruel: a punishment is cruel if it is so grossly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the people.
      • Unusual: a punishment is unusual if it is obsolete or contravenes contemporary standards as measured by a clear consensus of state legislatures or courts.
  • Article 1, § 15 (reformation and prevention):
    • Applies to the “penal code” (legislative design), not judicial sentencing discretion; “reformation” does not require release or reentry.
    • Hicks failed to show the relevant statutes are unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt under § 15.
  • Eighth Amendment:
    • No violation; Roper/Graham/Miller protect juveniles under 18. Hicks was 19.
  • Equal protection:
    • No violation. The statute creates two classes (under 18 and 18+). “Emerging adults” is not a statutory class; juveniles and 19-year-olds are not similarly situated under Wyoming law.
  • Remedy:
    • No resentencing; the sentences are constitutional.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012):
    • Roper bars the death penalty for those under 18 at the time of offense; Graham bars LWOP for juveniles in nonhomicide cases; Miller bars mandatory LWOP for juveniles even in homicide cases.
    • These cases hinge on juveniles being “constitutionally different.” Wyoming applied Miller to juveniles in Bear Cloud v. State (2013; 2014).
    • But the Court emphasized Miller drew a “clear line at age eighteen,” and did not reach 18–20-year-olds—echoing Nicodemus v. State, 2017 WY 34.
  • Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18; Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113:
    • Wyoming adopted individualized sentencing for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder consistent with Miller and addressed parole-eligibility structures for juveniles.
    • In Bear Cloud III (2014), the Court rejected an argument that accomplice-liability status alone warranted extra protection; that analysis undermines Hicks’s attempt to minimize culpability as a nonprincipal actor.
  • Nicodemus v. State, 2017 WY 34:
    • Held that Miller’s juvenile-specific protections do not extend to an 18-year-old; provided a template to entertain post-Miller challenges without res judicata barring review.
  • Norgaard v. State, 2014 WY 157; Fisher v. McDaniel, 64 P. 1056 (Wyo. 1901); In re McDonald, 33 P. 18 (Wyo. 1893):
    • Longstanding Wyoming precedents that shaped proportionality-based review and the meaning of “cruel or unusual.”
    • These decisions foreshadow the Court’s modern separation of “cruel” and “unusual” and its reliance on objective criteria and societal consensus.
  • Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958):
    • Solem supplied the three-factor proportionality framework used in Eighth Amendment analysis; Wyoming historically referenced Solem in state § 14 cases.
    • The Court now adjusts its state analysis to honor the disjunctive text of § 14, while still drawing on the objective-comparative insight of Solem for “unusualness.”
    • Gregg’s emphasis on objective indicia informs Wyoming’s approach to “unusual” punishments based on clear state consensus.
  • Greenwalt v. Ram Restaurant Corp., 2003 WY 77; Hageman v. Goshen Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2011 WY 91:
    • Set out Wyoming’s equal protection framework: identify the classification, the objective, and the rational relationship (or strict scrutiny if fundamental rights/suspect class).
  • Castle v. State, 842 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 1992):
    • Reinforces that § 15 does not require that punishment permit reentry; “reformation” does not equate to guaranteed release.

Legal Reasoning

1) Threshold Issues: Res Judicata and UDJA Notice

The State’s res judicata defense failed. Although Hicks could have raised constitutional arguments earlier, the Court, relying on Nicodemus, exercised discretion to reach the merits in light of post-sentencing developments (Roper/Graham/Miller and evolving state constitutional arguments).

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act notice requirement (Wyo. Stat. § 1-37-113) does not apply to a Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. Post-conviction is a continuation of the criminal case, and the Attorney General was already a party. The Court retained subject-matter jurisdiction.

2) No Categorical Protection for “Emerging Adults” Under Wyoming Constitution

Hicks urged a composite reading of Article 1, §§ 14, 15, and 16 as embodying a “humanitarian theory of punishment” that would bar mandatory LWOP for emerging adults. The Court rejected that claim for multiple, reinforcing reasons:

  • Textual focus:
    • Article 1, § 16 addresses conditions of confinement (jail/prison rigor and humane treatment), not sentencing length; it does not support a categorical sentencing rule.
    • Article 1, § 15 binds the Legislature to frame the penal code on “reformation and prevention,” but does not regulate judicial sentencing discretion and does not require release to satisfy “reformation.”
    • Article 1, § 14 is disjunctive (“cruel or unusual”), which must be given independent effect and does not itself articulate a bright-line age rule beyond the constitutional majority.
    • Article 3, § 53 expressly authorizes the Legislature to create LWOP penalties for specified crimes, insulating them from executive commutation—text that weighs against a categorical bar.
  • Historical and structural context:
    • Wyoming’s territorial statutes included mandatory penalties for murder and set ages of culpability; this “pre-existing state law” factor strongly disfavors Hicks’s theory.
    • Wyoming’s Constitution sets varying age benchmarks for civic roles but not for criminal culpability; nothing in the constitutional text supports an 18–21 carveout.
    • Laramie County’s “humanitarian theory” language arose in a tax-dispute context and does not control modern criminal-sentencing doctrine.

3) The Saldana Framework: When Wyoming Rights Can Exceed Federal Baselines

Working through Justice Golden’s six Saldana factors, the Court acknowledged that Wyoming’s Constitution can, in some contexts, provide broader protection than the Eighth Amendment, but it declined to extend categorical protection to “emerging adults.”

  • Text, differences in text, and structural differences:
    • Section 14’s “cruel or unusual” is disjunctive (distinct from the Eighth Amendment), and § 15’s “reformation and prevention” has no federal analog. But these textual differences do not compel an age-based categorical rule beyond Miller.
  • Constitutional history:
    • No ambiguity warranted resort to convention debates; thus this factor was not applied.
  • Pre-existing state law:
    • Wyoming’s territorial code embraced mandatory punishments and age-based culpability—cutting against Hicks’s theory.
  • Matters of particular state or local concern:
    • Sentencing is a state prerogative. Although this factor supports state-level tailoring, it does not itself substantiate Hicks’s categorical claim.

4) Article 1, § 15 (Reformation and Prevention): No Facial Invalidity of LWOP Statutes

Hicks challenged Wyo. Stat. §§ 6-2-101(b) (first-degree murder penalty), 6-1-201(b)(iii) (accessory-before-the-fact), and 6-10-301 (LWOP provisions) as violating § 15’s “reformation and prevention” directive. The Court:

  • Reaffirmed the standard of review: Statutes are presumed constitutional; an appellant must “clearly and exactly show the unconstitutionality beyond any reasonable doubt.”
  • Grounded that standard historically (Swan v. United States (Wyo. Terr. 1886); Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations; Thayer’s scholarship; early Wyoming cases) and declined to abandon it.
  • Held “reformation” means changing the offender’s character and does not require eventual release or parole; thus LWOP can coexist with § 15’s goals.
  • Emphasized Article 3, § 53 authorizes LWOP; absent a showing that the statutory scheme fails the dual aims of § 15, the challenge fails.

5) Article 1, § 14 (Cruel or Unusual): Wyoming Adopts a Bifurcated Test

Rejecting importation of the federal “evolving standards of decency” approach into state constitutional law, the Court crafted a Wyoming-specific test faithful to § 14’s disjunctive text:

  • Cruel: A punishment is cruel if it is so grossly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the people. The Court first weighs the gravity of the offense against the harshness of the penalty; only if gross disproportionality appears does it assess whether the punishment shocks the conscience.
  • Unusual: A punishment is unusual if it is obsolete or contravenes contemporary standards as measured by a clear consensus of state legislatures or courts. Mere uniqueness is insufficient; litigants must provide accurate, comprehensive, and current interjurisdictional data.

Applying the new test, Hicks’s sentences were neither cruel nor unusual:

  • Cruel: LWOP is severe but not grossly disproportionate to two murders (one a juvenile victim) and related conspiracies. The Court rejected minimizing culpability as a nonprincipal actor and refused to compare sentence harshness to the offender’s age-based remaining life expectancy.
  • Unusual: Hicks’s comparative showing was incomplete and inconsistent (reliance on noncomprehensive snapshots from other courts, including counts that miscategorized Wyoming). Even those sources showed many states authorize LWOP (mandatory or discretionary) for first-degree murder. No clear contrary consensus exists, and emerging-adult protection is not shown to be a national trend.

6) Eighth Amendment

Hicks’s federal claim was perfunctory and failed on the merits: Roper, Graham, and Miller protect juveniles under 18. Hicks was 19; there is no U.S. Supreme Court precedent extending those categorical rules to “emerging adults.”

7) Equal Protection (Wyoming Constitution)

Hicks argued that 19-year-olds are similarly situated to juveniles and that Wyoming’s first-degree murder statute, as amended post-Miller, unlawfully discriminates by giving juveniles parole eligibility and adults LWOP. The Court held:

  • The statute creates two facial classes (under 18; 18+). “Emerging adults” is not a statutory class and was not shown to be a de facto targeted class in application.
  • Juveniles and adults are not similarly situated under Wyoming law (separate juvenile code; legislative bright-line at 18; post-Miller amendments tracked the juvenile line).
  • Because the threshold “similarly situated” requirement failed and no suspect class or fundamental right was implicated, the claim failed without reaching strict scrutiny; the statutory age line at 18 is rational.

8) No New Sentencing Hearing

Hicks already received individualized sentencing proceedings in 2006 and, because his sentences are constitutional under Wyoming and federal law, no resentencing was warranted.

Impact

  • New test controlling all future state “cruel or unusual” challenges:
    • Litigants must frame Article 1, § 14 arguments in two distinct lanes—cruel (gross disproportionality that shocks the moral sense) or unusual (obsolescence or clear national consensus against the punishment).
    • For “unusual,” comprehensive, accurate 50-state (plus federal) surveys are essential. Partial or dated counts will be discounted.
  • Wyoming declines to constitutionalize “emerging adult” sentencing:
    • Claims for 18–20-year-olds will not receive categorical relief under the Wyoming Constitution absent legislative action or a demonstrable clear national consensus.
    • Scientific and sociological evidence regarding brain development may be relevant to individualized mitigation, but it is not the metric for “unusualness” under § 14 and does not convert “reformation” into a release mandate under § 15.
  • State constitutional method clarified:
    • Article 1, § 16 is about conditions of confinement, not sentence length.
    • Article 1, § 15’s “reformation and prevention” constrains legislative design of the penal code but does not prohibit LWOP nor require parole eligibility.
    • The “unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt” standard remains the bedrock for facial attacks on statutes in Wyoming.
  • Equal protection path narrowed for age-based sentencing challenges:
    • Absent a statutory classification targeting “emerging adults” or proof of discriminatory application, equal protection claims will falter at the “similarly situated” gate.
  • Rule 35 practice:
    • UDJA notice is not a jurisdictional hurdle for Rule 35(a) motions. The Attorney General’s participation as the State suffices.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a):
    • Allows a court to correct an illegal sentence “at any time.” A sentence is “illegal” if it exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple punishments for the same offense, or violates the constitution or law. Denials are reviewed de novo on appeal.
  • “Life Without Parole” (LWOP):
    • A sentence of life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole. Under Wyoming’s Constitution (Art. 3, § 53), the Legislature may create LWOP penalties for specified crimes.
  • Saldana factors:
    • Six nonexclusive criteria used to assess whether the Wyoming Constitution provides broader protection than the federal Constitution: text; textual differences; constitutional history; pre-existing state law; structural differences; and matters of particular state/local concern.
  • “Evolving standards of decency”:
    • A federal Eighth Amendment doctrine (Trop v. Dulles; Gregg) assessing punishments against contemporary societal values. Wyoming declined to adopt this as the state-law test under § 14, opting instead for a bifurcated “cruel” or “unusual” analysis grounded in proportionality and objective interjurisdictional consensus.
  • “Reformation” vs. “Rehabilitation”:
    • Wyoming’s § 15 uses “reformation,” meaning change in character toward the good. It does not require release or parole, and differs from the federal discussion of “rehabilitation” in cases like Graham.
  • Equal protection—“similarly situated”:
    • A threshold requirement: the claimant must show the statute treats similarly situated persons differently. Under Wyoming law, juveniles and adults are not similarly situated because the Legislature has created a separate juvenile code and fixed the line at 18.

Conclusion

Hicks establishes several consequential rules of Wyoming constitutional law. Most prominently, it inaugurates a bifurcated analysis for Article 1, § 14, giving independent force to the state constitution’s disjunctive phrasing. “Cruel” turns on gross disproportionality that shocks the moral sense; “unusual” turns on obsolescence or a clear, objective consensus in other jurisdictions. The Court declines to import the federal “evolving standards of decency” test into state § 14 analysis and refuses to recognize “emerging adults” as a categorically protected class under the Wyoming Constitution.

The opinion also clarifies that Article 1, § 15’s “reformation and prevention” mandate governs legislative design of the penal code and does not forbid LWOP or make release a constitutional requirement. It reaffirms the long-standing presumption of constitutionality and “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden for facial statutory challenges. On equal protection, it underscores the necessity of a statutory classification and the “similarly situated” prerequisite—both missing in Hicks’s claim.

Practically, defense counsel mounting state constitutional sentencing challenges must now:

  • Choose the correct lane under § 14 (cruel or unusual) and tailor proof accordingly.
  • For “unusual,” present rigorous, up-to-date, and comprehensive 50-jurisdiction surveys and controlling case law.
  • For § 15 attacks, focus on statutory purpose and demonstrate why the challenged scheme fails “reformation and prevention,” recognizing that “reformation” does not equate to parole.

Hicks leaves intact the juvenile-specific protections of Miller and Bear Cloud, but it firmly signals that any expansion to 18–20-year-olds is a legislative, not judicial, project—absent a demonstrable national consensus or a showing of gross disproportionality in a particular case. The decision thus both clarifies and constrains the path for future state constitutional sentencing challenges in Wyoming.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming

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